Ejército Venezolano
INTRODUCTIONOne of South America’s smaller nations, Venezuela currently is involved in a longstanding counterinsurgency against guerillas supported by the Inca Republic. The nation’s military is an experienced, and skilled, counter-guerilla formation. A greater threat to the nation is the possibility of Mexican or Inca conventional attack during the continent’s anticipated 4th Rio Plata War.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThanks to Dan Hebditch, David Gillon, and Jason Weiser for input and feedback on various aspects of the 2300-era Venezuelan Army. Various weapons systems mentioned below are the work of other authors, and are credited at the end of the article. NARRATIVE
Mishimishima-boweiteri had been a remote town deep
in the Guyana Highlands, along the banks of the Rio Mavaca, prosperous
enough to support its own church and the small and quaint Hotel Napoleon,
gathering place of expatriate anthropology and sociology students from
throughout Europe and the Americas seeking to study the Yanomamö Indians,
the recently arrived colonistas from the coast, and the syncretic
cultural traditions developing between the two. At least it had been until May, 2293, when the local
insurrectos had murdered four Canadian graduate students, declaring
them enemies of the indigenous peoples of Venezuela and French spies. International notoriety had been brief, and after
that the place had collapsed into a small and struggling village of
less than two-hundred, mostly Yanomamö, as the loyalist
colonistas fled back to the coast, and most of those who
supported the revolution went over the border into Inca territory. . Sargento Ayudante Juan Gonzalez stepped out of the jungle and into the daylight that bathed
the village, his patrol of four
other Venezuelan special forces soldiers and twenty Yanomamö militiamen
following him slowly, eyes alert to threats or anything that seemed
simply unusual. There was a time
when the villagers would have fled at the knowledge soldiers were coming,
but Gonzalez and the rest of Batallón de Fuerzas Especiales 199 had spent the last four years working to dissuade that fearfulness.
Today, his patrol was greeted with smiles from the locals, who
knew the patrol brought medical care, mail from the outside world, and
would pay in cash for a leisurely midday meal spent sitting with the
village mayor and other citizens,conversing in Spanish-Yanomamö Creole
and listening to both their complaints concerning the distant central
government as well as any news of the insurrectos. Sargento Ayudante Gonzalez would then do what he could to correct
both, working from his meager budget on the one hand, and relying on
his patrol’s organic firepower and a waiting quick reaction force of
Cazadores Paracaidista for the other. It was far from
glamorous, but it had largely driven the insurrectos from this village
and the other settlements in Gonzalez’ company’s territory, pushing
them back across the border into Inca lands and cutting them off from
the local populace. At least for the time being; the rebels seemed
to have been knocked back by the government’s counteroffensive over
the last several years but there was no sign that the camps across the
border were depopulated, nor any sign that the insurrectos had abandoned the struggle. Gonzalez expected
a renewed push from across the border and would spend this afternoon
speaking with the villagers and listening carefully for any hint or
suggestion of an increase in activity in his sector.
It was a slow and uncertain work, but it was also highly effective.
INDEXOrder of Battle Organisation of the Ejército Venezolano Divisions and Separate Brigades Personnel, Recruiting and Training ORDER OF BATTLE
Regíon Militar Norte
I División Aero-Blindado III División de Infantería Motorizado VI División Aero-Blindada X Cuerpo de Ingenieros 94ta Brigada de Artillería de Campaña Autopropulsado 97ma Brigada de Fuerzas Especiales Regíon
Militar Occidental
II División Aero-Blindado V División de Infantería Motorizado VIII División de Infantería de Selva 93er Brigada de Cabellería Contraguerillas 99na Brigada de Fuerzas Especiales Regíon
Militar Oriental
IV División de Infantería de Selva VII División de Infantería Motorizado 91ra Brigada de Cabellería Contraguerillas
CURRENT DEFENSE ISSUES AND FOREIGN RELATIONSThe most pressing issue currently facing the Ejercito Venezolano and other elements of the Venezuelan armed forces (Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales) is the Inca Republic-sponsored insurgents of the Venezuelan Indigenous Peoples’ Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario de Gente Indígena Venezolano), the Indigenous Liberty Brigade (Brigada de Libertad Indígena) and the several smaller offshoots of those two organizations. The insurgency began in the southern, economically impoverished estados of Amazonas and Bolívar shortly after the end of the 3rd Rio Plata War, though it remained at a low (though distressing) level until the absorption of Colombia into the Inca Republic ten years later. At the time, guerilla activity increased dramatically, primarily owing to the influx of assistance and support from “old” Inca regions (Peru and Ecuador), but also stemming in part from traditional rivalry between Venezuela and Colombia. The insurgency seems to have reached its high-water mark in 2294, when the guerillas staged a number of highly publicized terrorist actions in Caracas and Maracaibo (the so called “Battle of the Cities”), and were operating in battalion-strength in the two southern estados sympathetic to the insurrectos, as well as in the mountains south of Maracaibo. The tide began to turn in the government’s favor in the following year, as the Ejército instituted reforms and reorganization to improve its performance against the insurgents. The deployment of the newly reorganized IV División de Infantería de Selva to Amazonas in 2298, followed by a number of highly successful operations, aided by the 97ma Brigada de Fuerzas Especiales, did much to reduce the level of insurgent activity in the province, though it has not eliminated it entirely. At this point, the insurgency remains active, however, operating out of bases inside Inca territory and drawing financial and logistical support from the Incas, Argentina, and Mexico (though the latter two are more discrete about their participation). The Ejército Venezolano has increasingly attempted take the war to these base camps, bringing it into occasional clashes with the Ejército Nacíonal de República Inca and government-affiliated paramilitaries. Incidents have grown more common in the last five years, bringing to two nations to the brink of war on a number of occasions, most notably in late 2298 after an Incan Navy S-922 class subfighter ran aground in Venezuelan waters near Maracaibo, most likely on a mission to infiltrate insurgents into the region. Inca attempts to extricate the vessel and/or its crew prompted a clash between in the littoral region that left one Inca frigate sunk and forty to fifty military personnel on each side dead. The stranded subfighter was recovered by the Venezuelan government, and used extensively in propaganda, though the fate of its crew, and any passengers, remains unknown. A less immediate, though more menacing, threat to Venezuelan security is the possibility of armed incursion by Mexico, either alone or in conjunction with the Incas. Ostensibly, Venezuela is neutral in the broader South American conflict between Brazil and Argentina. However, the nation resides in Brazil’s northern flank and a hostile Venezuela would easily threaten the Brazilian Tantalum mining operation in the Pitinga deposit in Amazonia. This threat has been taken quite seriously by Brazil, wary of a further extension of hostile powers along its northern flank. France, for its part, has been less than enthusiastic about the prospects of a pro-Inca government in Venezuela (or absorption of Venezuela into the Inca Republic) on the border of French Guyana. As a consequence, the two nations have been supplying substantial military and financial aid and assistance to Venezuela since the start of the insurgency. The United Kingdom and the United States, both nations with vested interests in opposing a “domino effect” on the northern coast of South America, have also become embroiled in the conflict. Within the last few years, the Netherlands has also become involved in the war, as guerilla activity and cross-border maritime infiltration has resulted in a number of attacks on Dutch citizens or property in the Netherlands Antilles and on Aruba. The situation in Venezuela is complicated by some degree of ambivalence within the Venezuelan government towards both the Brazilian and French aid keeping the country afloat. Few, if any, members of the Asamblea Nacional are sympathetic to the insurgency, but a number object to the increasing prominence of Brazilian and French interests in the country, both nations previously having been considered rivals and threats to Venezuelan autonomy. Many also object to the Ejército’s support for the Ejército Nacional de Colombia Libertad (ENCL) insurgents who are engaged in trying to force Colombia back out of the Inca Republic, feeling that this somehow makes the Venezuelan position no better than that of the Inca Republic. As a consequence, there have been a number of unfortunate and costly security leaks to the nation’s media from anonymous government officials that have been capitalized on by the insurrectos or the Ejército Nacional de República Inca (ENRI).
FOREIGN
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
At any given time, there are a number of foreign military personnel, estimated to number in the low thousands, actively deployed in Venezuela. These personnel are primarily Brazilian, French, American, and British, though the Portuguese and Dutch militaries have also had occasion to operate in Venezuela. Most of these personnel are drawn from the special operations communities of their respective nations, and are variously involved in assisting in the training of the Venezuelan military, serving as advisors alongside field units, and engaging in operations alongside, or sometimes independent of, the Venezuelan special forces. The operations these units involve themselves in can occur anywhere in the country, though unofficially the estado of Bolívar is considered the “French sector,” while Brazil concentrates on neighboring Amazonas. The American zone is generally defined as the llanos savannah bisecting the country from east to west, and the British and Dutch are primarily active in the coastal provinces and littoral regions of the country. These sectors are not formally defined, but it has become customary for the “owning” nation or nations to be apprised of any operations in their area. There are also a number of paramilitary security corporations active in Venezuela, fulfilling various security contracts, primarily for foreign corporations doing business in the nation. These security corporations typically rely on former special operations and, in some cases, former civilian law enforcement personnel, augmented by carefully screened Venezuelan employees (usually former Venezuelan military personnel). Though relationships between the French, Brazilian, British, American, and Dutch official contingents operating in Venezuela are usually good, there is significantly more tension between the paramilitary security corporations working in country, with various firms with strong national identification (and often composed of former members of the same military units deployed to Venezuela) competing for finite numbers of contracts and funding. There have been occasions where military personnel have overly involved themselves in the contracting process, usually to assist one firm or another based on personal friendships with former military personnel. French involvement in Venezuela is primarily the domain of the Groupement des Troupes Spéciales de la Force d’Action Rapide and Groupement des Troupes Spéciales Terrestres, with the organizations generating temporary detachments and task forces for service in Venezuela. This involvement tends to primarily consist of direct action missions, as any French training for the Venezuelan military is done across the border in Guyana at the French military’s Jungle Warfare School and other facilities. The French government takes pains to keep this intervention as covert as possible, and does not maintain any major facilities within Venezuela, instead relying on existing bases in Guyana or off-shore support from the French Navy for its needs in the region, though there are rumors of DGSE affiliated operations being run out of the embassy in Caracas, which also contains a military mission involved in the transfer of equipment to the Venezuelan military. French activities are something of an open secret, but the French media has not taken any special interest in Venezuela, outside a few in the extreme left who have accused the French government of propping up an oppressive regime (albeit a democratically elected one that enjoys substantial popular support in most parts of the country.ing popular national support) regime opposed to the rights of indigenous peoples. It is believed that there is a fairly substantial French staging base at Matthews Ridge, a small mining community near the Guyana-Venezuela border. Brazilian forces in Venezuela are all under the control of the 3o Grupo de Operaciones Especiais (3rd Special Operations Group), with the Group maintaining an austere forward headquarters and stagin base at the confluence of the Rio Mavaca and Rio Orinoco, deep in the Guyana Highlands, known formally as Local Evora (“Site Echo” using standard English phonetic alphabet) and more informally as Nossa Senhora dos Secretos (“Our Lady of the Secrets”). A second base, Local Setúbal (Site Sierra), is located outside the settlement of Cabruta on the northern edge of the estado of Bolívar, and is used primarily by the Brazilian Air Force’s special operations aviation units, both to support Brazilian and Venezuelan operations. Forces deployed in-country vary, but typically involve elements of the Group’s 1o or 3o Batalhão de Forças Especiais (special forces battalion) and elements of an attached Batalhão de Comandos Aníibios (special operations battalion) from the Brazilian Marine Corps. A company of Caçadores Pára-quedista (airborne rangers) from 3rd SOG’s 2o Batalhão de Caçadores Pára-quedista and two search and rescue teams from the Brazilian Air Force’s 1o Esquadrão Aeroterrestre de Salvamento are maintained at Cabruta with aviation and hover AFV assets from 3rd SOG to serve as a quick reaction force. The Brazilian Air Force usually forward deploys an Esquadrão de Operaciones Especiais Brazilian military forces tend to operate in close cooperation with the Ejército Venezolano’s 99na Brigada de Fuerzas Especiales and VIII División de Infantería de Selva and are concerned primarily with eradicating the insurrectos along Brazil’s northern border. Brazil is known to support the anti-Inca guerillas of the Ejército Nacional de Colombia Libertad, who operate number of clandestine staging bases in Venezuelan territory, but it is believed that this support is channeled through the civilian Direccao de Seguranca (at least in Venezuela), rather than the military.
American forces in Venezuela all fall under the command of Joint Special Operations Task Force 202 (JSOTF 202), headquartered at Forward Operating Base Guanare, outside the city of the same name in the estado of Portuguesa. An Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) is maintained outside Willemstad in the Netherlands Antilles, primarily manned by logistics support and signals/intelligence personnel, though small operational teams sometimes operate out of the ISB (though such requires coordination with the Dutch, which sometimes proves problematic). The USN special warfare units deployed in Venezuela generally operate out of the Armada Venezolano’s base at Maracaibo. SOCOM units deployed in country typically include up to an entire battalion from the 5th Special Forces Group (sometimes augmented by elements of the 7th Special Forces Group and or reservists from the 20th Special Forces Group), a platoon-sized Mobile Training Team (MTT) from SEAL Team 3, and a reinforced company from the 75th Ranger Regiment serving as a quick-reaction and/or direct action mission force. An aviation task force drawn from either the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment or the USAF’s 1st Air Commando Wing, a reinforced troop of hover AFVs from the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Airborne), and a small Special Boat Unit from Littoral Special Warfare Squadron 3 provide additional operational and tactical mobility for JSOTF 202. A team drawn from one of the USAF’s Air Commando Tactical Squadrons provides combat control and CSAR support, as needed. Besides SOCOM assets, America also deploys a reinforced company of infantry from either XVIII Airborne Corps units or the 2nd Marine Division to provide local security for the joint American-Brazilian signals intelligence station near Mérida. This unit reports to JSOTF 202 while deployed, but is not subject to any additional taskings. British forces operating in Venezuela are believed to consist both of operatives from the civilian intelligence services as well as military teams drawn from various UKSF units, including regular and Territorial Army elements of the SAS and SBS. Like the French military, British operations tend to base out of the Jungle Warfare School in Guyana, though a small presence is maintained at the Dutch naval bases at Oranjestad and Willemstad. British operations appear to primarily consist of cooperative ventures with the Ejército and Armada Venezolano in the coastal/littoral region and in urban counter-terrorist operations, though, like all other foreign nations active in Venezuela, British special operations units can be encountered anywhere in the country. Dutch involvement in the conflict primarily consists of a cooperative patrol policy between the Dutch and Venezuelan navies in the littoral region between the South American mainland and the Dutch holdings offshore in the Antilles. In this endeavor, the Koninklijke Marine operates in a “weapons tight” capacity, being restricted to firing only in self-defense or if a vessel subject to boarding has repeatedly ignored warnings. However, contact and targeting data is freely shared with the Venezuelan Navy and Air Force, and Dutch participation has made surface and subsurface infiltration of insurgents or supplies through the Caribbean much more difficult. The Dutch Marine’s SBS squadron and the Army’s Regiment Commandotroepen have taken part in a number of more offensive direct action missions against groups or individuals known to operate in support of the insurgency in the Carribean (sometimes alongside UKSF assets in country, sometimes in concert with the Venezuelans), though the Dutch involvement in mainland Venezuela is comparatively limited.
ORGANIZATION OF THE EJÉRCITO VENEZOLANO
|
Enlisted Rank |
Equivalent or Typical Responsibility |
Officer Rank |
Equivalent |
Soldado |
Private (first 18 months of conscription) |
Subtenente |
Platoon Leader |
Soldado Distinguido |
Private (last 12 months of conscription) |
Tenente |
Company 2nd in Command or senior Platoon Leader |
Cabo Segundo |
Fire Team Leader |
Capitán |
Company Commander |
Cabo Primero |
Squad Leader/AFV Commander |
Mayor |
Battalion 2nd in Command, Senior Battalion Staff Officer, or senior Company Commander |
Sargento Segundo |
Platoon Sergeant |
Tenente Coronel |
Battalion Commander |
Sargento Primero |
Company 1st Sergeant or Sergeant Major |
Coronel |
Brigade 2nd in Command, Brigade Senior Staff Officer |
Sargento Ayudante |
Battalion and Higher Senior NCO |
General de Brigada |
Brigade Commander |
|
|
General de Division |
Division Commander |
|
|
General de Region |
Military Region Commander |
|
|
General en Jefe |
Chief of Staff |
The Ejército Venezolano employs a number of different weapons systems obtained from various international sources, as outlined above in the organizational section. The standard small arms systems are the old, but functional, Czech-Polish vz 68 series, with Argentinean F-7 laser rifles (locally produced under license) serving as a squad-level marksman’s weapon and the indigenous M-7 light machinegun in the light and medium machinegun role. The AMEDI 30mm add-on grenade launcher is utilized with the vz 68 assault rifle for additional squad-level firepower, while the M-95 rocket launcher provides squads and platoons with a multipurpose weapon used in lieu of plasma guns, dedicated ATGMs, and other weapons systems. The locally produced Modelo 19 5.6mm semiautomatic pistol is on issue as a side arm for officers and other personnel needing a very compact personal defense weapon.
Modelo 70 8mm Machinegun
An indigenous design, used in lieu of the vz 68 light machinegun, the Modelo 70 is designed to function as both a light and medium machinegun, depending on barrel kit fitted. The sustained fire kit, allowing the design to function as a medium machinegun, increases the weight of the weapon, with most weight located forward in the heavier barrel and cooling sleeve. Consequently, the sustained fire kit is normally used only from a bipod, tripod, or other mount. Without the sustained fire kit fitted, the weapon is fairly well balanced and can be fired from the shoulder. The design is functional, and reliable, though not especially remarkable, and somewhat dated in its use of a conventional caseless round. In Venezuelan service, the M-70 is usually equipped with a combination day/night optical sight, incorporating variable magnification (x1, x4, and x8 power settings) and a thermal channel for night operations.
Type: 8mm light machinegun, Country: Venezuela, Weight (Empty): 4.2 kg (LMG), 5kg (sustained fire kit), Length: 85 cm (Bulk = 3), Action: Single Shot or Bursts, Ammunition: 8x39mm caseless, Muzzle Velocity: 700 mps, Magazine: 150 round and 300 round cassette, Magazine Weight: 2.4 kg (150), 5kg (300), ROF: 5, Aimed Fire Range (LMG): 700 meters (900 meters from bipod), Aimed Fire Range (Sustained Fire): 1000 meters, Area Fire Burst: 20 rounds (AFV = 2.0), Area Fire Range (LMG): 300 meters (700 meters from bipod), Area Fire Range (Sustained Fire): 1000 meters, DP Value: 0.8, Price: Lv 380 (Lv 3 per 150-round cassette, Lv6 per 300 round cassette)
Modelo
19
5.6mm Semiautomatic Pistol
A fairly standard automatic pistol, chambered for the same 5.6mm high velocity round developed by FM for their P300 series of pistols. The Modelo 19 is a functional and reliable, though not especially remarkable. It uses the same magazines as the P300. The M-19 has been available for sale to Venezuelan civilians with demonstrable need for a self-defense weapons, and has also been exported, making it fairly common in South America and the Caribbean.
Type: 5.6mm semiautomatic pistol, Country:
Venezuela, Weight (empty): 0.5 kg, Length: 22 cm (Bulk=0),
Action: Single shot or bursts, Ammunition: 5.6x28mm fixed
ball cartridge, Muzzle Velocity: 650 mps, Magazine: 20
round box, Magazine Weight: 0.1 kg, ROF: 3, Aimed Fire
Range: 50 m, Area Fire Burst: 3 rounds (AFV=0.25), Area
Fire Range: 30 m, DP Value: 0.3, Price: Lv200 (Lv3
box 100)
Modelo 95 Rocket Launcher
An indigenous copy of the Brazilian
MD-8 Lança Rojão Universal (multipurpose rocket launcher), the
M-95 is capable of firing a variety of ordnance, making the weapons
system suitable for employment against a wide range of targets.
The basic weapon consists of the launch tube, usually fitted
with a day/night optical sight unit (the latter using a thermal channel)
capable of x2, x4, and x10 magnification.
A laser designator built into the sight unit provides ranging
data, though some versions used by Venezuelan forces incorporate more
expensive optical suites including passive range determination capabilities.
Ordnance consists of a wide range of
100mm guided rockets, including a selectable-attack anti-tank round,
a less expensive direct attack round (used more frequently in Venezuela,
primarily against fortifications), high explosive and flechette anti-personnel
rounds, incendeniary rounds, etc.
Launcher
Type: Multipurpose rocket launcher, Nation: Brazil, Venezuela, others, Weight (empty, with optics): 6 kg, Range: Varies with ordnance, Guidance: Automatic following gunner lock on, Homing Value: Varies with ordnance, Attack Angle: Varies with ordnance, DP Value: Varies with ordnance, Price: Lv2500
A modified version of the Brazilian Martelo LAW, the Martelo II is designed for use with the MD-8/M-95. The weapon has rudimentary guidance by modern standards, and the warhead is lacking in lethality for use against current generation armored vehicles, but it is more than adequate for bunker busting and the like. The weapon is lightweight, allowing a unit to carry Martelo II rounds in bulk for MD-8/M-95 launchers.
The Martelo II is locally produced in Venezuela under license, and is the standard ammunition issued to the Venezuelan Army for use against hard targets.
Type: Light anti-tank weapon, Nation: Brazil, Venezuela, and others, Weight: 4.5 kg, Range: 800 meters, Guidance: Automatic following gunner lock on, Homing Value: 8, Attack Angle: Direct, DP Value: As tamped explosive (EP = 15), Price: Lv500
Martelo III Anti-Armor Missile
A new design unrelated to the earlier
Martelo and Martelo II, the Martelo III is designed
to deal with current generation armor threats. Guidance is still subpar compared to dedicated
anti-armor missile systems like the Blindicide series, the Brazilian-American
Scorpion-AT, or the British Green Hunter, but is effective
at close ranges, especially in restrictive terrain that prevents hover-mobile
vehicles from evading at full speed.
The Martelo III is available to the
Ejército Venezolano, but is rarely issued, with all ordnance
being imported from Brazil. The
are generally only encountered issued to forces deployed along the Colombian
border who may encounter ENRI armor.
Type: Light anti-tank weapon, Nation: Brazil, Venezuela, and others, Weight: 7.5 kg, Range: 1000 meters, Guidance: Automatic following gunner lock on, Homing Value: 14, Attack Angle: Selectable, DP Value: As tamped explosive (EP = 25), Price: Lv1500
MD-81 Míssil Alto-explosiva
A high-explosive round with good anti-personnel
performance, the Brazilian MD-81 (locally manufactured under the designation
M-951), the MD-81 has rudimentary guidance, which is more than adequate
to make it highly lethal against personnel and other soft targets.
Type: Guided high-explosive missile, Nation: Brazil, Venezuela, and others, Weight: 6.5 kg, Range: 800 meters, Guidance: Automatic following gunner lock on, Homing Value: 8, Attack Angle: Direct, DP Value: As explosive (EP = 20), Price: Lv500
The standard Brazilian thermobaric
round for the MD-8, the MD-82, typically of such weapons, packs a very
heavy punch in a compact format. It
is widely used in the Ejército Venezolano for use against fortifications
and other structures.
Type: Guided thermobaric missile, Nation: Brazil, Venezuela, and others, Weight: 6.0 kg, Range: 800 meters, Guidance: Automatic following gunner lock on, Homing Value: 8, Attack Angle: Direct, DP Value: Concussion zone 25 meters (DPV 18), Price: Lv500
A Brazilian anti-personnel round, the MD-87 is a modification of the MD-81, fitted with an improved, pre-cut tungsten fragmentation sleeve (improving penetration of body armor) and selectable for point detonation or airburst.
Type: Guided high-explosive missile, Nation: Brazil, Venezuela, and others, Weight: 6.5 kg, Range: 800 meters, Guidance: Automatic following gunner lock on, Homing Value: 8, Attack Angle: Direct, DP Value: As explosive (EP = 20), Price: Lv500
An unguided, short-range flechette round available for the MD-8, the MD-88 has proven to be extremely useful in jungle engagements, and is used extensively by the Ejército Venezolano.
Type: Unguided anti-personnel rocket, Nation: Brazil, Venezuela, and others, Weight: 5.0 kg, Range: 50 meters, Guidance: N/A, Homing Value: N/A, Attack Angle: Direct, DP Value: 0.6 (x10), Price: Lv200
The Ejército Venezolano employs
a wide range of heavier equipment, again drawn eclectically from the
international arms market. Some
systems are locally manufactured under license (including VCIR personnel
carriers and ABR-76E armored cars), but more are direct imports. The other local production vehicle is the Bolívar light hover-tank,
a design based on the Kangaroo armored personnel carrier chassis.
Bolívar Light Tank
A light tank design engineered jointly
by Indonesia’s Sumatro Fabrique and Venezuela’s Suarez Heavy Industries,
the Bolívar is based on a much modified Kangaroo APC chassis,
significantly reworked to improve armor protection and reduce silhouette.
The design was built to Venezuelan specifications, and represents
a light armored vehicle geared towards operation primarily in a low-intensity
conflict setting (though its thin armor can be a liability in such environments). The Venezuelans have been quite pleased with the vehicle’s performance,
and have fielded it extensively. A
number of other Earth nations also use the Bolívar.
The vehicle’s layout is fairly conventional,
with the three man crew seated in the front of the vehicle in an expanded
version of the former Kangaroo’s driver/commanders compartment. The turret assembly occupies most of the vehicle’s
midsection, with the power plant and turbines at the rear.
Armament consists of the same 6cm mass
driver cannon as found on the Lukis-VIII hovertank in a casemated turret.
On the Bolívar it is fed from two ten-round ready magazines,
with an additional fifty rounds carried in the vehicle’s hull.
This load out is not adequate for high-intensity operations against
other AFVs, but is sufficient for most LIC applications.
A 25mm cannon and 5.5mm machinegun, both coaxial to the main
gun, provide the vehicle with a wide range of firepower options, while
a second 5.5mm machinegun is mounted in a point-defense fast traverse
mount atop the turret for anti-missile work.
Some vehicles mount a pair of launch tubes for Aero-12
antitank missiles and/or a Whisperdrone, though neither is universal
in Venezuelan service, usually being restricted to one or two vehicles
per platoon.
Type: Light hovertank
Crew: Driver, Gunner, Commander
Weight: 22 tons
Displacement Weight: 4500kg
Armor
Plenum: 6
Front: 30
Sides: 20
Top and Rear: 10
Armament
6cm MDC (as per LkPz-VIII)
5.5mm Point Defense Machinegun
5.5mm Coaxial Machinegun
25mm Coaxial Automatic Cannon
Dual Launch Tubes for Aero-13 ATGM (omitted on some vehicles)
Ammunition
70 rounds 6cm (2 x 10 round ready magazines, remainder carried
in hull)
2000 rounds 5.5mm (PD Machinegun)
4000 rounds 5.5mm (Coax)
500 rounds 25mm (100 and 150 round magazines, remainder in hull)
UAV System: Some fitted with Whisperdrone
Signature: 6
Evasion: 5
Sensor Range: 10km
Cargo: 300kg
Max Speed: 200kph
Cruise Speed: 180kph
Off Road Mobility:
Full
Power Plant: 0.75MW MHD turbine
Fuel: 270kg H2
Fuel Consumption: 25 kg/h
Endurance: 10.5 hours
Cost: Lv150,000 (estimated)
Various pieces of Venezuelan kit have been borrowed liberally from the work of others on Etranger. The FAM-90S special operations assault rifle, RPS-2292 combat shotgun, and ML-80 mortar are detailed in Dan Hebditch’s “Commandement de Troupes Spéciales - French Special Forces.” The P300S automatic pistol, L95 light machinegun and L92A1 plasma rifle are described in “British Army 2300: Infantry Equipment” by Dan and Bryn Monnery. The T-10 6cm mortar was designed by Bryn Monnery and is described in the Republic of Texas Army article by Dan, Bryn, Jason Weiser, and myself. The Wellonese SR-96 gauss sniper rifle can also be found in the Texas write up. The Blauvalk drone is described in David Gillon’s article concerning the Boomslang multi-purpose AFV. The Tirat wheeled light vehicles are also from David Gillon’s work. The AMEDI 30mm add-on grenade launcher is from Mark Brown’s “Azania Military Equipment and Defense Industries, Ltd” article. The vz 68 family of small arms, vz 94 binary assault rifle and the vz 97 laser rifle are from my own “Czech and Polish Small Arms” article.
18 August 2005
Copyright James Boschma, 2005