EJÉRCITO DE CHILE: 2300AD
Introduction
Long considered by many to live in the shadow of Argentina,
the nation of Chile has managed to retain a good measure of independence in its
military affairs despite the diplomatic dominance of its larger eastern neighbor. The Chilean army, circa 2300, is regarded by
many as possibly the third most capable military organization, behind Argentina
and Brazil, on the South American continent, at least in terms of conventional
operations. Chile’s hypothetical role
in a 4th Rio Plata War, as well as its possible independent resort
to armed force to regain lost territory from Bolivia, makes it subject to a
good deal of speculation on the part of international observers.
Index
Order of Battle
Current Defense and Regional Security Issues
Organization
Divisions and Selected Non-Divisional Units
Culture
Equipment
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the members of the Etranger discussion group for
their commentary and feedback on Chile, in particular, and South American
2300AD militaria in general as well.
Special thanks should be extended to David Gillon and Dan Hebditch for
assorted suggestions and review of this write up.
Cuartel General de Ejército
Brigada
de Fuerzas Especiales
6ta Brigada de Artillería Pesada
9na Brigada de Artillería Pesada de Reserva
I Cuerpo
Ira División Blindado
IIda Divisíon Mecanizado
IVta
Divisíon Mecanizado
Grupo de
Caballería Aero-Blindada N°3 "Húsares"
Grupo de
Caballería Aero-Blindada N°6 "Dragones"
8va Brigada de Artillería de
Cuerpo
1ra Brigada Independente de
Reserva
3er Brigada Independente de
Reserva
II Cuerpo
IIIer
Divisíon Ligero
Vta
Divisíon Ligero
Grupo de
Caballeria Blindada N°7 "Guías"
7ma Brigada de Artillería de Cuerpo
2da Brigada Independente de Reserva
4ta Brigada Independente de Reserva
INDEX
Argentina
Chile has long been an ally of Argentina in the bilateral
division of South America into Argentinean and Brazilian spheres of influence,
though this Chilean-Argentinean diplomatic and economic alliance has not always
translated into common military operations or objectives. On those occasions when it has, the
experience has not been without cost for Chile, though the current generation
of leadership on both sides of the border has done much fence mending from
earlier strains.
Chile participated significantly in the 1st Rio
Plata War, contributing an expeditionary corps to the main Argentinean effort
while simultaneously conducting a limited offensive against Bolivia, Brazil’s
ally at the time. The disastrous end of
the war for Argentina spilled over into Chilean territory, with Brazilian
forces transiting Bolivia and invading the northern portion of Chile before the
war’s end. This territory, centered on
the port of Arica, was eventually transferred to Bolivian control (which has
subsequently maintained it by defecting to an uneasy membership in the
Argentinean sphere). The loss remains a
nagging wound to the Chilean national psyche to this day, and soured relations
with Argentina for two generations, precluding Chilean support in either the 2nd
or 3rd Rio Plata Wars.
The last 30 years have seen something of a renaissance in
relations between the two nations, however, with significant efforts by
Argentina to bring Chile firmly back into its military coalition. With the Brazilian-Argentinean rivalry
anything but settled, Argentina is keenly aware that a fourth round of fighting
is likely in the future, and Chilean military assistance is highly valued in
Buenos Aires.
The situation is still not without significant
complications, most notably the issue of the Arica Strip. Both Chile and Bolivia are ostensibly
Argentinean allies at present, but this has done nothing to diminish Chile’s
irredentist claim to lost territory, or Bolivia’s military focus on retaining
the Arica Strip.
Bolivia
While most foreign observers of
South American militaries concern themselves with how Chilean forces would
stack up against those of Brazil, Chilean military thinking is, itself, much
more concerned with the idea of war against Bolivia. Though the loss of the Arica Strip occurred a century ago, it
remains a hugely volatile issue in Chilean politics. As recently as 2287, comments interpreted as favoring
normalization of relations with Bolivia were sufficient to derail the
presidential aspirations of an otherwise extremely popular candidate.
Chilean and Bolivian forces along
the Pacific coast have been staring at one another for generations across a
border that recreates a less affluent rendition of the heavily fortified
Argentinean-Brazilian frontier.
Occasional violent confrontations and other incidents keep the region
unsettled, and brinkmanship (especially on the part of Chile) has nearly
brought the region to war several times over the course of the century. The situation is significantly complicated
by Bolivia’s current alliance with Argentina and consequent Argentinean
diplomatic pressure to keep Chile in check.
Given that Bolivia’s alliance with Argentina also serves to keep Incan
Republic indigenous revivalism on a relatively short leash along its northern
border, it is likely that Chile would be more likely to upset this situation by
acting unilaterally rather than Bolivian defection to the Brazilian camp
provoking it (as this would open Bolivia to both Incan and Chilean military
ambitions). Some have speculated that
Chile plans to quickly reconquer the Strip during a 4th Rio Plata
War, while simultaneously supporting Argentina and presenting their more
powerful ally with a fait accompli.
If war were to occur, it likely
would see a quick strike by Chilean armored and mechanized forces aimed at
cutting off the Arica Strip from the Bolivian altiplano, followed by the
deployment of lighter forces to begin deliberate reduction of the Arica
garrison. Most observers suspect that
the Chilean military has the capability to successfully carry out such a
campaign. Less certain is what
Argentina’s response would be.
Brazil
Next to Bolivia, Brazil is the nation Chilean forces are
most likely to find themselves in combat against. While Chileans for the most part do not see Argentina’s perennial
struggle with Brazil as being their struggle as well by association, they do
hold Brazil responsible for the loss of the Arica Strip after the 1st
Rio Plata War. While Brazil is blamed
for the loss, however, most Chileans look to the idea of directly redressing
the loss through action against Bolivia.
This should not be taken to imply that Chilean participation
in a 4th Rio Plata War against Brazil is unlikely, as most observers
consider the contribution of some sort of Chilean expeditionary force in such a
scenario as highly likely.
Inca Republic
Though Chilean military personnel serve on the
Inca-Brazilian frontier in Argentinean sponsored military units like the Grupo
de Aviación Voluntario de Antisuyu, this should not be taken to imply any
particular warmth directly between the Incan and Chilean governments,
however. With a generally (and
unapologetically) European-derived culture and a national ethnic mix that
includes almost no “authentic” (i.e. non-mestizo) indigenous peoples, Chile is,
by definition, an affront to true believers of the Incan Republic’s dogma and
ideology. Conversely, Chile has a very
proud tradition of political democracy, an independent judiciary, respect for
human rights and the other trappings of the Western liberal democratic
tradition. The situation within the
Inca Republic is every bit as inimical to Chilean ideals as Chile is to Incan
ideals, with most Chilean citizens regard the Inca Republic as a throwback to
the worst eras of caudillo rule and radicalism that have characterized
South America’s history.
This does not preclude the two nations finding common cause
on some political issues, but on both sides this is a decidedly grudging bit of
realpolitik (and subject to varying degrees of resistance within their
respective domestic political arenas).
Some Chilean corporations do business in the Inca Republic, but this is
approached very much in the manner of dealing with an unstable 3rd
World sort of venue rather than a friendly nation.
Mexico
Originally an ally purely by dint of the mutual association
with Argentina, Mexico increased in significance for Chile during the era
between 1st and 3rd Rio Plata Wars, when Argentina and
Chile were on poor terms. Militarily,
the two nations have relatively close ties, with many exchanges of officer for
staff schools and the like, though joint training exchanges or actual mutual
defense are not particularly significant within the two nations’ armies (air
forces and navies train together frequently, however). Most Chilean citizens opting to emigrate off
Earth have selected Mexican colonies as their destination.
United Kingdom
Argentina’s other traditional enemy besides Brazil, the UK
figures prominently in Argentinean defensive and offensive military
strategy. Unlike the situation with
Brazil, where Chile has its own grievances, Chilean governments have
traditionally shied away from making the conflict with the UK their own as well. Partly this stems from historical relations,
with Chile often backing the UK at Argentina’s expense prior to the Twilight
War. The potential cost of a general
war with the United Kingdom is of far greater concern to Chilean politicians
than that of a 4th Rio Plata War (at least one that does not involve
Mexico, the US, the UK and various other nations becoming involved), as the Rio
Plata Wars have traditionally limited their copious devastation to northern
Argentina, southern Brazil, and Uruguay.
Armed confrontation with the United Kingdom poses a credible threat to
Chilean mining operations in Antarctica, commercial shipping, and other
interests.
In the last few decades, it has become somewhat harder to
remain uninvolved in Argentina-Brazil
tensions, with increasing difficulty tracking directly with improving military
relationships with Argentina. A current
sore point is Argentina’s desire to integrate Chilean Antarctic territory into
a common defense strategy, which would be more likely to bring Chile into
direct confrontation with the UK.
United States
Mexico’s primary enemy is, by extension, Chile’s enemy as
well. While ideological enthusiasm for
this stance is not particularly intense, centuries after Yanqui imperialism
last presented itself in Latin America (and was replaced, ironically in this
context, by Mexican imperialism), it is an easier stance for Chilean
politicians to embrace than hostility towards the United Kingdom. The consequences of Mexican-American warfare
along their mutual border and in the Caribbean have much lower direct
ramifications for Chile than a UK-Argentina naval war in the South Atlantic and
Antarctic littoral. The expansion of a
4th Rio Plata War to include both America and Mexico, on the other
hand, is a matter of greater concern.
Venezuela
Chilean support of the Inca
Republic in the Amazon, however limited and grudging, puts them at odds with
Venezuela, though neither nation has sufficient trade or other mutual interests
for this antagonism to see much expression.
Both maintain typical embassies and consulates in the other nation,
though relations are cold, at the best of times.
INDEX
The Ejército is broadly organized into two Corps
commands, answering to the Army Chief of Staff, himself a member of the
Combined Defense Staff.
The army’s I Corps contains its heavy elements, with an
armored division, two mechanized divisions, and a pair of independent cavalry
groups. The armored division and
cavalry groups are hover-mobile formations, while the two mechanized divisions
are equipped with a mix of tracked and wheeled AFVs which, while less mobile,
provide heavy firepower and infantry strength to provide a base of maneuver for
the faster forces, or conduct break-in fights to allow hover mobile forces to
pass through into the enemy rear.
Supporting these formations is an artillery brigade with two battalions
of MRLs, augmented by a battalion of long-range electromagnetic howitzers and a
third MRL battalion from the reserves.
On mobilization, the corps also assumes control of two reserve brigades
consisting of a mix of mechanized and motorized infantry formations, which are
intended primarily for line of communication security and stabilization
operations in occupied urban zones.
The II Corps consists of lighter formations suitable for
strategic mobility operations or operations in restrictive terrain. The corps controls two Light Divisions, each
with a mix of airmobile and mountain infantry units, as well as a cavalry group
equipped with wheeled armored vehicles suitable for both maneuver and direct
fire support tasks. A corps artillery
brigade identical to that in I Cuerpo provides fire support, and the corps also
controls two reserve infantry brigades for line of security and urban security
operations. Unlike I Cuerpo, however,
each of the corps’ two divisions are augmented on mobilization with three
additional infantry battalions (one per brigade).
In practice this division of the army’s units into a heavy
corps and a light corps is often more an administrative organization than an
operational one, with divisions often swapping brigades across corps lines
during exercises. The end result is
fairly conventional, with mission oriented task organization taking precedence
over maintaining corps or divisional integrity. It is understood that I Cuerpo would be the command
coordinating any offensive against Bolivian territory, however, with II
Cuerpo operating in a defensive capacity covering the non-Arican border
with Bolivia and guarding against the possibility of an Argentinean
intervention to terminate hostilities between its two ostensible allies.
Below divisional level, the Chilean Army is perhaps most
notable for having dropped the traditional Latin approach to organization, instead
adopting a variant of the French pattern of regimental organization. While an unusual approach within South
America, it is rather consistent with Chilean history, which has often looked
to successful European models for approaches to military organization, tactics,
and technology. Some have suggested a
certain desire to maintain a distance and difference from the Argentinean army
as well as driving this borrowing.
Infantry, cavalry, and artillery regiments all consist of
subordinate battalions (though cavalry units these battalions as regiments as
well, confusing some foreign observers and translators). Both infantry and cavalry battalions consist
of three line companies (or squadrons for cavalry units) augmented by a support
company armed with various supporting weapons systems, and a headquarters
company that includes logistics and maintenance assets. Artillery battalions, on the other hand,
consist of three firing batteries, a forward observer battery, and a
headquarters battery.
INDEX
Ira División Blindado
The primary operator of hover-mobile armor within the Ejercíto,
1st Armored Division is centrally located with its primary depot
outside the coastal city of Valparaiso, though the division’s 3rd
Manuever Brigade is forward deployed at Antofagosta, along with a support slice
of artillery, air defense and CSS units, sharing a depot with the Aero-Armored
Cavalry Group 6. The division consists
of four identical, relatively small, Manuever Brigades, each with a hover armor
and hover mech infantry battalion.
The division is primarily armed with major weapons systems
of Argentinean origin, with the 1st and 3rd Brigades
using the excellent ATAB-2 hover tank and AVBI-89 hover IFVs, while 2nd
and 4th Brigades continue to use older ATAB-1 hover tanks
(modernized LkPz-VIIIs) and AVLI-85 hover APCs, pending their replacement with
the more modern designs within the next five years.
The Ira Divisíon Blindado would figure prominently in
any conflict scenario Chile is likely to face, whether that consists of
assisting Argentina in a general South American war or in a smaller conflict
with Bolivia looking to reclaim the Arica strip. As such, the division regards itself as an elite. It would the core of various planned force
packages Chile might contribute to Argentina in the event of war, usually
reinforced with additional infantry forces and Aero-Armored Cavalry Group 6.
1ra Brigada de Maniobra
I/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada
N°1 "Granaderos"
I/Regimiento de Infantería N°1
"Buin"
2da Brigade de Maniobra
IV/
Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°1 "Granaderos"
II/ Regimiento de Infantería N°1
"Buin"
3er
Brigada de Maiobra
II/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°4 "Coraceros"
I/Regimiento de Infantería N°6 "Chacabuco"
4ta Brigade de Maniobra
II/ Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°8
"Exploradores"
I/Regimiento
de Infantería
N°15 "Calama"
1ra Brigada de Artillería de
Divisíon
1ra Brigada de Apoyo y Logistico
IIda Divisíon Mecanizado
The bulk of the army’s “frontline” garrison on the Bolivian
frontier, 2nd Mechanized Division is headquartered in the Atacama
Desert at Huara, northeast of the coastal settlement of Iquique.
Like the 1st Armored Division, the division
consists of four small maneuver brigades.
First through Third Maneuver Brigades are equipped with a mix of the
Czech-Polish designed Orzel tracked main battle tanks and Sokol
tracked IFVs. The division’s fourth
maneuver brigade is equipped with VLI-45 wheeled IFVs and intended to provide a
more substantial infantry force for deliberate assaults and operations in built
up areas, etc. Each of the four
brigades also has a company of eight Type 27 heavy tanks and a company of 34
combat walkers to provide additional support to the two line battalions, as
well as an armored reconnaissance company equipped with a mix of AFVs (ten
ATAB-1 hovertanks and eight AVBI-89 hover IFVs) as well as the medium range UAV
systems.
Intended for operations in the fortified Bolivian Arica
Strip, the division’s combat support assets also include a full two-battalion
brigade of combat engineers. Equipment
for this brigade includes a mix of Dzik combat engineering vehicles
(based on the Orzel tracked tank), Sokol IFVs operating as
engineering squad carriers, and a number of more specialized vehicles,
including UGVs, for minefield breaching and similar missions.
1ra Brigada de Maniobra
II/Regimiento
de Caballería Blindada N°1 "Granaderos"
I/Regimiento de Infantería N°10
"Pudeto"
2da
Brigada de Maniobra
III/Regimiento de Caballería
Blindada N°1 "Granaderos"
II/Regimiento de
Infantería N°15 "Calama"
3er
Brigada de Maniobra
I/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°4 "Coraceros"
II/ Regimiento de Infantería N°7 "Esmeralda"
4ta Brigada de Maniobra
I/Regimiento de Infantería N°21 "Arica"
III/Regimiento de Infantería N°21
"Arica"
5ta Brigada de Zapadores
I/Regimiento
de Zapadores N°1 "Atacama"
II/Regimiento de Zapadores N°1
"Atacama"
2da Brigada de Artillería de
Divisíon
2da Brigada de Apoyo y Logistico
IIIer Divisíon de Montaña
Garrisoning the
south of the country, 3rd Mountain Division has its primary depot
just north of Punta Arenas, with a secondary depot across the Straits of
Magellan at Puerto Nuevo being the home to 3er Brigade de Montaña. Though relatively remote from the rest of
the nation, the division’s primary depot is collocated with a Chilean Air Force
base and it can redeploy by air rapidly as needed.
The division
consists of two brigades of mountain troops, plus a third brigade of parachute
and airmobile trained infantry. All
three brigades have a peacetime establishment of two maneuver battalions, but
on mobilization all three would gain control of an additional reserve battalion
made up of recently discharged conscripts.
The division’s area
of responsibility includes tasking to provide a quick reaction force to
supplement the Carabineros security force maintained within Chile’s
Antarctic territories. This translates
into a requirement for a reinforced rifle company to be available within 24
hours (decreasing to six hours in times of international crisis and heightened
tensions between the UK and Argentina), followed by a full battalion battle
group within 36 hours (24 hours during crisis situations). The unit trains at least yearly in the
deployment of a full brigade to the southern continent, and joint training
exercises of up to battalion size with the Argentinean Marines’ 3er
Fuerza de Infantería de Marina ‘Austral’ (who have a similar mission in
regards to Argentinean Antarctic territories) are frequent as well.
As part of this Antarctic AOR, the division is the
controlling headquarters for the Ejército’s Antarctic training unit, the
Escuela de Operaciones Antárctico. The
cadre from this school can provide a small, but expert, company of troops for
reconnaissance, raiding, or security operations on the Antarctic continent if
mobilized (entailing suspending operations of the school, or curtailing them if
less than the full cadre company are deployed).
1ra Brigada de Montaña
I/Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°9
"Chillán"
II/
Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°9 "Chillán"
2da Brigada Aeromovel
II/Regimiento de Infantería de Paracaidistas
N°16 "Talca"
III/
Regimiento de Infantería de Paracaidistas N°16 "Talca"
3er Brigade de Montaña
I/Regimiento
de Infantería de Montaña N°23 "Copiapó"
II/
Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°23 "Copiapó"
3er Brigada de Artillería de
Divisíon
3er Brigada de Apoyo y Logistico
I/Regimiento de Zapadoes de Montaña N°4
"Arauco"
Escuela de Operaciones Antártico
IVta Divisíon Mecanizado
Headquartered
near La Serena, on the coast north of Santiago, 4th Mechanized
Division is organized identically to 2nd Mechanized Division. In any confrontation with Bolivia, its
ability to reinforce the border region would be crucial and the division
practices forward deployment of all assets, followed by extensive field
maneuvers in the Atacama Desert, twice yearly.
The division’s 4th Brigade, equipped with VLI-45 wheeled APCs
has a secondary tasking of reinforcing the 1st Armored Division if
that unit were to be deployed to Argentina in an expeditionary role.
1ra Brigada de Maniobra
III/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°4
"Coraceros"
I/Regimiento de Infantería N°7 "Esmeralda"
2da Brigada de Maniobra
I/Regimiento de Caballería Blindada N°8
"Exploradores"
III/ Regimiento de Infantería N°7 "Esmeralda"
3er Brigada de Maniobra
III/ Regimiento de
Caballería Blindada N°8 "Exploradores"
IV/Regimiento de Infanteria No 7
“Esmeralda
4ta Brigada de Maniobra
I/Regimiento de Infantería N°8
"Tucapel"
II/ Regimiento de Infantería N°8 "Tucapel"
5ta Brigada de Zapadores
I/Regimiento
de Zapadores N°5 "Punta Arenas”
II/Regimiento de Zapadores N°5
"Punta Arenas"
4ta
Brigada de Artillería de Divisíon
4ta Brigada de Apoyo y Logistico
Vta Divisíon de Montaña
The 5th
Mountain Division has its primary depot and headquarters outside Chile’s second
largest city, the Concepcíon metroplex south of Santiago, with brigade depots
for its two mountain brigades inland at remote El Abanico and Atacalco. The division’s third, airmobile, brigade, is
responsible for maintaining an alert company battle group (expanded to
battalion during times of crisis) for rapid deployment anywhere in the country
to respond to military emergencies or begin response to natural disasters. Like 3rd Mountain Division, the 5th
Division’s three brigades each gain a battalion of reserve infantry on
mobilization.
1ra Brigada Aeromovel
II/Regimiento de Infantería de Paracaidistas N°2
"Maipo"
III/
Regimiento de Infantería de Paracaidistas N°2 "Maipo"
2da Brigada de Montaña
I/
Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°12 "Sangra"
II/Regimiento
de Infantería de MontañaN°12 "Sangra”
3er Brigade de Montaña
I/Regimiento
de Infantería de Montaña N°19 "Colchagua"
II/
Regimiento de Infantería de Montaña N°19 "Colchagua"
5ta Brigada de Artillería de
Divisíon
5ta Brigada de Apoyo y Logistico
II/Regimiento de Zapadoes de Montaña N°4
"Arauco"
Brigada de Fuerzas Especiales
The Chilean
Special Forces Brigade is not primarily an operational command, but rather an
administrative one controlling the Ejército’s two Special Forces
Battalions. The brigade headquarters
elements and one battalion are based near Santiago, the second battalion further
south at Concepcíon.
Chilean Special
Forces battalions are commando-type formations primarily suited for direct
action missions with a secondary strategic reconnaissance role. Each battalion consists of four line
companies, each of 96 men, with one company per battalion being specialized as
reconnaissance troops and the remaining three companies being oriented towards
raiding and other DA mission sets. The
two battalions are conscript-manned units like the rest of the force (though
conscripts must volunteer for the unit, and accept a three year commitment
rather than the usual two year term of service), though the units’ organization
includes a larger number of professional officers and NCOs than line infantry
units, and is likewise more rank heavy then conventional units. Overall performance is generally considered
to be good, comparable to units like the US Army Rangers or the Brazilian
Para-Caçadores (perhaps not surprising, as those units, though composed of volunteers,
ultimately have a similar demographic make up).
A good number
of the battalions’ conscripts go on to remain in the military as professional
NCOs and officers, but those members who leave the military can be recalled as
needed for battle casualty replacements, providing the brigade good depth in
high tempo operations. The brigade’s
former members have also become associated with several private military
corporations that seem to operate with covert sponsorship by the Chilean
government providing, for instance, security to Chilean government and business
operations in the less settled regions of the Inca Republic.
I Batallon
de Fuerzas Especiales, Regimiento de Infantería N°2 "Maipo"
I Batallon de Fuerzas Especiales, Regimiento de Infantería N°16 "Talca"
Grupo de
Caballería Aero-Blindada N°3 "Húsares"
One of I Cuerpo’s
exploitation force units, Aero-Armored Cavalry Group 3 is, despite the name,
essentially an independent armored brigade.
Headquartered at Iquique in the north of the country, it would figure
prominently in any confrontation with Bolivia.
The group is currently equipped with older ATAB-1 hovertanks and more
modern AVBI-89 hover IFVs.
I/ Regimiento de Caballería Aero-Blindada N°3
"Húsares"
II/ Regimiento de Caballería
Aero-Blindada N°3 "Húsares"
II/Regimiento de Infantería N°21
"Arica"
III/Regimiento
de Artillería N°2 "Maturana"
Grupo de
Caballería Aero-Blindada N°6 "Dragones"
Based at Antofagasta in the north
of the country, Aero-Armored Cavalry Group 6, like its sister unit Aero-Armored
Cavalry Group 3, is essentially an armored brigade configured for exploitation
and counter-attack operations. It is
equipped with modern ATAB-2 hover tanks and AVBI-89 hover IFV. The brigade would figure prominently in any
operations against Bolivia, and is also part of most planned force packages for
a Chilean expeditionary to support Argentinean operations against Brazil.
I/ Regimiento de Caballería Aero-Blindada N°6
"Dragones"
II/ Regimiento de Caballería
Aero-Blindada N°6 "Dragones"
II/Regimiento de Infantería N°10 "Pudeto"
II/Regimiento
de Artillería N°7 "Chorrillos"
Grupo de
Caballeria Blindada N°7 "Guías"
The single
cavalry group assigned to II Cuerpo, Armored Cavalry Group 7 is
essentially an armored brigade, like the Ejército’s two other cavalry
groups, though actual organization is somewhat different. Armored Cavalry Group 7 is geared more
towards providing armored support to the light division of II Cuerpo. It consists of three armored battalions;
each with three companies of Orzel main battle tanks and one company of
mechanized infantry with VLI-45 wheeled IFVs.
The Group also has a single company of eight Type 27 heavy tanks and its
own artillery battalion.
1/Regimiento de Caballeria Blindada N°7
"Guías"
2/Regimiento de Caballeria Blindada N°7
"Guías"
3/Regimiento de Caballeria Blindada
N°7 "Guías"
I/ Regimiento de Artillería N°3
"Silva Renard"
INDEX
The two most notable features defining the Ejército de
Chile’s institutional culture that most foreign observers note is the
army’s reliance on conscription to fill its ranks and a pervasive sense that
the Chilean Army lives in the shadow of neighboring Argentina’s military.
The former trait, at least in its Chilean form, tends to
produce a soldier relatively well motivated to perform mission-related sort of
tasks, but who takes rather less enthusiastically to the spit and polish
minutiae of soldiering life in garrison.
Chilean soldiers, however, are more likely to complain or joke amongst
themselves when superiors are not present than actually shirk duty, even
irksome and senseless tasks.
The latter is nearly omnipresent, though in a relatively
restrained way. Argentinean military
forces are considered the benchmark, and a foreign observer will hear many
references to troops meeting (or not) an Argentinean standard, references to
superior Chilean military efficiency, etc.
References to, say, France or Germany are markedly less common. Perhaps curiously, as well, one tends to
hear little speculation about the relative efficiency of Brazilian versus Chilean
troops. Bolivian troops are notably
believed to be inherently inferior to Chilean troops, though, of course, the
matter has not been tested in open combat in generations.
The professional NCO and officer corps tend to be fairly
insular, maintaining a greater distance from enlisted conscripts than one sees
in some other forces, even comparable conscript forces. Within the last several generations, with
education levels generally rising among the population, the distance between
commissioned and non-commissioned officers has decreased, however, and there is
increasingly an attitude that NCOs and officers simply reflect different areas
of job specialization rather than connoting social class distinctions.
INDEX
Chile has long been partly dependent on Argentina for
military equipment, especially major systems like AFVs, artillery, aircraft and
combat walkers, though it has demonstrated a preference for indigenous designs
in less expensive equipment such as small arms, electro-optical sensors, radios
and the like.
However, at the low point in the relationship between the
two nations between the 2nd and 3rd Rio Plata Wars, Chile
sought various other sources of military hardware, acquiring a good deal of
equipment from acceptably neutral nations (in South American terms) like
Manchuria, Japan, Indonesia, Poland/Czechoslovakia and Azania. With the Argentinean-Chilean relationship
improving in the years since the 3rd Rio Plata War, this procurement
policy has gradually tapered off, and much of this equipment has since been
retired. Some systems remain, however,
most notably including Manchurian Type 27 heavy tanks and Polish and Czech
tracked MBTs and IFVs within the Ejército. Various
other systems, including some Azanian and Indonesian light and medium cargo
aircraft remain in service as well.
Otherwise, most major systems are of Argentinean (or less frequently,
Mexican) origin.
Small Arms
Chile retains an indigenous small arms industry that
provides for the nation’s own needs as well as some export sales.
F-78/94 Military Service Rifle
The standard service rifle of the Chilean military, the
Fusil Model 2278, 2294 revision, is a somewhat unusual design by 24th
Century standards, relying on conventional caseless ammunition with
electro-thermal chemical augmentation to allow variable muzzle velocity and
energy. While this approach is not as
elegant as either binary or gauss technologies, it does allow for the extension
of service life of existing weapons and ammunition supplies, rather than necessitating
complete replacement of both weapons and ammunition.
The F-78/94 rifle fires a relatively heavy 6.75mm round,
with a baseline muzzle velocity of 845 meters per second, allowing the weapon’s
use as a serviceable assault rifle.
With the ETC sleeve powered, the weapon fires at a heavier muzzle
velocity (1000 meters per second), allowing its use as something more akin to a
20th Century battle rifle.
The Chilean military, with its large alpine formations, preferred this
feature to a lower powered suppressive fire mode. Magazines for the F-78/94 hold forty rounds, and may have a 245
gram ETC battery pack fitted to the base of the magazine as needed.
Optics on the weapon are quite good, with the Modelo 2294
combat optic replacing earlier optics.
The M-94 sight is a variable power optic (x0, x2, and x8 magnification)
with a single, broad spectrum sensor head providing a unified display of the EM
spectrum from the visual range out into long-wave infrared. While not as sophisticated as synthetic
aperture variable magnification systems as used on current generation systems
used by better equipped forces, it is rugged and highly functional.
There has been some discussion between Argentina and Chile
concerning the possibility of replacing the F-78/94 with Argentina’s current
service gauss rifle (or an indigenous design firing the ESA standard 4.5mm
flechette), but currently the cost of replacement mixed with good deal of
fondness for the hard-hitting 6.75mm round have delayed any serious moves in
this direction.
F-78/94 Military Service Rifle
|
Type
|
6.75mm ETC-Enhanced Assault Rifle
|
Country
|
Chile
|
Weight (Empty, with Optics)
|
3.5 kilograms
|
Length
|
67 cm (Bulk = 2)
|
Action
|
Single Shot or Bursts
|
Ammunition
|
6.75x42mm fixed cartridge ball
|
|
Conventional Fire
|
ETC Fire
|
Muzzle Velocity
|
845 mps
|
1000 mps
|
Magazine
|
40 round box
|
40 round box with attachable battery pack
|
Magazine Weight
|
420 grams
|
665 grams (with battery pack)
|
Rate of Fire
|
3
|
2
|
Aimed Fire Range
|
850 meters
|
1000 meters
|
Area Fire Burst
|
10 rounds (AFV = 1.0)
|
10 rounds (AFV = 0.75)
|
Area Fire Range
|
550 meters
|
500 meters
|
DP Value
|
0.9
|
1.0
|
Cost
|
Lv190 (commercial purchase where legal), Lv2 for 100
rounds 6.75mm ammunition, Lv1 per 5 battery packs, Lv10 per magazine
|
F-78 Military
Service Rifle
The baseline version of the F-78 service rifle, firing the
same 6.75mm round, but not equipped with ETC components to allow enhanced
muzzle velocity. The F-78 is no longer
in service with frontline Chilean units, but can be found in the hands of
reserves and Carabineros de Chile national police force. A number can be found on and off Earth in
the grey to black surplus market, especially in the Chinese Arm where they
apparently arrived via entrepreneurial efforts by a since-involuntarily retired
Mexican Army officer. Some were also
provided to rebel forces in what would become the Inca Republic and these
weapons have since turned up in a number of Latin American nations.
Statistics are identical to the F-78/94 when firing standard
ammunition, except that weight is 3.9 kilograms,, and range is reduced to 600
meters (unless fitted with the M-94 combat sight, in which case range is the
same as an F-78/94 firing at standard velocity).
CLG-82/94 6.75mm Assault Carbine and 30mm Grenade Launcher
Initially fielded as a
squad level support weapon, the CLG-82/94 is a functional combination assault
rifle/grenade launcher type weapon firing the standard Chilean 6.75mm caseless
rifle round and 30mm rifle grenades. In
its present CLG-82/94 format, the weapon was adopted as the standard service
weapon for Chilean mechanized infantry units in 2294 (though it remains a
supporting weapon system in lighter forces).
Format is fairly typical
for 23rd and 24th Century combination weapons systems,
with the carbine and grenade launcher paired with a day/night electro-optical
sight capable of up to eight power magnification (selectable for zero power,
two power and eight power) including image intensification and thermal channels
for limited visibility conditions. The
rifle portion of the weapon has not been upgraded to incorporate ETC
technology, as, at 5.3 kilograms unloaded, the weapon was felt to already be
heavy enough without adding ETC components.
CLG-82/94 7.5mm Assault Carbine and 30mm Grenade Launcher
|
|
6.75mm Carbine
|
30mm Grenade Launcher
|
Types
|
Combination 6.75mm Carbine and
Semi-Automatic 30mm Grenade Launcher
|
Country
|
Chile
|
Weight (Empty, with Optics)
|
5.3 kilograms
|
Length
|
74 cm (Bulk = 3)
|
Action
|
Single Shot or Bursts
|
Single Shots
|
Ammunition
|
6.75x40mm fixed cartridge ball
|
30mm Grenades
|
Muzzle Velocity
|
772 mps
|
275 mps
|
Magazine
|
40 round box
|
4 round box
|
Magazine Weight
|
420 grams
|
540 grams
|
Rate of Fire
|
3
|
2
|
Aimed Fire Range
|
750 meters
|
300 meters
|
Indirect Fire Range
|
N/A
|
700 meters
|
Area Fire Burst
|
10 rounds (AFV = 1.0)
|
N/A
|
Area Fire Range
|
500 meters
|
N/A
|
DP Value
|
0.8
|
Varies
|
Cost
|
Lv350 (commercial sales where legal). Ammunition pricing as per M-78/90 above.
|
M-78/90
Light Machinegun
The M-78/90 light machinegun is a
modernized version of the M-78 light machinegun, adding an ETC sleeve to the
barrel to allow the weapon to function as both a squad level automatic weapon
as well as a platoon or company level general purpose machinegun. Ammunition is identical to that fired by the
F-78 service rifle, though it is pre-packed at the factory in disposable
plastic belts, with similar provisions for attaching a battery unit to power
the ETC components as found on F-78/94 magazines.
M-78/90 Light Machinegun
|
Type
|
6.75mm ETC-Enhanced Light
Machinegun
|
Country
|
Chile
|
Weight (Empty, with Optics)
|
4.5 kg
|
Length
|
90 cm (Bulk = 3)
|
Action
|
Single Shot or Bursts
|
Ammunition
|
6.75x40mm fixed cartridge ball
|
|
Conventional Fire
|
ETC Fire
|
Muzzle Velocity
|
845 mps
|
1000 mps
|
Magazine
|
100 round cassette
|
100 round cassette
|
Magazine Weight
|
1125 grams
|
1800 grams
|
Rate of Fire
|
5
|
4
|
Aimed Fire Range
|
1000 meters
|
1250 meters
|
Area Fire Burst
|
20 rounds (AFV = 2.0)
|
20 rounds (AFV = 2.0)
|
Area Fire Range
|
750 meters
|
850 meters
|
DP Value
|
0.9
|
1.0
|
Cost
|
Lv300 (Lv2 per 100 round cassette)
|
P-90/6 and P-90/10 6mm and 10mm Semiautomatic Pistols
One problem on 23rd and 24th century
battlefields is that handguns chambered for adequately lethal rounds against
unarmored personnel are typically very poor performers against opponents
wearing modern body armor. Various
solutions have been attempted to address this problem, with varying degrees of
success.
One solution, adopted by the Chilean military as well as
some others is the adoption of a pistol which can be easily switched back and
forth between a good generalist pistol caliber (in this case 10x28mm) and a
specialized armor piercing round (in this case 6x28mm). Users can vary ammunition by swapping
barrels; magazines are interchangeable, but the weapon will not go into battery
if ammunition and barrel assemblies are mismatched.
P-90/6 and P-90/10 Semiautomatic Pistols
|
|
6mm
|
10mm
|
Types
|
Semi-automatic pistol
|
Country
|
Chile
|
Weight (Empty)
|
880 grams
|
Length
|
23 cm (Bulk = 0)
|
Action
|
Single Shot or Bursts
|
Ammunition
|
6x28mm Caseless
|
10x28mm Caseless
|
Muzzle Velocity
|
642 mps
|
362 mps
|
Magazine
|
14 round box
|
14 round box
|
Magazine Weight
|
100 grams
|
175 grams
|
Rate of Fire
|
3
|
3
|
Aimed Fire Range
|
50 meters
|
50 meters
|
Area Fire Burst
|
3 rounds (AFV = 0.25)
|
3 rounds (AFV = 0.25)
|
Area Fire Range
|
30 meters
|
30 meters
|
DP Value
|
0.4*
|
0.4
|
Cost
|
Lv100 including both barrels, Lv80 for weapon with single
barrel (Lv2 per 100 rounds, either caliber)
|
SM-90/6 and SM-90/10
The SM-90/6 and SM-90/10 are submachineguns chambered to
fire the same 6x28mm and 10x28mm ammunition as the P-90 series of pistols. Substitution of one for the other requires
replacement of the bolt and barrel, which is user level maintenance that can be
done (in theory) without any tools, though in practice changing the barrel
sometimes requires the use of basic hand tools. The Chilean Army issues the SM-90 as a personal defense weapon
for vehicle crews and other personnel needing a very compact weapon system.
SM-90/6 and SM-90/10
|
|
6mm
|
10mm
|
Types
|
Submachinegun
|
Country
|
Chile
|
Weight (Empty)
|
1.5 kg
|
Length
|
53 cm (Bulk = 1)
|
Action
|
Single Shot or Bursts
|
Ammunition
|
6x28mm Caseless
|
10x28mm Caseless
|
Muzzle Velocity
|
706 mps
|
398 mps
|
Magazine
|
30 round box
|
30 round box
|
Magazine Weight
|
200 grams
|
375 grams
|
Rate of Fire
|
5
|
5
|
Aimed Fire Range
|
100 meters
|
100 meters
|
Area Fire Burst
|
10 rounds (AFV = 1)
|
10 rounds (AFV = 1)
|
Area Fire Range
|
70 meters
|
70 meters
|
DP Value
|
0.5*
|
0.5
|
Cost
|
Lv200, including ammunition conversion kit (Lv2 for 100
rounds of either ammunition type).
|
INDEX
Chile is 2300AD suffers from one of, if not the most,
internally contradictory histories of any Earth nation – notably suffering this
fate internal to the Adventurer’s Guide, with the ever delightful Earth/Cybertech
Sourcebook offering no improvement.
The nation is said to have been an essentially perpetual
Argentinean ally (beginning in 2024) in the broader Argentina-Brazil conflict
(AG 10), but there is no mention of any Chilean participation in the 1st
or 3rd Rio Plata Wars, and explicit mention of the nation not
participating in the 2nd Rio Plata War.
Curiously, though neither Chile or Bolivia took part in the
2nd RPW, and that war is basically presented as a draw insofar as
Argentina and Brazil are concerned.
Apparently, however, the Brazilian “victory” is, at the same time,
sweeping enough in diplomatic or military terms to force the transfer of the
Arica Strip from Chilean control to that of its ally, Bolivia (AG 10). Adding to the confusion of this whole issue,
the Strip was either given to Bolivia as a result of the 2nd Rio
Plata War, which ended in 2237 (according to the AG entry for Bolivia) or it
was given to Bolivia thirty-seven years later in 2274 (according to the AG
entry for Chile on the same page).
In short, Chile seems to be the victim of poor proofreading, in addition
to whatever good or bad befell it during the GDW wargaming that produced the
2300AD timeline.
The Earth/Cybertech Sourcebook does not provide much
clarification to this situation, apparently seeing no contradiction in the
above situation that cannot be rectified by changing the basic narrative with
some minimal references to Bolivia participating in the 2nd Rio
Plata War, but still not explaining the stripping of territory from a
non-belligerent Chile at the end of a war that neither Brazil nor Argentina won
decisively.
The easiest reconciliation of all of the above would seem to
be simply positing that the Bolivia/Chile/Arica Strip situation occurred during
the 1st Rio Plata War, when Brazil’s victory was such that it could
dictate this sort of outcome. One could
perhaps posit Bolivia remaining in the Brazilian camp, with Chile and Bolivia
nearly coming to blows during the 2nd Rio Plata War, and then
defecting to the Argentinean camp in time for the 3rd RPW without
any significant departures from broader timeline beyond the rationalization of
an otherwise incoherent bit of South American history concerning the Arica
Strip.
That is, in any case, the route I’ve chosen. Any departure from the standard 2300AD
timeline in this article is deliberate and an attempt to make sense of highly
contradictory material.
More generally, I have depicted Chile as something of an
independent member of the Argentinean military alliance. Partly this is due to the historic animosity
between those two nations, which GDW seems to have conveniently glossed over in
the game’s timeline (as they so often seemed inclined to do). Partly it is because I think Chile has the
ability to do so, unlike, say, Uruguay, which is smack in the middle of any
confrontation between Brazil and Argentina.
And finally it is because the tension between Bolivia and Chile, while
poorly elaborated on, seems to be a noteworthy and complicated aspect of the
South American military and diplomatic arena.
INDEX