EJÉRCITO DE CHILE: 2300AD

 

 

Introduction

Long considered by many to live in the shadow of Argentina, the nation of Chile has managed to retain a good measure of independence in its military affairs despite the diplomatic dominance of its larger eastern neighbor.  The Chilean army, circa 2300, is regarded by many as possibly the third most capable military organization, behind Argentina and Brazil, on the South American continent, at least in terms of conventional operations.  Chile’s hypothetical role in a 4th Rio Plata War, as well as its possible independent resort to armed force to regain lost territory from Bolivia, makes it subject to a good deal of speculation on the part of international observers. 

 

Index

Order of Battle

Current Defense and Regional Security Issues

Organization

Divisions and Selected Non-Divisional Units

Culture

Equipment

Notes

 

Acknowledgements

Thanks to the members of the Etranger discussion group for their commentary and feedback on Chile, in particular, and South American 2300AD militaria in general as well.  Special thanks should be extended to David Gillon and Dan Hebditch for assorted suggestions and review of this write up.

 

Order of Battle

 

Cuartel General de Ejército

Brigada de Fuerzas Especiales

6ta Brigada de Artillería Pesada

9na Brigada de Artillería Pesada de Reserva

 

I Cuerpo

Ira División Blindado

IIda Divisíon Mecanizado

IVta Divisíon Mecanizado

Grupo de Caballería Aero-Blindada N°3 "Húsares"

Grupo de Caballería Aero-Blindada N°6 "Dragones"

8va Brigada de Artillería de Cuerpo

1ra Brigada Independente de Reserva

3er Brigada Independente de Reserva

 

II Cuerpo

IIIer Divisíon Ligero

Vta Divisíon Ligero

Grupo de Caballeria Blindada N°7 "Guías"

7ma Brigada de Artillería de Cuerpo

2da Brigada Independente de Reserva

4ta Brigada Independente de Reserva

 

 INDEX

Current Defense and Regional Security Issues

 

Argentina
 

Chile has long been an ally of Argentina in the bilateral division of South America into Argentinean and Brazilian spheres of influence, though this Chilean-Argentinean diplomatic and economic alliance has not always translated into common military operations or objectives.  On those occasions when it has, the experience has not been without cost for Chile, though the current generation of leadership on both sides of the border has done much fence mending from earlier strains.

 

Chile participated significantly in the 1st Rio Plata War, contributing an expeditionary corps to the main Argentinean effort while simultaneously conducting a limited offensive against Bolivia, Brazil’s ally at the time.  The disastrous end of the war for Argentina spilled over into Chilean territory, with Brazilian forces transiting Bolivia and invading the northern portion of Chile before the war’s end.  This territory, centered on the port of Arica, was eventually transferred to Bolivian control (which has subsequently maintained it by defecting to an uneasy membership in the Argentinean sphere).  The loss remains a nagging wound to the Chilean national psyche to this day, and soured relations with Argentina for two generations, precluding Chilean support in either the 2nd or 3rd Rio Plata Wars.

 

The last 30 years have seen something of a renaissance in relations between the two nations, however, with significant efforts by Argentina to bring Chile firmly back into its military coalition.  With the Brazilian-Argentinean rivalry anything but settled, Argentina is keenly aware that a fourth round of fighting is likely in the future, and Chilean military assistance is highly valued in Buenos Aires.

 

The situation is still not without significant complications, most notably the issue of the Arica Strip.  Both Chile and Bolivia are ostensibly Argentinean allies at present, but this has done nothing to diminish Chile’s irredentist claim to lost territory, or Bolivia’s military focus on retaining the Arica Strip.

 

Bolivia
 

While most foreign observers of South American militaries concern themselves with how Chilean forces would stack up against those of Brazil, Chilean military thinking is, itself, much more concerned with the idea of war against Bolivia.  Though the loss of the Arica Strip occurred a century ago, it remains a hugely volatile issue in Chilean politics.  As recently as 2287, comments interpreted as favoring normalization of relations with Bolivia were sufficient to derail the presidential aspirations of an otherwise extremely popular candidate.

 

Chilean and Bolivian forces along the Pacific coast have been staring at one another for generations across a border that recreates a less affluent rendition of the heavily fortified Argentinean-Brazilian frontier.  Occasional violent confrontations and other incidents keep the region unsettled, and brinkmanship (especially on the part of Chile) has nearly brought the region to war several times over the course of the century.  The situation is significantly complicated by Bolivia’s current alliance with Argentina and consequent Argentinean diplomatic pressure to keep Chile in check.  Given that Bolivia’s alliance with Argentina also serves to keep Incan Republic indigenous revivalism on a relatively short leash along its northern border, it is likely that Chile would be more likely to upset this situation by acting unilaterally rather than Bolivian defection to the Brazilian camp provoking it (as this would open Bolivia to both Incan and Chilean military ambitions).  Some have speculated that Chile plans to quickly reconquer the Strip during a 4th Rio Plata War, while simultaneously supporting Argentina and presenting their more powerful ally with a fait accompli.

 

If war were to occur, it likely would see a quick strike by Chilean armored and mechanized forces aimed at cutting off the Arica Strip from the Bolivian altiplano, followed by the deployment of lighter forces to begin deliberate reduction of the Arica garrison.  Most observers suspect that the Chilean military has the capability to successfully carry out such a campaign.  Less certain is what Argentina’s response would be.

 

Brazil
 

Next to Bolivia, Brazil is the nation Chilean forces are most likely to find themselves in combat against.  While Chileans for the most part do not see Argentina’s perennial struggle with Brazil as being their struggle as well by association, they do hold Brazil responsible for the loss of the Arica Strip after the 1st Rio Plata War.  While Brazil is blamed for the loss, however, most Chileans look to the idea of directly redressing the loss through action against Bolivia.

 

This should not be taken to imply that Chilean participation in a 4th Rio Plata War against Brazil is unlikely, as most observers consider the contribution of some sort of Chilean expeditionary force in such a scenario as highly likely.

 

Inca Republic
 

Though Chilean military personnel serve on the Inca-Brazilian frontier in Argentinean sponsored military units like the Grupo de Aviación Voluntario de Antisuyu, this should not be taken to imply any particular warmth directly between the Incan and Chilean governments, however.  With a generally (and unapologetically) European-derived culture and a national ethnic mix that includes almost no “authentic” (i.e. non-mestizo) indigenous peoples, Chile is, by definition, an affront to true believers of the Incan Republic’s dogma and ideology.  Conversely, Chile has a very proud tradition of political democracy, an independent judiciary, respect for human rights and the other trappings of the Western liberal democratic tradition.  The situation within the Inca Republic is every bit as inimical to Chilean ideals as Chile is to Incan ideals, with most Chilean citizens regard the Inca Republic as a throwback to the worst eras of caudillo rule and radicalism that have characterized South America’s history.

 

This does not preclude the two nations finding common cause on some political issues, but on both sides this is a decidedly grudging bit of realpolitik (and subject to varying degrees of resistance within their respective domestic political arenas).  Some Chilean corporations do business in the Inca Republic, but this is approached very much in the manner of dealing with an unstable 3rd World sort of venue rather than a friendly nation.

 

Mexico
 

Originally an ally purely by dint of the mutual association with Argentina, Mexico increased in significance for Chile during the era between 1st and 3rd Rio Plata Wars, when Argentina and Chile were on poor terms.  Militarily, the two nations have relatively close ties, with many exchanges of officer for staff schools and the like, though joint training exchanges or actual mutual defense are not particularly significant within the two nations’ armies (air forces and navies train together frequently, however).  Most Chilean citizens opting to emigrate off Earth have selected Mexican colonies as their destination.

 

United Kingdom
 

Argentina’s other traditional enemy besides Brazil, the UK figures prominently in Argentinean defensive and offensive military strategy.  Unlike the situation with Brazil, where Chile has its own grievances, Chilean governments have traditionally shied away from making the conflict with the UK their own as well.  Partly this stems from historical relations, with Chile often backing the UK at Argentina’s expense prior to the Twilight War.  The potential cost of a general war with the United Kingdom is of far greater concern to Chilean politicians than that of a 4th Rio Plata War (at least one that does not involve Mexico, the US, the UK and various other nations becoming involved), as the Rio Plata Wars have traditionally limited their copious devastation to northern Argentina, southern Brazil, and Uruguay.  Armed confrontation with the United Kingdom poses a credible threat to Chilean mining operations in Antarctica, commercial shipping, and other interests.

 

In the last few decades, it has become somewhat harder to remain uninvolved in  Argentina-Brazil tensions, with increasing difficulty tracking directly with improving military relationships with Argentina.  A current sore point is Argentina’s desire to integrate Chilean Antarctic territory into a common defense strategy, which would be more likely to bring Chile into direct confrontation with the UK.

 

United States
 

Mexico’s primary enemy is, by extension, Chile’s enemy as well.  While ideological enthusiasm for this stance is not particularly intense, centuries after Yanqui imperialism last presented itself in Latin America (and was replaced, ironically in this context, by Mexican imperialism), it is an easier stance for Chilean politicians to embrace than hostility towards the United Kingdom.  The consequences of Mexican-American warfare along their mutual border and in the Caribbean have much lower direct ramifications for Chile than a UK-Argentina naval war in the South Atlantic and Antarctic littoral.  The expansion of a 4th Rio Plata War to include both America and Mexico, on the other hand, is a matter of greater concern.

 

Venezuela
 

Chilean support of the Inca Republic in the Amazon, however limited and grudging, puts them at odds with Venezuela, though neither nation has sufficient trade or other mutual interests for this antagonism to see much expression.  Both maintain typical embassies and consulates in the other nation, though relations are cold, at the best of times.

 

 INDEX

Organization of the Ejército de Chile
 

The Ejército is broadly organized into two Corps commands, answering to the Army Chief of Staff, himself a member of the Combined Defense Staff. 

 

The army’s I Corps contains its heavy elements, with an armored division, two mechanized divisions, and a pair of independent cavalry groups.  The armored division and cavalry groups are hover-mobile formations, while the two mechanized divisions are equipped with a mix of tracked and wheeled AFVs which, while less mobile, provide heavy firepower and infantry strength to provide a base of maneuver for the faster forces, or conduct break-in fights to allow hover mobile forces to pass through into the enemy rear.  Supporting these formations is an artillery brigade with two battalions of MRLs, augmented by a battalion of long-range electromagnetic howitzers and a third MRL battalion from the reserves.  On mobilization, the corps also assumes control of two reserve brigades consisting of a mix of mechanized and motorized infantry formations, which are intended primarily for line of communication security and stabilization operations in occupied urban zones.

 

The II Corps consists of lighter formations suitable for strategic mobility operations or operations in restrictive terrain.  The corps controls two Light Divisions, each with a mix of airmobile and mountain infantry units, as well as a cavalry group equipped with wheeled armored vehicles suitable for both maneuver and direct fire support tasks.  A corps artillery brigade identical to that in I Cuerpo provides fire support, and the corps also controls two reserve infantry brigades for line of security and urban security operations.  Unlike I Cuerpo, however, each of the corps’ two divisions are augmented on mobilization with three additional infantry battalions (one per brigade). 

 

In practice this division of the army’s units into a heavy corps and a light corps is often more an administrative organization than an operational one, with divisions often swapping brigades across corps lines during exercises.  The end result is fairly conventional, with mission oriented task organization taking precedence over maintaining corps or divisional integrity.  It is understood that I Cuerpo would be the command coordinating any offensive against Bolivian territory, however, with II Cuerpo operating in a defensive capacity covering the non-Arican border with Bolivia and guarding against the possibility of an Argentinean intervention to terminate hostilities between its two ostensible allies.

 

Below divisional level, the Chilean Army is perhaps most notable for having dropped the traditional Latin approach to organization, instead adopting a variant of the French pattern of regimental organization.  While an unusual approach within South America, it is rather consistent with Chilean history, which has often looked to successful European models for approaches to military organization, tactics, and technology.  Some have suggested a certain desire to maintain a distance and difference from the Argentinean army as well as driving this borrowing.

 

Infantry, cavalry, and artillery regiments all consist of subordinate battalions (though cavalry units these battalions as regiments as well, confusing some foreign observers and translators).  Both infantry and cavalry battalions consist of three line companies (or squadrons for cavalry units) augmented by a support company armed with various supporting weapons systems, and a headquarters company that includes logistics and maintenance assets.  Artillery battalions, on the other hand, consist of three firing batteries, a forward observer battery, and a headquarters battery.

 

 INDEX

Divisions and Selected Non-Divisional Units

 

Ira División Blindado
 

The primary operator of hover-mobile armor within the Ejercíto, 1st Armored Division is centrally located with its primary depot outside the coastal city of Valparaiso, though the division’s 3rd Manuever Brigade is forward deployed at Antofagosta, along with a support slice of artillery, air defense and CSS units, sharing a depot with the Aero-Armored Cavalry Group 6.  The division consists of four identical, relatively small, Manuever Brigades, each with a hover armor and hover mech infantry battalion.

 

The division is primarily armed with major weapons systems of Argentinean origin, with the 1st and 3rd Brigades using the excellent ATAB-2 hover tank and AVBI-89 hover IFVs, while 2nd and 4th Brigades continue to use older ATAB-1 hover tanks (modernized LkPz-VIIIs) and AVLI-85 hover APCs, pending their replacement with the more modern designs within the next five years.

 

The Ira Divisíon Blindado would figure prominently in any conflict scenario Chile is likely to face, whether that consists of assisting Argentina in a general South American war or in a smaller conflict with Bolivia looking to reclaim the Arica strip.  As such, the division regards itself as an elite.  It would the core of various planned force packages Chile might contribute to Argentina in the event of war, usually reinforced with additional infantry forces and Aero-Armored Cavalry Group 6.

 

1ra Brigada de Maniobra

                        I/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°1 "Granaderos"

                        I/Regimiento de Infantería N°1 "Buin"

2da Brigade de Maniobra

            IV/ Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°1 "Granaderos"

            II/ Regimiento de Infantería N°1 "Buin"

            3er Brigada de Maiobra

                        II/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°4 "Coraceros"

                        I/Regimiento de Infantería N°6 "Chacabuco"

            4ta Brigade de Maniobra

                        II/ Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°8 "Exploradores"

                        I/Regimiento de Infantería N°15 "Calama"

            1ra Brigada de Artillería de Divisíon

            1ra Brigada de Apoyo y Logistico

 

 

IIda Divisíon Mecanizado
 

The bulk of the army’s “frontline” garrison on the Bolivian frontier, 2nd Mechanized Division is headquartered in the Atacama Desert at Huara, northeast of the coastal settlement of Iquique.

 

Like the 1st Armored Division, the division consists of four small maneuver brigades.  First through Third Maneuver Brigades are equipped with a mix of the Czech-Polish designed Orzel tracked main battle tanks and Sokol tracked IFVs.  The division’s fourth maneuver brigade is equipped with VLI-45 wheeled IFVs and intended to provide a more substantial infantry force for deliberate assaults and operations in built up areas, etc.  Each of the four brigades also has a company of eight Type 27 heavy tanks and a company of 34 combat walkers to provide additional support to the two line battalions, as well as an armored reconnaissance company equipped with a mix of AFVs (ten ATAB-1 hovertanks and eight AVBI-89 hover IFVs) as well as the medium range UAV systems.

 

Intended for operations in the fortified Bolivian Arica Strip, the division’s combat support assets also include a full two-battalion brigade of combat engineers.  Equipment for this brigade includes a mix of Dzik combat engineering vehicles (based on the Orzel tracked tank), Sokol IFVs operating as engineering squad carriers, and a number of more specialized vehicles, including UGVs, for minefield breaching and similar missions.

 

1ra Brigada de Maniobra

II/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°1 "Granaderos"

I/Regimiento de Infantería N°10 "Pudeto"

            2da Brigada de Maniobra

                        III/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°1 "Granaderos"

                        II/Regimiento de Infantería N°15 "Calama"

            3er Brigada de Maniobra

                        I/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°4 "Coraceros"

                        II/ Regimiento de Infantería N°7 "Esmeralda"

            4ta Brigada de Maniobra

                        I/Regimiento de Infantería N°21 "Arica"

                        III/Regimiento de Infantería N°21 "Arica"

            5ta Brigada de Zapadores

                        I/Regimiento de Zapadores N°1 "Atacama"

                        II/Regimiento de Zapadores N°1 "Atacama"

            2da Brigada de Artillería de Divisíon

            2da Brigada de Apoyo y Logistico

 

 

IIIer Divisíon de Montaña
 

Garrisoning the south of the country, 3rd Mountain Division has its primary depot just north of Punta Arenas, with a secondary depot across the Straits of Magellan at Puerto Nuevo being the home to 3er Brigade de Montaña.  Though relatively remote from the rest of the nation, the division’s primary depot is collocated with a Chilean Air Force base and it can redeploy by air rapidly as needed.

 

The division consists of two brigades of mountain troops, plus a third brigade of parachute and airmobile trained infantry.  All three brigades have a peacetime establishment of two maneuver battalions, but on mobilization all three would gain control of an additional reserve battalion made up of recently discharged conscripts. 

 

The division’s area of responsibility includes tasking to provide a quick reaction force to supplement the Carabineros security force maintained within Chile’s Antarctic territories.  This translates into a requirement for a reinforced rifle company to be available within 24 hours (decreasing to six hours in times of international crisis and heightened tensions between the UK and Argentina), followed by a full battalion battle group within 36 hours (24 hours during crisis situations).  The unit trains at least yearly in the deployment of a full brigade to the southern continent, and joint training exercises of up to battalion size with the Argentinean Marines’ 3er Fuerza de Infantería de Marina ‘Austral’ (who have a similar mission in regards to Argentinean Antarctic territories) are frequent as well.

 

As part of this Antarctic AOR, the division is the controlling headquarters for the Ejército’s Antarctic training unit, the Escuela de Operaciones Antárctico.  The cadre from this school can provide a small, but expert, company of troops for reconnaissance, raiding, or security operations on the Antarctic continent if mobilized (entailing suspending operations of the school, or curtailing them if less than the full cadre company are deployed).

 

            1ra Brigada de Montaña

                        I/Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°9 "Chillán"

                        II/ Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°9 "Chillán"

            2da Brigada Aeromovel

                        II/Regimiento de Infantería de Paracaidistas N°16 "Talca"

                        III/ Regimiento de Infantería de Paracaidistas N°16 "Talca"

            3er Brigade de Montaña

                        I/Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°23 "Copiapó"

                        II/ Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°23 "Copiapó"

            3er Brigada de Artillería de Divisíon

            3er Brigada de Apoyo y Logistico

            I/Regimiento de Zapadoes de Montaña N°4 "Arauco"

            Escuela de Operaciones Antártico

 

 

IVta Divisíon Mecanizado
 

Headquartered near La Serena, on the coast north of Santiago, 4th Mechanized Division is organized identically to 2nd Mechanized Division.  In any confrontation with Bolivia, its ability to reinforce the border region would be crucial and the division practices forward deployment of all assets, followed by extensive field maneuvers in the Atacama Desert, twice yearly.  The division’s 4th Brigade, equipped with VLI-45 wheeled APCs has a secondary tasking of reinforcing the 1st Armored Division if that unit were to be deployed to Argentina in an expeditionary role.

 

            1ra Brigada de Maniobra

                        III/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°4 "Coraceros"

            I/Regimiento de Infantería N°7 "Esmeralda"

2da Brigada de Maniobra

I/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°8 "Exploradores"

III/ Regimiento de Infantería N°7 "Esmeralda"

3er Brigada de Maniobra

III/ Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°8 "Exploradores"

IV/Regimiento de Infanteria No 7 “Esmeralda

4ta Brigada de Maniobra

            I/Regimiento de Infantería N°8 "Tucapel"

                        II/ Regimiento de Infantería N°8 "Tucapel"

            5ta Brigada de Zapadores

                        I/Regimiento de Zapadores N°5 "Punta Arenas”

                        II/Regimiento de Zapadores N°5 "Punta Arenas"

            4ta Brigada de Artillería de Divisíon

4ta Brigada de Apoyo y Logistico

 

 

Vta Divisíon de Montaña
 

The 5th Mountain Division has its primary depot and headquarters outside Chile’s second largest city, the Concepcíon metroplex south of Santiago, with brigade depots for its two mountain brigades inland at remote El Abanico and Atacalco.  The division’s third, airmobile, brigade, is responsible for maintaining an alert company battle group (expanded to battalion during times of crisis) for rapid deployment anywhere in the country to respond to military emergencies or begin response to natural disasters.  Like 3rd Mountain Division, the 5th Division’s three brigades each gain a battalion of reserve infantry on mobilization.

 

            1ra Brigada Aeromovel

                        II/Regimiento de Infantería de Paracaidistas N°2 "Maipo"

                        III/ Regimiento de Infantería de Paracaidistas N°2 "Maipo"

            2da Brigada de Montaña

                        I/ Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°12 "Sangra"

                        II/Regimiento de Infantería de MontañaN°12 "Sangra”

            3er Brigade de Montaña

                        I/Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°19 "Colchagua"

                        II/ Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°19 "Colchagua"

            5ta Brigada de Artillería de Divisíon

            5ta Brigada de Apoyo y Logistico

            II/Regimiento de Zapadoes de Montaña N°4 "Arauco"

 

 

Brigada de Fuerzas Especiales
 

The Chilean Special Forces Brigade is not primarily an operational command, but rather an administrative one controlling the Ejército’s two Special Forces Battalions.  The brigade headquarters elements and one battalion are based near Santiago, the second battalion further south at Concepcíon.

 

Chilean Special Forces battalions are commando-type formations primarily suited for direct action missions with a secondary strategic reconnaissance role.  Each battalion consists of four line companies, each of 96 men, with one company per battalion being specialized as reconnaissance troops and the remaining three companies being oriented towards raiding and other DA mission sets.  The two battalions are conscript-manned units like the rest of the force (though conscripts must volunteer for the unit, and accept a three year commitment rather than the usual two year term of service), though the units’ organization includes a larger number of professional officers and NCOs than line infantry units, and is likewise more rank heavy then conventional units.  Overall performance is generally considered to be good, comparable to units like the US Army Rangers or the Brazilian Para-Caçadores (perhaps not surprising, as those units, though composed of volunteers, ultimately have a similar demographic make up).

 

A good number of the battalions’ conscripts go on to remain in the military as professional NCOs and officers, but those members who leave the military can be recalled as needed for battle casualty replacements, providing the brigade good depth in high tempo operations.  The brigade’s former members have also become associated with several private military corporations that seem to operate with covert sponsorship by the Chilean government providing, for instance, security to Chilean government and business operations in the less settled regions of the Inca Republic.

 

I Batallon de Fuerzas Especiales, Regimiento de Infantería N°2 "Maipo"

I Batallon de Fuerzas Especiales, Regimiento de Infantería N°16 "Talca"

 

 

Grupo de Caballería Aero-Blindada N°3 "Húsares"
 

One of I Cuerpo’s exploitation force units, Aero-Armored Cavalry Group 3 is, despite the name, essentially an independent armored brigade.  Headquartered at Iquique in the north of the country, it would figure prominently in any confrontation with Bolivia.  The group is currently equipped with older ATAB-1 hovertanks and more modern AVBI-89 hover IFVs.

 

            I/ Regimiento de Caballería Aero-Blindada N°3 "Húsares"

            II/ Regimiento de Caballería Aero-Blindada N°3 "Húsares"

            II/Regimiento de Infantería N°21 "Arica"

            III/Regimiento de Artillería N°2 "Maturana"

 

 

Grupo de Caballería Aero-Blindada N°6 "Dragones"
 

Based at Antofagasta in the north of the country, Aero-Armored Cavalry Group 6, like its sister unit Aero-Armored Cavalry Group 3, is essentially an armored brigade configured for exploitation and counter-attack operations.  It is equipped with modern ATAB-2 hover tanks and AVBI-89 hover IFV.  The brigade would figure prominently in any operations against Bolivia, and is also part of most planned force packages for a Chilean expeditionary to support Argentinean operations against Brazil.

 

            I/ Regimiento de Caballería Aero-Blindada N°6 "Dragones"

            II/ Regimiento de Caballería Aero-Blindada N°6 "Dragones"

            II/Regimiento de Infantería N°10 "Pudeto"

            II/Regimiento de Artillería N°7 "Chorrillos"

 

 

Grupo de Caballeria Blindada N°7 "Guías"
 

The single cavalry group assigned to II Cuerpo, Armored Cavalry Group 7 is essentially an armored brigade, like the Ejército’s two other cavalry groups, though actual organization is somewhat different.  Armored Cavalry Group 7 is geared more towards providing armored support to the light division of II Cuerpo.  It consists of three armored battalions; each with three companies of Orzel main battle tanks and one company of mechanized infantry with VLI-45 wheeled IFVs.  The Group also has a single company of eight Type 27 heavy tanks and its own artillery battalion.

 

            1/Regimiento de Caballeria Blindada N°7 "Guías"

            2/Regimiento de Caballeria Blindada N°7 "Guías"

            3/Regimiento de Caballeria Blindada N°7 "Guías"

            I/ Regimiento de Artillería N°3 "Silva Renard"

 

 INDEX

Culture
 

The two most notable features defining the Ejército de Chile’s institutional culture that most foreign observers note is the army’s reliance on conscription to fill its ranks and a pervasive sense that the Chilean Army lives in the shadow of neighboring Argentina’s military.

 

The former trait, at least in its Chilean form, tends to produce a soldier relatively well motivated to perform mission-related sort of tasks, but who takes rather less enthusiastically to the spit and polish minutiae of soldiering life in garrison.  Chilean soldiers, however, are more likely to complain or joke amongst themselves when superiors are not present than actually shirk duty, even irksome and senseless tasks.

 

The latter is nearly omnipresent, though in a relatively restrained way.  Argentinean military forces are considered the benchmark, and a foreign observer will hear many references to troops meeting (or not) an Argentinean standard, references to superior Chilean military efficiency, etc.  References to, say, France or Germany are markedly less common.  Perhaps curiously, as well, one tends to hear little speculation about the relative efficiency of Brazilian versus Chilean troops.  Bolivian troops are notably believed to be inherently inferior to Chilean troops, though, of course, the matter has not been tested in open combat in generations.   

 

The professional NCO and officer corps tend to be fairly insular, maintaining a greater distance from enlisted conscripts than one sees in some other forces, even comparable conscript forces.  Within the last several generations, with education levels generally rising among the population, the distance between commissioned and non-commissioned officers has decreased, however, and there is increasingly an attitude that NCOs and officers simply reflect different areas of job specialization rather than connoting social class distinctions.

 

 INDEX

Equipment
 

Chile has long been partly dependent on Argentina for military equipment, especially major systems like AFVs, artillery, aircraft and combat walkers, though it has demonstrated a preference for indigenous designs in less expensive equipment such as small arms, electro-optical sensors, radios and the like.

 

However, at the low point in the relationship between the two nations between the 2nd and 3rd Rio Plata Wars, Chile sought various other sources of military hardware, acquiring a good deal of equipment from acceptably neutral nations (in South American terms) like Manchuria, Japan, Indonesia, Poland/Czechoslovakia and Azania.  With the Argentinean-Chilean relationship improving in the years since the 3rd Rio Plata War, this procurement policy has gradually tapered off, and much of this equipment has since been retired.  Some systems remain, however, most notably including Manchurian Type 27 heavy tanks and Polish and Czech tracked MBTs and IFVs within the Ejército.  Various other systems, including some Azanian and Indonesian light and medium cargo aircraft remain in service as well.  Otherwise, most major systems are of Argentinean (or less frequently, Mexican) origin.

 

Small Arms
 

Chile retains an indigenous small arms industry that provides for the nation’s own needs as well as some export sales. 

 

F-78/94 Military Service Rifle
 

The standard service rifle of the Chilean military, the Fusil Model 2278, 2294 revision, is a somewhat unusual design by 24th Century standards, relying on conventional caseless ammunition with electro-thermal chemical augmentation to allow variable muzzle velocity and energy.  While this approach is not as elegant as either binary or gauss technologies, it does allow for the extension of service life of existing weapons and ammunition supplies, rather than necessitating complete replacement of both weapons and ammunition.

 

The F-78/94 rifle fires a relatively heavy 6.75mm round, with a baseline muzzle velocity of 845 meters per second, allowing the weapon’s use as a serviceable assault rifle.  With the ETC sleeve powered, the weapon fires at a heavier muzzle velocity (1000 meters per second), allowing its use as something more akin to a 20th Century battle rifle.  The Chilean military, with its large alpine formations, preferred this feature to a lower powered suppressive fire mode.  Magazines for the F-78/94 hold forty rounds, and may have a 245 gram ETC battery pack fitted to the base of the magazine as needed.

 

Optics on the weapon are quite good, with the Modelo 2294 combat optic replacing earlier optics.  The M-94 sight is a variable power optic (x0, x2, and x8 magnification) with a single, broad spectrum sensor head providing a unified display of the EM spectrum from the visual range out into long-wave infrared.  While not as sophisticated as synthetic aperture variable magnification systems as used on current generation systems used by better equipped forces, it is rugged and highly functional. 

 

There has been some discussion between Argentina and Chile concerning the possibility of replacing the F-78/94 with Argentina’s current service gauss rifle (or an indigenous design firing the ESA standard 4.5mm flechette), but currently the cost of replacement mixed with good deal of fondness for the hard-hitting 6.75mm round have delayed any serious moves in this direction.

 

F-78/94 Military Service Rifle

Type

6.75mm ETC-Enhanced Assault Rifle

Country

Chile

Weight (Empty, with Optics)

3.5 kilograms

Length

67 cm (Bulk = 2)

Action

Single Shot or Bursts

Ammunition

6.75x42mm fixed cartridge ball

 

Conventional Fire

ETC Fire

Muzzle Velocity

845 mps

1000 mps

Magazine

40 round box

40 round box with attachable battery pack

Magazine Weight

420 grams

665 grams (with battery pack)

Rate of Fire

3

2

Aimed Fire Range

850 meters

1000 meters

Area Fire Burst

10 rounds (AFV = 1.0)

10 rounds (AFV = 0.75)

Area Fire Range

550 meters

500 meters

DP Value

0.9

1.0

Cost

Lv190 (commercial purchase where legal), Lv2 for 100 rounds 6.75mm ammunition, Lv1 per 5 battery packs, Lv10 per magazine

 

 

F-78 Military Service Rifle
 

The baseline version of the F-78 service rifle, firing the same 6.75mm round, but not equipped with ETC components to allow enhanced muzzle velocity.  The F-78 is no longer in service with frontline Chilean units, but can be found in the hands of reserves and Carabineros de Chile national police force.  A number can be found on and off Earth in the grey to black surplus market, especially in the Chinese Arm where they apparently arrived via entrepreneurial efforts by a since-involuntarily retired Mexican Army officer.  Some were also provided to rebel forces in what would become the Inca Republic and these weapons have since turned up in a number of Latin American nations.

 

Statistics are identical to the F-78/94 when firing standard ammunition, except that weight is 3.9 kilograms,, and range is reduced to 600 meters (unless fitted with the M-94 combat sight, in which case range is the same as an F-78/94 firing at standard velocity). 

 

 

CLG-82/94 6.75mm Assault Carbine and 30mm Grenade Launcher
 

Initially fielded as a squad level support weapon, the CLG-82/94 is a functional combination assault rifle/grenade launcher type weapon firing the standard Chilean 6.75mm caseless rifle round and 30mm rifle grenades.  In its present CLG-82/94 format, the weapon was adopted as the standard service weapon for Chilean mechanized infantry units in 2294 (though it remains a supporting weapon system in lighter forces).

 

Format is fairly typical for 23rd and 24th Century combination weapons systems, with the carbine and grenade launcher paired with a day/night electro-optical sight capable of up to eight power magnification (selectable for zero power, two power and eight power) including image intensification and thermal channels for limited visibility conditions.  The rifle portion of the weapon has not been upgraded to incorporate ETC technology, as, at 5.3 kilograms unloaded, the weapon was felt to already be heavy enough without adding ETC components.

 

CLG-82/94 7.5mm Assault Carbine and 30mm Grenade Launcher

 

6.75mm Carbine

30mm Grenade Launcher

Types

Combination 6.75mm Carbine and Semi-Automatic 30mm Grenade Launcher

Country

Chile

Weight (Empty, with Optics)

5.3 kilograms

Length

74 cm (Bulk = 3)

Action

Single Shot or Bursts

Single Shots

Ammunition

6.75x40mm fixed cartridge ball

30mm Grenades

Muzzle Velocity

772 mps

275 mps

Magazine

40 round box

4 round box

Magazine Weight

420 grams

540 grams

Rate of Fire

3

2

Aimed Fire Range

750 meters

300 meters

Indirect Fire Range

N/A

700 meters

Area Fire Burst

10 rounds (AFV = 1.0)

N/A

Area Fire Range

500 meters

N/A

DP Value

0.8

Varies

Cost

Lv350 (commercial sales where legal).  Ammunition pricing as per M-78/90 above.

 

 

M-78/90 Light Machinegun
 

The M-78/90 light machinegun is a modernized version of the M-78 light machinegun, adding an ETC sleeve to the barrel to allow the weapon to function as both a squad level automatic weapon as well as a platoon or company level general purpose machinegun.  Ammunition is identical to that fired by the F-78 service rifle, though it is pre-packed at the factory in disposable plastic belts, with similar provisions for attaching a battery unit to power the ETC components as found on F-78/94 magazines.

 

M-78/90 Light Machinegun

Type

6.75mm ETC-Enhanced Light Machinegun

Country

Chile

Weight (Empty, with Optics)

4.5 kg

Length

90 cm (Bulk = 3)

Action

Single Shot or Bursts

Ammunition

6.75x40mm fixed cartridge ball

 

Conventional Fire

ETC Fire

Muzzle Velocity

845 mps

1000 mps

Magazine

100 round cassette

100 round cassette

Magazine Weight

1125 grams

1800 grams

Rate of Fire

5

4

Aimed Fire Range

1000 meters

1250 meters

Area Fire Burst

20 rounds (AFV = 2.0)

20 rounds (AFV = 2.0)

Area Fire Range

750 meters

850 meters

DP Value

0.9

1.0

Cost

Lv300 (Lv2 per 100 round cassette)

 

 

P-90/6 and P-90/10 6mm and 10mm Semiautomatic Pistols
 

One problem on 23rd and 24th century battlefields is that handguns chambered for adequately lethal rounds against unarmored personnel are typically very poor performers against opponents wearing modern body armor.  Various solutions have been attempted to address this problem, with varying degrees of success.

 

One solution, adopted by the Chilean military as well as some others is the adoption of a pistol which can be easily switched back and forth between a good generalist pistol caliber (in this case 10x28mm) and a specialized armor piercing round (in this case 6x28mm).  Users can vary ammunition by swapping barrels; magazines are interchangeable, but the weapon will not go into battery if ammunition and barrel assemblies are mismatched.

 

P-90/6 and P-90/10 Semiautomatic Pistols

 

6mm

10mm

Types

Semi-automatic pistol

Country

Chile

Weight (Empty)

880 grams

Length

23 cm (Bulk = 0)

Action

Single Shot or Bursts

Ammunition

6x28mm Caseless

10x28mm Caseless

Muzzle Velocity

642 mps

362 mps

Magazine

14 round box

14 round box

Magazine Weight

100 grams

175 grams

Rate of Fire

3

3

Aimed Fire Range

50 meters

50 meters

Area Fire Burst

3 rounds (AFV = 0.25)

3 rounds (AFV = 0.25)

Area Fire Range

30 meters

30 meters

DP Value

0.4*

0.4

Cost

Lv100 including both barrels, Lv80 for weapon with single barrel (Lv2 per 100 rounds, either caliber)

 

 

SM-90/6 and SM-90/10
 

The SM-90/6 and SM-90/10 are submachineguns chambered to fire the same 6x28mm and 10x28mm ammunition as the P-90 series of pistols.  Substitution of one for the other requires replacement of the bolt and barrel, which is user level maintenance that can be done (in theory) without any tools, though in practice changing the barrel sometimes requires the use of basic hand tools.  The Chilean Army issues the SM-90 as a personal defense weapon for vehicle crews and other personnel needing a very compact weapon system.

 

SM-90/6 and SM-90/10

 

6mm

10mm

Types

Submachinegun

Country

Chile

Weight (Empty)

1.5 kg

Length

53 cm (Bulk = 1)

Action

Single Shot or Bursts

Ammunition

6x28mm Caseless

10x28mm Caseless

Muzzle Velocity

706 mps

398 mps

Magazine

30 round box

30 round box

Magazine Weight

200 grams

375 grams

Rate of Fire

5

5

Aimed Fire Range

100 meters

100 meters

Area Fire Burst

10 rounds (AFV = 1)

10 rounds (AFV = 1)

Area Fire Range

70 meters

70 meters

DP Value

0.5*

0.5

Cost

Lv200, including ammunition conversion kit (Lv2 for 100 rounds of either ammunition type).

 

 INDEX

Notes
 

Chile is 2300AD suffers from one of, if not the most, internally contradictory histories of any Earth nation – notably suffering this fate internal to the Adventurer’s Guide, with the ever delightful Earth/Cybertech Sourcebook offering no improvement.

 

The nation is said to have been an essentially perpetual Argentinean ally (beginning in 2024) in the broader Argentina-Brazil conflict (AG 10), but there is no mention of any Chilean participation in the 1st or 3rd Rio Plata Wars, and explicit mention of the nation not participating in the 2nd Rio Plata War. 

 

Curiously, though neither Chile or Bolivia took part in the 2nd RPW, and that war is basically presented as a draw insofar as Argentina and Brazil are concerned.  Apparently, however, the Brazilian “victory” is, at the same time, sweeping enough in diplomatic or military terms to force the transfer of the Arica Strip from Chilean control to that of its ally, Bolivia (AG 10).  Adding to the confusion of this whole issue, the Strip was either given to Bolivia as a result of the 2nd Rio Plata War, which ended in 2237 (according to the AG entry for Bolivia) or it was given to Bolivia thirty-seven years later in 2274 (according to the AG entry for Chile on the same page).  In short, Chile seems to be the victim of poor proofreading, in addition to whatever good or bad befell it during the GDW wargaming that produced the 2300AD timeline.

 

The Earth/Cybertech Sourcebook does not provide much clarification to this situation, apparently seeing no contradiction in the above situation that cannot be rectified by changing the basic narrative with some minimal references to Bolivia participating in the 2nd Rio Plata War, but still not explaining the stripping of territory from a non-belligerent Chile at the end of a war that neither Brazil nor Argentina won decisively.  

 

The easiest reconciliation of all of the above would seem to be simply positing that the Bolivia/Chile/Arica Strip situation occurred during the 1st Rio Plata War, when Brazil’s victory was such that it could dictate this sort of outcome.  One could perhaps posit Bolivia remaining in the Brazilian camp, with Chile and Bolivia nearly coming to blows during the 2nd Rio Plata War, and then defecting to the Argentinean camp in time for the 3rd RPW without any significant departures from broader timeline beyond the rationalization of an otherwise incoherent bit of South American history concerning the Arica Strip.

 

That is, in any case, the route I’ve chosen.  Any departure from the standard 2300AD timeline in this article is deliberate and an attempt to make sense of highly contradictory material.

 

More generally, I have depicted Chile as something of an independent member of the Argentinean military alliance.  Partly this is due to the historic animosity between those two nations, which GDW seems to have conveniently glossed over in the game’s timeline (as they so often seemed inclined to do).  Partly it is because I think Chile has the ability to do so, unlike, say, Uruguay, which is smack in the middle of any confrontation between Brazil and Argentina.  And finally it is because the tension between Bolivia and Chile, while poorly elaborated on, seems to be a noteworthy and complicated aspect of the South American military and diplomatic arena.


INDEX