HEIDEGGER AND THE GREEKS:
HERMENEUTICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCHES OF
IGNORANCE, BLINDNESS AND NOT-BEING
IN HEIDEGGER’S BEITRÄGE
PLATO, PLOTINUS AND PROCLUS

by
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submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other university, that it is entirely my own work, and that it may be lent or copied by the Library upon request.

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Date: 21 June 1998
SUMMARY

Concealed in Ignorance, Blindness and Not-Being lie our real themes of knowledge, truth and Being. The condition of possibility for such a thing is a positive role for negation. Plato was the first to take up such a problematic in the *Sophist*, and it forms the core common to the philosophical research of Heidegger and the Neoplatonists, receiving, in all of Heidegger’s works, its fullest development in the *Beiträge*, which, to that extent, present Heidegger’s own brand of Platonism (chapter 1). Working on the same problematic always only following the lead of the *Beiträge*, we seek to see Plato through Heidegger’s eyes. The link between virtue and the divine (*daimōn*) of the problematic of Socratic ignorance is projected in outline as homologous to the inner movement of the *Beiträge* as a whole (chapter 3). What Plato left unsaid in the “flight to the *logoi*” (*Phaedo* 99d), the negative relation to the origin seen preserved in the fear of being blinded of the eclipse-analogy, is projected in outline as homologous to the *Lichtung für das Sichverbergen* of the fifth part of the *Beiträge* (chapter 4). The One in Us of the Neoplatonists, grasped via the negations of Not-Being, is projected in outline as homologous to the Ultimate God of the seventh part of the *Beiträge* (chapter 5). In each case the sketches presented are believed to be pioneering as to analytical method if not result and the most closely related Platonic, Heideggerian and other authorities are considered (chapter 2).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Not in every city may one benefit from a Heidegger club of interested persons, not specialists, which, from the years 1982 to 1988, renewed and amplified my interest in Heidegger that began my senior year in 1973. I was initially inspired to build on this interest and begin a serious study of Heidegger's dialogue with Platonism in 1985, in a course at Boston College given by Professor H. G. Gadamer. I am also in his debt for the many visits in Heidelberg over the years. Professor Charles Rowan Beye first suggested the study of ancient Greek and of German. Professor G. C. Rota was good enough to introduce me to the North American Heidegger Circle and to the methods of phenomenology. Over time, Professor William J. Richardson, S.J. taught me the vast complexities of Heidegger, including those of the Beiträge, and I learned from him the questions that I should ask. Professor John N. Findlay allowed my first appreciation of the intricacies of Plotinus at Boston University during the last seminar he gave on the Enneads before his death. In 1987 I had the singular good fortune to meet Professor John M. Dillon who was gracious enough to take me on despite my limited background in the academic study of philosophy. His wide learning has been a constant inspiration for me. I would like to record an extraordinary gesture by my former law partners of the firm of Weingarten, Schurgin, Gagnebin & Hayes. At a time when they very definitely needed my services, they were kind enough and interested enough in me to allow a leave of absence to study in Dublin.
This dissertation has been a labor of love, and throughout the course of writing it I was able to talk through the subtleties of Neoplatonism with Professor Greg Shaw. My parents have given me all the moral support conceivable through a long process. I am grateful for the use of the O’Neil library at Boston University, the Mugar library at Boston College, and the Andover-Theological, Houghten, Pusey and Widener libraries at Harvard. And finally, I was lucky enough to have had the benefit of countless hours of philosophical conversation with personal friends.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMATIC OF HEIDEGGER AND THE GREEKS

1. Heidegger and the Greeks

As Heideggerians, we seek to uncover Heidegger’s relation to the Greeks. Was Heidegger a Platonist? To what extent can Heidegger’s thinking be understood in terms of Plato’s philosophy? Is there a proper sense to what we may call a Platonic-Heideggerianism?

As Platonists, on the other hand, we seek to discover whether and the extent to which Plato’s thinking can be understood in terms of Heidegger’s philosophy. Is there a proper sense to what we may call a Heideggerian-Platonism?

Our research manifestly moves in a circle. We seek to understand Heidegger through Plato, and Plato, and the Neoplatonists, through Heidegger. How then are we to properly enter this circle?

We do not want to violate the matter by introducing our own, or others’, interpretations of what Plato may have meant by his philosophy, or by introducing our own, or others’, interpretations of what Heidegger may have meant by his thinking. Nor do we want, on the basis of such presuppositions, to compare and contrast different aspects of Heidegger, Plato and
Neoplatonism. Rather, what we want is to questioningly enter the circle itself, so as to let the matters themselves show us the relation we seek between Heidegger and the Greeks.\(^1\)

If we follow Heidegger’s lead to the matters themselves, then the criteria by which we may take a proper orientation to our question of Heidegger’s relation to the Greeks can only be Heidegger’s one and only question: what is the meaning of Being? To questioningly enter the circle, we accordingly ask Heidegger’s question of the meaning of Being in a threefold dispersion. 1.) How did Heidegger understand what Plato thought by Being? 2.) How did Heidegger understand the relation of what he thought by Being to the thinking of Being of Plato? And 3.) how did Heidegger understand the relation of his concept of Being to the philosophical research of the Neoplatonists?

In the winter/spring semesters of 1924-25, two years before the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger addresses our questions in the *Plato’s Sophist* lecture course, to which we now turn. Our purpose here, and throughout, is not to evaluate the accuracy of Heidegger’s understanding, but only to understand it as clearly as we can.

2. How Heidegger Understood What Plato Thought by Being

The text of *Plato’s Sophist* is in two parts; the first treats Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (among other texts of Aristotle), and the second, to which we limit ourselves here, the *Sophist*, giving it an almost line by line exegesis. In the course of Heidegger’s discussions of Aristotle and Plato, both the Presocratics, and, as we shall see, the Neoplatonists, are touched upon.

We shall follow Plato’s discussion of Being in the *Sophist*, and Heidegger’s exegesis in *Plato’s Sophist*, fairly closely, because it is here that Heidegger lays bare the manner that his question of the meaning of Being joins the framework of Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy.

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4 Sections 1-32.

5 Sections 33-81.


7 Cf. Kisiel, who says of Heidegger’s *Plato’s Sophist* lecture course: “In the ‘battle of the Titans over ὄσια’ (246A) historically fought by the early Greek philosophers for the middle ground between matter and idea, the one and the many, being and non-being, he [Heidegger]
The exhibition of Plato’s concept of Being that Heidegger gives in the *Plato’s Sophist* lectures proceeds in three major stages. The first stage considers the views of the “earth-born,”" the second those of the “friends of the Forms,”" and the third stage of the exhibition is given by way of a summary of the first two stages. For each of the stages, we first present the relevant portion of the discussion from the *Sophist*, and then give Heidegger’s interpretation from *Plato’s Sophist*.

The first formulation of the concept of οὐσία Plato advances against the earth-born, those who hold that only what may be grasped by the hands is real (σῶμα). He asks them to admit that the moment of soul, in the conjoint of soul and body, is also to be understood as real, insofar as “whatever can come to be present in a thing or absent from it [τὸ δύνατόν τῷ παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι] is certainly a real thing.”

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9 *Plato’s Sophist*, 321-330.


12 *Sophist*, 246e-248a.

13 *Sophist*, 247a8ff.
Heidegger interprets the sense of “reality” Plato expresses by the formula τὸ δύνατὸν τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι as the “relational” character of the soul’s ability to become present (or absent) to body: “They then will say -- and we must consider this sentence very carefully -- what is determined by the ‘can,’ τὸ δύνατὸν, in the sense of παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι, in the sense of ‘being able to become present and to become absent,’ τινὶ(τῷ), in relation to something else, is in every case something or other.”  

And if they (the earth-born) admit that the soul is both οὐσία and without body, and already granting them that σῶμα is οὐσία, Plato asks them to consider: “When they say that these bodiless things and the other things which have body are alike ‘real’ [εἶναι], what common character that emerges [συμφυές γεγονός] as covering both sets of things have they in view?”

Heidegger explains, that when they say “is” [εἶναι], the common character [συμφυές γεγονός] they have in view is to be understood as that which at the same time is already there for both (the visible the invisible).

“This εἶναι is characterized as συμφυές γεγονός. Φύσις is that which is already present at the very outset. Συμ- means for both together, for the visible and the invisible. Γεγονός (perfect tense) means it is already there, before them. This γεγονός is related to γένος: that out of which they have their ontological provenance.

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14 Plato’s Sophist, 326.

15 Sophist, 247d2ff.
And the συμφυές is that which for both at the same time, for the one and the other, is already there... "16,17

Plato advances to the first stage in his concept of Being in giving them the answer:

“I suggest that anything has real being that is so constituted as to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else [εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν] or to be affected [εἰς τὸ παθεῖν], in however small a degree, by the most insignificant agent, though it be only once. I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but power [δύναμις].” 18

Because the earth-born have nothing better to offer, Plato says they will accept that, 19 and concludes: “That will do, for later on both they and we may change our minds [ἐπεροῦ ἂν φανείη].” 20

What, then, does οὐσία = δύναμις of this first formulation of the concept of Being of Plato mean? For those who admit that σώμα is οὐσία, what is there already is the ability to be affected by another, whereas for those who say that soul is οὐσία, in the conjoint of soul and

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16 Plato’s Sophist, 327.

17 With this Being that is the possibility for both the visible and invisible but is neither visible nor invisible, we glimpse a way of logic that lies outside the usual logic of opposition. That the middle is not excluded is the same principle at work in the understanding of Love in the Symposium (202b1ff), who is neither ugly nor beautiful, but rather is between these two poles. To this extent, both the Platonic concept of Being and the Platonic philosophy of Love belong together. Accord, Heidegger, “Plato saw the ἔπερον very early [referring to Symp. 202b1ff]...,” Plato’s Sophist, 396.

18 Sophist, 247d11ff.

19 Ibid., 247e5ff.

20 Ibid., 247e7ff.
body, what is there already is the ability to effect an other; what is common to both the ability to affect or effect is δύναμις, as ability towards.... . Heidegger interprets:

“Δύναμις is related here εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν and εἰς τὸ παθεῖν. ... Πάσχειν means here simply: to be determined by another. We already know ποιεῖν; it means ἀγεῖν εἰς οὐσίαν, to bring something into being, to help something into being, to genuinely arrange for the Being of a being. What is capable of something like that, what has such a δύναμις, properly is. ... Because these people obviously do not for the moment have anything better at their disposal with which to answer the question of what οὐσία is, they will possibly accept this determination.”21

This δύναμις, as ability towards.... , Heidegger sees as “pure” relation, in the sense of the possibility for one thing and another. In this possibility for the “and,” Being as δύναμις, Heidegger sees nothing other than the Being of what is not (ἦτερον). Heidegger interprets:

“But perhaps, says the ξένος, what is given here in relation to Being will show itself afterwards, to us as well as to them, differently, ἥτερον ἄν φανεῖη (248a1). Plato discovers this ἥτερον precisely in the Sophist, in a certain sense for the first time, as a particular kind of non-being and precisely as the kind that does not express a total difference from the other, or from the one in relation to which it is the other, but instead expresses the fact that every being, insofar as it is, is itself and something other.”22

The second formulation of the concept of οὐσία is obtained in discussion with the friends of the Forms, who hold the always abiding self-same intelligible ideas (εἶδη) as what is real.23

21 Plato’s Sophist, 329.

22 Ibid., 329.

23 Sophist, 248a-249b.
After asking them to admit that “we have intercourse [κοινωνεῖν] with becoming by means of the body through sense, whereas we have intercourse with real being by means of the soul through reflection,”¹ and to admit that “real being ... is always in the same unchanging state, whereas becoming is variable,”² Plato asks them whether the meaning of this “intercourse” is none other than that found in the formulation of Being won against the earth-born, namely, “The experiencing an effect [πάθημα] or the production [ποίημα] of one, arising, as the result of some power [γιγνόμενον ἐκ δυνάμεως τίνος], from things that encounter one another.”³⁴

Heidegger interprets Plato as offering to the friends of the Forms the same “relational” concept of Being (as δύναμις) as he offers to the earth-born; notices its three moments as relata, relation, and as a third thing, the possibility for the former two moments; and isolates the latter as nothing other than the meaning of Being:

“What is κοινωνεῖν in itself? Is it not precisely that which we have already said, namely in the determination of οὐσία as δύναμις? In fact the ξένος now gives each of the two modes of κοινωνεῖν, as κοινωνία, the same definition he had previously offered for οὐσία: ... ‘a being affected, πάθημα, or an affecting, ποίημα, that has γιγνόμενον ἐκ δυνάμεως τίνος, arisen on the basis of a certain ‘can,’ a certain possibility, and out of things that pass over into one another.’ Thus again we have the being with one another, the being related to one another, and the possibility

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¹ With this opposition, the conclusion is inescapable that Plato himself was not beholden to Being simply as the eternity of the Ideas.

² Sophist, 248a11ff.

³ Ibid., 248a14ff.

⁴ Ibid., 248b6ff.
for that. This possibility is nothing else than the meaning of Being.”

The friends of the Forms, however, cannot agree with this formulation, “They reply that a power of acting and being acted upon belongs to becoming, but neither of these powers is compatible with real being.” To determine whether they have good grounds for doing so, Plato asks them to admit “that the soul knows and real being is known,” and gaining that, goes on to show that if they admit that knowledge is either an action or experiencing an effect or both, which they cannot, that implies the co-presence of life, soul and understanding in οὐσία: “But tell me, in heaven’s name, are we really to be so easily convinced that change, life, soul, understanding have no place [μὴ παρείναι] in that which is perfectly real -- that it has neither life nor thought but stands immutable in solemn aloofness, devoid of intelligence?”

Heidegger interprets:

”Note well that it is a matter of the παρείπα of something, the co-existence of something, namely of ζωή, ψυχή, in what genuinely is. We can therefore scarcely believe that life and knowledge do not pertain to beings in the most proper sense; ... Plato has been interpreted to be saying here that the genuine

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28 Plato’s Sophist, 331.
29 Sophist, 248c8ff.
30 Ibid., 248d1.
31 Ibid., 248d3.
32 Ibid., 248d4-7.
33 Ibid., 248d8-e5.
34 Ibid., 249a1-4.
beings, the Ideas, would have understanding, life, and the like. This is sheer nonsense. What the passage says is that φρόνησις, νοῦς and ζωή keep company with the genuine beings; in other words, the meaning of Being must be conceived in such a way that νοῦς, κίνησις and ζωή can also be understood as beings. ... That is, it implies that what is moved and movement itself belong to beings and that the meaning of Being must be conceived on the basis of this constatation and in correspondence with these new facts."35, 36

Recapitulating his position with respect to each of the earth-born, and friends of the Forms, Plato, in a third, and culminating stage,37 arrives at his final formulation of the concept of Being. Over and against the earth-born, knowledge is impossible of the ever-changing,38 while over and against the friends of the Forms, knowledge is impossible of the never-changing,39 which prompts Plato, “like a child,” to call for “both”; namely, οὐσία = στάσις + κίνησις.40

Of the character of this final formulation, Plato tells us that “reality is not motion and rest ‘both at once,’ but something distinct from them,”41 wherein reality is discerned as a “third

35 Plato’s Sophist, 333-334.
36 Hanna Arendt, who attended Heidegger’s Plato’s Sophist lectures, understood that what is here at stake is “an understanding of Being pertains to Being,” Plato’s Sophist, 334 n. 5. Cf. “Being-There as understanding,” Being and Time, 182-188.
37 Sophist, 249b-251a.
38 Ibid., 249b9-11.
39 Ibid., 249b5-7.
40 Ibid., 249c12-d5.
41 Ibid., 250c3-4.
thing,”⁴² one which arises from “taking \([\upsilon \lambda \lambda \alpha \beta \omicron \nu]\) both movement and rest together as embraced by reality and fixing your attention \([\alpha \pi \iota \delta \omicron \nu]\) on their common association with reality.”⁴³

Heidegger tells us how to apprehend this phenomenon of Being as a third thing in the following way:

“1.) the \(\upsilon \lambda \lambda \alpha \beta \epsilon \iota \nu\), the taking together of both in view of something, 2.) \(\kappa \omega \iota \alpha \pi \iota \delta \omicron \nu\), and intrinsically with the former, the pursuing which extracts in seeing. ... What is important ... is to grasp the \(\alpha \pi \delta \epsilon \iota \nu\) in the correct way as an extraction from something and a pursuit of what is thus extracted. In this pursuit, the \(\alpha \pi \iota \delta \epsilon \iota \nu\) comes together with the \(\upsilon \lambda \lambda \alpha \beta \epsilon \iota \nu\), insofar as the taking together of \(\kappa \iota \nu \sigma \iota \zeta\) and \(\sigma \tau \alpha \zeta \iota \zeta\) precisely does not mean to grasp them simply as two but to look away from them, in a particular way, such that in this looking away they are yet still there as those pregivenesses for which the \(\epsilon \nu\), which is supposed to be seen in this \(\alpha \pi \iota \delta \epsilon \iota \nu\), is determinative.”⁴⁴

If Heidegger is right that this \(\epsilon \nu\) of the third thing of the \textit{Sophist} presents Plato’s concept of Being, and if we recall that \(\sigma \tau \alpha \zeta \iota \zeta\) and \(\kappa \iota \nu \sigma \iota \zeta\) mean nothing else than the famous two-worlds, for \(\kappa \iota \nu \sigma \iota \zeta\) here refers to the relation of sensual perception to the sensibles,⁴⁵ while \(\sigma \tau \alpha \zeta \iota \zeta\) refers to the relation of intellectual apperception to the intelligibles,⁴⁶ then with this third thing the conclusion is inescapable that Plato himself was not beholden merely to a two-world

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⁴² \textit{Ibid.}, 250c1-2.

⁴³ \textit{Ibid.}, 250b8-12.

⁴⁴ \textit{Plato’s Sophist}, 341-342.

⁴⁵ \textit{Sophist}, 248a11.

⁴⁶ \textit{Ibid.}, 248a12.
doctrine. Rather, it is the third thing that remains determinative of both worlds in their already being pregiven.

In answer, then, to our first question of what Heidegger understood Plato’s concept of Being to be, we can, in short, now say that it is Being as the “third thing.” Because the discussion by Plato of the concept of Being involved here is motivated in a confrontation with Parmenides,\textsuperscript{47} so much so that it indeed is one which involves an apparent patricide,\textsuperscript{48} we call Plato's concept of Being, over and against the Parmenidean concept of Being, to which it always already belongs, the “Platonic/Parmenidean” concept of Being.

As distinguished from the Parmenidean concept of Being, the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being is first rightly seen as Not-Being, and indeed of the kind that “is.”\textsuperscript{49} Plato does not in the \textit{Sophist} tell us more about this Not-Being that is,\textsuperscript{50} but goes on to consider through the celebrated dialectic of the five highest kinds the concept correlative to Not-Being that allows what is not to be, namely, the ἔτερον.\textsuperscript{51}

We conclude the present topic with an indication of how Heidegger understood the nature of the ἔτερον. For, as we shall see, the concept of the ἔτερον plays a central role in our

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 237aff..

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 241d3-4.

\textsuperscript{49} That is to say, the third thing, seen from the point of view of Parmenides, as not Being, would simply be nothing at all; seen from the point of view of Plato, that opposes Parmenides’ viewpoint and at the same time belongs together with it, this not Being is necessarily the Not-Being that “is.”

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Sophist}, 250e4-251a4.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 251a-264c.
understanding of what is at stake in what we have called Heideggerian-Platonism and Platonic-Heideggerianism.

At the place of the *Sophist* where, after the dialectic of the five highest kinds reaches its end with the showing of the universal presence of the ἐτερον in all things, Plato says of ἀπόφασις: "So, when it is asserted that the negative signifies a contrary, we shall not agree, but admit no more than this -- that the prefix 'not' indicates something [τι μηνύει] different from the words that follow, or rather from the things [τῶν πραγμάτων] designated by the words pronounced after the negative."\(^{52}\)

Heidegger interprets this ἀπόφασις, which is cognate to the ἐτερον,\(^{53}\) in terms of a “productive negation”:

"This characterizes ἀπόφασις explicitly as τι μηνύει, as 'showing something,' and indeed τῶν πραγμάτων, 'of the matters themselves.' The μηνύειν of ἀπόφασις is περὶ τὰ πράγματα; i.e., the μὴ has the character of δῆλον, it reveals, it lets something be seen. This denial is presentifying, it brings something into view: namely the otherness of the πράγματα, which as such are encountered in a pre-given horizon of substantive nexuses. Thus the ἐναντίον, as the empty 'opposite,' is different than the substantive 'other.' ... Over and against a blind addressing of something in merely identifying it by name, there is a disclosive seeing of it in its co-presence with others. And in opposition to the mere blind exclusion that corresponds to this identification by name, there is, if our interpretation of ἀπόφασις is correct, a denial which discloses, which lets something be seen precisely in the matters denied. Hence Plato understands the 'not' and negation as disclosive. The denying in λέγειν, the saying 'no,' is a letting be seen and is not, as in the case of the mere exclusion corresponding to the pure calling by name, a letting

\(^{52}\) *Ibid.*, 257b10ff.

\(^{53}\) *Plato’s Sophist*, 387.
disappear, a bringing of what is said to nothing. If these connections are pursued further, it becomes clear that negation, understood in this way, as possessing a disclosive character, can have, within the concrete uncovering of beings, a purifying function, so that negation itself acquires a productive character."\textsuperscript{54}

3. How Heidegger Understood the Relation of What He Thought by Being to the Thinking of Being of Plato

Let us now turn to our second question, and ask, how does Heidegger understand the relation of his own concept of Being to what we have called the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being? If we use \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger’s most celebrated work, as the measure of what Heidegger understood his own question of Being to entail, we know that Heidegger’s project in that work is, as the caption of the published Division One reveals, to give “the interpretation of \textit{Dasein} in Terms of Temporality, and the explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being.”\textsuperscript{55}

If Heidegger understood his own question of Being in \textit{Being and Time} in terms of 1.) interpreting \textit{Dasein} in terms of temporality and 2.) explicating time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being, how did he understand the relation of these tasks to the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being (the third thing)?

What Heidegger in \textit{Plato’s Sophist} says he sees at work in the third thing of Plato’s \textit{Sophist} two years before the publication of \textit{Being and Time} is precisely Being as presence at work, though not explicitly questioned by Plato, and because of that, both 1.) the problem of

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 387-388.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Being and Time}, 7.
time, and 2.) the problem of an ontology of Dasein -- the very matters which he later unfolded in Being and Time.

“What genuinely is at issue in this γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς ὀσιότητας? The issue is the disclosure of beings, the ones that genuinely satisfy the meaning of Being, and consequently the issue is the demonstration of the meaning of ὀσιότητα itself. ...The question of the meaning of ὀσιότητα itself is not alive for the Greeks as an ontological theme; instead they always ask only: which beings genuinely satisfy the meaning of Being and which ontological characters result thereby? The meaning of Being itself remains unquestioned. ...It is precisely the fact that the Greeks did not ask about the meaning of Being which testifies that this meaning of Being was obvious to them. ...The meaning of Being implicitly guiding this ontology is Being = presence. ...We will make use of this meaning of Being (which we ourselves first make visible, although of course we cannot discuss it further in this context), namely Being = presence, because it includes the whole problem of time and consequently the problem of the ontology of Dasein. ...

“The battle is first of all over what primarily and genuinely satisfies the meaning of Being, i.e., presence. That includes a battle over which mode of access to the genuine beings is the original one. ...This question of the mode of access to what most properly possesses Being is not one the Greeks themselves raise as such. But, de facto, they do raise it, insofar as they ask what else still belongs to the Being of beings, whether, i.e., νοῦς would also belong to beings. This remarkable question ... means nothing else than this: if beings are that which always is, still the meaning of Being as presence can have legitimacy only if there is something in attendance on them. The meaning of Being is thus dependent on the possibility that beings can be encountered by a being which possesses something like the present in general" (emphasis mine).  

56 That must wait until Being and Time.

57 Plato’s Sophist, 323-324.
In answer to our second question, then, we can say that Heidegger understood the relation of his concept of Being in *Being and Time* to the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being in the *Sophist* as an unfolding, one that understood itself as joining issue with the same matter as that named by the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being, and that understood itself as exhibiting structures that Plato necessarily saw as such, but did not make, and perhaps could not make, into explicit themes for analysis.

4. How Heidegger Understood the Relation of His Concept of Being to the Philosophical Research of the Neoplatonists

Let us now turn to our third question, and ask, how did Heidegger understand the relation of what he thought by Being to the philosophical research of the Neoplatonists?

There are two places in his commentary on the *Sophist* where Heidegger addresses the relation of the Neoplatonists to what we have called the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being. At the place in the *Sophist* where Plato first brings to summary the results of the battle of the

58 The “third thing” as the first properly existent Not-Being.

59 The meaning of Being as presence, in Plato’s question of which beings satisfy this meaning of Being, and *de facto*, the question of the mode of access to the beings that satisfy this meaning of Being.

60 The question of the meaning of Being as such, and with that, both the problem of time, as the horizon for the question of the meaning of Being as presence, and the problem of *Dasein*, of that being that lets beings be encountered in the present.
Titans concerning ὁσία in this "third thing" that is neither at rest nor in motion, nor both at once, Heidegger says:

"To be sure, it is not that Plato was unaware of the difficulties here, but instead he asked: how can something be which is neither at rest nor in motion, and yet nevertheless is? This question is, for Plato and the Greeks, a very weighty one, if we realize that beings -- as before -- are necessarily either moved or at rest. And now there is supposed to be something which resides beyond these and yet is, and indeed not only is but constitutes Being in the proper sense. This questioning, as it occurs here in the Sophist, later became for the Neoplatonists a locus classicus. They derived from it the idea of the ἐπεκείνα, of what resides beyond all concrete beings: the idea of the τό, of the ἔν, of ὂν. The Neoplatonic commentaries, above all the ones on the Parmenides, take their orientation precisely from this passage in the Sophist."  

From this we can immediately see that Heidegger understood that the research of certain, but unnamed, Neoplatonists, particularly those concerned with the Parmenides, aligned itself precisely about the same state of affairs as Plato did in naming Being as the “third thing,” so much so, that Heidegger referred to that alignment as a locus classicus.

The second passage in Plato’s Sophist where Heidegger discusses the relation of Neoplatonic scholarship to that of the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being occurs at the place where Plato, in the concluding stages of the dialectic of the five highest kinds shows, using

61 Sophist, 250b8ff.
62 Plato’s Sophist, 343.
63 Perhaps the most celebrated Neoplatonic commentary on the Parmenides is the one by Proclus, discussed in chapter 5, below.
motion as the guideline, the ability of otherness to be co-present throughout all the kinds.\textsuperscript{64} Heidegger interprets:

"He [Plato] demonstrates: 1.) over and against the complete difference of κίνησις in relation to στάσις, that a certain ταύτόν of κίνησις and στάσις is indeed possible, 2.) over and against the co-existence of δόν, that κίνησις is a μὴ δόν, and 3.) over and against the difference in regard to ταύτόν, that ταύτόν is also co-present in κίνησις. In the fifth and sixth \textit{Enneads}, Plotinus later took up this passage about the five γένη and set it into a general metaphysical system with the aid of Aristotelian categories.\textsuperscript{65, 66}

Immediately from this we can see that Heidegger understood Plotinus to have worked out in the fifth and sixth \textit{Enneads} the same subject matter that occupied Plato in the concluding stage of the dialectic of the five highest kinds, and \textit{a fortiori}, understood Plotinus as aligning himself about the same states of affairs as Plato did in naming Being as the “third thing.”

In answer to our third question, then, we can now say that Heidegger understood that the Neoplatonists, like Plato, were concerned with the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being, in such a way that it both motivated the researches of certain unnamed Neoplatonists into the ἔπεκεινα, particularly those concerned with the \textit{Parmenides}, and motivated the research of

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Sophist}, 256a7ff.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Plato’s Sophist}, 380.

\textsuperscript{66} Cf. S. E. Gersh, “Plato’s celebrated discussion of the nature of Being and of the so-called megista gene inspired the analysis of the spiritual world pursued as such length by the Neoplatonists. Plato had associated Being with Life and Intelligence, and this authority was sufficient to link the three concepts together more or less permanently in the minds of Plotinus and his successors. ... Again, Plato had associated Being with, in the first place, Rest and Motion, and in the second place, Sameness and Difference, and these five became for the Neoplatonists the ‘categories’ of the spiritual world.” \textit{Kinesis Akinetos, A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus} (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973) 3-4.
Plotinus to set forth his celebrated system in the theological *Enneads*. And since we have already seen that Heidegger understood his own research into the question of Being in *Being and Time* as so motivated in the matter named by the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being as to unfold certain structures necessarily seen, but left unsaid, by Plato, we can conclude that Heidegger understood that he, as well as Plato, Plotinus and certain unnamed Neoplatonists, each in their own way, were indeed concerned with the same, namely, the matter named by the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being.

We complete the present topic by referring to other works by Heidegger dating from the same period as the *Plato’s Sophist* lectures, which show that Heidegger indeed understood his own research into the question of the meaning of Being to move in the same horizon as Plato’s research into Being.

Heidegger, like Plato, claimed in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*67 (285) that what he was after is nothing other than the “*eperkeina tes ousias,*” “but in all sobriety and in the complete disenchantment of purely objective inquiry,” and in *The Essence of Reasons*68 (93–95), he “equated” therewith the transcendence of the *Dasein*: “If we wish to clarify the *agathon*, then, we should take the hint that Plato himself gives and hew to the task of interpreting the essence of the connection of truth, understanding, and Being. Inquiring back into the inner possibility of this connection, we see ourselves ‘forced’ to execute *explicitly* the surpassing that

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happens necessarily, though for the most part covertly, in every Dasein.” Heidegger adds: “We might point out here that the portion of the investigations concerning ‘Being and Time’ published so far has as its task nothing more than a concrete, revealing sketch of transcendence” (97 n. 59).

5. The Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)

*Being and Time* appeared two years after Heidegger’s *Plato’s Sophist* course, and it presents the relation of “Being and time,” adumbrated by his reflections on the “third thing” of Plato’s *Sophist*, in terms of a fully worked out existential-temporal analytic of *Dasein*, that has the one aim of rendering temporality visible as the transcendental horizon for the question of the meaning of Being in general on the basis of that existential-temporal analytic of *Dasein*.

The published portion of *Being and Time* (that is to render temporality visible as the transcendental horizon for the question of the meaning of Being in general on the basis of an existential-temporal analytic of *Dasein*) fails, however, to make plain why such an investigation of *Dasein*, which is, after all, only an interrogation of a being as to its Being, should in principle be able to give any information about Being itself. What remains to be thought is the relation of “time and Being,” which is to say, just how an existential analysis of *Dasein* in terms of time is supposed to uncover temporality as the transcendental horizon for the question about the meaning of Being itself and in general.
As is well known, *Being and Time* is a torso; the Third Division of its published Part I, which was to turn things around under the heading of “Time and Being,”69 and its entire Part II,70 were held back, and never published.71 Needless to say, being held back, just what Heidegger supposed to be at stake in this reversal is difficult to fathom from *Being and Time* itself.

Heidegger’s letter found in the preface to Richardson’s *Heidegger--Through Phenomenology to Thought*72 gives us the clue that what we are on the lookout for, this turn between “Being and time” and “time and Being,” which would complete *Being and Time*,73 and,

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69 Early in January of 1927, as Kisiel tells it, “Heidegger comes to the realization that the composition of the Third Division of the First Part of BT, bearing the title ‘Time and Being’ (cf. SZ 39), was ‘inadequate’ (unzureichend). The later Heidegger (in 1941) recalls this decision in the following words: ... ‘The decision to postpone came to me in the last days of December of 1926 during a visit in Heidelberg with Karl Jaspers. Out of our friendly but lively disputes over the galleys of *Being and Time*, it became clear to me that the elaboration of this all important Division (I, 3) drafted up to that point had to be incomprehensible. The decision to discontinue publication took shape on the day that we got the news of Rilke’s death. -Of course, at the time I thought that in the course of the year everything could be said more clearly. That was a delusion.’” Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 485-486.

70 Which was supposed to present a deconstruction of the history of metaphysics in light of the newly won meaning of Being.

71 Heidegger upon its first publication in 1975 adds a footnote that identifies the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* as a “new elaboration of the Third Division of the First Part of *Being and Time*” (1 n. 1). But this course too remains a fragment of what was originally projected; the last three Divisions of the existing Part II, and the entire Part III were never presented.


73 “Diese Kehre ist nicht eine Änderung des Standpunktes von >>Sein und Zeit<<, sondern in ihr gelangt das versuchte Denken erst in die Ortschaft der Dimension, aus der >>Sein und Zeit<< erfahren ist und zwar erfahren aus der Grunderfahrung der Seinsvergessenheit.” This turn is not an alteration of the standpoint of “Being and Time,” the
with that, would give the fullest exhibition by Heidegger of the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being, is named the “Ereignis.”


Anwesen (Sein) gehört in die Lichtung des Sichverbergens (Zeit). Lichtung des Sichverbergens (Zeit) erbringt Anwesen (Sein).

Es ist weder das Verdienst meines Fragens noch der Machtspruch meines Denkens, daß dieses Gehören und Erbringen im Er-eignen beruht und Ereignis heißt (vgl. ‘Identität und Differenz’, S. 30 ff.) (xxi-xxii).”

The ‘happening’ of the turn you ask about ‘is’ Being as such. It only lets itself be thought out of the turn. No particular manner of happening comes about by means of this. Rather, the turn between Being and time, between time and Being determines itself out of the way that there is Being, there is time. About this ‘there is’ I attempted to say a little in the lecture ‘Time and Being,’ which you yourself have heard here 30 January 1962.

If instead of ‘time’ we put: clearing of the self-concealing of presence (time), then Being determines itself out of the region of

attempted thinking rather first arrives in it at the locale of the dimension from which “Being and Time” is experienced and experienced indeed out of the basic experience of Being’s forgottenness. Martin Heidegger, *Brief Über den Humanismus* (Bern & München: Francke Verlag, 1975) 72.
projection of time. This arises though only to the extent that the clearing of the self-concealing takes into its use a thinking corresponding to it.

Presence (Being) belongs in the clearing of the self-concealing (time). The clearing of the self-concealing (time) brings presence (Being) about.

It is neither the merit of my questions nor the arbitrariness of my thinking that [accounts for the fact that] this belonging and bringing rests in [mutual] appropriation and is called Ereignis (cf. “Identity and Difference,” p. 30 ff).

The Beiträge zur Philosophie are subtitled “Vom Ereignis.” Unlike other works that treat of the turning relation between Sein and Zeit in quite limited respects but otherwise maintain the Ereignis in almost full reticence, such as the “Es gibt” of Time and Being, or the belonging-together that more originally is a belonging-together of Identity and Difference, the Beiträge, as its head quote indicates, present what Heidegger elsewhere long held back in hesitating refusal.

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74 Heidegger himself on the title page of the Beiträge characterizes the subtitle as the “essential subtitle.”


77 “Hier wird das in langer Zögerung Verhaltene andeutend festgehalten als Richtscheit einer Ausgestaltung.”

78 It is interesting to note that just as the unpublished portion of Being and Time was held back, so the Beiträge (written in 1936-1938) were held back by a provision of Heidegger’s will unto the occurrence of the 100th anniversary in 1989 of Heidegger’s birth.
The *Ereignis* as it is worked out in the *Beiträge* renders visible the matter to be thought of *Being and Time*, and with that, the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being in the fullest concretion to be found in Heidegger’s works. To see if we are right, let us draw a preliminary orientation as to what the *Ereignis* ought to tell us about, by reminding ourselves what is at stake in the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being.

In distinction with the Parmenidean concept of Being, that holds only Being is and that not Being is nothing at all, the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being holds that Not-Being is, in the sense that the dialectic of the five highest kinds first proves the existence of a "not" that is not nothing at all (as the ἐναντίον to Being, the one or the other), but rather a not that is productive, insofar as it discloses the Being of what is not (as the ἔτερον, the possibility for the one and the other).

As third thing, this existent Not-being is determined as the possibility for the one (rest) and the other (motion). Possibility is determined as the “relation,” there in advance, wherein both “motion” (the mixing of the body through sense with the sensible) and “rest” (the mixing of the soul through reflection with the intelligible), are said to “be.” In short, as δύναμις, the third thing is the possibility for the mixing of the seer and the seen, whether sensible or intelligible. Although Plato tells us no more in the *Sophist* about this Not-Being that is, it is precisely this relation of seer and seen that Plato further determines in the *Republic* in terms of the sun and growth analogies.⁷⁹

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⁷⁹ *Republic*, 506d4ff.
Just as the light of the sun yokes the eye to that which is visible, so it is the Idea of the Good that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower.\textsuperscript{80} And just as the sun gives growth without being itself generation so the Good gives the objects of knowledge their existence and essence but transcends essence in power and dignity.

With the sun and growth analogies the ἐπέκειναι is determined as ἔτερον.\textsuperscript{81} What is beyond Being, and so is not Being, is not nothing at all. Nor is it determined as a transcendental other. Rather it is the Idea of the Good which gives objects of knowledge their essence and existence, giving truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower. As such it is a δύναμις, understood as the productivity of the ἔτερον, the possibility for the one and the other, the co-presence in knowledge of mortal man (as seer) and God (as Idea of the Good), something prohibited by the Parmenidean concept of Being that holds that only Being is and what is not Being is nothing at all.

\textsuperscript{80} Cf. Proclus, “For the full participation of true wisdom is affected through truth, since this every where illuminates intellective natures, and conjoins them with the objects of intellection, just as truth also is the first thing that congregates intellect and the intelligible.” Proclus, The Platonic Theology, tr. Thomas Taylor (Kew Gardens: Selene Books, 1985) 78.

\textsuperscript{81} Cf. Proclus, “For in the Republic, indeed, he indicates the ineffable peculiarity and hyparxis of the good, through analogy to the sun. ... For on this account the first cause is exempt from all the natures produced by it because every where cause is established above its effects; and on this account the first is nothing of all things, because all things proceed from him. For he is the principle of all things, both of beings, and at the same time of non-beings. ... For negations, as it appears to me, extend a triple peculiarity in things. And that one time, indeed, being more primogenial than affirmations, they are procreative and perfective of the generation of them.” Proclus, The Platonic Theology, 118-119. Also compare the “ontogenetic” character of negation for Armstrong and Trouillard, discussed below in chapter 2, section 2.3.1.
If Heidegger's thinking stems from concern with the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being, and if the Beiträge that treat of the Ereignis indeed represent the fullest concretion of that concern in the writings of Heidegger, then we should expect the Beiträge to conceive of the Ereignis in a way analogous to how Plato conceived Not-Being as Being, namely, in terms of a productive negation that does not exclude the other but rather first grants the possibility for the one and an other.

In section 7 entitled “Vom Ereignis,” he gives this definition:

“Schließlich und zuerst kann das >>Ereignis<< nur er-dacht (vor das anfängliche Denken gezwungen) werden, wenn das Seyn selbst begriffen ist als das >>Zwischen<< für den Vorbeigang des Letzten Gottes und für das Da-sein.”

“The ‘Ereignis’ can only be thought (compelled by beginning thinking) at first and last, if Being itself is conceived as the ‘between’ for the passing-by of the ultimate God and for there-Being.”

At first sight, Being as the “between” for the passing-by of the ultimate God and for Da-sein is so different terminologically that it may seem that Heidegger’s concept of Being in the Beiträge really has little connection with the Idea of the Good or with the third thing of Plato and the Neoplatonists. But in terms of the matter, what we have called the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being, they are homologues. For just as with the third thing that, as Not-Being, is not nothing at all but grants, in knowledge, the possibility for the co-presence of the one (rest) and the other (motion), and just as with the ἐπεκείνα, that as not Being is not nothing at all but grants, in knowledge, the possibility for the co-presence of the one (Idea of the Good) and the
other (man as seer), so it is with \textit{Seyn} as the between, that, "gleich dem Nichts,"\textsuperscript{82} is not nothing at all but grants, in knowledge (\textit{Ereignis in anfängliche Denken}), the possibility for the one (the passing-by of the ultimate God) and the other (\textit{Da-sein}).

6. Heideggerian-Platonism/Platonic-Heideggerianism

If Heidegger understood his question of the meaning of Being to have unfolded the same matter (the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being) questioned by Plato and the Neoplatonists, and if the unfolding of that question achieved its most perfect expression in the \textit{Beiträge}, then we can claim that Heidegger's thinking in the \textit{Beiträge} may indeed be understood as Heidegger's own brand of Platonism. But with that, we have already uncovered the Heideggerian-Platonism we are looking for.

What then is lacking in Heidegger’s works is not a Heideggerian-Platonism, for we already have that, and indeed most fully, in the \textit{Beiträge}, but rather, what is lacking is the proper sense to be given to what we have called a Platonic-Heideggerianism. Not in the impossible sense that Plato was a Heideggerian, but in the sense of a Platonic phrasing of what we have identified as Heidegger's brand of Platonism, which indeed is something that Heidegger himself never provides, but which, as we shall see, lies implicit in the matter of the Heideggerian-Platonism of the \textit{Beiträge}. To this end of explicitly providing a Platonic-Heideggerianism, the investigations of chapters 3-5 are ventured. Since Heidegger himself nowhere makes any such

\textsuperscript{82} For it is said to be “gleich dem Nichts” in section 256 entitled “Der letzte Gott,” \textit{Beiträge}, 415.
venture, it is sure to be controversial, as every scholar necessarily must decide in original reflection on the matters themselves the truth of the Platonic-Heideggerianism we present in chapters 3-5.

If what we have called the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being forms the common core for the reflections of Plato, the Neoplatonists and Heidegger, and if Heidegger on this foundation gave what we have called a Heideggerian-Platonism, that does not mean that they were concerned about it in the same way.

Plato and Aristotle for the first time elaborated in scientific form the range and manner of questioning of what we today most concretely know as ancient philosophy. As the references in the Platonic dialogs and works of Aristotle show, they were aware of the thought of the so-called Presocratics, but for us, much of their thought is preserved only in fragments. The Neoplatonists already had that foundation, but it was mediated by the Middle Platonists, and by the schools of the Garden, the Cynics, the Skeptics and of the Porch.

Heidegger, more than two millennia later than the first Western philosophical researches, had available but a fragment of the materials presumably available to Plato, Aristotle, the Middle Platonists and the Neoplatonists, but also had what was not available to them, the reflections of the Church Fathers, medieval scholars, the German philosophical tradition, the philosophers of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and Nietzsche.83

83 Not to mention Luther and the thinkers of the Reformation, and, among others, German mystics, Zen thinkers and Taoist thinkers.
Heidegger outlines his own way through this mix of history in the *Beiträge*, using the history of the question of Being as the criteria. The *Beiträge* are in six parts, together with an introduction, that serves as a preview of the six parts, and a concluding essay on *Seyn*. The inner movement of the six parts of the *Beiträge* articulates Heidegger’s own way through the matrix of the history of philosophy and defines the jointure wherein Heidegger’s thinking (the so-called “other beginning”), and the thinking of the tradition (the so-called “first beginning”), first play into one another.

Being itself, as Heidegger understands the history of the question of Being in the *Beiträge*, was last seen by Plato (and Aristotle with him), who thus stand as transitional figures at the beginning of an epoch characterized by the collapse of truth and the abandonment

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85 In section 2 entitled “The Saying of Ereignis as the First Answer to the Being-Question,” Heidegger tells us that the thought of the *Ereignis* is motivated precisely in that: “Was gesagt wird, ist gefragt und gedacht im >>Zuspiel<< des ersten und des anderen Anfangs zueinander aus dem >>Anklang<< des Seyns in der Not der Seinsverlassenheit für den >>Sprung<< in das Seyn zur >>Gründung<< seiner Wahrheit als Vorbereitung der >>Zukünftigen<< des letzten Gottes<<.” What is said, is questioned and thought in the “play” of the first and other beginnings towards one another out of the “beginning sound” of Being [that resounds] in the need of Being’s abandonment for the “spring” into Being [that springs] towards the “foundation” of its truth as the preparation of the “coming” of the “ultimate God” (*Beiträge*, 7).

86 *Beiträge*, sections 210, 211.

87 *Ibid.*, sections 210, 211.
of Being.\textsuperscript{88} Modern Western society stands, Heidegger tells us, squarely within the epoch of the collapse of truth and abandonment by Being.\textsuperscript{89}

Asking again the question of Being out of the experience of Being’s abandonment initiates another beginning\textsuperscript{90} in such a way as to reverse the collapse of truth and thereby retrieve and repeat the first beginning.\textsuperscript{91}

To the extent that the \textit{Beiträge} accomplish their stated aim of letting the other beginning play out of the first beginning in the articulated play of the six parts, at the same time, they also deconstructively retrieve the first beginning.\textsuperscript{92} And this deconstructive\textsuperscript{93} retrieve that lies in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibid.}, sections 85, 91.
\item \textsuperscript{89} \textit{Ibid.}, section 58.
\item \textsuperscript{90} \textit{Ibid.}, section 85.
\item \textsuperscript{91} \textit{Ibid.}, section 23.
\item \textsuperscript{92} \textit{Ibid.}, section 90.
\item \textsuperscript{93} “Aber deshalb ist dieses Nein, äußerlich gesehen: die Ab-setzung des anderen Anfangs gegen den ersten, niemals >>Verneinung<< im gewöhnlichen Sinne der Abweisung und gar Herabsetzung. Vielmehr ist diese ursprüngliche Verneinung von der Art jener Verweigerung, die sich ein Nochmitgehen versagt aus dem Wissen und der Anerkennung der Einzigartigkeit dessen, was in seinem Ende den anderen Anfang fordert. Solche Verneinung freilich genügt sich nicht mit dem Absprung, der nur hinter sich läßt, sondern sie entfaltet sich selbst, indem sie den ersten Anfang und seine anfängliche Geschichte freilegt und das Freigelegte zurücklegt in das Besitztum des Anfangs, wo es, hinterlegt, alles auch jetzt und künftig noch über-ragt, was einstmals in seinem Gefolge sich ergab und zum Gegenstand der historischen Verrechnung wurde. Dieses Erbauen des Ragenden des ersten Anfangs ist der Sinn der >>Destruktion<< im Übergang zum anderen Anfang.” “But for this reason, this no, externally seen: the setting-off of another beginning over against the first, at no times means a ‘negation’ in the familiar sense of a rejection and indeed of a debasing. Rather, this original negation is of the kind of that refusal which denies itself out of the knowledge and recognition of the uniqueness of that which in its end demands another beginning. Such negation certainly does not content itself with a spring away which only lets behind itself,
setting of the other beginning out of the first beginning constitutes the inner necessity that makes possible the sketches of the Platonic-Heideggerianism that we attempt in chapters 3-5.

7. Preview of Chapters 3, 4 and 5

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively present sketches of Ignorance, Blindness and Not-Being that draw on the Beiträge, Plato, Plotinus and Proclus. Each theme announces a peculiar "not." For Ignorance does not imply not knowing, nor Blindness not seeing, and Not-Being not nothing at all, as if the negations were to be understood in purely exclusionary terms. The negations suggested thereby are not negative, but rather the titles are meant to suggest the productivity of negation in the sense of the ἐπιθέμων, as Plato in the Sophist was the first to work out, and which, as we have seen, the Neoplatonists also made use. Each chapter takes up the ἐπιθέμων in another respect. In chapter 3, that treats of Ignorance, the ἐπιθέμων is taken up in respect to knowledge. In chapter 4, that treats of Blindness, the ἐπιθέμων is taken up in respect to truth. While in chapter 5, that treats of Not-Being, the ἐπιθέμων is taken up in respect to Being.

As the chapter headings indicate, the character of the sketches is “hermeneutical-philosophical.” By hermeneutical, we mean that each of the chapters conducts an inquiry intended to allow each reader to uncover the matters for themselves in an original, interpretive seeing. As such, they are precisely not doctrinal. Rather, they are phenomenological.

rather it unfolds itself, in that it lays free the first beginning and its originary history and puts back what is laid free in the possession of the beginning, where it, lying under, looms-over everything now and still to come, what at one time could ensue in its train and become the object of historical calculation. This construction of the looming of the first beginning is the meaning of ‘destruction’ in the transition to another beginning” (Beiträge, 178-179).
By philosophical, we mean that each of the chapters conducts its inquiry in the form of a play of question and answer that, at decisive points in the retrieve of something of the matter to be seen in the lens of the first beginning, always only takes its guidance from Heidegger's repetition of the question of Being of the other beginning as it is presented in the *Beiträge*.

With so much said for the place where the investigations of chapters 3-5 are properly to be found, and their character, we now offer a preview of each of the chapters in order, on the one hand, to provide the reader an initial orientation, and on the other, to provide something like a standard of relevance that will permit us, in chapter 2, to discuss the state of present scholarship as it relates to the investigations of chapters 3-5.

In terms of textual materials, the Hermeneutical-Philosophical Sketch of Ignorance of chapter 3 draws freely upon Plato's dialogs, as well as from the “preview” of the *Beiträge*, where Heidegger presents a first view of the movement of thought of the *Beiträge* as a whole. In terms of thematic content and scope, it offers a sketch of the movement of the *Beiträge* as a whole in terms of the problematic of Socratic ignorance.

The Hermeneutical-Philosophical Sketch of Blindness of chapter 4 draws upon the eclipse-analogy of Plato found at 99d of the *Phaedo*, as well as upon the central sections of the fifth part of the *Beiträge*, “Die Gründung.” In terms of its thematic content and scope, it offers an interpretation of the *Lichtung für das Sichverbergen* of the other beginning in terms of what Plato left unsaid in the eclipse-analogy, where he speaks of the truth of the origination of the Ideas.
Chapter 5, where the Hermeneutical-Philosophical Sketch of Not-Being is presented, draws upon *Ennead 6.7* of Plotinus and Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides*, as well as upon the seventh part of the *Beiträge*, “Der letzte Gott.” In terms of thematic content and scope, it offers an interpretation of the ultimate God of the other beginning in terms of the One in Us of the Neoplatonists.

The investigations allow themselves to be exhibited in the form of homologues, which we present below.

8. Chapter 3: Productivity of Negation as Ignorance Giving Knowledge

With respect to the productivity of negation as giving knowledge, the left-hand column of the Table below presents our sketch of the Platonic-Heideggerianism of the first beginning as the homologue of the Heideggerian-Platonism of the right hand column. Our claim is twofold. On the one hand, we claim that the order of the terms arranged in the left-hand column is determined by the order of the terms of the right hand column. That is to say, we project a Platonic-Heideggerianism on the basis of the Heideggerian-Platonism that we believe, for the reasons presented above, to be present in the *Beiträge*. On the other hand, we claim that the meaning of each of the terms of the left-hand column is determined by way of the meaning of the corresponding terms in the right hand column.

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<th>Paideia</th>
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<td>in</td>
<td>in</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socratic Ignorance</td>
<td>anfängliches Denken</td>
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</tbody>
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41
The left-hand column, which links virtue, as the *aretē* of the soul, with the divine (*daimōn*), is to be read as the *Paideia* in Socratic ignorance as knowledge (virtue) gives *eudaimonia* and its *daimonion*. The right hand column sketches the inner movement of the Beiträge taken as a whole, and is to be read as the *Ereignis* in *anfängliches Denken* as *Verhaltenheit* gives *Geschichte* and its holy (Being as refused). The left hand and right hand columns are homologues, which means to say, *Paideia* corresponds in meaning to the *Ereignis*, ignorance to *anfängliches Denken*, and so on.

Chapter 3 is divided under eight (8) headings.

In section one, the *euporia* to the *aporia* of Socratic ignorance is said to lie in a *paideia*, one which manages to see a “presence in an absence,” and therewith “something” in “nothing,” in spite of its supposed Eleatic impossibility.

If this *paideia* is the *Wissen of Wesen*, the *Ereignis* as beginning thinking, as section two shows, then, as section three shows, the *aretē* of those so instructed is a *Verhaltenheit*, one which preserves “not-knowing” positively, and indeed in a loneliness near to the self-hiding.
Then the *paideia* reaches its term, *eudaimonia* as *Geschichte*, as section four shows.

The *daimonion* of such *eu-daimonia*, that as *daimonion* is intermediate between the divine and man in such way as to “bring messages between” the divine and man, is, then, as sections five and six show, none other than the “futural” ones (*die Zukünftigen*) who, in the silence near to the self-hiding, stand in the coming of the holy (being as refused).

But such ones are the ones who live and grow truly, *genesis* as *Entscheidung*, as section seven shows.

Section eight then “rounds off” chapter 3, by showing the complement of the matter treated in sections one through seven, and is limited to showing that, just as *eros* is what Socratic ignorance is not, so *das Unseiende* is what Being is not (*the Enteignis in the Ereignis*).

9. Chapter 4: Productivity of Negation as Blindness Giving Realm of Truth

The *Phaedo* by the eclipse-analogy (99d) presents the theory of Ideas as originating out of a fear of being blinded. The truth of the Ideas, as something positive, is thereby said to originate in something negative, the fear of blindness, but Plato only says that it is so, but leaves unsaid the sense of how it is so, beyond saying that the Ideas are "second best" when seen in such an origination.

With respect to the productivity of negation as giving the realm of truth, the left-hand side of the Figure below presents our sketch of a Platonic-Heideggerianism of the first beginning as the homologue of the Heideggerian-Platonism of the other beginning of the right-hand side of the figure. The top left figure illustrates the "ontic" aspects of the eclipse-analogy, showing the
"sun," the concern for "seeing," and the "fear of blindness" that relates the two. The bottom left figure illustrates the "ontological" aspects of the eclipse-analogy, showing the "One," the "zugon," and the "negative-relation to the origin" that relates the two. The One corresponds to the sun, the zugon (as always-seeing-in-the-light of truth) corresponds to the concern for seeing, and the negative relation to the origin corresponds to the fear of blindness.

The right-hand side of the Figure illustrates the "Grund," understood as the "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen," that arises out of the "Sichverbergen" by way of a "presence of an absence," that relates the two.

Just as the zugon (always-seeing) and the origin are negatively related (fear of being blinded), so the Grund, i.e, the Lichtung für das Sichverbergen, and the Sichverbergen are negatively related (presence of an absence).

Chapter 4 first recalls the place in the Phaedo where Plato presents the so-called eclipse-analogy, and seeks to find the euporia to the aporia of how the ideas are second best if seen as originating in response to a fear of being blinded in thereby preserving, but otherwise leaving unsaid, what we call a "negative relation to the origin." As Plato left unsaid the character of this negative relation to the origin, the fourth chapter goes on first to interpret section 110 of the Beiträge, that explicitly treats of the Platonic ideas, in terms of the collapse of what we call the negative relation to the origin, and then goes on to interpret the group of sections entitled the "Essence of Truth," which group of sections occupy central place in the fifth part of the Beiträge captioned "Die Gründung," in terms that reverse the collapse of the negative relation to the origin.
origin, seeing the not of “not being-blinded” preserved in the “always-seeing” in a light, which is to say, the zugon, as the Grund, the Lichtung für das Sichverbergen of the Da-sein.

10. Chapter 5: Productivity of Negation as Not-Being Giving the One in Us

Unlike for the investigations of chapters 3 and 4, the investigations of chapter 5 do not permit of graphical representation. In chapter 5, we claim that the time-space of the stillness of the passing-by of the ultimate God of the Heideggerian-Platonism of the other beginning is the homologue of the negations of Being that give the One in Us of the Platonic-Heideggerianism of the first beginning. Once more, something negative gives the positive, but not the other way around.

Chapter 5 first investigates the earliest fragment of the Neoplatonists where the One in Us is presented, then, turning to Proclus to learn what light he may have to shed on the matter of the One in Us, finds that the negations of Being are for him “productive,” and indeed of the Idea of the Good, and thereafter refers to Plotinus as confirmation of Proclus, both of whom make use of the image of a “choral dance” to preserve something of the way the productivity of the negations of Not-Being give the One in Us. Chapter 5 then turns to the seventh section of the Beiträge, finds that for Heidegger, as for Proclus, the refusal (negation) of Being is “productive,” as “Verschenkung,” the gift of the openness of the self-hiding as the no-longer and not-yet of space-time, which, for Heidegger, as for Proclus and for Plotinus, reveals itself as a “choral dance,” indeed one where “belonging’s encountering of need and need’s looming in encountering so circle as to be something originating: Being as arrival, happening in itself,
as fountain or wellspring, precisely as the tension between God and man, God’s Vorbeigang and man’s Geschichte” (Beiträge, 413).
CHAPTER TWO

RELATION TO OTHER WORKS IN THE SAME FIELD

2.1 Productivity of Negation as Ignorance Giving Knowledge--General Orientation to Works in the Same Field

If we have achieved anything in attempting to follow Heidegger’s lead in Chapter 3, Hermeneutical-Philosophical Sketch of Socratic Ignorance, it would be to have rendered visible in outline a projection of the problematic of Socratic ignorance as the homologue to the inner essence of the movement of the Beiträge as a whole on the basis of the homologous way the productivity of negation works for both problematics. Insofar as our analytical method is concerned, chapter 3 is believed to be “pioneering.” But as to result, the linkage projected between virtue, as the aretē of the soul, and the divine (daimōn), the story is quite different. For our “discovery” amounts, as we shall see, to little more than a recovery of what the ancient tradition of philosophy, almost without exception, already knew. It is only we moderns for whom it may be something of a discovery. Contemporary Heideggerian scholarship of the Beiträge, despite the deep roots in the tradition that Heidegger everywhere displays, has, as we shall see, almost always remained bound to analysis of Heidegger in his own terms as if his philosophy were somehow self-standing. As a result, our claim, that the link between virtue, as the aretē of the soul, and the divine, is homologous to the inner essence of the movement of thought of the Beiträge as a whole, remains almost without anticipation from the side of
We should note, in passing, a sixth, the Skeptics, who, apparently taking Socratic ignorance literally, embraced the paradoxical position of an anti-dogmatic knowledge. For the Skeptics, see, for example, Edwyn Bevan, *Stoics and Skeptics* (London: Lowe and Brydone Printers, 1959).

With reference to the Cynics, Epicureans, Stoics, Peripatetics and, among others, the Academy, Hadot takes a similar position. “Our claim has been, then, that philosophy in antiquity was a spiritual exercise. As for philosophical theories: they were either placed explicitly in the service of spiritual practice, as was the case in Stoicism and Epicureanism, or else they were taken as the objects of intellectual exercises, that is, of a practice of the contemplative life which, in the last analysis, was itself nothing other than a spiritual exercise. It is impossible to understand the philosophical theories of antiquity without taking into account this concrete perspective, since this is what gives them their true meaning. ... Contemporary historians of philosophy are today scarcely inclined to pay attention to this aspect, although it is an essential one. The reason for this is that, in conformity with a tradition inherited from the Middle Ages and from the modern era, they consider philosophy to be a purely abstract-theoretical activity.” Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy As a Way of Life*, tr. Michael Chase, ed. Arnold Davidson (New York: Blackwell, 1995) 104, 107.

For our purposes here, it is enough to show, if only in a rough and ready fashion, that in the century that followed upon Socrates' death in 399 B.C., the five major "schools" that emerged, the Cynics, the Porch, the Garden, the Peripatetics and the Academy, each defined virtue, as the *aretē* of the soul, in relation to the divine (*daimōn*). In the following, our aim is

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not to critically review the several schools, but only to render our claim not impossible; for that, it is enough to cite passages and authorities that support our view.

As to the Cynics (Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates), the specific virtue of their Sage was self-mastery (egkrateia) and imperturbability (apatheia) (D.L. 6.2; 6.5), gained through the practice of a rigorous discipline of askēsis (D.L. 70-71). Our evidence that the virtue of the Cynic Sage is connected with the divine is twofold.

The first evidence comes from Julian. Julian says: "The goal proposed by Cynicism is apathy, which is equivalent to becoming God." The second evidence is the controversial conclusions J. L. Moles draws from an examination of the question of Cynic cosmopolitanism. After recognizing that his claim that Cynic cosmopolitanism relates the Cynic Sage to the gods is "fiercely contested by modern scholars" (113), he says: "The gods, who are man's benefactors, provide a paradigm for Cynic self-sufficiency; the Cynic himself is godlike, friend of the gods, their messenger, their agent, and, in being agathos daimōn (‘tutelary god,’ ‘guardian angel’), he is himself virtually divine" (113).

Let us then turn to the Epicureans. The ethical instruction of the Garden sought to provide "eudaemonia [happiness] via ataraxia [peace of mind]" (26), “pleasure” understood as

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3 Julian, *Orationes*, 12.192a


5 For our account of the Epicureans, we rely on Hibler. Richard W. Hibler, *Happiness Through Tranquility, the School of Epicurus* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984).
freedom from “pain and fear” (30). Closely connected with this is *phronesis*, “The capstone of Epicurean ethics” (64).

The divine element of the virtue of the Epicurean Sage is brought out in the concluding sentences of the *Letter to Menoeceus*, where Epicurus delivers his doctrine of ethics: "Meditate therefore on these things and things akin to them night and day by yourself, and with a companion like to yourself, and never shall you be disturbed waking or asleep, but you shall live like a god among men. For a man who lives among immortal blessings is not like to a mortal being" (33).

Bailey, in his commentary on these lines, says that living "like a god among men" is not:

"A mere rhetorical exaggeration. The gods in their perfectly untroubled life are the ideal of what human life might become, and the man who has come near to this ideal might justly be said to have become a god on earth (cf. Lucr. iii. 222 'dignam dis degere vitam'). This explains how, again not metaphorically or in mere adulation, his later disciples could speak of Epicurus himself as a god, e.g. Lucr. v. 8 'deus ille fuit, deus.'"

The Stoics, by a well-known lineage, trace their origin to Socrates through the Cynics. They maintained a "school" that continued from Zeno to Epictetus, and instructed students seeking virtue in ethics, as well as in logic and physics. We first find our evidence of the divine element of the virtue of the Stoic Sage in the lines 31 through 39 of Cleanthes' famous *Hymn to Zeus*.


But, Zeus all-bountiful! the thunder-flame
And the dark cloud thy majesty proclaim:
From ignorance deliver us, that leads
The sons of men to sorrow and to shame.

Wherefore dispel it, Father, from the soul
And grant that Wisdom may our life control,
Wisdom which teaches thee to guide the world
Upon the path of justice to its goal.

So winning honor thee shall we requite
With honor, lauding still thy works of might;
Since gods nor men find worthier meed than this--
The universal Law to praise aright.\(^8\)

Our second is from Chrysippus. Specifically, we draw our evidence from Long.\(^9\) In context of a discussion of Stoic ethics and *eudaimonism*, and particularly of the *telos* of Stoic ethics as “living in agreement with nature,” Long says:

“In a well-known passage from his *On Ends* book I, Chrysippus elucidated 'living in agreement with nature' [the *telos* of Stoic ethics] as follows: 'Engaging in no activity which the common law is wont to forbid, which is the right reason pervading everything and identical to Zeus, who directs the organization of reality. And the virtue of the happy man and his good flow of life consist in this: always doing everything on the basis of the concordance of each man's guardian spirit (daimôn) with the will of the director of the universe'” (165).

Our final evidence for the divine (*daimonic*) element of the virtue of the Stoic Sage we draw from Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. As to Epictetus, we have the word of the editor of *Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus* that: "Sometimes this [genius] is rendered literally by the word


'daemon' and it connoted to the Stoic the higher element within man, his reason."¹⁰ For Marcus Aurelius, we find much the same equation of moral reason (virtue) and the *daimōn*. In meditation V.27, for example, we read:

"Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is every man's understanding and reason."¹¹

As to the Peripatetics, we find our evidence of the divine element of the Aristotelian Sage in the *Eudemian Ethics*:

“Here as elsewhere one should conduct one's life with reference to one's superior, and more specifically with reference to the active state of one's superior. A slave, for instance, should look to his master's (*sic*) and everyone to the superior to whom he is subject. Now a human being is by nature a compound of superior and inferior, and everyone accordingly should conduct their lives with reference to the superior part of themselves. However, there are two kinds of superior: there is the way in which medical science is superior, and the way in which health is superior; the latter is the *raison d'être* of the former. It is thus that matters stand in the case of our intellectual faculty. For God is not a superior who issues commands, but is the *raison d'être* of the commands that wisdom issues. But ‘*raison d'être*’ is ambiguous, as has been explained elsewhere-- this needs saying, since of course God is not in need of anything. To conclude: whatever choice or possession of natural goods--bodily goods, wealth, friends, and the like--will most conduce to the contemplation of God is best: this is the finest criterion. But any standard of living which either through excess


or defect hinders the service and contemplation of God is bad (1249b6-21).”

Kenny interprets:

"None the less the final chapter of the EE does offer a general standard for the exercise of virtue.... Each virtue does indeed have its own internal criterion, the mean; but what the mean is in each case is to be determined by wisdom; and wisdom gives its commands for the sake of God" (100).

With regard to the Academy after Plato, Dillon describes its history in The Middle Platonists in terms of the Old Academy (Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon), the Skeptical Academy (Carneades), the New Academy (Antiochus), to which "came to be added, after Antiochus, a strand of Pythagorean transcendentalism" (422). For our purposes here, we limit ourselves to the Old Academy, and note, that as Dillon tells it, so far as Antiochus was concerned, the Old Academy, in the case of Polemon in particular, was Stoic: "Polemon was also, as we have seen, the key factor in Antiochus' second principle: the substantial identity of the teaching of the Old Academy with that of the Stoa" (58).

With the rise of the so-called enlightenment of the modern period, the humility of the ancient seeker after virtue who, somehow knowing his or her ignorance, wanted thereby to become wise in emulation of the Sage, is displaced by a calculating-reason that, in advance, makes all things accessible to everyone in equal measure. The divine piety of the ancient seeker after wisdom, based on the belonging together of perfected moral understanding (virtue) and the divine, loses its foundation, as the same calculating-reason drives the divine and the way of being

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of the *daimonic* man outside of the domain of reason proper, either into the sphere of religion, or into the realm of the merely superstitious, or dismisses them as mere myth or as a curiosity.\textsuperscript{14}

Of the recent Anglo-American scholarship on the Socratic question, we limit ourselves here to a consideration of Gregory Vlastos' research, specifically to the texts *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher* and *Socratic Studies*.\textsuperscript{15} We follow him in three points; 1.) the so-called "tremendous assumption," his interpretation of the Socratic elenchus; 2.) the distinction between knowledge "C" and knowledge "E," his interpretation of Socratic ignorance, and 3.) his conception of Socratic "religion," that the divine is not an extra-rational source of knowledge "C." The first two points are drawn from the text *Socratic Studies*, and the third from *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*.

Considering the early Platonic dialogs as examples of logical argument, Vlastos presses them to extract the necessary and sufficient conditions by which the Socratic elenchus can be understood as a form of logically coherent refutation. As Vlastos puts it, "Socratic elenchus is a search for moral truth by question-and-answer adversary argument in which a thesis is debated ____________________________

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Hadot, "When, in the modern age, philosophy regained its autonomy, it still retained many features inherited from the medieval conception. In particular, it maintained its purely theoretical character, which even evolved in the direction of a more and more thorough systematization. Not until Nietzsche, Bergson, and existentialism does philosophy return to being a concrete attitude, a way of life and of seeing the world. For their part, however, contemporary historians of ancient thought have, as a general rule, remained prisoners of the old, purely theoretical conception of philosophy. Hadot, *Philosophy As a Way of Life*, 107-108.

only if asserted as the answerer's own belief and is regarded as refuted only if its negation is deduced from his own beliefs" (4). Its logical moments are (11):

“(1) the interlocutor asserts a thesis, p, which Socrates considers false and targets for refutation.
(2) Socrates secures agreement to further premises, say q and r (each of which may stand for a conjunct of propositions). The agreement is ad hoc: Socrates argues from {q, r}, not to them.
(3) Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q & r entail not-p.
(4) Socrates then claims that he has shown that not-p is true, p false.”

Between moments (3) and (4) lies the "problem in the elenchus." Of this we are told:
"How is it that Socrates claims to have proved a thesis [p of the set of theses {p, q}] false when, in point of logic, all he has proved is that the thesis is inconsistent with the conjunction of the agreed-upon premises for which no reason has been given in that argument? Could he be blind to the fact that logic does not warrant that claim?" (21).

That is to say, the refutand, in the face of the evidence, could throw out q just as well as p, so the falsity of p would not be proved by proving not-p true.

Vlastos then proposes that even if the interlocutor threw out q, Socrates must have believed that he "would have the resources to recoup that loss in a further elenchus" (22), which leads to the so-called "tremendous assumption" (25):

"Socrates then is making a tremendous assumption. Stated in fullest generality, it comes to this: [A] whoever has a false moral belief will always have at the same time true beliefs entailing the negation of that false belief."

In this tremendous assumption we think Vlastos to be correct, for in it we see lying frozen in Vlastos' cold logic the truth of the moral consciousness. But the irony of it may be, that
Vlastos, seeking certain knowledge, may in the end have only ended up with true opinion. The decision would turn on how the "tremendous" in the tremendous assumption were understood. If in the sense of "an amazingly brazen thing to say and maintain," then the truth of the moral consciousness would still lie inanimate in the chill of cold logic. But if in the sense of "something awesome," then perhaps there is already a stirring of the moral consciousness itself, moving out from the conceit of knowledge into "ignorance."

In the next chapter of the same book, Vlastos sets knowledge "C," the certain knowledge of scientific proof and demonstration, distinctly apart from knowledge "E," the kind of knowledge that belongs to the Socratic elenchus. In this, we think Vlastos to be both correct and incorrect. Correct, in that knowledge "E" certainly is not knowledge "C." Incorrect, in that Vlastos always only understands knowledge "E" from the point of view and frame of reference of knowledge "C," incorrectly making knowledge "E" out to be an inferior form of knowledge "C."

In a profound confusion, apparently oblivious to the fact that for Aristotle there are indeed archai (Nicomachean Ethics VI, 12) in the domain (ἐν δε χόμενον ἀλλως) of the moral consciousness (φρόνησις), Vlastos nonetheless relies on Aristotle to set up the ideal of all knowledge as knowledge "C," and concludes from this (56):

"Socrates could not have expected his knowledge E to meet the fantastically strong standards of knowledge C. No great argument should be needed to show this. In elenchic inquiry nothing is ever 'known through itself' but only 'through other things' and there is

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16 Pr. An. 64b34-6, Metap. 1051b31-1052a1 (52); Post. An. 71b15-16, 72b3-4 (53); and, among others, N.E. 1139b19-21 (54).
always a security gap between the Socratic thesis and its supporting reasons” (emphasis mine).

Though correct in separating knowledge "C" from knowledge "E," the confusion of the archai of the moral consciousness for those of the sciences is a disfiguration that totally buries the truth of moral consciousness, so-called knowledge "E."

Finally, with regard to the question of the divine, Vlastos' analysis of the daimōn is irredeemably corrupted by the distinction between knowledge “C” and knowledge “E,” so we content ourselves here only to outline his analysis. For Vlastos, what is at stake is to deny that the daimōn is an extra-rational source of knowledge "C" while somehow retaining the Platonic texts that undeniably make reference to the “divine sign.” He accomplishes his aim by denying

17 To the same misguided effect, compare: “Now, I suggest, we can understand why Socrates is startled by Delphi’s accolade. He can hardly bring himself to believe that his own understanding of the good life, chancy, patchy, provisional, perpetually self-questioning, endlessly perplexed as it is, should have any value at all in the eyes of the god who enjoys the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth—the perfect security, the serene completeness of knowledge C” (64).


19 "Should this incline us to believe that Socrates is counting on two disparate avenues of knowledge about the gods, rational and extra-rational respectively, yielding two distinct systems of justified belief, one of them reached by elenctic argument, the other by divine revelation through oracles, prophetic dreams and the like? If we did, ... we would have to conclude that he would look to the intimations of his daimonion as a source of moral knowledge apart from reason and superior to it, yielding the certainty which is conspicuously lacking in the findings of his elenctic searches" (167).
knowledge "C" to what the daimōn gives, in every case requiring the assent of knowledge "E" to what the divine sign may give.\textsuperscript{20, 21}

We conclude the present topic by way of recounting what Guthrie has to say of the relation of Socratic virtue and the divine in his \textit{History of Greek Philosophy}.\textsuperscript{22} In a beautiful passage, which we quote below, Guthrie relies on the \textit{Alcibiades} to show the intimate connection between reason itself, as the virtue of the soul, and the divine.

``Can we mention,' he asks (133c), `anything more divine about the soul than what is concerned with knowledge and thought? Then this aspect of it resembles God, and it is by looking toward that and understanding all that is divine--God and wisdom--that a man will most fully know himself.' God, he goes on, reflects the nature of psyche more clearly and brightly than anything in our own souls, and we may therefore use him as a mirror for human...

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\textsuperscript{20} For Socrates diviners, seers, oracle-givers, poets are all in the same boat. All of them in his view are know-nothings, or rather, worse: unaware of their sorry epistemic state, they set themselves up as repositories of wisdom emanating from a divine, all-wise source. What they say may be true; but even when it is true, they are in no position to discern what there is in it that is true. If their hearer were in a position to discern this, then he would have the knowledge denied to them; the knowledge would come from the application of his reason to what these people say without reason. Though Socrates does not apply this theory explicitly to prophetic dreams or to his own 'divine sign' the connection with the latter is unavoidable, since he refers to the functioning of his daimonion as his 'customary divination' and to himself as a 'seer,' without ever denying, directly or by implication, that what is true of divination generally would also apply to that homespun variety of it with which 'divine dispensation' has favored him" (170).

\textsuperscript{21} It may be noted that if Vlastos' distinction between knowledge "E" and knowledge "C," and with it, its present problem context, were thrown out, because irremediably corrupted, in a curious way, although barely recognizably, Vlastos too accords with what we have called the traditional view. For what would then remain over would be the link between knowledge "E," as the moral consciousness, and the divine.

nature too, if what we are looking for is the *areté* of the soul, and this is the best way to see and understand ourselves” (473-474).”

Although intellectually honest, “How far one is justified in translating ó Ṭεός simply as ‘God’ is a difficult question” (474), Guthrie’s account of the daimōn perhaps suffers the fault of being too careful and reticent. After considering various passages in the *Apology* and *Euthyphro*, he resolves this question by saying: “Yet in some cases he [Socrates] seems to have advanced beyond the popular theology to the notion of a single divine power, for which ‘God’ is the least misleading modern equivalent” (474).

2.1.2 Heideggerian Homologue of Socratic Ignorance

We group here those Heideggerian authorities who venture to interpret the *Beiträge* as a whole. But because no authority interprets the link between virtue, as the *aretē* of the soul, and the divine, as homologous to the inner essence of the movement of the *Beiträge* as a whole, they are only of peripheral relevance to our problematic. Accordingly, we limit ourselves here to giving a general summary of each of their views.

Franjo Zenka’s article, entitled “Die Zeit: Via negativa der Fundamentalontologie,” *Synthesis Philosophica* 4, no. 2 (1987): 385-398, insofar as it treats of *Sein und Zeit*, does not properly belong here that includes authorities that treat of the *Beiträge* in general and as a whole. But it is included nonetheless, inasmuch as it squarely faces the intrinsic negativity of Heidegger’s program of philosophy and speculates that temporality may indeed be the “*via negativa*” of fundamental ontology, a speculation that we share.
Hans-Helmuth Gander, in an article entitled “Wege der Seinsfrage, Aus Anlaß der 100. Wiederkehr des Geburtstages Martin Heideggers veröffentlichte Texte aus dem Nachlaß,” Heidegger Studies 6 (1990): 117-123, characterizes the Beiträge as “laying the foundation for the whole of Heidegger’s later philosophy” (118), a characterization with which we find ourselves in full agreement, and, among other things, gives a brief reading of the way of joining of its six “joinings.”

Parvis Emad, in an article entitled “The Echo of Being in Beiträge zur Philosophie—Der Anklang: Directives for its Interpretation,” Heidegger Studies 7 (1991): 15-35, among other things, gives a reading of the guide and ground questions that interprets the transformation from the former into the latter as the Enteignis in the Ereignis of the “Anklang” of the Beiträge.

Kenneth Maly, in an article entitled “Soundings of Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis),” Research in Phenomenology 21 (1991): 169-181, among other things, reflects on the way from Being and Time to the Ereignis, finds it in Seinsgeschichte, the “historical root unfolding is really a handing over ... of being” (173), and sounds out “the words that name ...[such] thinking” (174), namely, as“going the way”(175),“transformation”(176),“questioning that frees up” (176), as “doing” (176), as “thinking all the way through and out of being” (177), as “preparing opening the way” (177), and as “saying” (178).

Alfons Grieder, in an article entitled “Essential Thinking: Reflections on Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 23, n. 3 (1992): 240-251, ponders, among other things, the definition of Dasein, and the relation of Dasein and Seyn, and, although attempting to think that as “Essention,” in the end remains content with such
aporiai as how two (Dasein and Seyn) are to be thought as one (Essention). “Essention” is Grieder’s translation of Wesung, understood as the “happening of the Truth of Being... the Event (das Ereignis)” (241-242).

George Kovacs, in an article entitled “The Leap (der Sprung) for Being in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis),” Man and World 25, no. 1 (1992): 39-59, presents reflections that (1) indicate the nature of thinking at work in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis); (2) analyze the radical leap in the effort to reformulate the entire question of Being, and (3) unearth some questions that are at stake in Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy. In the course of the article it is noted that “to think Being means ... to hold fast to the abyss (Abgrund) brought forth by the not-knowing of Being” (42), but no attempt is made to venture an interpretation of Socratic ignorance as such.

Joan Stambaugh, in her book The Finitude of Being (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), which is everywhere concerned with the question of concealment (“negation”) and its meanings, includes a chapter (19) on the Beiträge, which ventures to interpret it in each of its main “joinings,” and, when it comes to the central question of the essential relation of concealment with the open as found in the Beiträge, concludes: “The persistent question remains whether the meaning of this concealment is sheltering (Bergung) or distortion and disessence (Unwesen). One would somehow like to say what belongs to being is sheltering, and the disessence is a kind of degeneration of that sheltering, but one cannot do that without distorting Heidegger. ‘Whence does the sheltering have its need and its necessity: From self-concealing. In order not to get rid
of self-concealing, but rather to preserve it, the sheltering of this occurrence is needed” (citing Heidegger’s *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977) 340 (145)).

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, in his book *Wege ins Ereignis, zu Heideggers “Beiträgen zur Philosophie,”* (Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1992), considers in four separate parts Ereignis and its joinings, and Ereignis’ relation respectively to art and technology, to speech-poetry, and to the man/god relation. The considerations, however, appear to take little account of concealment (“negation”) as such.

In another article entitled “Grund-und Leitstimmungen in Heidegger’s ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie,’” *Heidegger Studies* 10 (1993): 15-31, Hans-Helmuth Gander, among other things, gives a reading of the guide and ground questions that pays close attention to the “Vollzugs-character” of their corresponding “moods” as they play out in each of the six “joinings” of the Beiträge.

William J. Richardson, in an article entitled “Dasein and the Ground of Negativity: A Note on the Fourth Movement in the Beiträge-Symphony,” *Heidegger Studies* 9 (1993): 35-52, reflects on the negativity ingredient to Being, and, among other things, identifies the Grund with Truth, conceives Truth as the Lichtung für das Sichverbergen, faults, with Heidegger, the Greeks (Plato and Aristotle) for failure to preserve the “negative,” and notices that Heidegger attempts with his “Abgrund” to compensate for this fault, in that it “comports acquiescence to the hidden dimension of concealment that lurks within the entire reach of luminosity” (43). However, when attempting to interpret this very concealment, Richardson does so largely in negative
terms, as suffering and death, and as un-truth, finding “truth ... permeated by a subversive element, effect of primordial contention, that insinuates itself into the clearing as such” (48).

George Kovacs, in another article entitled “The Power of Essential Thinking in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis),” in From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire: Essays in Honor of William J. Richardson, S.J., ed. Babette E. Babich (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1995) 37-53, among other things, names thinking as the “opening up of the hermeneutic circle (the order of a historical destiny) of understanding, as the appropriating event of Being, of the clearing and withdrawing of the truth of Being” (38), characterizes such thinking as the need for “education in the art of essential thinking” (42), but, although venturing to offer certain directives to that end, seemingly despairs, in the observation that Heidegger only appears to ask “further questions rather than ... (give) some pedagogical instructions” (45).

2.2 Productivity of Negation as Blindness Giving Realm of Truth--General Orientation to Works in the Same Field

If we have achieved anything in attempting to follow Heidegger’s lead in chapter 4, Hermeneutical-Philosophical Sketch of Blindness, it would be to have rendered visible in outline the projection of what Plato left unsaid in the eclipse-analogy of the Phaedo (the preservation of a "negative relation to the origin" in the "flight to the logoi," which (negative relation to the origin) not only constitutes the "best" in the second best, but also determines the "second best" as always-seeing-in-a-light, the zugon as the realm of the truth of the Ideas) as a homologue of the Lichtung für das Sichverbergen of the Dasein, found in the central sections of the part of the
Beiträge, die Gründung, where truth is under investigation, based on the homologous way the productivity of negation works for both problematics. Insofar as our analytical method and results are concerned, chapter 4 is believed to be “pioneering.” But there have been Platonic scholars, both ancient and modern, who have considered the question of the place, i.e., constitution of the realm, where the ideas are properly found, which we present under the heading 2.2.1 below, as well as contemporary Heideggerian scholars who have dealt with the question of truth, which we present under the heading 2.2.2 below. As we shall see, although our Platonist authorities do not conceive of the realm of truth of the logoi in "negative" terms as such, they do make the question of the realm of the logoi into a problem, and grasp that realm in relation to the One or Good (the intelligible sun); to that extent, they are believed to be the works most closely related to our own problematic. As we shall also see, Heideggerian scholarship on the Beiträge, despite the many clues Heidegger scattered about in his writings, such as those we have seen above from the Basic Problems, Essence of Reasons and Plato’s Sophist, has, for the most part, failed to take seriously Heidegger’s equation of his question of Being with Plato’s inquiry into the epekeina, so that our problematic, the question of the positive role the negative plays in the constitution of the realm of truth, the Lichtung für das Sichverbergen, remains largely unanticipated from the side of contemporary Heideggerian scholarship.
2.2.1 Productivity of Negation of Blindness Giving Realm of Truth of the Eclipse-Analogy -- Platonic Scholarship

Damascius\(^{23}\) in his exegesis of the *Phaedo* gives account both of what the "best" is, and of how the *logoi* are to be understood as "second best" in that context. As to the best, "intelligence," Damascius explains its "final causality" as a necessity of its metaphysical origin (222):

"Intelligence is the first to revert to the Good, because it is separated from it and yet closest to it of all separate existents and, in the phrase of the *Philebus*, its 'kinsman' [30e1]; because, having been projected as the 'eye of Love' of the Good, it is the first of all beings that have detached themselves and therefore need such an eye. It is for good reason, then, that Socrates links the efficient cause, intelligence, directly with the final cause [the Good], and cannot view intelligence apart from finality."\(^{24}\)

As to how the ideas are second "best" in the context of this intelligence as best, Damascius explains that the *logoi* too share this noetic realm, in such a way that the efficient and final causes are comprehended in the *logoi*. "Once exemplary causes are posited, the efficient cause is somehow comprehended in them (things here below are what they are by participation in the prototypes), and so is the final cause" (224). Being thus comprehended, the *logoi* are second “best,” in that they accomplish the same thing that the intellect accomplishes, namely, in their own way to comprehend the efficient and final causes.


\(^{24}\) Of this "eye," that characterizes the relation of the intellect and the One, Damascius does not tell us more in the present context, but following Westerink (222 n. 3), just as we would expect, it is conceived (Dam., princ. 188.8-10) as “φῶς ἀνάπτωσα τὸ οἰκείον” (cf. our always-seeing-in-a-light).
As to their character as "second" best, Damascius explains as follows:

"He [Socrates] begins by presenting as the true causes of things sensible the efficient and the final cause. However, since the sensible world is indefinite and in it sense-perceptions and opinions take the place of pure reason, he resorts to 'reasons', i.e. universal forms (the fact that he calls them 'reasons' and considers them superior to sensible things proves that he locates them in rational soul), because on this level he expects to find what he is seeking. So the 'alternative course' is after the final cause the exemplary clause, or after the world of intellection that of disclosive thought, or else, starting from below, after the search in the sphere of sense-perception the approach to the sphere of disclosive thought" (222).25

Although Philo26 does not consider the Phaedo's "flight to the logoi" as such, nor speak of the realm of the logos in negative terms, we include him here because we believe the account of the logos he does give is consonant in material respects with our interpretation of the eclipse-analogy of the Phaedo. For Philo, the logos, the place of the logoi, is understood as the "shadow" of God.27,28 The logos is further understood by Philo as a headwater of two powers,29

25 Insofar as we are only concerned with the generation of the realm of the logoi, the problem of the nature of the logoi themselves lies outside the scope of the present considerations.

26 We draw our account of Philo from the epitome of Philo in Dillon’s The Middle Platonists, 139-183.

27 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 160.

28 Via its "shadow," it is interesting to speculate, is another way to view an eclipse of the sun without becoming blinded thereby.

29 "In the exegesis of the two cherubim with the flaming sword guarding Paradise, the cherubim are the two Powers, and the sword between them is the Logos. The relation of the Logos to the two Powers is not quite clear in this passage, but ... we gather that it is superior to them. They are divided off from it, 'as from a fountainhead'." Dillon, The Middle
which (two powers) are understood as "second best" for a "mind which has vision" initiated into the "minor rites." The "mind which has vision" (cf. our always-seeing-in-a-light) is multivariate; it apprehends the central Being, on the one hand, as One, and on the other, as Three (the logos and its powers), the latter being said to be a "second-best voyage."

The "second best" for Philo is to see the central Being through the powers of the logos, while the "best," reserved for those initiated into the “highest mysteries,” is to see it as One, both possibilities (of the One (unmixed) and Three (mixed)) for the "mind which has vision." Just as the "mind which has vision" does not apprehend the central Being directly as One but sees the central Being as Three via the powers of the logos, so our "always-seeing-in-a-light," as realm of the truth of the ideas, is not blinded by the sun; provided, of course, that the sun, as the intelligible sun, and the central Being, as One, name the same matter.

By the time Archer-Hind produces his edition of the Phaedo, the hermeneutical situation is entirely different from that of Philo and Damascius. Unlike these authors, who already grasped the logos in a "metaphysical" context, Damascius, in context of the One-noeton-nous

Platonists, 161-162.

30 “So the central Being, attended by each of his Powers, presents to the mind which has vision the appearance sometimes of One, sometimes of Three; of One, when that mind is highly purified and, passing beyond not merely the multiplicity of other numbers, but even the Dyad which is next to the Monad, presses on to the ideal form which is free from mixture and complexity, and being self-contained needs nothing more; of Three, when, as yet uninitiated into the highest Mysteries, it is still a votary only of the minor rites and unable to apprehend the Existent alone by itself and apart from all else, but only through its actions, as either 'creative' or 'ruling' [the Powers]. This, as they say, is a ‘second-best voyage’” (De Abrahamo 120ff.) Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 162-163.

(final cause, exemplary cause, efficient cause) triad, and Philo, in context of seeing the central
Being as “Three,” Archer-Hind found it necessary to begin his account of the "flight to the *logoi*" by opposing a materialist interpretation of the origination of the ideas.

The view of the materialists that he opposes, and we think rightly, is the understanding that it is the blinding spectacle of phenomena (corresponding to Socrates’ fear of being blinded) which motivates Socrates to study these same phenomena through the medium of the *logoi*. The latter conception (to study the phenomena via the ideas as formal causes), Archer-Hind objects, wrongly construes the character of the second best as an absolute rather than as a relative best, and leads the materialists to the erroneous view that the *logoi*, as "images" of matter, are second best to phenomena or matter, which is what is "best."

"Socrates has in the previous chapter given us two perfectly precise statements: (1) that he had actually tested and discredited the methods of the physicists, (2) that his hope was to discover Τάγαθόν καὶ δέον as the ultimate αἰτία; in other words, to construct a teleological theory of the universe. This then is the 'great and wondrous hope', which the physicists could not gratify, and which he himself failed to fulfill; and this is it for which the method of λόγοι offers a substitute. I conceive then that Professor Geddes has fallen into error as to the nature of the πρώτος πλοῦς by failing to keep a firm hold upon the meaning of δεύτερος πλοῦς: for I cannot imagine that he would maintain that Plato even for a moment could speak of the study of λόγοι as inferior to the study of phenomena" (188-190).

The former conception (the sun as the blinding spectacle of phenomena), Archer-Hind objects, wrongly construes what Plato elsewhere (*Republic* 508c, 516a) always only sets forth as the intelligible sun, which leads the materialists to the erroneous view that the sun, for Plato, symbolizes matter.
"But I have another very grave objection to his interpretation. He [Geddes] speaks of the ‘dazzling maze of phenomena’, ‘the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἐργα, as studied by the physicists’; and in his exposition the sun symbolizes material particulars. But where shall we find such language in Plato? If we turn to a part of the Republic with which our present passage is intimately connected [Republic 508c], we shall see something very different. ... Thought is always to him [Plato] the region of truth and light, matter of dimness and uncertainty: and that he should even for moment represent thought as a medium to temper the blinding glare of material existence is in my judgment unnatural and inconsistent with the whole tenor of his language on this subject" (189).

With his objections made, the way is clear for Archer-Hind to present his own views of the "best," and of the "second-best." As to the best, he finds it to be a "teleological theory of the universe," for which the method of the logoi offers a substitute. Archer-Hind explains what he has in mind as follows:

"Socrates in fact, since he despairs of actually grasping the eternal ideas, of which all natural phenomena are symbols, endeavors to form from those symbols, mental concepts or universals, which shall represent the ideas to him: they are the ideas as reflected in his intelligence. The verity of these concepts cannot be thoroughly ascertained, as the Republic tells us, until the ideas have been actually apprehended and compared with them: meanwhile they afford the best working hypothesis that can be obtained. No prospect of this verification is held out in the Phaedo; in the Republic however Plato speaks more hopefully" (190).

Gadamer, in The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, makes reference to the Phaedo at different points, but does not give an exegesis of it as such. Like Archer-Hind,

he rejects the hypothesis of the ideas as a materialist thesis of the scientific investigation of nature:

"The test of 'experience' would be a complete absurdity for the postulation of an idea. What constitutes being a horse can never be confirmed or refuted by a single empirical horse (101)."

And also like Archer-Hind, by the postulation of the ideas as second-best, Gadamer does not understand Socrates to have abandoned altogether his search for a final cause in favor of merely formal causes, but rather understands, and we agree with him, the hypothesis of the ideas as "an interim stage on the way to the Idea of the Good(25)."

2.2.2 Heideggerian Homologue of Blindness

None of the authorities that treat of the Beiträge was concerned with the problematic of our fourth chapter. So, as second best, insofar as our fourth chapter deals with the generation of the realm of truth, we group here those authorities that carry on the already decades-old debates of whether or not truth was understood in the pre-classical period in terms of Heidegger’s aletheia, whether or not Heidegger was right that Plato was responsible for its collapse, and on the interpretation of Heidegger’s text Platon’s Lehre von der Wahrheit. Since these authorities are only of peripheral relevance to our problematic, we limit ourselves here to a general summary of each of their views.

Robert J. Dostal, in chapter 7 entitled “Beyond Being: Heidegger’s Plato,” found in Martin Heidegger, Critical Assessments, ed. Christopher Macann (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), among other things, recognizes in the course of his observations on
Heidegger’s text *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* Heidegger’s equation of “time” with the *epekeina*, and its equation in turn with the *Dasein*, but for the most part finds Heidegger’s analysis flawed, for such reasons as focusing too much on the “light,” which, in his opinion, prevents Heidegger from fully appreciating man’s “erotic attachment to the Good” (79), or the “Good (as) the mixture which the human in its weakness and finitude longs to attain” (79).

In *Reading Heidegger, Commemorations*, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), Adriaan T. Peperzak has a chapter (14) entitled “Heidegger and Plato’s Idea of the Good,” which, among other things, considers some early and late texts of Heidegger where Heidegger understands himself to think the *epekeina* with his analysis of the *Dasein*, and presents an account of the *aletheia*-as-unconcealment controversy; but, in the course of reflection on Heidegger’s text *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, the article merely equates the Good with the Idea of the Good, which, in the end, limits its depth of penetration.

John Sallis, in the second, expanded edition of his book *Delimitations, Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), includes a chapter (14) entitled “At the Threshold of Metaphysics,” which gives an account of the Friedländer--Heidegger controversy, whether or not truth had the meaning of unconcealment for the preclassical Greeks, and attempts a close reading of Heidegger’s text *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, which, in its concluding question, recognizes, but does not elaborate, the need to think a presence in an absence: “In the course of his lecture text *Parmenides*, Heidegger poses the following question: ‘Is the shadowness of Being in Hades connected with the essence of the Greek experience of beings and of their unconcealment?’ Then it would be a matter of tracing
in the dialogue the lines -- or, rather, the shadows -- of archaic closure, of the closure belonging to the ἀρχή, belonging within the origin at the origin, at the threshold of metaphysics” (185).

2.3 Productivity of Negation as Not-Being Giving One in Us--General Orientation

If we have achieved anything in attempting to follow Heidegger’s lead in chapter 5, Hermeneutical-Philosophical Sketch of Not-Being, it would be to have rendered visible in outline the projection of the ultimate God of the Beiträge as the homologue of the One in Us on the basis of the homologous way the productivity of negation works for both problematics. Insofar as our analytical method and results are concerned, chapter 5 is believed to be “pioneering.” But there has been some speculation on the “productive aspects” of negative theology by contemporary scholars of Platonism, which we present under the heading 2.3.1 below, as well as a wide variety of speculation as to the identity of the ultimate God by contemporary Heideggerian scholars, which we present under the heading 2.3.2 below.

2.3.1 Productivity of Negation of Being Giving One in Us--Platonic Scholarship

"I have left myself little time to explain why this extremely negative doctrine of God, which the Fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries, in the East, I think, as well as the West, could not accept, and which has on the whole remained alien to Western religious thinking, may have something very positive to contribute to theology in the intellectual climate of our period."33 We

begin the present section with a quote from A. H. Armstrong, because it, talking of the "Neoplatonic doctrine of the One or Good beyond Being and Intelligence (which is what I mean by Neoplatonic apophatic theology)\(^\text{(77)}\)," nicely makes two points that we agree with: 1) that it has remained alien to “Western... thinking,” and 2.) that it “may have something very positive to contribute.”

The first point may help to explain the paucity of contemporary scholarship on the question of the One in Us, and the second may shed light on what Armstrong understood of the One in Us. We shall treat each of these two points in turn.

The reasons advanced by Armstrong for the nearly complete lack of reception of Neoplatonic apophatic theology are three-fold. In the first place, Armstrong notes that the “Christian theologians, before the author of the Dionysian writings,...[remained,] as has often been observed, in a pre-Neoplatonic rather than a Neoplatonic position” \(^\text{(77)}\), motivated, he says, at least partly, to a “not unjustified fear that if you sweep out [by full Neoplatonic apophatism] the room in your mind where God should dwell quite as thoroughly as this, and leave it quite so empty, devils will come in” \(^\text{(78)}\).

The second is that full Neoplatonic apophatism as “the One gives what he has not got, the multiplicity-in-unity of the Forms which are Intellect's content” \(^\text{(81)}\), is antithetical to the “generally rather simple-minded doctrines of the Ideas as the 'thoughts of God' to be found in his [Plotinus’] predecessors, of which the first

\(^{34}\) Armstrong stops short here, and throughout the article, of making explicit reference to the "productivity of negation" in connection with his treatment of “Neoplatonic apophatic theology,” but it is interesting to speculate that this choice of words may reflect that sense.

\(^{35}\) Armstrong stops well short of making explicit the character of the daimonic man we find to be at work in the problem of the productivity of negation of ignorance as knowledge (cf. chapter 3), but, as we shall see below, among other things, his “supersubstantial bread” shows him to be not unfamiliar with its “giving” character.
Christian thinkers and their successors made use (80).” Armstrong goes on to say: "This doctrine does not simply move the Supreme Being and Supreme Intellect down to second-place" (81), but: "Even Divine Intellect must leave itself behind" (81), in such a way that: "It is in its ‘loving, mad, drunken’ state... that the Divine Intellect and ourselves in it can find what we want" (cf. the One in Us) (81). The third reason advanced for the failure of Western thought to obtain to a genuine appreciation of the Neoplatonic understanding of apophatic theology, Armstrong says, lies in the doctrine of the Trinity, insofar as "the Orthodox insistence on the consubstantiality and co-equality of the persons of the Trinity, must, it seems, inevitably lead to the thinking of the Godhead as Supreme Intellect and Supreme Being" (86).

Of the second point, the positive content of negative theology, he finds it in the "'criticism without limits' of which Trouillard speaks" (87). As opposed to the "ex cathedra utterances of an ecclesiastical authority" (87), and its attendant truth as certainty, this criticism without limits leads to:

"...the denial of an eternal unchanging intelligible reality, which is in principle the supreme object of thought of all minds and must control our thinking, whether we come to know it by reason or by revelation. This means the end of two-world thinking, in which the static intelligible or spiritual world, the living but immobile Divine Mind, is the superior archetype of this changing and imperfect world of ours. The only kosmos noëtos which will survive in this way of thinking is a Heraclitean one, the ever-changing succession of created thoughts about the ever-changing created world, in which we may hope and believe that we receive lights from the Good sufficient for our personal needs in our particular time and place, but not of the kind which we can appropriate and fix and demand that others should accept as

36 Compare, in this connection, our chapter 1, section 2.
unchanging universal truths. The Good does not give us a share in his own ideas: he has not got any. He creates ideas in us to supply our needs at the time. He gives us each day our supersubstantial bread" (84).

Of this "criticism without limits," Armstrong, in another essay, “Negative Theology,” found in the same book, in a remarkable passage that brings together the three aspects of the productivity of negation (knowledge, truth and Being) that concern us in chapters 3-5, goes on to say:

"Finally, we discover that the intellectual labor of the negative theology is never-ending. ... We are not looking for Absolute Truth which we can contemplate in static repose, but for the Cause of all truth of whom all truths are untrue. And the Neoplatonists have discovered that if you cease to be active at any level at which God is present and pressing us to let him return in us, and he is present at all levels, including those of creative imagination and discursive reason, you fall out of the great cycle of procession and return as far you can (never completely) into formless and sterile fantasy... . The ultimate silence generates ever-new critical discourse. The watch word of Neoplatonic negative theology, and of all true Platonic philosophy, is 'We must begin again'.

37 Notice that for Armstrong, negative theology involves the question of the generation of the realm of truth; cf. our chapter 4.

38 If we substitute the One for God, notice that for Armstrong negative theology involves the One in Us; cf. our chapter 5.

39 Notice also that for Armstrong, negative theology involves the generation of knowledge; cf. our chapter 3.


41 We agree with Armstrong in seeing "beginning thinking" at the root; compare our chapter 3, section 2, and what follows.
A dimension of the One in Us that is outside the scope of the present chapter, but which may be noted in passing, is the theurgic dimension. As Siorvanes\textsuperscript{42} puts it: “At the pinnacle of the operation, the priest-theurgist entrusts the soul’s ‘one’ to the One itself.” Of the One in Us itself, he tells us that it "reaches beyond the definition and limit of cognitive knowledge" (191) and so is "beyond the grasp of its ordinary awareness" (191), and that the gap is bridgeable by an "experiential journey to God...[rather than] intellectual theorizing about God" (191). As such, the One in Us is an awareness of God's activity (\textit{theourgia})--but not conceptual knowledge.

We conclude our treatment of the present topic with Jean Trouillard, who we have already heard of in Armstrong, and who presents in his "L’Un et l’Âme selon Proclus"\textsuperscript{43} views of the productivity of negation which are, as we already have seen from Armstrong’s elaboration of Trouillard’s “criticism without limits,” quite congenial to our own. Our presentation of Trouillard as such however must remain provisional, and fragmentary, not only since we know no French and must rely on Beierwaltes’ epitome of Trouillard,\textsuperscript{44} but also because we learned of the importance of his work only after we completed the substance of our own research. We accordingly shall list as propositions that which we find congenial to our own understanding of

\textsuperscript{42} Siorvanes, \textit{Proclus, Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science}, 197. In this connection, also see G. Shaw, \textit{Theurgy and the Soul, the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus} (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).


\textsuperscript{44} Werner Beierwaltes, “Marginalien zu Jean Trouillards Proklos-Interpretation, zugleich ein Beitrag zum Begriff der Negation,” in \textit{Denken Des Einen} (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985) 281-296. Beierwaltes himself, it may be noted, \textit{contra} Trouillard, founds negation in self-affirmation (287 ff.), but neither this nor anything else in the chapter leads us to suspect that his account of Trouillard is other than accurate and balanced.
the productivity of negation and the role it plays in producing knowledge, truth and the One in Us.

1.) The soul comes to know its ground, the One, via negation.45, 46

2.) The soul, or the world phenomenon, as "middle," is the being between nous and aisthesis.47, 48

3.) The act of mediating is understood as the activity in the Soul of the One unifying the two worlds, its “power” or “immanence.”49


46 Cf. our interpretation of the epekeina as a “negative” determination, chapter 1, section 5.

47 “Konkretisiert wird dieser Grundgedanke der Relation von Seele und Einem ... durch die ausführliche Beschreibung der Seele als Mitte (μέσον, μεσότητα) oder als aktiver Vermittlung. ... Aktive Vermittlung ist die Seele -- die Welt- oder Einzel-Seele in einer inhaltlich je verschiedenen Weise--, insofern sie Gegensätze in sich zu einer Einheit fügt und sich so selbst als seierende Mitte konstituiert. Eine Einheit vollzieht sie zwischen dem intelligiblen (zeitfreien) und dem zeithaften ... Bereich” (282-283).

48 Cf. our interpretation above (chapter 1, section 2) of the “third thing” as “ground of the two worlds.”

49 “Als besonderen Index und Grund des Vermittlung-Seins der Seele hebt Trouillard den Gedanken der Immanenz des Einen oder der ‘Kräfte’ des Einen in der Seele heraus. Der Akt der Vermittlung also wird als die Gegensätzliches verbindende, einigende Wirkung des Einen in ihr verstanden” (284).

50 Cf. our interpretation above (chapter 1, sections 2, 5) of the “third thing” as “ground of the two worlds,” here the “act of mediating,” and also our interpretation of the Idea of the Good as a further determination of the third thing, which (Idea of the Good) is itself determined by “power.”
2.3.2 Heideggerian Homologue of One in Us

As to the Heideggerian authorities that treat the “ultimate God” of the Beiträge, the answers as to whom he might be range from Be-ing, the Moment, Christ, No-thing, and, among others, the Inscrutable, but no authority saw fit to see in it the One in Us as such, as in chapter 5 of the present investigations. As such, they are only of peripheral relevance to our problematic. Accordingly, we limit ourselves here to a general summary of each of their views.

Otto Pöggeler, in his book entitled Neue Wege mit Heidegger (Freiburg und München: Karl Alber GmbH, 1992), has a section (387-482) on the great traditions, comparing and contrasting Heidegger to Lao Tse, and mystical thought, and that analyzes, among other things, the “passing of the last God” in the Beiträge. On the latter topic, among other things, in the Lichtung für das Sichverbergen is seen the Streit of Erde und Welt, from inside of which the essence of God is marked off in an experience of a final whole, like that of the celebrated

51 “Der Vollzug der Einheit der Seele kann auch von dem Begriff des αὐθυπόστατον, des Sich-selbst-Konstituierenden her erhellt werden. ... Trouillard verbindet mit dieser Theorie ... eine Interpretation des proklischen Begriffs Negation... Negation versteht er als das Medium der Selbstkonstitution der Seele: dadurch, daß die Seele alles, was das Eine selbst nicht ist, in Bezug auf dieses Eine negiert, konstituiert sie sich selbst ... . Nicht mehr die ‘Selbststrukturation’ ist für Trouillard ... das Interpretament der Selbstkonstitution der Seele, sondern die produktive Negation. ... Im Horizont des Begriffs einer produktiven Negation nennt Trouillard die Seele— in Analogie zu dem proklischen πλήρωμα εἰδῶν oder λόγων (in Parm. 896, 4. In eucl. 55, 18)-- πληρωμα τῶν ἀποφάσεων, Fülle der Negationen... ” (285-286).

52 Cf. our interpretation (chapter 4) of the realm of truth, here the noetic realm, as generated by a negation.
Vorlaufen zum Tode of Being and Time, which brings one back to the moment of decision and ever again to the beginning of possibilities, and in that whole is seen the place to renew the question of God precisely in the moment that makes time full, and thus, according to the article, as Vorbeigang.

Reiner Thurnher, in an article entitled “Gott und Ereignis--Heideggers Gegenparadigma zur Onto-Theologie,” Heidegger Studies 8 (1992): 81-102, among other things, shows that Heidegger’s counter-position to onto-theologie lies in a “Betroffenheit durch die Gottferne” (97), and shows the way thereto to lie in the Enteignis of the Ereignis. The latter allows the experience of the collapse of truth, which first makes possible the former, understood as “Nichtmehr der entflohenen Götter und im Nochnicht des Kommenden” (97).

Dennis Schmidt, in an article “On the Memory of Last Things,” Research in Phenomenology 23(1993): 92-104, attempts an historical account of the fifth and sixth “joinings” of the Beiträge, and thinks of the “last God” as that “history” “that calls for a new sense of memory, one that Heidegger refers to as ‘Andenken’” (103). Of what he has in mind with Andenken, Schmidt tells us no more than: “Of course Andenken is a form of memory that understands the finitude of its own recuperative powers and never presents itself as possessing the keys to the gates of time” (103).

Gail Stenstad, in an article entitled “The Last God --a Reading,” Research in Phenomenology 23 (1993): 172-183, provides a reading of the Last God in an analysis that in turn reflects on “last,” “(Not-)God,” “De-cision,” “Ab-grund” and “Attuning” in a non-metaphysical way, which, in the “Attuning” section thereof, concludes that the “beckoning hint
of the passing by of the last God” (181) may first be experienced in Da-sein, understood as “the ‘there’ which is needed by be-ing -- the opening for the disclosive play of revealing and concealing,” likening the same to “a ringing dance and resounding echoing” (182).

Günter Figal, in a chapter entitled “Philosophie als hermeneutische Theologie, letzte Götter bei Nietzsche und Heidegger,” in „Verwechselt mich vor Allem nicht!,” Heidegger und Nietzsche, ed. Hans-Helmuth Gander (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), among other things, after giving an interpretation of hermeneutics as embracing one’s not-knowing by analogy to Socratic ignorance, concludes that the Last God can only be found in such hermeneutics if the Wink of the Last God “serves as a giving to understand” (103), one which “arrives in flight--and simultaneously its arrival remains refused” (104). In such openness is found the Vorbeigang of the ultimate God in the “overpowering of the openness of space-time, which can only be, insofar as it is experienced as the intensity of the exchange of flight and arrival” (104), in which is found the belonging together of “presence and absence” (105), and in that, the Last God.

Otto Pöggeler has a chapter entitled “Destruction and Moment” in the book Reading Heidegger from the Start, Essays in His Earliest Thought, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), which discusses the notion of moment as found in a widely-ranging consideration of Heidegger’s texts, and concludes, in the last pages (150-156) with the Beiträge, where the moment is related to the passing of the last God. However, he only gives a clue of what he has in mind: “Can ‘being called’ in the singularity of the moment still be
claimed for our life today? ...It [man’s relation to God] can be regained only in God’s call out of that passing in which God only shows His back to the human being” (155).

Constantino Esposito, in an article entitled “Die Geschichte des letzten Gottes in Heideggers „Beiträge zur Philosophie,” Heidegger Studies 11 (1995): 33-60, finds the being of god in the withdrawal of Being, and apparently interprets that refusal purely literally, in pondering whether that comes to the same as the “impossibility of an answer,” for if so, he concludes, “In the end this impossibility indeed is genuinely itself: God” (60).

George J. Seidel, in an article entitled “A key to Heidegger’s Beiträge,” Gregorianum 76, no. 2, (1995): 363-372, offers a Christology of the last God, which the article notes, is a logos rather than a Marcan Christology. He says he came to the realization while working on Fichte, “I came across the distinction Fichte makes between Seyn (God) and Daseyn (Christ). At that point a different sort of reading of the Contributions to Philosophy ... began to suggest itself” (365). By Marcan Christology he means a Christology “without the final chapter (ch. 16) of St. Mark’s gospel, one without resurrection appearances” (366). He explains that: “The Christology of the Beiträge, on the other hand, would be of a very different sort. It is a Logos Christology, more specifically that of the Prologue to the Gospel of John” (366).

Jean Greisch, in an article entitled “The Eschatology of Being and the God of Time in Heidegger,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4, no. 1 (1996): 17-43, among other things, draws attention to Heidegger’s 1927 characterization of Plotinus as a “theosophist,” with “wild and windy speculations,” and conducts a six-section investigation of eternity and time. The first section implicates eternity into time; the second observes that the problematic of time
and eternity may best proceed from a more original temporality; the third section seeks to find the same in the enigmatic “summits of time,” in a time “fissured with abysses,” or in “the god who is ‘only time’”; the fourth section recapitulates the inquiry into such time in terms of some of the central themes of the Beiträge, linking Ereignis as Zerklüftung to the moment, and Dasein to the Ereignis; the fifth again follows the lead of the Beiträge and thinks original temporality in terms of Ereignis as Time-Space; and the sixth section ventures to interpret the “passing of the last God,” first by noting that “‘in the Ereignis and as Ereignis the last God is hidden’” (36), thinks that in terms of a destinal eschatology, and then seeks to find its passing in such eschatology by noting that the last God “will never be present in the sense of a constant, available presence. Its being will be nothing other than passing. The Ereignis is the space of encounter in which such a passage can be produced. But it is a passage that has nothing of the ephemeral and transitory. ... On the contrary, it is itself accorded an Augenblicks-Stätte” (37). How he understands this passing Greisch does not say, but the concluding words may well be telling: “Has Heidegger himself not ‘departed from the phenomena’ in order to deliver himself over totally to a speculation which could itself be misunderstood as a strange kind of ‘theosophy’ (38)?”
CHAPTER THREE
HERMENEUTICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH OF SOCRATIC
IGNORANCE

1. Ἐν Ἐννοίᾳ: Ἐννοιᾳ?

The question that remains elusive in the history of Platonism is the question of the One/Many. The question, in its Socratic form, asks about the relation of virtue and the good; aretē, in the sense of excellence and power, and the agathon, in the sense of the epekeina tes ousias, at the end of book six of the Republic. What is impenetrable is how this one good "relates" to excellence, just in what sense what is beyond Being can have anything to do with human excellence here below in the many and manifold beings.

We must believe that the perpetual riddle that the Republic places into view is intentionally so, for there is no indication that the dialogues are the least bit accidental in their formulation and their content, and so we must also believe that they are so written that some key will unlock that riddle.

Manifestly, inasmuch as the Republic treats of paideia, pedagogy is the key. But what "instruction" is it that unlocks the riddle of the aretē "of" the One and Good and Beautiful? What is puzzling in the puzzle is in what sense the One has to do with Platonic virtue, i.e., in what sense knowledge of the One makes us virtuous, how, by knowing the One, there is virtue.
The mystery that remains throughout the history of Platonism is the mystery of the relation of the One and the Many, that, once it is known, makes aretē understood, and so is productive of ethics. But what is the pedagogy at work here?¹

Already from the face that the sun analogy² presents us, the pedagogical relation we seek is bound up in the analogical relations of intelligible sun to truth and beauty and Being, to that of the physical sun to growth and warmth and light, as analogous to that paideia that turns the whole soul about to that excellence that is born of the agathon: Socratic knowledge. And what is puzzling is that Socratic knowledge claims that ethics, that is, the paideia of the soul in aretē, is born of that knowledge of the One that turns the whole of body and soul towards the agathon in such a way that nothing less than truth, Being, and beauty are there, as it were, to be had, naturally born of the divine One. Ethics and “natural” theology! But who can fathom this abyss?

Our perplexity can only grow stronger if we seek refuge in the paradoxical formula that such knowledge knows that it does not know. On this account, the mysterious relation between ethics and natural theology in Socratic knowledge is made even more mysterious. How, by this insertion of the "not," indeed as "knowing" that one does "not know," is pedagogy to gain insight into the aporia of the One/Many? Knowing that one does not know is supposed to unlock the

¹ Aristotle too knew of the difficulty of this very puzzle in the way that he, in the face of the question of the relation of the good to virtue, apparently discounted the question in "universal" terms in favor of an analysis in terms of the practical good for man in the Nicomachean Ethics, 1096 b32-35.

² The “sun analogy” is found, of course, at the end of book 6 of the Republic, 506 d7ff.
aporía. Socratic knowledge is: ignorance. How does Socratic ignorance give the highest knowledge, insight into the One/Many, and with it, entry into aretē?

Here, as Heidegger would have it, and it is not without merit, the trick is to turn an “absence into presence,” which is to say, to think the “not” of Socratic ignorance “positively.” But what is tricky about it is that such has been rendered impossible by the Eleatic prohibition, which prohibition, in its most tangible form, would deny the very possibility of the generation of anything from nothing, and so of knowledge from ignorance. If something can't come from nothing, how then are we to find a "presence in an absence" so as to unlock the paradox of Socratic ignorance as knowledge?

Here we can only follow Heidegger’s lead. Heidegger founds, as it were, his thought on the abyss. The abysmal may draw its true imaging power only in the German, where it

3 The similarity (one can only wonder if it is accidental) to a Zen koan (e.g., “the sound of one hand clapping”) is unmistakable in the paradox of Socratic knowledge.

4 The Eleatics would have it that Being alone “is” and that therefore not Being simply is nothing at all. See Kirk, Raven and Schofield, “Parmenides of Elea,” and particularly the “Didactic Poem,” in The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 239-263. Also compare the Sophist, “But my young friend, when we were your age the great Parmenides from beginning to end testified against this, telling us what he also said in his poem, 'never shall this be proved -- that things that are not are, but do thou, in thy inquiry, hold back thy thought from this way'” (237a).

5 If one can somehow do so, wouldn't one then by one means or another have to refute Zeno’s paradoxes, by showing that his refutations depend on the finding of a presence of an absence for their validity, and indeed permissibly so?

6 Die Fragenden haben alle Neugier abgelegt; ihr Suchen liebt den Abgrund, in dem sie den ältesten Grund wissen. "Those who question have abandoned everything new; they lovingly seek the abyss, in which they recognize the oldest ground." Beiträge, in section 5
bespeaks a fathoming of the abysmal, in the way that one, standing gazing into the chasm, sights the abyss itself in its very “abysmalness.” Herein, in the disclosure of the abyss that is seen in abysmal sight, lies in clear view something like that presence of an absence that we seek in Socratic ignorance as knowledge.

Let us follow this clue to find a presence in an absence in Socratic ignorance. Then the correct emphasis is that self-knowledge knows itself when it knows that it does not know, which is to say, that knowledge is abysmal. The puzzle of Socratic ignorance unlocks itself when not-knowing is seen positively, when paideia turns the soul about so as to know the presence of an absence in knowing that it does not know. Seen positively, knowing that one does not know is the knowledge of "that which conditions and grants knowledge." It is the abysmal character of the very presence of an absence that determines the nature of the conditioning and granting of knowledge that those know, who know they don't know. The key is to take ignorance as knowledge of the “conditions of the granting” of knowledge.8

We know that the correct paideia in the resolution of this aporia is no mean thing, as by it we are to discover in ignorance no less than truth, beauty and Being; happiness; the unity of

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entitled "Für die Wenigen -- Für die Seltenen."

7 In metaphysics, this knowing that it does not know could implicate a "higher" self that knows, hypostatized as itself a being.

8 Ignorance in this sense corresponds to knowledge of the finitude of knowledge. Its “condition of possibility,” but not, as we shall see, in Kant’s manner.
the virtues, and more besides.⁹ The usual antithesis of the *paideia* that knows it does not know expresses itself either as knowing that we are godlike or as knowing that we are mortals. Perhaps, instead of an antithesis, what if mortal knowledge and godlike knowledge belonged together in a synthetic origin? Then finitude itself and that which is like the divine would not be separated by a chasm as if they were two different things; rather, that which is mortal and that which is divine would be held together in their difference originatingly. Indeed, some such open middle wherein the One could grant mortal man his share in the divine excellence would have to prevail if there were to be the relation between ethics, as *aretē*, and natural theology, as knowledge of the One, that we seek in the correct *paideia*.

2. Paideia and Knowledge of the Ereignis

Unless we are wholly wide of the mark, Heidegger calls this *paideia* "*Ereignis.*" Like *paideia*, *Ereignis* is not a *techne*, and so cannot be taught.¹⁰ Nonetheless there is still a lot that can be said about it.¹¹

What is distinctive about Socratic virtue is that it is knowledge, albeit one that cannot be taught. Given that *paideia* is instruction in virtue as knowledge, and if we are right in seeing *paideia* as *Ereignis*, then *Ereignis* too would have to be a *Wissen*. Heidegger calls this *Wissen*

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⁹ Indeed, as book 10 of the *Republic* hints (621b1), the very "salvation" of the soul somehow lies wrapped in the *aretē* that corresponds to Socratic ignorance.

¹⁰ Rather, the celebrated “Sprung” is required, which cannot be calculated or described in advance but which rather first opens up in stepping into it.

¹¹ Band 65 of the Gesamtausgabe is subitled “Vom Ereignis.”
"Das Denken im anderen Anfang." Its nature is quite peculiar, far from the usual ranges of concept formation.

What is peculiar about this *Wissen* is that it is *Wesen*. This *Wissen as Wesen* is "thinking in the other beginning." For such knowledge, there is in it no "production," i.e., no prior clear idea ("techne") that rules in the production of one thing out of another. Rather, as *Wesen*, it is the nature of thinking itself that it manifests itself abysmally, in a manner that Heidegger seems to describe with a detail which is without parallel in the tradition. In Platonic terms, if *techne* is a "demiurgic" production, beginning thinking, as essential knowledge, is "non-demiurgic generation."  

But who can fathom this abyss, beginning thinking as a generation that is not a production, non-*demiurgic*? How is the "non" of non-*demiurgic* to be conceived, if Eleatic logic would have it that such a thing could only be nothing at all?

12 In the other beginning, the truth of Being (*Wesen*), conceived as the clearing for the self-hiding, is understood as an origin or beginning, in the sense of a fountain or headwater. To think (*Wissen*) that beginning is "beginning thinking," *Wissen as Wesen*.

13 Unfortunately, at every point at which Plato is about to tell us about the nature of what we call non-*demiurgic* generation the dialogues fall into silence and one falls with them into perplexity. The *Timaeus* gives the much celebrated "probabilistic" account of the *demiurgic* production of the universe only after Timaeus tells Socrates that the account of a non-*demiurgic* generation is "past finding out" and even if ...[it] were found out to tell of ...[it] to all would be impossible" at 28 c3-5. And in the *Critias*, the dialogue itself abruptly ends at 121c just when Zeus, the God of gods whose eye alone sees how the noble ones have strayed from the true *paideia*, convokes the gods in his "most honorable residence at the world’s center and overlooks all that has part in becoming, and when he had gathered them there, he said .... "

14 Once more, the correct resolution of the *aporia* of non-*demiurgic* generation turns about a "negation."
Here we can only follow Heidegger's lead. In the section 5 entitled "Für die Wenigen -- Für die Seltenen," Heidegger tells us:

Das Denken im anderen Anfang ist in einer einzigen Weise ursprünglich geschichtlich: die sich fügende Verfügung über die Wesung des Seyns.

"Thinking in the other beginning is primordially historical thinking [,and this] in a unique way:  the self-accommodating accommodation to the essence of Being."

"Die sich fügende Verfügung über die Wesung des Seyns" is beginning thinking, thought beginningly, as generation itself;  non-demiurgic, in that there is only one thing here, not a production of one thing from another, but the generated and generating are at one in generation itself. It is rather more like nature, which gives itself from the inside of itself and takes what is given back into itself, the giving and taking-back in original unity constituting the generation of it which it itself "is."

That which unifies the formula "die sich fügende Verfügung über die Wesung des Seyn," and so first lets it be seen as "beginning thinking" in the manner of the other beginning, is that which Heidegger calls the Ereignis:  the event.

For Heidegger, the knowledge of the Ereignis is made necessary because we do not know what bears our history,\textsuperscript{15} just as for Plato Socratic ignorance is made necessary because we do not know ourselves. Heidegger tells us in the very next paragraph in the section we are quoting:

\textsuperscript{15} "History" as \textit{Geschichte} has the sense of "sending" or "dispensation." Insofar as no man knows the future and what it may bring, we do not know what bears, carries-out our "history."

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"A sketch of the essence of Being as *Ereignis* must be ventured, *because* we do not know what mandates our history. We would like to thoroughly experience the essence of this unknown in its self-concealing."

3. Aretē and Verhaltenheit

Now if *paideia* in Socratic ignorance as knowledge leads to *aretē*, and if the *paideia* in the *Ereignis* is nothing but the *paideia* in *Wissen* as *Wesen*, as "beginning thinking in the other beginning," we can expect that the *paideia* in the *Ereignis* too would unfold its own manner of human comportment. Heidegger calls it "Verhaltenheit" in the next paragraph in the section we are quoting:

Wollten wir doch dieses Wissen entfalten, daß uns das unbekannte Aufgegebene den Willen in der Einsamkeit läßt und so das Bestehen des Da-seins zur höchsten Verhaltenheit gegen das Sichverbergende zwingt.

"Should we want to develop this knowledge [*Wissen* as *Wesen*], that would require of us the unfamiliar task of letting the will into solitary aloneness so as to force being-there to stand in its highest [i.e., most noble] behavior [, i.e. the one that is born in man precisely] in the face-to-face encounter with the self-hiding."

Simply put, Heidegger preserves the "not" of not-knowing by figuring it positively: man relates to the "not" by letting the will into loneliness and so forcing being-there to stand in its
highest holding-back (loneliness) against the self-hiding.\textsuperscript{16} It is “positive,” in that thereby alone can there be "event," non-demiurgic generation; \textit{Ereignis} is not “produced,” but is originating in a beginning manner.

The \textit{Ereignis} unfolds in its knowing, i.e., beginning thinking in the other beginning happens (\textit{Wesen}), when man is so "suspended" that on the one hand the will is released into solitary loneliness and its stillness, and on the other, so comes to stand in a way that it is held in itself against the self-hiding. Such \textit{Wissen} knows the nearness of the divine as the originary silence, and so knows the \textit{Ereignis} as it holds itself back against the origin and lets it originate in word and works, indeed in such a way that it is it itself that originates in this way (\textit{Wesen}).

In the next paragraph, Heidegger tells us:

\begin{quote}

"The nearness to the ultimate God is [had in] silence. This silence [though is "generative,"\textsuperscript{17} in the generation that] must be set into speech and works in the manner of holding-back."
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} The radicality of Heidegger’s “beginning thinking” must not be underestimated. In the extreme, one could even say here that there is “loneliness” \textit{because} the One withdraws, but not as two separate things, rather: the loneliness \textit{is} the withdrawal. In this "is" is the interface between man and the divine as a synthetic origin.

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. section seven below.
4. Εὐδαιμονία and Geschichte

But the goal of *paideia* in virtue is *eudaimonia*,¹⁸ and if we follow the connection between *Ereignis* and *paideia*, and *Verhaltenheit* and *aretē*, insofar as the turning of the whole soul and body towards the One gives birth to *aretē* in the same way that the *Wissen of Wesen as Ereignis* gives rise to the mood of *Verhaltenheit*, which sets the divine to word and work, then "happiness" would mean as much as having one’s share of Being in essential rightness. And Heidegger tells us in the very next paragraphs of the section we are considering that what comes to pass for the man mooded in *Verhaltenheit* is none but *Geschichte*:

> In der Nähe des letzten Gottes sein -- und sei diese Nähe die fernste Ferne der Unentscheidenheit über die Flucht oder die Ankunft der Götter --, das kann nicht auf ein "Glück" oder ein "Unglück" verrechnet werden. Das Beständnis des Seyns selbst trägt sein Maß in sich, wenn es überhaupt noch eines Maßes bedarf. Aber wem unter uns Heutigen ist dies Beständnis beschieden? Kaum daß uns die Bereitschaft zu seiner Notwendigkeit glückt oder auch nur der Hinweis auf diese Bereitschaft als den Beginn einer anderen Bahn der Geschichte.

"To be in the nearness of the ultimate God -- and this nearness may be the most-distant distance for the undecidability of [the question about] the flight or arrival of the gods -- cannot be calculated by [the economics of] 'success' or 'failure'. The way Being itself comes-to-stand bears its measure in itself, if it [in its coming-to-stand] is in need of a[n external] measure at all. But who among us today has taken the measure of this coming-to-stand? The fact is that it hardly ever happens for us [moderns] to be in readiness for the necessity of Being’s coming-to-stand or

¹⁸ *Euthydemus* 279c-280a, 282a, 282e, 292e, 293a; *Gorgias* 472c6-d1; *Meno* 88c.
even to take the reference to this readiness as [pointing to] the beginning\textsuperscript{19} of another way of [understanding] history."

5. The Δαίμονιον and die Zukünftigen

Now if we have caught something of the correspondences that ought to prevail when thinking turns from the first to the other beginnings, deconstructing in the process the metaphysics of presence and its residue, the "rational animal" of modern subjectivity, and so have come to see Wissen as Wesen, Ereignis in Verhaltenheit and its Geschichte, which is to say, paideia in Socratic ignorance as aretē and its happiness, we should also be in a position to see how it is that for the Platonic tradition, it is Socratic ignorance, as self-knowledge, that brings about the "life" of the daimōn.\textsuperscript{20} That is, what is "born" in ignorance is the life of that self that Plato called by the name of the "daimonion."\textsuperscript{21}

What then is this that Plato tells us about, that it is that which is the intermediary between the gods and man, and "is" intermediary, in that it is that which mediates, "brings messages

\textsuperscript{19} So different is this “happening” from all our usual knowledge, that leaves everything unchanged once it is gained, that we moderns find it difficult to appreciate that even readiness for it already involves the beginning of that “happening” itself.

\textsuperscript{20} Alcibiades I, 133c-d, 134d-e, 135 d; Meno 99b-100c1; Phaedo 99c2; Phaedrus 242c6; Theages, 129e-131a; Theaetetus 150e-151d.

\textsuperscript{21} The celebrated daimōn of Socrates, too, partakes of the nature of the daimonion. Its uniqueness (Republic 496c3-5) does not lie in its character as daimonion, but in that it always only says “no.” Cf. Proclus, who gives as the reason for this peculiarity that: “Socrates possessed this quality of liberality as regards good services to those who approached him..., he naturally required one [daimōn] who would deter rather than impel him.” Proclus, Alcibiades I, A Translation and Commentary, tr. by William O’Neill, (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965) 82.
between," man and the divine (One). Indeed, to this writer’s knowledge, the nature of the intermediary position and the nature of the "bringing of messages" is not anywhere further specified by Plato as to what constitutes the intermediary position and as to how the messages are brought. If we are right, this is no accident, for this is precisely what would have constituted the pedagogy of the paideia that unlocks the aporia of Socratic ignorance that one knows oneself when one does not know.23

Let us then try and follow Heidegger here. Heidegger tells us in the section 26, "Philosophy as Wissen," the following:

Wenn das Wissen als Verwahrung der Wahrheit des Wahren (des Wesens der Wahrheit im Da-sein) den künftigen Menschen auszeichnet (gegenüber dem bisherigen vernünftigen Tier) und ihn in die Wächterschaft für das Seyn erhebt, dann ist das höchste Wissen jenes, das stark genug wird, um der Ursprung eines Verzichtes zu sein.

"If knowledge as the preserving of the truth of the true ([i.e., of knowing] the essence of truth in there-being) is what distinguishes futural man (as opposed to the heretofore rational animal) and raises man to the power to watch for Being, than the highest knowledge is that knowledge that is strong enough to be the origin of something that is renounced."

22 Cf. the Symposium, 203a et seq. and section six below.

23 That is to say, as a daimonic man, Socrates knew he did not know. Such ignorance, as the starting point (beginning) of knowledge, is eu-daimon, in the sense of being full of the daimon. Compare Dillon, "It is noteworthy that Xenocrates makes a point of declaring a man's soul to be his daemon (Fr. 81), etymologizing eudaimon, "happy', as 'with one's daemon in a good state.' Plato does, at Tim. 90A, describe as 'a daemon given by God to each man the highest part of the soul, that is, the rational soul..." Dillon, in The Middle Platonists, 30.
Here we confront a not-knowing, a “renunciation” as highest knowledge, that becomes what it is about the origin of something that is renounced. The highest knowledge, that which preserves the essence of Being, is that knowledge which "situates" itself about the origin, "is" futurally there where truth comes to be true.

Heidegger goes on tells us how the "not" in not-knowing as the highest Wissen, this "renunciation," is to be grasped:

Verzicht gilt uns freilich als Schwäche und Ausweichen, als Aushängen des Willens; so erfahren, ist Verzicht das Weg-geben und Sichlossagen. Aber es gibt einen Verzicht, der nicht nur festhält, sondern sogar erst erkämpft und er-leidet, jener Verzicht, der entspringt als die Bereitschaft für die Verweigerung, das Festhalten dieses Befremdlichen, das solchgestaltet als das Seyn selbst west, jenes Inmitten zum Seienden und zur Göterung, das einräumt das offene Zwischen, in dessen Zeit-Spiel-Raum die Bergung der Wahrheit in das Seiende und die Flucht und Ankunft der Göter ineinander schlagen.

"We certainly evaluate resignation as weakness and evasion, as loss of will; thus experienced, resignation is giving-way and loss of self. But there is a resignation which not only stands fast but first struggles and suffers, that resignation which arises as the readiness for refusal. This resignation holds fast to the strangeness of refusal, knowing in it the form that Being manifests itself as. The knowledge of that which is resigned holds fast to the refusal of Being as that which, intermediary between the divine and beings, grants the openedness in between them. In its play of time and space, the flight and the arrival of the gods and the sheltering of the truth in beings fold one into the other."

When one knows one does not know, one knows something that is "renounced." This renunciation is not nothing, not a giving up, but the highest knowledge. Such knowledge knows the origin; in silence, it fathoms the abyss, insofar as it is ready for refusal. Then one knows
oneself in that one knows the deepest strata to be found at the origin of the self. Then one is, as it were, at the abysmal font itself, drinking of its waters. It is these waters that are what knowledge of the abysmal opens out. In the flowing of these waters, in the very play of time and space, the divinity and the truth of beings unfold one to the other. When the will is let into loneliness such that there-being is renounced, Being is known as refused, and man, holding fast to the refusal in silence, is authentically held out to the open future, opened out between the holy and beings, not emptily, but in the very play of time and space that is experienced as the flight and arrival of the gods and the sheltering of the truth in beings.

Such a one, "intermediate" between the divine and man, Plato called the "daimonic" one, which title belonged to one who knew himself in knowing that he did not know. If Heidegger is right, the resigned knowledge of such a one that knows that Being is refused knows the abysmal origin in watching for the stillness of the divine and preserving the truth of Being in beings as Ereignis. Such ones are the "futural" ones, those who, having the highest knowledge, stand in the coming of the divine as Ereignis, whereby alone the God is sheltered in beings. The futural ones, open between the gods and beings, are then the daimonic ones.

But all of this is very far from the beaten paths of men, as Heidegger goes on to tell us in the same section 26.

Das Wissen von der Verweigerung (Da-sein als Verzicht) entfaltet sich als die lange Vorbereitung der Entscheidung über die Wahrheit, ob diese noch einmal des Wahren (d.h. des Richtigen) Herr werde oder selbst nur nach ihm und so nach dem, was unter ihr ist, gemessen werde, ob Wahrheit nicht nur das Ziel des technisch-praktischen Erkennens bleibe (ein "Wert" und eine
"Idee"), sondern zur Gründung des Aufruhrs der Verweigerung werde.

"The knowledge of the refusal (there-being as renounced) unfolds itself as the long preparation of the decision about truth, whether this can once more master the true (i.e. the correct) or will itself be measured by what is lower than it, whether truth will not merely remain the object of technical-practical know-how (a ‘value’ and an ‘idea’) but rather will become the grounding of the upheaval of refusal."

The kind of knowledge of the resignation of there-being, if we correctly follow Heidegger, unlocks the pedagogical meaning of Socratic ignorance, that one knows oneself when one knows one does not know. It is the abysmal knowledge of the futural ones, who know the coming (Zukunft) of the holy (Being as refused). Such knowledge, which Heidegger calls beginning thinking in the other beginning, is not nothing, but the knowing that knows insofar as it fathoms the abyss of the refusal of Being as Ereignis.

It is a very strange and unique knowledge to be sure, but Heidegger tells us that is the sense of "knowing that one does not know" in the section 35, captioned "Das Ereignis":

_Die Wegbesinnung:_
1. Was anfangliches Denken ist.
2. Wie der andere Anfang als Erschweigung sich vollzieht.

="Reflection on the away:"
1. What beginning thinking is.
2. How the other beginning brings itself to completion as _silence_ ."

6. The “Ascending and Descending ἑρως” and die Erschweigung

If we are right so far, that _paideia in aretē_ that turns the whole soul towards the Good in such a way that the one so turned can act ethically is the _paideia_ that knows itself when it
knows it does not know. In such knowing, the knower, as *daimonic* man, is participating in the life of the *daimonion*, which, as we have seen, means to say *die Zukünftigen*, those who, knowing Being as refused, silently stand in the coming of the holy.

The *daimonion*, understood as the intermediary between the divine and man, "is" intermediary insofar as it "brings messages."

The nature of the message-bearing is wrapped up in an *aporia* that has come under the name of the “ascending and descending ἐρως.”

Of the *daimones*, Diotima tells Socrates in the *Symposium*:24

> “They are the envoys and interpreters that ply between heaven and earth, flying upward with our worship and our prayers, and descending with the heavenly answers and commandments, and since they are between the two estates they weld both sides together and merge them into one great whole. They form the medium of the prophetic arts, of the priestly rites of sacrifice, initiation, and incantation, of divination and of sorcery, for the divine will not mingle directly with the human, and it is only through the mediation of the spirit world that man can have any intercourse, whether sleeping or waking, with the gods. And the man who is versed in such matters is said to have spiritual powers, as opposed to the mechanical powers of the man who is expert in the more mundane arts.”

What is perplexing is the manner of the message-bringing. If we are right in following Heidegger here, the resolution of this perplexity is again a pedagogical insight.

Heidegger tells us in section 37 entitled "Das Seyn und seine Erschweigung (die Sigetik)" the following:

24 *Symposium*, 203a *et seq.*, translation by Michael Joyce.
Die Grundfrage: *wie west das Seyn?*

"The basic question: *how does Being manifest itself?*
Coming to silence is the circumspect lawfulness of silence (to be still). Coming to silence is the ‘logic’ of philosophy, inasmuch as this asks the basic question out of the other beginning. It seeks the _truth of the manifesting of Being_, and this truth is the glancing-allusive concealment (the mystery) of the event (the hesitating denial)."

Here, everything is already turned about, the *paideia* is already effected, and we stand before the mystery, insofar as we come into the silence, and so come to know the ascending and descending ἔρως, the event of glancing-allusiveness, the *logos* itself, born of the stillness of the futural ones who silently stand in the coming of the holy. Such ones know the mystery of the One in its abysmality, the *daimonic* ones, bearing the message of the *logos* itself.²⁵

Heidegger goes on to tell us:

Wir können das Seyn selbst, gerade wenn es im Sprung ersprungen wird, nie unmittelbar sagen. Denn jede Sage kommt aus dem Seyn her und spricht aus seiner Wahrheit. Alle Wort und somit alle Logik steht unter der macht des Seyns. Das Wesen der "Logik" (vgl. SS. 34) ist daher die Sigetik. In ihr erst wird auch das Wesen der Sprache begriffen.

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²⁵ If Gadamer is correct in _Truth and Method_, his "universal hermeneutics,” and presumably that of Heidegger as well, is nothing but the attempt to breathe new life and meaning into the same question that motivates the inquiry into the *verbum dei*.\footnote{99}
Aber "Sigetik" ist nur ein Titel für jene, die noch in "Fächern" denken und ein Wissens nur dann zu haben glauben, wenn das Gesagte eingeordnet ist.

"We can never directly say Being itself, precisely if it springs forth in a spring. Because every saying comes out of Being and speaks out of its truth. Every word and with it all logic stands under the power of Being. The essence of 'logic' (cf. SS. 34, note omitted) is therefore ‘sigetic.’ It is in it that the essence of language is first grasped. But 'sigetik' is only a title for those who still think in 'subjects' and only believe they have knowledge when what is said is classified."

That is to say, when the soul is turned about, the perplexity of the “message-bearing” is resolved in coming to know how the messages are brought, which is to say, to recognize precisely in stillness the sighting-sounding mystery of the Ereignis. That the logos thus comes out of the silence, then, says no other than that the “divine will not mingle directly with the human.” But as now turned about, this means that the word “is” the truth of Being itself, that arises as the beginning thinking of the futural ones, the ones who, in silence, hold fast to the refusal of Being.

26 “Sigetic” is a word play on “Logik”-- sigé (silence) being the opposite of logos.

27 Compare the section 23 entitled “Das anfängliche Denken. Warum das Denken aus dem Anfang?”: Was ist also der Anfang, daß er das Höchste alles Seienden werden kann? Er ist die Wesung des Seins selbst. ... Der Anfang--anfänglich begriffen--ist das Seyn selbst. ... Das anfängliche Denken ist: 1. Das Seyn aus dem erschweigenden Sagen des begriffenden Wortes in das Seiende ragen lassen. ... 4. in sich sigetisch, in der ausdrücklichsten Besinnung gerade erschweigend. "What is it about the beginning, that it can be the highest of all that is? It is the manifesting of Being itself. ... The beginning -- grasped beginningly -- is Being itself. ... Beginning thinking is 1. letting Being loom out of the saying out of silence of the defining word in beings. ... 4. in itself silence, coming-to-silence in most acute reflection."
7. Γένεσις and Entscheidung

Now if we have caught something of the correspondences as Heidegger would have it, then we are in position to breathe life and meaning into what Plato calls φιλομάθεια, "instruction in desire (of knowledge)," of the Republic:28

"Will it not be a fair plea in his defense to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive emulously for true Being and that he would not linger over the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs to lay hold on that kind of reality -- the part akin to it, namely -- and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge, and truly live and grow, and so find surcease from his travail of soul, but not before?"

Here we are told in no uncertain terms that the course of the pedagogy in Socratic ignorance culminates in "living and growing truly," being incorporate, as it were, in truth and Being. The completion of the course of the paideia in aretē then lies in a γένεσις, insofar as it is there that one first begins to live and grow truly. But then that means that it is from γένεσις, from ontological movement,29 that we can expect the resolution of the aporia of Socratic ignorance. The one so instructed is the one whom Plato calls φιλομαθής.

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28 at 490 b ff., Shorey’s translation.

29 Strictly impossible, by the Eleatic prohibition.
But nowhere to this writer’s knowledge does Plato tell us explicitly about what we thus seek. The possibility of ontological movement is wrapped in a possibility of non-Eleatic logic. As the Eleatics would have it, since only Being is, what is not Being -- and this would include becoming -- is nothing at all. On this showing, the perplexity of Eleatic logic is, then, that movement is ontologically impossible.

Again the way out of our perplexity involves the seeing of some absence in a presence if becoming is to be possible at all. But everywhere Plato treats of the Being of becoming, he breaks off at the crucial moment, his “wings” failing him, as we saw above, and he seemingly leads those who seek concrete guidance for the question of becoming into perplexity.

Let us again try to follow Heidegger here.

Heidegger in section 38, entitled "Die Erschweigung," tells us, in an eristic discussion of the aporia of finding the nature of logic in silence:


"The foundational experience is not the expression, and consequently [not] the principle, whether it [be conceived] ‘mathematically[-statically]’ or ‘dialectically[-dynamically,]’ but rather behavior’s holding itself against the hesitating self-denial in

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30 Indeed it would seem that he tells us the very opposite, insofar as it is everywhere the case that the dialogues distinguish the desirability of Being over becoming.
the truth (clearing of self-hiding) of the need, by which the necessity of decision arises.\textsuperscript{31}

As Plato would have it, the pedagogy in desire (φιλομαθής) comes to its culmination when the subject of the pedagogy begins to live and grow truly. As Heidegger, when the necessity of decision is seen to be born of truth as the need of the lighting of obscurity; which is to say, when man knows himself when he holds himself against the hesitating denial.

Everything now is turned about, and thereby the paideia is fulfilled. Decision is necessary because Being denies itself in need. Decision corresponds to the denial, joins it in truth, and so lets Being be.\textsuperscript{32} But this is the γένεσις that we seek. Knowing decision then is always already a knowledge of the need of Being’s denial, thus the very presence of that absence we seek in Socratic ignorance.

Let us try to follow Heidegger farther and look more deeply into the essence of decision. Heidegger tells us of its most lofty form in the section 43 entitled "Das Seyn und die Entscheidung," that it is to be conceived as a “beginning,” indeed the one that first separates and appropriates man and God, and so is as the beginning for mortals.

\textsuperscript{31} To us mortals, Being does not show itself all at once, but rather parcels itself out over the course of life. Behavior's holding itself against such "hesitant self-denial" in the truth of this need, gives that necessity by which "decision" arises, in the sense of "generation."

\textsuperscript{32} As Ereignis.

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müssen es als den Ursprung begriffen, der erst Götter und Menschen ent-scheidet und er-eignet.

"Used by the gods, through this elevation becoming shattered, we must question the essence of Being as such in the realm of this mystery. [From such a vantage.] we can not then explain Being as apparently supplemental, but rather must grasp it as origin, which [as originary] first appropriates-to and separates-apart man and gods."

Heidegger goes on to tell us at the fifth paragraph down in the same section that man with decision thereby knows both himself as the "Da-gründer" and knows the Being of becoming in its divine temporalization. We will present the quotation, then seek further to clarify the aspect of the Da-gründung, which is where we believe the paideia that resolves the question of the Being of becoming, of "ontological motion," lies. The passage:

"What is here called de-cision then [as appropriating-to and separating-apart] moves into the most-inward center of the essence of Being itself and has nothing at all to do with what we call running up against choices and the like. Rather, it says: stepping-out-of-one-another itself, that which divides, and [it is] in the divide, [wherein is] first let into play [what is] ones own[:]

precisely this[ appropriating-to and separating-apart] opened into one another [, i.e.,] as the clearing for the self-hiding and still undecidable, [herein, wherein] man belongs to Being as the grounder of the truth of Being and Being is referred to the temporality of the ultimate God."
The open "moves" men and gods towards and away from each other, and is decision, insofar as man knows himself as the *Da-gründer*, and insofar as Being is referred to the temporality of the ultimate God. But this decision is none other than the becoming we seek in "living and growing truly"; what Heidegger calls decision, is the *paideia* in γένεσις that is called φιλομαθής by Plato.

Just as for Platonic *paideia* in its diverse *aporiai*, so for the Heideggerian *Entscheidung*, a turn about is required. The turn is central. For Plato, it is wrapped in the glorious, if still ambiguous, "turn of the eye of the soul towards the Good"; for Heidegger, in the celebrated, if controversial, "Kehre im Ereignis," the turn of the truth of Being into the Being of truth.

We thus turn to a passage that promises to shed some light on this turn itself. In the last two paragraphs of the section 44 entitled "Die 'Entscheidungen'," we read:

Das Wissen von der stetigen Bedachtsamkeit des Seltenen gehört zur Wächterschaft für das Seyn, dessen Wesen als die Wahrheit selbst im Dunkel ihrer eigenen Glut erstrahlt.

*Die Wahrheit des Seyns ist das Seyn der Wahrheit* -- so gesagt klingt es wie eine gekünstelte und eine Verleitungen zu einem diallektischen Spiel. Während doch diese Umkehrung nur ein flüchtig-äußeres Zeichen ist der Kehre, die im Seyn selbst west und ein Licht wirft auf das, was hier mit Entscheidung genannt sein möchte.

"The knowledge of the continual thoughtfulness of those rarified ones [who let themselves into loneliness in order to say and to think the truth of Being] belongs to the power to watch for Being, whose essence radiates in the dark as the truth itself by its own brightness.

*The truth of Being is the Being of truth* -- said in such a way it sounds like an artifice and like an invitation to a dialectical play. Whereas in fact this turn around is only an external and at that unstable pointer to the *turn*, which manifests itself in Being itself
and which casts a light on what we would like here to name decision."

That is to say, man is implicated in Being as "decision" whenever the truth of Being is once grasped as the Being of truth, which is to have sighted time as the very coming-to-stand of Being itself. Such is the "turn in the event," insofar as by that "turn" man "turns into," leaps back into Being. But such turning-into by leaping-back is not the discovery of some "eternal realm" separate from becoming but rather the coming-to-be that is the way that Being itself becomes what it is in truth. This becoming-being is not a flux, but rather the "decision" that holds man in while separating him from beings and the divine. And man comes to himself in such a turn about as the one who thinks out of the origin, as the one who has abysmal knowledge in joining the need of Being’s denial in the necessity of decision, which is to say, as the one who, knowing that he does not know, lives and grows truly.

What seems clear so far is that Socratic ignorance as abysmal knowledge enables γένος as Entscheidung and thereby brings to fulfillment beginning thinking in the manner of the other beginning.

Heidegger tells us of the nature of the bringing to fulfillment of beginning thinking in section 22 entitled "Das anfängliche Denken." If we are right, what he tells us is the pedagogy that resolves the aporia of ontological motion, such that becoming may “be,” if thinking rests in the origin. The section in question:

Das anfängliche Denken ist das Er-denden der Wahrheit des Seyns und so die Ergründung des Grundes. Im aufruhen auf dem Grunde offenbart es erst und allein seine gründende, sammelnde und einbehaltende Kraft.
Wie aber ist das Er-dunken des Seyns ein Aufruhen? Indem es das Frag-würdigste eröffnet, vollzieht es die Würdigung und damit höchste Verklärung von jenem, worin das Fragen aufruht, d. h. nicht aufhört. Denn sonst könnte es, das Fragen, als eröffnendes nicht aufruhen.


"Beginning thinking is thinking out of the truth of Being and is thus the setting-up of the ground. Its [beginning thinking’s] grounding, gathering and containing power first and only reveals itself in resting upon the ground.

But how is it the thinking of Being is a resting? Inasmuch as it opens-up what is most question-worthy, it fulfills worthiness and with that, the highest clarity of that in which questioning rests, which is to say, does not leave off. Because it, questioning, as opening [up in question] otherwise could not [come to] rest [since it would only then question ad infinitum].

Resting calls forth and names the way questioning finds its way to the ultimate realm of power, the belonging to the final happening which is the turn in the Ereignis. [Cf omitted] The way to it comes about in the spring, which itself unfolds as the grounding of there-being."

The "resting" of "beginning thinking," if Heidegger is to be believed, is the coming to rest in the open in such a way that there-being thinks out of the truth of Being itself. Resting in such openness, there-being opens to the power that gathers and holds. Resting in the power that gathers and holds, there-being rests in the origin. Such original resting in power and hold is the self, but not a static, substantial self as in the modern thought of the I, not a Wissen of essences, but rather as Wesen, originating in the power that gathers and holds wherein it first wins it itself.
In the immediately prior section 21 entitled “Das ängangliche Denken (Entwurf),” Heidegger tells us:

Das Erdenken der Wahrheit des Seyns ist wesentlich Ent-wurf. Zum Wesen eines solchen Entwurfs gehört es, daß er im Vollzug und in der Entfaltung sich selbst in das durch ihn Eröffnete zurückstellen muß.

"The thinking out of the truth of Being is essentially released in a throw. It belongs to the essence of that which is released in a throw that in its completion and unfolding it must place itself back in that which is opened in the throw."

Here we are confronted by a saying that thinks itself from out of an unfolding, insofar as it is it itself that unfolds in the unfolding. If we dare the direct comparison, the "opening out" ("Entwurf") in the unfolding, the "placing itself back in" ("zurückstellen") the unfolding, and the "remaining" as the unity of the two ("Vollzug"), the "originating thinking out of the truth of Being," is none but the \( \gamma\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma \) we seek, as becoming a self, living and growing truly.

Indeed, as we should expect from Socratic ignorance as self-knowledge, Heidegger tells us in the same section that it is indeed the self itself that is born in "beginning thinking":

Der Entwurf entfaltet den entwerfer und fängt ihn zugleich ein in das durch ihn Eröffnete. Dieser zum wesentlichen Entwurf gehörige Einfang ist der Anfang der Gründung der im Entwurf errungenen Wahrheit.

"The essential release in the throw unfolds the thrower and instantaneously catches the thrower in that which is opened through the throw. This being-caught, that belongs to the essential release in the throw, is the starting point and provenance [the

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33 Of course, “Entwurf” literally means “sketch” or “rough draft,” but “released in a throw” better catches Heidegger’s meaning, as the next sentence shows.
resting in the beginning originatively,] of the grounding of the truth that is wrested therein."

The "dynamics" of Entscheidung as beginning thinking, if we may call γένεσις that, is bound up in the mood-structure of Da-sein. It is thus as it should be if we are to find in aretē, surely a term that relates directly to man, that which, effected somehow by turning the eye of the soul towards the Good, enables man to live and grow truly. Heidegger in the section 5 entitled "Für die Wenigen — Für die Seltenen" calls this mood-structure the basic-mood of thinking in the other beginning. He sets its structure forth as follows.

Die Grundstimmung des Denkens im anderen Anfang schwingt in den Stimmungen, die entfernt nur sich nennen lassen als das Erschrecken die Verhaltenheit die Scheu.

"The basic-mood of thought in the other beginning moves about in the moods which only from afar let themselves be named as fright holding-back awe before the holy."

What is central is the inner movement among these three moods. The inner movement Heidegger brings out in the description of the three moods. As we shall see in what follows, the movement is the movement of the "place" in being, the Da-sein, wherein Being is born, "truthed" as it were, out of the holy itself. Heidegger tells us of the mood "fright" the following:

Das Erschrecken ist das Zurückfahren aus der Geläufigkeit des Verhaltens im Vertrauten, zurück in die Offenheit des Andrangs des Sichverbergenden, in welcher Offenheit das bislang Geläufige als das Befremdliche und die Fesselung zugleich sich erweist.
"Fright is the return from the facility of dealings with the familiar back into the open of the impulse of the self-hiding, in which openness the hitherto familiarity proves itself as what is both strange and enslavement at once."

"Fright" thus names having caught sight of the abysmal workings of the holy as the impulse of the self-hiding behind the common experience of the blind trust of the everyday commerce with beings. In such fright, as mood, a will develops of itself to lay hold of the abyss and so draw near to the holy. This will is called Verhaltenheit. Heidegger tells us:

Doch dieses Erschrecken ist kein bloßes Zurückweichen und nicht das ratlose Aufgeben des "Willens," sondern, weil in ihm gerade das Sichverbergen des Seyns sich auftut und das Seiende selbst und der Bezug zu ihm bewahrt sein will, gesellt sich zu diesem Erschrecken aus ihm selbst sein ihm eigenster "Wille," und das ist jenes, was hier die Verhaltenheit genannt wird.

"This fright is no mere evasión and not the helpless surrender of 'will' but rather, because directly in it the self-hiding of Being opens itself and [in it] beings themselves and the relations to beings want to be preserved, there belongs to this fright itself its own most proper 'will,' and that is what is here called Verhaltenheit."

Of this Verhaltenheit, Heidegger tells us in the same section:

Die Verhaltenheit, die Vor-Stimmung der Bereitschaft für die Verweigerung als Schenkung. In der Verhaltenheit waltet, ohne jenes Zurückfahren zu beseitigen, die Zukehr zum zögernden Sichversagen als der Wesung des Seyns. Die Verhaltenheit ist die Mitte für das Erschrecken und die Scheu. Diese kennzeichnen nur ausdrücklicher, was ursprünglich zu ihr gehört. Sie bestimmt den Stil des anfänglichen Denkens im anderen Anfang.

34 The reference to those bound in chains in the Cave (Republic, 514) is patent.
"Holding-back, the preliminary mood of the readiness to understand refusal as gift. In holding-back holds sway, without setting aside that return [from the familiar back into the open of the self-hiding], the turn towards the hesitating self-denial as the essence of Being. Holding-back is the mean for fright and holy awe. Calling it a mean only expresses what belongs to holding-back originally. It determines the very style of beginning thinking in the other beginning."

As a mean, it moves between fright and holy awe, “moods” man in such a way that the open of the holy is taken over by the will that holds itself back before the gaping open so as to let Being manifest out of the origin in the experience and mood of holy awe. This primarily happens for man in that mood, where silence prevails before the majesty of the divine origin.

About Scheu Heidegger tells us this in the section we are considering:


"But holy awe is not to be confused with and even not to be understood in the direction of timidity [before the holy]. So little is that to be permitted that the here intended holy awe [is itself ‘strong enough’] to grow over the [so-called] ‘will,’ and this [precisely] out of the depths of the ground of the unitary basic-mood. In it, that is holy awe, the necessity of still silence arises, and it is the letting-be of Being as Ereignis that runs throughout all

35 Here explicitly the presence of an absence is preserved as such.

36 As a “verb.”
that takes hold in the midst of beings and all relations towards beings.

By it, that is to say holy awe, there is released the necessity of silence. Silence means here: the silence that holds man in the whole of beings and the letting of man’s commerce with beings manifest out of the silence of the origin, as Ereignis.

That is to say, in holy awe is named the drawing close to the holy that overpowers the will and lets man into the silence embracing all and preserves the silence’s silent originating as such in all of man’s dealing with beings. This holy awe knows the divine as Being’s gathering power in and through silence. Heidegger tells us:

Die Scheu ist die Weise des Sichnahmens und Nahebleibens dem Fernsten als solchem (vgl. Der Letzte Gott), das in seinem Winken dennoch — wenn in der Scheu gehalten — zum Nächsten wird und alle Bezüge des Seyns in sich sammelt.

"Holy awe is the way of the drawing close of nearness and the remaining near of the most-distant as such (cf. the Ultimate God), which nonetheless -- if beheld in holy awe -- becomes the closest of all in its beckoning and gathers in itself all relations of Being [the "world"]."

We now have gathered in outline the full structure of the “basic mood” that would correspond to aretē in Socratic ignorance, if indeed they are to function to the same ends, i.e., to show how it is possible for Socratic ignorance to be divine knowledge. But if this is so, then it becomes possible to ask why it is that the class of citizens to which the philosopher-kings belonged was called the class of the "Guardians,” but not by another name.

Heidegger tells us, again in the same section we are considering:
That is to say, "the Guardians" are not so much guardians of the state (as they are on the surface), but guardians of the truth.

Which is what the negation of a negation in Eleatic logic would give, in that what is not ignorance must be knowledge, insofar as two negatives make a positive. But that is absurd in this context.

8. "Ερως and das Unseiende

Now if the foregoing is strange and unique in the ways that the "not" is preserved in the sense of beginning thinking as abysmal knowledge, we should already have accustomed ourselves to the unfamiliar twists of reasoning and so not be too surprised to again find that we are confronted with an aporia involving a "negation," this time the aporia that arises when one asks what kind of "not" it is that those who don't know they don't know possess, if it is patently absurd that the negation of a negation here could not then be something positive, which is what Eleatic logic would require of it. That is, if once genesis is seen in Socratic ignorance, it is genesis that, in a reflection from it, first lights up the meaning of eros. Eros is what genesis is
not, or to say the same, *eros* is not yet *genesis*, for striving itself (*eros*), when seen from the perspective of the negation of Socratic ignorance as what it is not, is surely not "knowledge."

How then to resolve this *aporia* that two negatives do not make a positive, what is the form of the negation of negation, of double negation, that lets *eros* be seen in return from Socratic ignorance without it thereby being knowledge? To this writer’s knowledge, Plato tells us most explicitly about what we seek in the *Symposium* at 202a, where he tells us how it is that those who, seen from the perspective of Socratic knowledge, are those who, on the way to Socratic knowledge, are called by no other name than "lovers." "Love," he tells us there, is "intermediate" between beauty and ugliness just as one who does not know, but seeks, is intermediate between knowledge and ignorance, occupying a middle position whose place is not filled by a mere privation. But so far as this writer knows, just how this middle, apparently excluded by Eleatic logic, is to be thought is nowhere further explained in conceptual terms than to say at 206 e4-5 that this “intermediate” love is a "longing not for the beautiful itself, but for the conception and generation that the beautiful effects."

With the section we are about to cite, we move into the very center of the obscurity of the thinking of the nothing itself that is to provide the pedagogy that resolves this and the foregoing *aporiai.*

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39 That the pedagogy of the nothing is something esoteric is demonstrated by the dialogues themselves, which, although they do leave clues by which they may be resolved, everywhere break off in perplexity just at the crucial moments, and by the tradition as a whole, insofar as it may be seen, as Plato saw it, as doing violence to Parmenides, which means overturning Eleatic logic, and with it, the prohibition against the Being of not Being.
We offer here a translation of the polemical section 47 entitled "Das Wesen der Entscheidung: Sein oder Nichtsein," which sheds light on the inner nature of the double negation in relation to Socratic ignorance and on the negation in Socratic ignorance itself, insofar as its negativity is not nothing at all. The section is polemical, in that the "Vorblick" sets into the form of the questionable precisely what, when seen as not in question, grants the starting points that, as such, are not in question.  


Was ist hier das Äusserste: Sein oder Nichtsein und zwar nicht das Sein von irgend einem Seienden, etwa des Menschen, sondern Wesung des Seins oder?

Warum kommt es hier zum Entweder — Oder?

Die Gleichgültigkeit wäre nur das Sein des Unseienden, nur das höhere Nichts.

Denn "Sein" meint hier nicht an sich Vorhandensein, und Nichtsein meint hier nicht: völliges Verschwinden, sondern Nichtsein als eine Art des Seins: Seiend und doch nicht; und ebenso Sein: nichthaft und doch gerade Seiend.

Dieses in die Wesung des Seins zurückgenommen, verlangt die Einsicht in die Zugehörigkeit des Nichts zum Sein, und erst so bekommt das Entweder — oder seine Schärfe und seinen Ursprung.

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40 For Plato, these are the *aporiai* themselves, which must therefore be seen in the right way, i.e., the *aporiai* must be turned about. If we are right, that is the *paideia* preserved in and as the *aporiai*. 

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Weil das Seyn nichthaft, braucht es zum Beständnis seiner Wahrheit das Bestehen des Nicht und damit zugleich das Gegen alles Nichtege, das Unseiende.
Aus der wesenhaften Nichtigkeit des Seins (Kehre) ergibt sich, daß es jenes verlangt und braucht, was vom Da-sein her als Entweder — Oder sich zeigt, das Eine oder das Andere, und nur sie.
Die wesentliche Wesung der Entscheidung ist Zusprung zur Entscheidung oder die Gleichgültigkeit; also nicht der Entzug und nicht die Zerstörung.
Die Gleichgültigkeit als das Nichtentscheiden.
Die Entscheidung geht ursprünglich darüber, ob Entscheidung oder Nichtentscheidung.
Entscheidung aber ist, sich vor das Entweder — Oder Bringen, und damit ist schon Entschiedenheit, weil hier schon zugehörigkeit zum Ereignis.
Die Entscheidung über die Entscheidung (Kehre). Keine Reflexion, sondern das Gegenteil davon: über die Entscheidung, d.h. schon wissen das Ereignis.
Entscheidung und Frage; Frage als ursprünglicher: das Wesen der Wahrheit zur Entscheidung stellen. Wahrheit selbst aber schon das Zuentscheidende schlechthin.
"The essence of decision: to be or not to be -- can only be determined from out of its essence. Decision is decision between either -- or. But thereby indeed the nature of the decisive is already taken in advance. What grounds are there for the either -- or? What grounds for: only this or only this? Whence the indispensability of the in one way or another? Isn’t there a third, indifference? But here in most extreme reflection this is not ‘a possible option.’
What is here the most extreme: to be or not to be. Indeed, we are not concerned here about the Being of any single being, even man, but rather [the most extreme:] the essence of Being --or?
Why does it come down here to the either -- or?
Indifference could only be the higher nothing, only the Being of non-being.
Then 'Being' does not here mean the present at hand and non-being does not mean: complete disappearance, rather, non-being is a way of Being: it is something yet at the same time not; and likewise for Being: nihilating and yet immediately something that is.
Taking this back to the essence of Being demands an insight into the belonging of the nihilating to Being and from this insight the either -- or receives both its sharpness as well as its origin. Because Being has the character of the “no,” it needs the subsistence of the ‘no’ for it to subsist in its truth. Therewith, the ‘no’ shows itself simultaneously as the opposite to all that nihilates, non-being. Out of the essential nihilating of Being (the turn) there arises of itself that there is both the demand for servitude as well as the taking into service of what shows itself in there-being as the either -- or, the one or the other, and only it. The way that decision essentially manifests itself is to spring forth into decision or indifference; thus [non-being is] not withdrawal and not destruction. In-difference as not-deciding. Decision spans originally the poles of to decide or not to decide. But decision is already decidedness in bringing itself before the either -- or, because here already the belonging to the Ereignis. The decision about decision (the turn). It is not a reflection, rather the opposite of it: about the decision, i.e., already knowing the Ereignis. Decision and questioning; questioning is more original: to put to decision the essence of truth. Truth itself then however is that which is to be decided purely and simply.”

We give a partial outline here of the non-Eleatic logic of the nothing that is at work here at the center of Heidegger’s thought. There are two "kinds" of nothing that belong together as complements. The "nihilating" and its complement, what nihilating is not. The former, however, is the nihilating of Being, glimpsed in the turn in the Ereignis. The latter its negation. If what is glimpsed in the former is called Entscheidung, as the open middle wherein the gods and man play out of the open in that they are there first given to each other and held apart, then its complement is properly to be called in-difference. The latter, as in-difference, however, can only be seen from the former. If Socratic ignorance as genesis is "decision,” and double
ignorance is "not-deciding," the not of this "not-deciding," in-difference, tells us what the nature of what is neither single nor double ignorance is like seen from the perspective of Socratic knowledge. The lovers then would be those who were no longer in double ignorance, but knew they did not know, but did not know what they did not know. They would then be between in-difference and decision, longing, as it were, to find decision, to conceive in the beautiful.
CHAPTER FOUR:
HERMENEUTICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH OF BLINDNESS

Before turning to our present task, an existential (daseins-analytic) interpretation of the ideas, an apparently fundamental objection needs to be addressed. The objection is not that Heidegger is not of sufficient rank as a thinker to properly be compared to Plato, but rather that, since Heidegger is celebrated for his deconstruction of Platonism, and its doctrine of the ideas, it is Plato who is of insufficient rank to be compared with Heidegger.

If distinguishing between Platonism and Plato is not alone enough to remove the foregoing objection sufficiently to permit the present task, since it is not at all clear that what Plato had in mind and what later came to be known as Platonism are the same, it is rendered altogether powerless in face of Heidegger's own admission, that he did not in any event understand himself as having gone beyond some error of Plato, but only to perhaps have thought what was unthought by Plato, and so the same.

In the section 101\(^1\) entitled "From Early On in a Secure Light...," Heidegger tells us that the point of the deconstruction of the ideas of Platonism, insofar as it is to steer clear of Platonism, is not for the sake of a forsaking of Plato. "To the contrary, by the [deconstructive]
distinguishing [of, among other things, the Platonic ideas] of the first beginning, tradition first becomes tradition, and die Künftigen first come into their heritage."²

In the next line of the same section Heidegger gives a clue as to how not to translate the "Künftigen." "Such are not and never merely through the accident of having-come-later."³ The positive clue Heidegger already gave in having placed emphasis on the "werden," as the "(having)-come-into," taken in its sense of the legatee's taking of possession, and with it, the right of enjoyment, of the testamentary legacy.

Plato⁴ is, then, so little to be cast aside and forsaken by the deconstruction of Platonism, that rather he is to be first handed down as an already-accumulated "property,"⁵ indeed one that therefore can first be enjoyed by his "heirs," if and as they see fit.

We take our starting point from the hermeneutic principle that things are to be found where they have their origin and, following Gadamer,⁶ look to the Phaedo as naming the place where the ideas have their origin.⁷ We excerpt here a rather lengthy passage, but no longer than

² "In der Auseinandersetzung aber mit dem ersten Anfang, wird das Erbe erst Erbe und die Künftigen werden erst zu Erben."

³ "Solches ist man nicht und nie lediglich durch den Zufall, ein Späterer zu sein."

⁴ Who belongs to the "first beginning."

⁵ To be taken in analogy to its juristic sense of the legatee's right to enjoy and to use the testamentary property.


⁷ The propaedeutic function of the ideas in the education of the guardians, as in the Republic; the apology for the ideas in face of the venerable Parmenides, as in the Sophist and
just enough to answer three questions, (1) what is sought through positing the ideas, (2) how do the ideas let what is sought be found, and (3) what is the inner possibility that what is sought is able to be found by positing the ideas.

"One day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, that it is the mind that manages and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought, 'if this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes each thing as it is best for it to be. So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it. And therefore in respect to that particular thing, and other things too, a man need examine nothing but what is best and most excellent; for then he will necessarily know also what is inferior, since the science of both is the same.' As I considered these things I was delighted to think that I had found in Anaxagoras the teacher of the cause of things quite to my mind. ... I prized my hopes very highly, and I seized the books very eagerly and read them as fast as I could, that I might know as fast as I could about the best and worst. ...

My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. As I went on with my reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other absurdities. ... But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right, but to say that those things are causes of my doing what I do, and that I act with intelligence but not from the choice of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of

Parmenides, and the obscure power of the ideas to reveal the One, as in the Seventh Letter, must all remain in the background of our present inquiry.
cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. And so one man makes the earth stay below the heavens by putting a vortex about it, and another regards the earth as a flat trough supported on a foundation of air; but they do not look for the power (δύναμις) which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine force (δαιμόνιος ισχύς), but they think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal and more all-embracing than this, and in truth they give no thought to the good, which must embrace and hold together all things. Now I would gladly be the pupil of anyone who would teach me the nature of such a cause; but since that was denied me and I was not able to discover it myself or to learn of it from anyone else, do you wish me, Cebes, said he, to give you an account of the way in which I have conducted my second voyage (δεύτερος πλοῦς).  

I wish it with all my heart, he replied.  

After this, then, said he, since I had given up investigating realities, I decided that I must be careful not to suffer the misfortune which happens to people who look at the sun and watch it during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes unless they look at its image in water or something of the sort. I thought of that danger, and I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So it seemed to me that there is the need to run away from the possibility of being blinded by taking refuge in the logos, which is to say, to think the truth of beings in the ideas.  

Now perhaps my metaphor is not quite accurate; for I do not grant in the least that he who studies realities by means of conceptions is looking at them in images any more than he who studies them in the facts of daily life. However, that is the way I began. I assume in each case some principle which I consider strongest, and whatever seems to me to agree with this, whether relating to cause or to anything else, I regard as true, and whatever disagrees with it, as untrue. But I

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8 Proverb quoted in Liddell & Scott: "The next best way, from those who use oars when the wind fails." Note that both ways are complementary, not mutually exclusive, and, given a skilled captain, who knows how to use the wind and command his sailors, enable one to voyage the open sea with prospect that the shore may be reached.

9 To the same effect, compare the definition of the philosopher in the Sophist at 254a8.
want to tell you more clearly what I mean; for I think you do not understand now.
Not very well, certainly, said Cebes.
Well, said Socrates, This is what I mean. It is nothing new, but the same thing I have always been saying, both in our previous conversation and elsewhere. I'm going to try to explain to you the nature of that cause which I have been studying, and I will revert to those familiar subjects of ours as my point of departure and assume that there are such things as absolute beauty and good and greatness and the like. If you grant this and agree that these exist, I believe I shall explain cause to you and shall prove that the soul is immortal. ...Then consider the next step, and see whether you share my opinion. It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is beautiful because it partakes of that absolute beauty, and for no other reason. Do you accept this kind of causality?
Yes, I do.
Well, now, that is as far as my mind goes; I cannot understand these other ingenious theories of causation. If someone tells me that the reason why a given object is beautiful is that it has a gorgeous color or shape or any other such attribute, I disregard all these other explanations -- I find them all confusing -- and I cling simply and straightforwardly and no doubt foolishly to the explanation that the one thing that makes that object beautiful is the presence in it or association with it, in whatever way the relation comes about, of absolute beauty. I do not go so far as to insist upon the precise details -- only upon the fact that it is by beauty that beautiful things are beautiful. This, I feel, is the safest answer for me or for anyone else to give, and I believe that while I hold fast to this I cannot fall; it is safe for me or for anyone else to answer that it is by beauty that beautiful things are beautiful."
*Phaedo* 99c-101e. (Fowler's translation, except for the italicized language, which is my construction).

As to our first question, it is the *nous* that is sought in the ideas. Plato, in advance, decided in favor of an "intelligible" cause (*nous*), the "power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed," and which is to be sought out and understood in advance as "divine power (δαίμων)," over against those, who, starting with "physical causes,"
devoid of such divine power and guiding force, "are giving it a name that does not belong to it."

Plato says such ones are "unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. So much, then, for what Plato intends to find by means of the ideas.

As to our second question, how positing the ideas allows the *nous* to be found, apparently the answer is as simple as it is profound. Simple, in that the "ideas" are causes precisely in the way that their “presence in things,” Plato regards as “true,” and correspondingly, their absence from things Plato regards as “untrue.” Not only does the profundity of this simple view of "causation" lie in the fact that one can then let one’s life be led by the ideas, inasmuch as the ideas reveal truth and untruth and no one, as the celebrated maxim would also have it, knowingly does what is untrue, but the profundity also lies in the soteriology that belongs to the ideas.\(^\text{10}\)

As to our third question, we posed it as the "inner possibility" of the ideas, and by this mean to ask, with what assurance or criterion of truth is it that the ideas answer to the cause Plato seeks? How is it that, precisely because of the ideas, we thereby retain that which Plato seeks, the divine cause, or *nous*, in its truth? What does "truth" mean here? Where, indeed, are we to look to find such truth?

\(^{10}\) The soteriology of the ideas lies outside the scope of the present investigation, but to make the point, two things may be noted. From the outside, it may be glimpsed from the fact that, for Plato, the ideas not only enable access to the *nous* (as cause) but also "prove that the soul is immortal." In this latter connection, at 107d, Plato says "but now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or be saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its education and nurture, and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither."
Unless we are wholly mistaken, we think that Plato had already told us of the place to look, when he tells us in the passage cited that Socrates' motivations are two-fold. On the one hand, that the ideas are, at best, only "second best," and on the other, that they originate, in a very specific manner, in that realm where a certain danger lies, analogous to the danger of being-blinded that arises in the attempt to be an eye-witness of an eclipse of the sun. These, we presume, are the criteria we seek; but what are their truth-probative force?

We satisfy ourselves that "second best" means something like "does the same job, but in some way in an inferior manner," and further satisfy ourselves that "the same job" is none but the simplicity and profundity of the ideas, as discussed above in our second point. What is perplexing is the "best" presupposed, but left unsaid, by having called the ideas "second best." For surely, there can only be a second best if one were already in possession of, or at least were sufficiently possessed of, the best, to call the ideas "second best."

We believe Plato when he tells us that he did not discover the best way (98c8), but don't take him to have meant that thereby he knew nothing of it at all; on the contrary, only by knowing of it already could he know what he said of it to be the "second best" (in the sense of knowing to have failed to adequately conceive the matter) and indeed, unless we are wholly mistaken, the second best, as best, is such, because somehow, in some way, it already tells us something of the best. How, then, is this second best preserved in what Plato does tell us about, the second best?

The eclipse-analogy, if we may be permitted to call it so, is strange, and raises several questions. Does Plato there, where he introduces the ideas, and uses the eclipse-analogy to
express Socrates' inner motivations, mean to announce something of the best? And if he intends precisely this, which is what we presume, as unfamiliar as that may seem,\(^\text{11}\) then viewed from that perspective, the question becomes just what is the eclipse-analogy to tell us about the best that we seek here?

As we have come to expect from Plato, we get nothing direct when it comes to such matters,\(^\text{12}\) but only *aporiai*, often in the form of analogies, here the eclipse-analogy. In what way then does the eclipse-analogy speak to the question of how the best is preserved in the second best, which is to say, of how it expresses the inner possibility for the ideas as such to preserve the truth of the divine cause as *nous*? Since Plato tells us nothing direct about this, we must draw our clues from the eclipse-analogy itself.

The truth of the divine cause as idea is analogous to the way the calm surface of a still body of water allows the physical eyes to behold an eclipse of the sun without being blinded by its light. What is analogous on both sides of the analogy the assurance of an "always-seeing," in the form of a guarantee of "not being-

\(^{11}\) We are not aware of any commentator, ancient or modern, who has considered this possibility as such; see chapter 2, section 2.2.1 for a discussion of the works most closely related to our own research. As appears there, the “best” is usually interpreted as the teleological or final cause and the “second best” as the exemplary or formal case. Although the commentators differ as to their relation and individual natures, none has seen fit to inquire into the structure of the eclipse-analogy itself as preserving, but otherwise leaving unsaid, a “negative relation to the origin,” and to interpret that (“negation”) itself as the unsaid “best” in the “second best,” as will appear presently (cf. n. 16).

\(^{12}\) Compare, for example, the famous "cave" analogy of Book VII of the *Republic*, 514 *et seq.*
blinded."\textsuperscript{13} Always-seeing = not being-blinded. In short, contraries!\textsuperscript{14} What are we to make of this, that "contraries" lie at the heart of the ideas?\textsuperscript{15}

We understand from the eclipse-analogy that in the "always-seeing" of the ideas lies a contrary, "not being-blinded." In the "always-seeing" of the ideas lies a "not being-blinded," in the form of a taking shelter by fleeing. The form of the contrary preserves the negative relation the ideas as always-seeing have to their origin as not being-blinded.\textsuperscript{16} Plato's eclipse-analogy,

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} For Plato at \textit{Phaedo} 100 explicitly denies that it is the "image" quality that is of decisive importance in the eclipse-analogy.
\item \textsuperscript{14} The subsequent path of the dialogue then loses any mystery as to why Plato saw fit to introduce just such contraries at 102e into the discussion of the nature of participation. Nor are contraries strangers to the other dialogues; compare the same contraries of the five highest kinds of the \textit{Sophist}; and compare the \textit{Parmenides}, which is full, to overflowing, with such "back and forth." And indeed, in a certain sense, the "Eleatic strangers" of the latter are the living embodiments, as it were, of such things! If it is so, that the figure of the stranger from Elea is the "living truth" of the contraries, then, perhaps, given Plato's well-known Pythagoreanism, such artful "philosophizing" is the nature of the "art" that Socrates, awaiting death, alludes to at the beginning (60e) of the \textit{Phaedo}, saying there that he believed to have practiced such "art" his whole life long.
\item \textsuperscript{15} One thing should be clear in advance, Plato here, as elsewhere in his logical investigations, never wrestled with negations (typically as contraries and \textit{heterotes}) merely to pin them, and so force them to submit, but wrestled with them to learn their moves, in hopes of becoming a better contestant in the stakes of the Parmenidean game of Being and not Being as Plato saw it.
\item \textsuperscript{16} If we are right, it is the form of the contrary itself that is "second" in second best, but, insofar as it does capture something of the negative relation to the origin, the flight to the \textit{logoi} from the fear of being-blinded, it is, to that extent, second best. And if we are right, the contrary, as negation, is precisely second best to the \textit{heteron}, which, only first worked out in the \textit{Sophist}, adequately founds the relation of seer and seen as “power,” and with that, at Republic 505a, the Idea of the Good is said to be the “final knowledge.” Cf.. in this connection chapter 5, below.
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however, tells us no more about this "negation" in truth that we seek.\textsuperscript{17} We must then try to
follow Heidegger here.

In the section 110 entitled "The Ιδέα, of Platonism and Idealism," Heidegger traces the
history of the ideas from Plato through modern times in twenty-seven separate points. In the
first eight "points," to which we limit ourselves here, Heidegger interprets the
Platonic/Aristotelian thinking on ἀληθεία (as ιδέα), as it is important in what follows to bear
in mind, always already in light of the question of the meaning of Being.

In the first point,\textsuperscript{18} the idea is defined as the outward appearance, the look, that by which
something is what it is. It is this, not as something represented is presented for a representing

\textsuperscript{17} Though, in terms of the eclipse-analogy, it is interesting to speculate, the α-privative of ἀληθεία corresponds to the not, of not being-blinded, and the ληθη corresponds to the being-blinded. The mystery, if we may term ληθη that, is already apprehended in quite a peculiar way, if it to be experienced as analogous to the fear of being-blinded. That is to say, on the one hand, an instrument for apprehending the mystery is already presupposed to be at work analogous to the seeing-eye, and on the other, the mystery itself is already experienced in the analogy in terms of the light source, the sun. Everything is then already turned-about, the alpha-privative in no way expresses non-being as if it were nothing at all, but rather expresses the way the mystery is to be apprehended in its truth -- always-seeing-in-the-light-of-the-sun (Cf. the "Idea of the Good"). But precisely what kind of "negation" it is that is not a mere "no" and "not at all," Plato does not say.

\textsuperscript{18} 1. Der Begriff der ιδέα (εἴδος), das Aussehen von etwas, das, als was etwas sich gibt
und macht, das, wohin zurückgestellt etwas das Seiende ist, das es ist. Obzwar ιδέα auf ιδείν (νοείν) bezogen ist, so meint das Wort gerade nicht das Vorgestellte des Vorstellens, sondern umgekehrt das Aufscheinen des Aussehens selbst, was die Aussicht bietet für ein Hinsehen. Das Wort will gerade nicht, neuzeitlich gedacht, den Bezug zum »Subjekt« anzeigen, sondern die Anwendung, das Aufscheinen der Aussicht im Aussehen und zwar als das, was anwesend zugleich Bestand gibt. Hier ist der Ursprung der Unterscheidung in das τί ἐστιν (essentia, quidditas) und δέ (existentia) in der Zeitlichkeit der ιδέα (vgl. Der Sprung). Das Seiende ist seidend in der beständigen Anwesenheit, ιδέα, das Gesichtete in seiner Gesichtetheit (ἀληθεία).
subject. It rather presents itself there, in the manner of that looming-up in which sight becomes a seeing-sight, which is to say, in the manner of a presencing that comes to stand in itself, indeed as what and that it is in original unity. The foundational sense of Being is "constant presence." "Constant presence" is what is at work in the ideas, the "sighted in its sightedness." Presence is presence that always already has come to stand in presence.\textsuperscript{19}

In the second point,\textsuperscript{20} having secured the idea in advance in terms of "constant presence," it becomes possible to decide what is not constantly present, namely, the ever-changing. Thus, the idea is seen as κοινόν. Constant presence takes on the character of κοινόν only in opposition to "beings," that is, to the not constantly present. The idea "tree" is common to the many trees, and only to them. If and only if the many trees come and go is the idea "tree" what remains present and common to all.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19} Compare the "always-seeing" of the eclipse-analogy.

\textsuperscript{20} Die iδέα das, wohnin das noch Wechselnde und Viele zurückgestellt wird, das Einigende Eine und deshalb δν, seiend = einigend; und in der Folge davon ist die iδέα mit Bezug auf ihr Vieles (ἐκαστὸς) das κοινόν, und, merkwürdig, diese nachträgliche Folgebestimmung der iδέα als Seiendheit, das κοινόν, wird dann zur ersten und letzten Bestimmung der Seiendheit (des Seins), dieses ist das »Generellste«! Aber das ist nicht merkwürdig, sondern notwendig, weil von Anfang an das Sein als Seiendheit nur vom »Seienden«, gleichsam Seienden her, dem Vielen her und auf dieses zurück und nur so erfahren und gedacht wird.

\textsuperscript{21} In Heidegger's short-hand, Being (iδέα) is always already the Being of beings (κοινόν), as opposed to Being itself, which, according to what we have seen in the eclipse-analogy, corresponds to the "negative relation" of "not being-blinded" that lies in the always-seeing in a light (as iδέα).
The third point, having interpreted the Being of beings (ideas) in distinction from the ever-changing as κοινόν, the κοινόν on the flipside stands in first place over against the ever-changing. The κοινόν, ὅντως ὄν; the ever-changing, μὴ ὄν.

With the fourth point, the unity of the ideas is interpreted. In short, a plurality of ἰδέαι can be only as γένη. The γένη have their unity only in "community," "marriage," whereby they are not simply co-present and indifferent to each other but rather they "beget" all things and so are the so-called "universals," as the progenitors of all things.

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22 Ist einmal die ἰδέα als die Seiendheit des Seienden angesetzt und ist sie als κοινόν begriffen, dann muß sie, wieder vom gleichsam Seienden (Einzelnem) her gedacht, an diesem das Seiendste sein, das ὅντως ὄν. Die ἰδέα genügt dem Wesen der Seiendheit zuerst und allein und darf daher beanspruchen, als das Seiendste und eigentlich Seiende zu gelten. Das Einzelne und Veränderliche wird zum μὴ ὄν, d.h. das der Seiendheit nicht und nie Genügende.

23 Ist so das Sein (immer als Seiendheit, κοινόν), begriffen, ἐν, das Seiendste und Eine - Einigendste, und sind der ἰδέα selbst viele, so kann dieses Viele als Seiendes nur sein in der Weise des κοινόν, d.h. in der κοινωνία unter sich. In dieser wird die Anwesung und Beständigkeit in der Seiendheit und d.h. Einheit gesammelt; die γένη als Einheiten sich einigende und so Her-künfte bezw. »Gattungen«.

24 At once, we are spared the misunderstanding of thinking constant presence, "always-(already)-seeing" in a light, as if it were some simple "eternity" of the ideas. As κοινωνία, the γένη exhibit the rich and interconnected dimensionality of the Being of beings.
The first four points are drawn to the Being aspect of the \( \lambda \omega \gamma \delta \zeta \), so called ontology.\(^{25}\)

The remaining four points are drawn by Heidegger from regard to the \( \theta \varepsilon \omicron \varsigma \) aspect of the \( \lambda \omega \gamma \delta \zeta \).\(^{26}\)

In the fifth point,\(^{27}\) "constant presence" (\( \iota \delta \varepsilon \alpha \) as \( \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \alpha \)), is not something ultimate, but rather a relation is indicated to what it is not -- \( \epsilon \pi \varepsilon \kappa \varepsilon \iota \nu \alpha \tau \iota \varsigma \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \alpha \zeta \).\(^{28}\) This negative relation (\( \epsilon \pi \varepsilon \kappa \varepsilon \iota \nu \alpha \tau \iota \varsigma \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \alpha \zeta \)) is not nothing at all, but rather indicates the \( \delta \alpha \gamma \mu \omicron \omega \nu \) itself as the

\(^{25}\) An interpretation of ancient "ontology," as such, is outside the scope of the present inquiry.

\(^{26}\) These twin aspects of the \( \lambda \omega \gamma \delta \zeta \) are expressed most succinctly in Heidegger's claim that all ontology is "onto-theo-logie."

\(^{27}\) Die Auslegung des \( \omicron \nu \) als \( \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \alpha \) und diese als \( \iota \delta \varepsilon \alpha \) (\( \kappa \omicron \iota \nu \omicron \nu \), \( \gamma \nu \nu \nu \)) begreift die Seiendheit des Seienden und damit das \( \epsilon \iota \nu \alpha \iota \) des \( \omicron \nu \) (das Sein, aber nicht das Seyn). In der Seiendheit (\( \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \alpha \)) ist das \( \epsilon \iota \nu \alpha \iota \), das Sein, geahnt als das irgendwie Andere, das sich in der \( \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \alpha \) nicht voll erfüllt. Deshalb wird versucht, im Weiterschreiten auf demselben Wege, d.h. des Fassens der Anwesung, über die Seiendheit hinauszugehen: \( \epsilon \pi \varepsilon \kappa \varepsilon \iota \nu \alpha \tau \iota \varsigma \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \alpha \zeta \) (vgl. Die metaphysischen Grundstellungen des abendländischen Denkens (Metaphysik). Übungen Wintersemester 1937/38). Aber weil die Frage nur steht nach dem Seienden und seiner Seiendheit kann sie auf das Seyn selbst und von diesem her nie stoßen. Das \( \epsilon \pi \varepsilon \kappa \varepsilon \iota \nu \alpha \) kann deshalb nur als etwas bestimmt werden was die Seiendheit nunmehr als solche in ihrem Bezug zum Menschen (\( \epsilon \upsilon \delta \alpha \iota \mu \omicron \omicron \omicron \iota \alpha \)) kennzeichnet, als das \( \alpha \gamma \alpha \theta \omicron \omicron \), das \( \text{Taugliche} \), alle \( \text{Tauglichkeit} \) Begründende, also als Bedingung des »Lebens«, der \( \psi \nu \chi \nu \) und somit deren Wesen selbst. Damit ist der Schritt getan zum »Wert«, zum »Sinn«, zum »Ideal«. Die Leitfrage nach dem Seienden als solchem ist bereits an ihrer Grenze und zugleich an der Stelle, wo sie zurückfällt und die \( \text{Seiendheit} \) nicht ursprünglicher mehr begreift, sondern be-wertet, derart, daß die Wertung selbst als das Höchste ausgegeben wird.

\(^{28}\) Inasmuch as the motive for the flight to the \textit{logoi} remains in the \textit{logoi} in a negative way, this is precisely what we would expect from the eclipse-analogy. The fear of being-blinded is never a mere casting-aside. Rather, it is a relation in the \textit{nous} as divine cause, albeit a negative one, which is indicated in the eclipse-analogy.
"middle" between the θεός and man, as such.29 Here the ψυχή, "life," is born of and has its essence in this negative relation.30 That is to say, as δαίμον mortals experience the ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας as ἀγαθόν in and through the ιδέα.

In the 6th point,31 in such a life, the way of presence of what is sighted in the sightedness of constant presence (εἴδος) is the way of being-seen and grasped in living apprehension -- εἴδος is already nous. Further in such a life, the way of presence of the idea itself, "unifying," (κοινόντια), also indicates the way of presence of the idea with the others (κοιννωνία), which are in the ways of being spoken out in living discourse, either with oneself, or with others -- κοινόν and κοινωνία are already διαλέγεσθαι and λόγος. Further in such a life, the way of presence of what is beyond Being is in the way of an enlivened arousal (ἐρως) — ἀγαθόν and καλόν are already ἐρως.32

29 Compare the Symposium at 203a et seq. and the sections 4-6 of chapter three, supra.

30 And, indeed, if the Phaedo is to be believed, not any old life, but un-dying life.

31 In eins damit werden nun auch die Bezüge der ιδέα selbst zur ψυχή deutlich und maßgebend:
a) als εἴδος zum ιδείν und νοεῖν - νοῦς
b) als κοινόν und κοινωνία zum διαλέγεσθαι und λόγος
c) als ἀγαθόν - καλόν zum ἐρως.

32 These three ways of Being (presence) of life are not further specified.
In the 7th point, the soul, already grasped as comprehending in itself the salient features of constant presence (ιδέα, κοινόν, κοινωνία and δαίμων), is understood as "life," as what properly lies in life (ἀρχή ζωής und ζωή). So living, one lives well (εὐδαιμονία).

Finally, in the 8th point, Heidegger explicitly points out the soteriological aspect of onto-theo-logie.

Unless mere word mysticism is at work, constant presence, as the truth of Being, has already been assigned to time. If such time "has" Being, then the Being of truth is another name for the question of how something "negative" can be; that is to say, the truth of Being already involves the question of the Being of truth. For "time" surely means something like what changes and varies, and so in one way or another "is not." The question of the Being of truth

33 Weil so in der ψυχή das Wesen des Seienden versammelt ist, ist die ψυχή selbst die ἀρχή ζωής und ζωή die Grundgestalt des Seienden. ψυχή is hier und auch bei Aristoteles nicht Subjekt, und demnach ist mit diesem Bezug des ὅν als οὐσία Wesentliches gesetzt:
  a) das Seiende als solches ist immer das Gegenüber, Gegenstand,
  b) das Wem-gegenüber selbst das ständig Anwesende und Vorhandene und Seiendste und der Seinsbefragung Unbedürftige.

34 Das ἔπεκεινα τῆς οὐσίας als ἀρχή του ὅντος hat gemäß seiner Maßgabe für die εὐδαιμονία den Charakter des θείου und θεος, vgl. Aristoteles.
  Die Frage nach dem Seienden als solchem (im Sinne der Leitfrage), die Ontologie, ist somit notwendig Theo-logie.

35 Ἰδέα as οὐσία as "constant presence."
thus encloses the ancient Platonic -- Parmenidean question of whether or not, and how, what is not can be.\footnote{Heidegger therefore questions the same as Parmenides, who prohibited, so it would seem, thinking what is not in the so-called "didactic poem," and as Plato, who, with explicit reference to that prohibition, introduced the dialectic of the five highest kinds in the \textit{Sophist} and who, as we have just seen, even produces the ideas themselves out of the explicit projection of a negation ruling in the eclipse-analogy.}

What, then, does Heidegger tell us of this "negation" that lies at the heart of truth?\footnote{As we saw above, since Plato characterizes the idea as "second best," he says nothing explicit about the negative relation we seek beyond preserving it in terms of the eclipse-analogy.} How does Heidegger understand this "negation" which Plato expressed analogically as a turn-away (flight) that always already lies in the turning-to (arrival) the idea?

We will follow the text closely here, for, so far as we are aware, the treatment Heidegger gives of the negative relation we seek is unprecedented, as to its pedagogical detail, in the history
of philosophy. 38 We thus turn to the group of sections called the "Essence of Truth," 39 believing that here we find account of the negative-essence we seek, in its truth.

In section 210 entitled "Towards the Destinal Gift of the Essence of Truth," the Platonic .nome as ência is explicitly interpreted in terms of the Platonic νομόν.

The section 210 begins:

Seit Plato die ἀληθεία als die Helle, in der das Seiende als solches steht, die Gesichtetheit des Seienden als seine Anwesenheit (ἀληθεία καὶ ἕν). Zugleich als die Helle, in der das νοέσιν erst sieht. Also die Helle das, was ἕν ἕν und νοέσιν verknüpft, das νομόν.

"Since Plato, ἀληθεία [has been interpreted] as the brightness, in which what is stands as such, [which is to say,] the sightedness of what is as its presence (ἀληθεία καὶ ἕν).
Simultaneously [ἀληθεία was interpreted] as the brightness in which νοέσιν first

38 In the section 129 entitled "The Nothing," Heidegger would seem to grant that he too found no other to have explicitly given detailed account of that negative relation as such: Sollte unser Fragen nur diese zugestandene (aber gleichwohl noch nicht begriffene) Nichtigkeit angehen, dann dürfte es nicht beanspruchen, die Metaphysik in Frage zu stellen und die Zusammengehörigkeit von Seyn und Nichts ursprünglicher zu bestimmen. "Should our questioning only touch this conventional (but nonetheless still not grasped) no-ness, then there would be no need to have claimed to have placed metaphysics in question and to have determined the negative relation of Being more originally."

39 In "c) Das Wesen der Wahrheit," which group of sections occupies central place in the fifth part of the Beiträge captioned "Die Grundung," preceded by two groups of sections captioned "a) Da-sein und Seinsentwurf," and "b) Das Da-sein," and followed by the two groups of sections called "d) Der Zeit-Raum als den Ab-grund" and "e) Die Wesung der Wahrheit als Bergung."
Heidegger characterizes later in the same section the kind of truth of the ζυγόν as "Grund," one which grounds "nur im Gegründetsein des Gesetzten seiner Einsichtigkeit," precisely in the groundedness of what is placed there already into intellectual apprehension; and which finds therein, and only therein, i.e. in such groundedness, its homoiotic truth, "weshalb eben die ὀμοίωσις noch ἄληθεια ist, griechisch, auf diesem grund ruht, in ihm als Wesen west und deshalb auch noch so gennant werden kann und muß."\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40} See, the Republic, Book VI, 508a1 for the zugon.

\textsuperscript{41} The very next sentence introduces the collapse: "Später aber geht die ἄληθεια als solche verloren." But later than when? Later than Plato!
The ground, necessarily open for Plato as κυρόν, gets lost, "allein, das reicht, wie die Geschichte zeigt, nicht zu,"\textsuperscript{42} and Heidegger draws therefrom the impetus to seek again the same negative essence of truth, "die Unverborgenheit muss als Offenheit des Seienden im Ganzen und die Offenheit als solche des Sichverbergens (des Seins) und dieses als Da-sein ergründet und gegründet werden," "the un-hiddenness must be grounded [again] and founded, [which is to say, be understood in advance] as the openness of beings as a whole, and the openness as such [must be conceived in advance in terms] of the self-hiding (of Being), and this [intends nothing but placing mortal mankind in such a self-hiding opening,\textsuperscript{43}] as Da-sein."

What matter, then, is named by the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen"? From Lichtung both the "clear" and the "light" come to speech. Lichtung thus preserves something of the light-character (φῶς) of the Platonic κυρόν. From "das Sichverbergen," a "not," something "negative," comes to speech. "Verbergung" thus preserves something of the not of "not being-blinded" of the flight to the logoi of the eclipse-analogy. And as third moment, the "für" names the relation between the Lichtung and the Sichverbergen. In formal terms, then, the formula as a whole names the very negative relation we seek, namely, how the "not" is to be thought in the not being-blinded in relation to the always-seeing in a light of the eclipse-analogy.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{42} In section 211 entitled "ἀλήθεια, the turn-about of its destinal-gift as accomplished by Plato and Aristotle, its last glimmer and full collapse."

\textsuperscript{43} "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen," for short.

\textsuperscript{44} An orientation with respect to how the matter stands is given in section 213 entitled "That with Which the Truth Question Deals," in the form of six propositions which we
What, then, is called for by the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen"? As general background, it is well-known that Heidegger was fond of likening the concept "Lichtung" to the metaphor of the forest-clearing. Hiking through the woods, one comes upon a clearing. There, in the bright open, and only there, is found the surrounding envelope of hidden forest, precisely as hidden. Only, as it were, in the clearing is the forest experienced as hidden. The clearing is not only the clearing of the forest but also, that wherein the forest first shows itself as hidden.

In section 214 entitled "The Being of Truth, (Openedness)," another metaphor is given that is said to be like to what is summoned up by the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen."

Aber das Offene, in das, zugleich sich verbergend, je das Seiende hereinsteht, und zwar nicht nur die nächsten handlischen Dinge, ist in der Tat so etwas wie eine hohle Mitte, z. B. die des Kruges.

merely repeat here:
1. it is not about a mere change of concept,
2. it is not about a merely more original look into essence.
3. Rather it is about the spring into the Being of truth.
4. And consequently it is about a transformation of human being in the sense of a dis-lodgement of his place in beings.
5. And thus, at first, about a more original appreciation and empowerment of Being itself as Ereignis.
6. And therefore, above all, about the grounding of human being in Da-sein as the ground of man's truth necessitated by Being itself.
"But the open, in which, simultaneously concealing itself, beings in each case stand, and indeed not only the closest things at hand, is in fact something like a hollow middle, for example, that of a jug."

Heidegger tells us the "hollow middle" is not to be thought as a void, empty of matter, defined by the encircling walls, which alone have matter and substance; but rather, the way of thought is to be turned about, whereby the walls of the jug are to be thought from out of the openness. Then the open-ness is not devoid of any content, but the open-ness is that which determines the walls as encircling walls, supporting and bearing out the encircling ordering of the "walling" of the walls.

"Hier erkennen wir jedoch, daß nicht eine beliebige Leere nur durch die Wände umschlossen und von »Dingen« unerfüllt gelassen ist, sondern umgekehrt, die hohle Mitte ist das Bestimmend-Prägende und Tragende für die Wandung der Wände und ihrer Ränder. Diese sind nur die Ausstrahlung jenes ursprünglichen Offenen, das seine Offenheit wesen läßt, indem es solche Wandung (die Gefäßform) um sich herum und auf sich zu fordert."

"Here we do not intend an arbitrary emptiness merely enclosed by walls and empty of ‘matter,’ but rather the opposite, the hollow middle is the determining-stamping and supporting for the parting of the walls and their borders. These are only the emanation of that original open, which lets its open-ness essence, inasmuch as it demands the walling (the form of the vessel) precisely about itself and in relation to itself."

That is to say, the open-ness is not defined by the encircling walls of the jug, rather the open-ness gives the walls their place, by enplacing them in that place.

So strahlt im Umschließenden die Wesung des Offenen wider.

45 If we may be permitted a Heideggerian neologism.

46 It is interesting to compare in this connection the much-discussed but ever-elusive Platonic "chora."
"Thus [when turned-about.] the essence of the open emanates the surrounding walls."

The open-ness of the open lets what is opened up thereby stand in the open, like the hollowness of the hollow middle lets the walls stand determined and shaped thereby -- as a jug.

What is decisive in the jug-analogy, is the turn-about from the usual view that the negative is merely the absence of the positive. On this view, the hollow middle has no "being" of its own but is precisely to be determined by the encircling walls, which alone define it as "empty."

When turned-about, the negative is to be seen to give the positive in analogy to the way the open of the hollow middle enplaces the jug in its open-ness.

If we hold fast to the way the jug-analogy works, then we can use it as a clue to interpret the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen." Here, everything is already turned-about, and if, following the clue of the jug-analogy, we are to see the negative as giving the positive, this means we are to see the Lichtung\(^{47}\) as given by the Sichverbergen,\(^{48}\) which Heidegger expresses in the very next sentence of the section we are considering:

> Entsprechend, nur wesentlicher und reicher, müssen wir die Wesung der Offenheit des Da verstehen. Seine umrandende Wandung ist freilich nichts dinghaftes Vorhandenes, ja überhaupt nicht ein Seiendes und selbst nicht das Seiende, sondern des Seins selbst, das Erzittern des Ereignisses im Winken des Sichverbergens.

> "Correspondingly only more essentially and richer, we must understand the essence of the open-ness of the Da. Its bounding walls are certainly nothing materially at hand, indeed overall not any particular thing and

\(^{47}\) As positive.

\(^{48}\) As negative.
itself not what is in general, but rather [it is the encircling] of Being itself, the vibrancy of Ereignis in the wink of the self-concealing."

We are on virgin conceptual territory indeed. The "Lichtung," which corresponds to the Platonic φῶς as ζυγόν, is thought out of the self-hiding, in the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen." Later in the same section and in the context of a negative discussion of what philosophy hitherto was not able to retain, Heidegger explicitly tells us that the way of Being of the Lichtung, its "Wesung," is first to be experienced from out of the Sichverbergen:

Sowenig wie das Offene und die Offenheit verfolgt wurden in ihrer Wesung (den Griechen war zuvor überhaupt ein Anderes aufgegeben), ebensowenig wurde klar und der grundsätzlichen Erfahrung zugewiesen die Wesung von Verborgenheit - Verbergungs. Auch hier wurde, echt griechisch, das Verborgene zum Abwesenden, und das Geschlehnis der Verbergung ging verloren und damit die Notwendigkeit, es eigens zu gründen und vollends in seinem inneren Zusammenhang mit der Wesung der Offenheit zu begriffen und schließlich und zuerst dieses Einheitliche auch als ureigenes Wesen zu gründen.

"As little as the open and its openness could be tracked in its manner of Being (for the Greeks, an other in general and in advance was posited), just as little could its manner of Being be allotted clearly in the fundamental experience of hiddenness-hiding. Even here, in a typically Greek way, the concealed was thought as absence, and the event of hiding collapsed, and with it, the necessity, genuinely to ground and to conceive it completely and fully in its inner possibility with the manner of Being of openness and, to ground this unitariness simply and at first also as the primordial essence."

What, given the clue of the jug-analogy, is the proper name of the negative relation we seek, which names the "not" of not being-blinded of the eclipse-analogy, the second best left unsaid in the second best, which, if we are right, lies implicit in the formula "Lichtung für das
"Sichverbergen"? Heidegger gives us the answer in the very next sentence: "Der Versuch dazu ist die Nennung und Entfaltung des Da-seins."

At this juncture, one thing is certain. The famous Heideggerian Da-sein is not anything like a conventional "subject" concept. Rather, as we have just seen, its proper birth-mark is the "new concept of Being and not-being" begotten in original reflection on the birth-place of the Platonic idea.49

So here it has become clear (1) that and how Heidegger asked the same question as Plato, (2) that the famous Heideggerian "deconstruction" of the history of philosophy is aimed at a reconstruction, indeed one that attempts to think the same more originally, and (3) that the result thereof, in a single word, is the Da-sein. But, at this juncture, all of this has only been pointed out.50

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49 Compare, as Heidegger says in section 218 entitled "The Indication of the Manner of Being of Truth": "Zugleich aber soll diese Nennung anzeigen, daß die Auslegung der Wesung der Wahrheit in der Erinnerung steht an die ἄληθεία, d.h. nicht an das bloße wörtlich übersetzte Wort, in dessen Bereich dann doch wieder die herkömmliche Auffassung einfällt, sondern an die ἄληθεία als den Namen für das erste Aufleuchten der Wahrheit selbst und zwar notwendig in der Einheit mit der anfänglichen Nennung des Seienden als φαύς. "Immediately this naming should indicate, that the interpretation of the manner of Being of truth stands in reflection on ἄληθεία, that is, not as the merely literal translating word in whose realm the subsequent interpretation dovetails, but rather on ἄληθεία as the name for the first coming to light of truth itself and indeed necessarily in unity with the beginning naming of what is as φάύς." 

50 Auch diese Besinnung kann nur anziegen, daß ein Notwendigkeit noch nicht begriffen und ergriffen ist. Dieses selbst, das Da-sein, wird nur erreicht durch eine Verrückung des Menschseins im Ganzen und d.h. aus der Besinnung auf die Not des Seins als solchen und seiner Wahrheit. "Such reflection can only indicate that something necessary is still not grasped and conceived. Itself, Da-sein, is only attained through a dislodgement of human being as a whole, that is, out of reflection on the need of Being as such and its truth" (sec. 214).
In the section 215 entitled "The Manner of Being of Truth," Heidegger gives a definition of Da-sein, which thinks the relation of man to Da-sein on the basis of the turned-about manner aforesaid of a "positive from a negative," of the jug-analogy. Man, then, first opens to Da-sein when placed before the self-hiding. How is this to be thought? Heidegger says:


"What does this mean: to stand before the self-hiding, the denial, hesitantly placed in its open? To come to be held by what holds back, and therefore the finding oneself back in the ground: fear, [before what holds back,] being held thereby, [and so, opening out to] holy awe. Such is only possible for man and when and how 'sent.'"

If we may be permitted the direct comparison, the "not" of "not being-blinded" is positively retained when turned-about as "held-in in being held-back" (as "Verhaltenheit"), not as absence (as if a contrary), but "held-in in being held-back" precisely as a "standing-open."51

51 It is interesting in this connection to compare the Neoplatonic "One in Us," and chapter five of the present investigations.
Daß eine Lichtung sich gründe für das Sichverbergende, dies meint die Fassung: Wahrheit sei lichtende Verbergung zuerst (vgl. der Ab-grund). Das Sichverbergen des Seyns in der Lichtung des Da. Im Sichverbergen west das Seyn. Das Ereignis liegt nie offen am Tag wie ein Seiendes, Anwesendes (vgl. Der Sprung, Das Seyn). "That a clearing grounds itself for the self-hiding (that is the Ereignis; hesitating denial as ripeness, fruit and gift.) Truth, but not simply lighting, rather, precisely clearing for the self-hiding."

If we are right so far, then the last step in our present inquiry, namely, to give an "existential" interpretation of the ideas, has already been taken. How so?

52 Daß eine Lichtung sich gründe für das Sichverbergende, dies meint die Fassung: Wahrheit sei lichtende Verbergung zuerst (vgl. der Ab-grund). Das Sichverbergen des Seyns in der Lichtung des Da. Im Sichverbergen west das Seyn. Das Ereignis liegt nie offen am Tag wie ein Seiendes, Anwesendes (vgl. Der Sprung, Das Seyn). "That a clearing grounds itself for the self-hiding, this means the interpretation that truth is at first the hiddenness that comes to light (compare the abyss). The self-hiding of Being in the clearing of the there. Being's manner of being lies in self-hiding. The event never lies open in the day like a being, present at hand (compare the spring, Being)" (sec. 217).

53 Die Er-eignis in ihrer Kehre ist weder im Zuruf noch in der Zugehörigkeit allein beschlossen, in keinem von beiden und doch beides er-schwingend, und das Erzittern dieser Erschwingung in der Kehre des Ereignisses ist das verborgenste Wesen des Seyns. Diese Verbergung bedarf der tiefsten Lichtung. Das Seyn »braucht« das Da-sein. "The appropriation in the turn-about is alone enclosed neither in the call [of Being] nor in the belonging [of man thereto], [and] not in the two together[, ]and nonetheless compelling both, and the vibrancy of this compulsion in the turn of the Ereignis is the most hidden essence of Being. This hiding needs the deepest clearing [of Being]. Being ‘needs’ Da-sein" (sec. 217).

54 Er-eignis, as coming into what is proper to man, corresponds to "existential authenticity" in Sein und Zeit.
It is the *Lichtung für das Sichverbergen*, the open-standing relation thought out of the self-hiding as *Da-sein*, that names the essence of the negative relation Plato left unsaid in the eclipse-analogy.
CHAPTER FIVE
HERMENEUTICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH OF NOT-BEING

Iamblichus among the Neoplatonists is believed\(^1\) to be the first to have coined the phrase “One of the Soul,” so it is with him, and particularly with the passage preserved by Hermeias in his commentary\(^2\) on the *Phaedrus* (Fr.6 Dillon), that we take our start into the inquiry of what the Neoplatonists may have meant by their formula of the έν έν ημίν.\(^3\) The fragment reads in full:

<ψυχής κυβερνήτη μόνω θεατή [νώ]. 247C.>
'O theios 'Iámblikhoς κυβερνήτην το ἐν τής ψυχής ἀκούει. ἡνίοχον δὲ τὸν νοῦν αὐτῆς. τὸ δὲ 'θεατή' οὐχ ὅτι καθ' ἐτερότητα ἐπιβάλλει τούτῳ τῷ νοητῷ ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐνούται αὐτῷ καὶ οὕτως αὐτής ἀπολαύει. τούτῳ γὰρ δῆλοι τὸν κυβερνήτην τελειότερόν τι τού ἡνίοχου καὶ τῶν ἵππων. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τής ψυχής ἐνούσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς πέφυκεν.\(^4\)


\(^2\) *In Phaedrum* 150, 24ff.

\(^3\) One in Us.

\(^4\) “The divine Iamblichus takes the ‘helmsman’ as being the one of the soul; its Intellect is the charioteer; the term ‘spectator’ is used not to signify that it directs its gaze on this object of intellecction as being other than it, but that it is united with it and appreciates it on that level; for this shows that the ‘helmsman’ is a more perfect entity than the charioteer and the horses; for it is the essential nature of the One of the soul to be united with the gods.” Translation Dillon’s, in John Dillon, ed. and tr., *Iamblich Chalcidensis, In Platonis Dialogos* 146
Thereby Iamblichus is reported to have identified the “helmsman” with the “One of the Soul,” and to have delimited it from the “charioteer” and the “horses,” the traditional parts of the Platonic Soul, insofar as there is no otherness in it, presumably like that of intellect and intelligible object, but rather a “being in being” belongs to the “helmsman,” a condition shared by the Gods as Gods.

The fragment does not explicitly raise the question whether the “helmsman” was grasped in relation to the other parts of the soul as another, separate part, such as a “fourth” part of the Soul separate and distinct from the intellect and the rest, or as some kind of “effervescence” or “flowering” of an already acknowledged part, presumably the intellect, but the fragment does tell us that it was grasped as “more perfect in a way” than the intellect. Nor correspondingly does the fragment tell us what role the intellect plays in relation to the helmsman, whether the step from the “otherness” of the intellect/intelligible object structure to the “being in being” that has no such otherness of the “helmsman” and is more perfect in a way than intellect happens

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5 Usually taken as intellect, anger and the passions.

6 ἐνοῦσθαι

7 τοῖς θεοῖς πέφυκεν ἐνοῦσθαι

8 Because it is the acknowledged “highest” part of the Soul.

9 τελειότερόν τι
through the intellect or by means of something else. Nor does the fragment tell us anything
definite about the nature and kind of such a step, nor of the manner of such a way of perfection.\footnote{The alternatives are undecidable without more, since no answer is given in the fragment under consideration, but howsoever the matter is properly to be resolved, the foregoing fragment makes at least one thing clear, that what we are dealing with is no ordinary matter, but rather, what is required for its resolution requires insight into what constitutes the gods as gods.}

Let us, then, now turn to Proclus, particularly \textit{Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides}, to see what light he may have there shed on the matter.

Proclus understands Plato’s \textit{Parmenides} to present a dialectic, and indeed, one which has no other aim than “of rousing up the most divine part” of the Soul.\footnote{Commentary at 988 et seq.}

As a dialectic, Plato’s \textit{Parmenides} always has the same aim in view throughout all the individual steps of the dialogue that treat of the first hypothesis, from the first to the last, and that same aim, if Proclus is to be believed, is none but the “One in Us.” And as a dialectic, the aim comes to its term at the very end, where, for the first time, we see what the preceding discussion was about. To our mind, such considerations as these justify a “reverse” interpretation of Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s negative dialectic of the One, along the lines of the interpretation we have attempted here, which starts from the end sections of Book VII, and moves backwards, skipping the intermediate sections,\footnote{The individual steps, of course, are indispensable, to the extent that, without undertaking them, there can be no “rousing up,” if that indeed is what Plato had in mind.} and concludes back at the first sections of Book VI, hoping thereby to gather something of what Proclus may have meant by the formula of the “One in Us.”
But what is remarkable is, that when all has been said, the dialectic of the One, as Proclus understands it, ends in silence, “It is with silence, then, that he [Plato] brings to completion the study of the One.”

Such silence, for Proclus the end of the negative dialectic of the One, has no sense of “dumbness,” but rather, if we, lacking a better word, may so say, is very wisdom itself.

In the immediately preceding dialectical section at 62K et seq. of Book VII, Proclus says that learning the matter involves:

“a divinely inspired knowledge, that is better than natural knowledge and which leads the One in ourselves towards that One, ... and learning it is the ‘final discipline,’ as Socrates rightly says (Rep VI 505a), because it is discipline in the final knowledge. But this final knowledge is not science, but is higher than science.”

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13 Commentary at 76K.

14 In this connection, compare the commentary at 1028 et seq. “For those who avidly cling to the divine, there is prepared an ungrudging dispensation from that source. ... It is, after all, a property of the God-like cause and of divine power to be available to all who are able to partake of it.”

15 Although, so far as we are aware, Proclus does not use the word in our context in that portion of his commentary that treats the dialectic of the One as such, Proclus does use the word in the introductory portion thereof, indeed on the very first page of the Book I, when he invokes the intelligible Gods precisely for “fullness of wisdom.”

16 Compare the commentary, at 44K et seq., where Proclus refers to the Seventh Letter’s “learning different from all other kinds of learning,” of which we will hear more immediately below.

17 Of course, for Aristotle too, it is wisdom that is higher than science in the sense of cognizing first principles (Nicomachean Ethics VI, 7), but that only raises the question of what wisdom may have meant for Aristotle, a question outside the scope of the present inquiry.
What are we to make of such silence, wherein lies the final discipline, the one which leads the One in ourselves towards the One? But this involves the prior question of what does Proclus mean by the formula of the One in Us, and in the immediately prior dialectical section of Book VII, Proclus tells us two things about it.

On the one hand, Proclus says at 48K et seq. of the One in Us that it:

“is rightly said in the Letters (VII, 341d), as we have said, that it is to be learned in a different way; that when we have given much care and attention to it, a divine light is kindled in us through which there comes about -- in such a way as is possible to us -- a glimpse of it, which makes us participate in it in respect of that part of ourselves that is most divine. But the most divine thing in us is the One in Us, which Socrates called the illumination of the Soul, just as he called the truth itself light. This illumination is our individual light, and so, if it is not impious to say this, here also like is apprehended by like; ...so by the One in ourselves do we apprehend the One, which by the brightness of its light is the cause of all beings, by which all participate in the One” (emphasis mine).

and on the other hand, Proclus says at 54K et seq. of the One in Us that it:

“does not come from knowledge, since if it did, what has no share in knowledge could not seek after it; but everything has a natural striving after the One, as also has the Soul. What else is the One in ourselves except the energy and operation of this striving?” (emphasis mine).

The “One in Us,” then, for Proclus has two determinations; the “One in Us,” Proclus takes to be eros, innate, constituting the very nature of desire, and the “One in Us,” Proclus takes

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18 Since, after all, it is what is led to the One, as Proclus in the foregoing quote puts it.

19 That is, the Platonic ζυγόν, as Proclus specifically says in the commentary at 44K et seq. that “it is the light of truth which brings the intelligible before the intellect.” Perhaps herein lies a way towards the resolution of the aporia we faced when we left our consideration of Iamblichus, for the ζυγόν at least unites intellect with intelligible without any “otherness” in it, but we still are left without explicit clue as to what the “helmsman” may have to do with such light, save perhaps that it is what first comes to light there.
to be the light of truth. What the unity of these two determinations is Proclus does not explicitly say, nor does he explicitly say what the manner of their unity is, beyond indicating at 58K that it is what Socrates too meant when he said that it occurs for “he who inclines his own light towards it,” whereas, the one so inclined, we are also told at 58K et seq., “does not know the One by direct vision (i.e. intuitively) or intellectually, but is united with it, ‘drunk with its nectar’ (Symp. 203b), for its nature, and what is in it, is better than all knowledge.”

Proclus tells us little directly in the commentary proper about what this “drunk with its nectar” that is not “direct vision” is to signify, that presumably being the unsaid fruit of undergoing the individual steps of the negative dialectic of the One, so we conclude our consideration of the commentary by jumping back to the very first sections thereof, where Proclus does seem to tell us something directly of it, but this time, in terms of a “choral dance” at 1071 et seq., where, in Book VI, the commentary of Proclus on Plato’s negative dialectic of the One properly begins. We present the passage in full:

> “Let this, then, be reckoned as the subject of the First Hypothesis: the ascent from One Being to the very One itself in the truest sense, and the consideration of how it is transcendent over all things, and how it is to be reckoned together with none of the divine orders. Secondly after this let us consider what type of discourse will suit such a subject as this, and how we might properly take a grasp of the exegesis of the present topic, and how we may be able, I would say, to operate logically and intellectually and at the same time with divine inspiration, in order that we may be able to grasp the demonstrative power of

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20 Cf. the Republic at 518d, where Plato characterized paideia not as signifying the kindling of sight and light in otherwise blind eyes but rather as the proper direction of eyes already seeing in a light.

21 Cf., also, Plotinus, Enn. VI 7, 35.
Parmenides and to follow his conceptions, dependent as they are upon real Being, and that we may ascend by divine inspiration to the unspeakable and incomprehensible consciousness of the One. For we do possess, inasmuch as we rank as souls, images of the primal causes, and we participate in both the whole Soul and the plane of Intellect and the divine Henad; and we must stir up the powers of those entities within us for the comprehension of the present subject matter. Or how else are we to become nearer to the One, if we do not rouse up the One of the soul, which is in us as a kind of image of the One, by virtue of which the most accurate of authorities declare that divine possession most especially comes about? And how are we to make this One and flower of the soul shine forth unless we first of all activate our intellect? For the activity of the intellect leads the soul towards a state and activity of calm. And how are we to achieve perfect intellectual activity if we do not travel there by means of logical conceptions, using composite intelllections prior to more simple ones? So then, we need demonstrative power in our preliminary assumptions, whereas we need intellectual activity in our investigations of being (for the orders of being are denied of the One), and we need inspired impulse in our consciousness of that which transcends all beings, in order that we may not slip unawares from our negations into Not-Being and its invisibility by reason of our indefinite imagination, but rousing up the One within us and, through this, warming the soul (cf. Phaedrus. 251b) we may connect ourselves to the One itself and, as it were find mooring, taking our stand above everything intelligible within ourselves and dispensing with every other one of our activities, in order that we may consort with it alone and perform a dance around it, leaving behind all the intelllections of soul which are directed to secondary things. Let this, then, be the manner of our discourse, logical, intellectual, and inspired, for in this way one might take the grasp that one should of the present hypothesis” (emphasis mine).

The inspiration that guides the rousing up of the One in Us, an inspiration that is to safeguard precisely against the “slip unawares from our negations into Not-Being,” is such that by it the One in Us is awakened and in such a way as to connect with and moor about the One, whereby the One in Us is said to “dance” around the One.

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22 Possibly a reference to Iamblichus.
So what are we to make of this “dance,” which describes the “mooring” of the One in Us about the One, and which, if our interpretation does not go too far wrong, names the same matter as that “silence” which, as the “final knowledge,” somehow brings to unity the “light of truth” and the “desire” prior to all understanding?

If, then, the “dancer” is the One in Us, the “dance” its “mooring” about the One, and the “choir director” is the One, how does Proclus describe the “mooring,” or in other words, how does Proclus describe the dance as dance? We believe that Proclus gives the answer\(^\text{23}\) in the section captioned\(^\text{24}\) “Suitability of Negations to the First Cause” in the same Book VI, where, in a word, he explicitly finds “negations” to be “productive”\(^\text{25}\): “In the case of the One, the negations reveal its superiority as a causal principle.”\(^\text{26}\) And to clarify what he means thereby, Proclus goes on in the

\(^{23}\) Though he does not explicitly formulate our question there, or anywhere else for that matter, so far as we are aware.

\(^{24}\) By the modern editors.

\(^{25}\) The *epekeina* as *arche* or *aitia*! Cf. the *Republic*, at 509a,b, where the sun as *epekeina* is explicitly understood as cause of light, warmth, and so growth.

\(^{26}\) Commentary, at 1076 et seq.
very next sentences of the passage we are quoting to give several examples; we quote here the first one:

“For this reason also the causal principles among those entities following upon the One have negations of what is secondary to them predicated truly of themselves. For instance, when we say that the Soul neither has the power of utterance nor is silent, we do not say these things about it in the sense that we would about stones or pieces of wood or any other thing without sensation, but in the sense that it produces voice and silence in the living being” (emphasis mine).27

As Proclus says in the commentary at 54K, since we are among “our own peers,” we make bold and say that the “mooring” of the One in Us about the “One” as “dance” is none but the revelation28 of the absent29 One -- the idea of the Good.30 Proclus, so far as we are aware, nowhere says this as such,31 but as we shall see immediately below, this is precisely what Plotinus in no uncertain terms does seem to say of the One in Us, and in the very context of a “choral dance.”

27 Commentary, at 1076 et seq..

28 As “production”; aitia or arche.

29 As “negated”; epekeina.

30 Such at any rate would be consonant with Plato, in as much as the “final knowledge” could be none but knowledge of the Good, which would be obtained by that paideia which turns “our light” towards the One, and which, interestingly enough, is such that in it there is no “direct vision” of the One, but rather that which Proclus described as a being “drunk with its nectar.”

31 Though he does equate the One and Good at 58K, calling them the “same,” and says of the latter, also at 58K, that what Socrates means by “light” is none but “the One that is in the soul,” and goes on to explain that “the Good can be compared with the sun, and that this light is like a seed from the Good planted in souls.”
In Ennead VI.9, sections 8 and 9, Plotinus expresses the matter more clearly, more eloquently and more beautifully than we could ever hope to do, and so, letting Plotinus speak for himself, we end our considerations of what the Neoplatonists may have meant by the formula of the One in Us by quoting the passage in full:

“Every soul that knows its history is aware, also, that its movement, unthwarted, is not that of an outgoing line; its natural course may be likened to that in which a circle turns not upon some external but on its own chantry, the point to which it owes its rise. The soul’s movement will be about its source, to this it will hold, poised intent towards that unity to which all souls should move and the divine souls always move, divine in virtue of that movement; for to be a god is to be integral with the Supreme; what stands away is man still multiple, or beast.

Is then this ‘chantry’ of our souls the Principle for which we are seeking? We must look yet further: we must admit a Principle in which all these centers coincide: it will be a chantry by analogy with the chantry of the circle we know. The soul is not a circle in the sense of the geometric figure but in that its primal nature (wholeness) is within it and about it, that it owes its origin to what is whole, and that it will be still more entire when severed from body.

In our present state -- part of our being weighed down by the body, as one might have the feet under water with all the rest untouched -- we bear ourselves aloft by that intact part and, in that, hold through our own chantry to the chantry of all the centers, just as the centers of the great


33 Here we find the same talk of “unity” as we found in Iamblichus, the one which characterizes the nature of the Gods as Gods, but which goes on to point out that its nature lies in the way the soul circles about its center, which, if we are right in our considerations of Proclus, means as much as to say the revelation of the hidden One as the idea of the Good, whereby the “negations” involved in the “silence” of the “ineffable One” become “productive,” which is to say, as the One in Us “dances” about the One, giving knowledge and truth, warmth and growth.
circles of a sphere coincide with that of the sphere to which all belong.\textsuperscript{34} Thus we are secure.
If these circles were material and not spiritual, the link with the centers would be local; they would lie round it where it lay at some distant point; since the souls are of the Intellectual, and the Supreme still loftier, we understand that contact is otherwise procured, that it is by those powers which connect Intellectual agent with Intellectual object;\textsuperscript{35} indeed soul is closer to the Supreme than Intellect to its object -- such is its similarity, identity, and the sure link of kindred. Material mass cannot blend into other material mass: unbodied beings are not under this bodily limitation; their separation is solely that of otherness, of differentiation; in the absence of otherness, it is similars mutually present.\textsuperscript{36}
Thus the Supreme as containing no otherness is ever present with us, we with it when we put otherness away. It is not that the Supreme reaches out to us seeking our communion: we reach towards the Supreme; it is we that become present. We are always before it: but we do not always look:\textsuperscript{37} thus a choir, singing set in due order about the conductor, may turn away from that chantry to which all should attend; let it but face aright and it sings with beauty, present effectively. We are ever before the Supreme -- cut off is utter dissolution; we can no longer be -- but we do not always

\textsuperscript{34} Note that Plotinus here invokes the cosmology of Ptolemy, presumably to emphasize that the circling of the soul, the “dance” of the One in Us about the One, is not in some isolated region beyond the heavens and earth, but rather to indicate that the soul in such a condition is inextricably involved in the very dance of the cosmos itself.

\textsuperscript{35} For Plotinus too, as it would seem, it is the Platonic \textit{ζυγόν}, that “unifies” intellect with intelligible object, which does the work of “contact,” and which, although Plotinus does not use the phrase in our context, is the same, at least for Proclus, as the One in Us.

\textsuperscript{36} Cf. The non-otherness of the “speculative” of the Iamblichus quotation we considered above, which Iamblichus left unspecified, and which we then surmised to be opposed to the “otherness” of the intellect/intelligible object structure, but which Plotinus now seems to fill in as “similars mutually present,” over against the “otherness” of that which has “material mass.” What this means, Plotinus explains in the next sentence.

\textsuperscript{37} Cf. The Platonic \textit{paideia} that turns “our light” towards the One; \textit{Republic}, Book VII, 518c \textit{et seq}. 

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attend; when we look, our Term is attained; this is rest; 38 this is the end of singing ill; effectively before Him, we lift a choral song full of God. In this choiring, the soul looks upon the wellspring of Life, wellspring also of Intellect, beginning of Being, fount of Good, root of Soul. 39 It is not that these are poured out from the Supreme, lessening it as if it were a thing of mass. At that the emanants would be perishable; but they are eternal; they spring from an eternal principle, which produces them not by its fragmentation but in virtue of its intact identity: therefore they too hold firm; so long as the sun shines, so long will there be light. We have not been cut away; we are not separate, what though the body nature has closed about us to press us to itself; we breathe and hold our ground because the Supreme does not give and pass but gives on forever, so long as it remains what it is. Our being is the fuller for our turning Thither; this is our prosperity; to hold aloof is loneliness and lessening. Here is the soul’s peace, outside of evil, refuge taken in the place clean of wrong; here it has its Act, its true knowing; here it is immune. Here is living, the true; that of today, all living apart from Him, is but a shadow, a mimicry. Life in the supreme is the native activity of Intellect; in virtue of that silent converse it brings forth gods, brings forth beauty, brings forth righteousness, brings forth all moral good; for of all these the soul is pregnant when it has been filled with God 40 This state is its first and its final, because from God it comes, its good lies There, and, once turned to God again, it is what it was. Life here, with the things of earth, is a sinking, a defeat, a failing of the wing” (emphasis mine).

38 Cf. The “silence,” supra, with which Proclus ends his commentary on the negative dialectic of the One.

39 In this connection, compare the kallichoron preserved of the rites of Demeter at the ruins of Eleusis, where her dancers danced about a center that contained a fountain, in James Miller’s, Measures of Wisdom, the Cosmic Dance in Classical and Christian Antiquity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) 37.

40 Note that for Plotinus, too, as it would seem, the negations are productive, and indeed, if Plotinus is to be believed, it is the very intellect’s “activity” whose “silent converse” begets none but the idea of the Good.
Let us now turn to Heidegger, particularly to the part VII of the Beiträge captioned “Der letzte Gott,”41 to learn something of what Heidegger can tell us about the matter of our inquiry. Part VII of the Beiträge is unique among the eight parts thereof, in that it alone bears an inscription on its cover page. Immediately following the title, “Der letzte Gott,” the inscription reads “Der ganz Andere gegen die Gewesenen, zumal gegen den christlichen.”42

Let us take Heidegger at his word. The “ultimate God,” he tells us, is other to the God that has been, particularly the Christian God, so that if we on the one hand had some sense of the Christian God and on the other knew what sense of “other” Heidegger had in mind, then we would be in a position to discover the “ultimate God” precisely by applying that very sense of “otherness” to the Christian God.43

Heidegger’s analysis, in the section 254 entitled “Die Verweigerung,”44 is as simple as it is mysterious, and, to our mind, turns the question of the nature of this “other” about the ruling concept of “negation.” In the past, and that means now, the “no” of negation is thought of as

41 “The ultimate God.”

42 The “ultimate God” is “completely other than the god of the past, particularly, other to the Christian God.” It is interesting to speculate at the outset that the Neoplatonists may, from the other side of history, have intended to say the same, after the manner of Proclus or Damascius, who habitually dismissed the Christians as a-theists. Compare J. Dillon, “‘A Kind of Warmth’: Some Reflections on the Concept of ‘Grace’ in the Neoplatonic Tradition,” in The Passionate Intellect, essays presented in honor of I. G. Kidd (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996) 323-332 n. 10.

43 And vice versa, granting that by “other” Heidegger did not intend merely to indicate the total novelty of his conception of the “ultimate God,” vis à vis the history of the concept of God.

44 “Negativized,” in a broad sense.
something “not at all”; but, as such, as Heidegger tells us, it appears in “the mask of non-being.” This, though, Heidegger goes on to tell us, is not nothing at all, but rather is precisely “Being’s abandonment,” as “the disfiguration, and laying-waste of Being.” And indeed Heidegger goes on to tell us that this “no” of the “nothing at all” as “Being’s abandonment”:

“is not empty arbitrariness and disorder, to the contrary: everything and everyone are now inset into the planned interlockability and assurance of sure progress and its ‘unstoppable’ hegemony. Everywhere already industry takes that which is not into the protection of the illusion of beings, and the despoliation of humankind inevitably compelled thereby gets compensated through the ‘life experiences’ [it makes available].”

As to how the God who has been, and is now, is to be conceived along this way of negation, Heidegger does not say in the part of the Beiträge we are considering, but he does speak of the Gods who have been, and of them says: “[Both their] flight and arrival now move together [no longer distinguished] into what has been and have withdrawn into the [simply]

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45 “Die Verschleierung des Unseienenden.”

46 “Seinsverlassenheit.”

47 “Die Losgebundenheit und Verschleuderung des Seyns.”


49 The “bad” negation.

50 Presumably because He, as everybody knows, is dead.
past.” Of the significance of this undistinguished moving together of flight and arrival we shall see more below, but in terms of the context of Heidegger’s characterization of “space-time.”

Let us now consider what Heidegger may tell us of the sense of the “no” of “negation” that is not the “not at all.” He says in the same section that it is:

“the highest nobility of the bestowal, and the undertow of that which keeps itself hidden, its revealability is what constitutes the original essence of the truth of Being. In this way alone is Being able to present itself in its strangeness [so unfamiliar to us today], [that is, as] the stillness [of the silence wherein there is the rest and the calm] of the passing by [that alone opens up the truth] of the ultimate God.”

And of this “no” of the “negation” which opens the self-hiding as such into its open manifestation, Heidegger tells us even more. In section 255 entitled “The Turn-About in the Ereignis,” Heidegger speaks of this “no” in terms that imply no sense of detachment from things or affairs of the world, as may belong to certain Eastern meditations, but rather speaks of it in terms and in a context that have the opposite force, namely, that it “first enables to prepare the contest of world and earth, the [very] truth of the there, and through this [truth], the [coming

51 “Flucht und Ankunft der Götter rücken jetzt in das Gewesene zusammen und werden dem Vergangenen entzogen.”

52 The “good” negation.

53 “Die Verweigerung ist der höchste Adel der Schenkung und der Grundzug des Sichverbergens, dessen Offenbarkeit das ursprüngliche Wesen der Wahrheit des Seyns ausmacht. So allein wird das Seyn die Befremdung selbst, die Stille des Vorbeigangs des letzten Gottes.”

54 “Die Kehre im Ereignis
to light of the] momentary place of decision, and thus of the struggle, and with that, the
sheltering in beings.”

Indeed, the “calm” to which this “no” belongs is so little like Buddhist detachment that
Heidegger tells us later on in the same section that rather it indeed is “the simple and never
calculable arrival into the full presence of the totality of space-time.”

At this juncture of the characterization of space-time, perhaps it is well to briefly pause,
and explicitly consider some possible interpretations. For one may argue, doesn’t Heidegger by
the foregoing construction of the “no” then really involve himself with some kind of pantheism,
inasmuch as by his own argument the ultimate God is somehow to be found in space-time, or,
someone else may argue, doesn’t this finding of the ultimate God in space-time really privilege
sight, so that, in the end, Heidegger would have to align himself with those who held the Intellect
to be the highest over against those who posited a higher still?

The text we are considering here does not raise these possible interpretations, but perhaps
to take into account some such interpretations as these, the concluding section 256 entitled “The
Ultimate God” of the part of the Beiträge we are considering is prefaced with a sentence whose
sense would exclude these interpretations as misinterpretations, for, as Heidegger tells us there,

55 “vermag erst dem Streit von Erde und Welt, der Wahrheit des Da, durch dieses die
Augenblicksstätte der Entscheidung und so der Bestreitung und somit der Bergung im
Seienden zu bereiten.”

56 “Beständnis des einfachen und nie errechenbaren Ereignisses aller Zeit-Raum.” It is
interesting to note in passing that perhaps here is where one may first gain access to the
phenomenon (or related phenomena) of what the Greeks called pronoia/heimarmene, for
insofar as to this calm the “ultimate god” belongs, there could be providence, and insofar as
time and space and decision belong to it too, there could be fate.
“the ultimate God is not [identical with] the event [of arrival into the full presence of the totality of space-time] itself but rather has need of it as that by which the one who founds the there belongs [to God through what is].”

Of this need, we shall see more below, but let us now consider what else Heidegger tells us about this “no” and its “space-time” in the part of the Beiträge we are considering.

Heidegger goes on, not only like Proclus and Plato and Plotinus to think the “no” of negation “productively,” and indeed explicitly in the sense of a “fountain,” or “headwater,” as we have seen above in our consideration of the Neoplatonists, but also to explicitly delimit the sense of “space-time” itself by doing so. He says of the “no” in the section we are now considering that in it:

“Being itself comes to its term. [Such a] term means the readiness to bear fruit and to be a gift. [As fruit bearing and gift giving, there is to be seen] therein the ultimate, [as ultimate, such fruit bearing and gift giving is itself] that which is essential [presence], demanding [an origination out of] an origin, not that of being carried along to its end. Here [in space-time] the innermost finitude of Being reveals itself[, which finitude is at one with]: the “wink” of the ultimate God. Immediately therein lies the most hidden essence of the no, as still-not and no-longer, in the term, [understood as] the empowering to bear fruit and in the greatness of what is given[-forth].

57 “Der letzte Gott ist nicht das Ereignis selbst, wohl aber seiner bedürftig, als jenes, dem der Dagründer zugehört.”

58 Proclus in the commentary at 1224 et seq. reports that “the Pythagoreans used to term it ‘Occasion,’ and Orpheus calls his first principle of all, ‘Time’. ” Occasion” here translates καιρός, the right or critical moment of time.

59 “Der Wink ” as essentially intended to preserve the “no,” as the next sentence underscores.

60 To take the ontic example of a natural spring, not only the flowing of the waters is given into presence, but the springhead as well, but precisely as “not” showing itself, wherein lies
The inwardsness and inness [of the showing up] of that which has the character of the not in Being is thereby to be seen.”

So far so good, for unless we are wholly mistaken, we think the foregoing analysis suggests that Heidegger with his “der Zeit-Raum der Stille des Vorbeigangs des letzten Gottes” and the Neoplatonists with their “ἔν έν ἡμῖν” were concerned with the same problem horizon, but also has given us a glimpse of what directions Heidegger moved in to strike out explicit paths in that very horizon. But what remains to consider is what Heidegger may have to tell us about the Neoplatonistic “dance” as dance in the part of the Beiträge we are considering.

In this connection, and if we are to be permitted the direct comparison, whereby we would take the Dasein as the dancer and the dance director as the “no” of Being in the sense outlined above, then what does Heidegger have to tell us that may bear on what the Neoplatonists spoke of in terms of the being “drunk with its nectar,” the “mooring” of the One in Us about the One, which is to say, if we are not too far wrong, about the dance as dance?

Further on in the same section, if Heidegger is to be believed, the proper “evaluation” of the ultimate God depends on the way “its Vorbeigang demands a coming-to-stand of things

the sense of origin, of ultimate.


62 “Würdigung.”
and our stand within the midst of them,”\textsuperscript{63} and in such a way that “beings (as works, instruments, things, deeds, sights and words) withstand the Vorbeigang in the won-back simplicity of their essence, not by letting it lie fallow, but rather by letting it unfold.”\textsuperscript{64}

What is the nature of this “unfolding” that not only holds beings in its folds but also unfolds man himself within it? In the next sentence of the same section, Heidegger says that it is the “inset and onset of a more original essence (to-be-grounding the there) in Being itself: the acknowledgment of the belonging of mankind in Being through God, who loses nothing of himself or his greatness through acknowledging this need of God for Being.”\textsuperscript{65}

In such need, and the acknowledgment it implies, Heidegger goes on to tell us in the very next sentence “Being in its self-concealment reveals itself as that ‘ring-dance,’\textsuperscript{66} in which belonging’s encountering of need and need’s looming in encountering [so circle as to be something originating]: Being as Ereignis, that happens out of this turning overflow of itself,

\textsuperscript{63} “sein Vorbeigang eine Beständigung des Seienden und damit des Menschen inmitten seiner fordert;”

\textsuperscript{64} “eine Beständigung, in der erst das Seiende je in der Einfachheit seines zurückgewonnenen Wesens (als Werk, Zeug, Ding, Tat, Blick und Wort) dem Vorbeigang standhält, ihn so nicht still legt, sondern als Gang walten läßt.”

\textsuperscript{65} “die Einsetzung des ursprünglicheren Wesens (Da-seinsgründung) in das Seyn selbst: die Anerkennung der Zugehörigkeit des Menschen in das Seyn durch den Gott, das sich und seiner Größe nichts vergebende Eingeständnis des Gottes, des Seyns zu bedürfen.”

\textsuperscript{66} “kehrige Mitte.”
and thus becomes the “wellspring” of the tension between God and man, between God’s Vorbeigang and man’s Geschichte.”

Thus, if Heidegger is to be believed, the originating character of the wellspring is interior to the God and the man which are what originates (presences), precisely as the tension between them, which is to say, as God’s Vorbeigang and man’s Geschichte.

And in this dance, if dance is what it be, there are not two things, not dancer and dance director, but rather, again if we follow Heidegger, as he says a little further on in the same section, “Being as the innermost between is equal to the nothing, [wherein] God overpowers man and man encounters God, immediately as it were, but both only in Ereignis, as which the truth of Being itself is.”

What more can be said? Heidegger, like Proclus, who ends his commentary on Plato’s negative dialectic of the One with “silence,” says “from here all speech of there-being draws

67 “ursprung.”


69 “das Seyn als das innigste Zwischen gleich dem Nichts, der Gott übermächtigt den Menschen und der Mensch übertrifft den Gott, unmittelbar gleichsam und doch beides nur im Ereignis, als welches die Wahrheit des Seyns selbst ist.”

70 That is, from “the great stillness of the most-hidden self-knowledge,” “die große Stille des verborgensten Sichkennens” (sec. 255).
its origin, for which reason it is in essence of the silence,”71 but he, unlike Proclus, goes on to say towards the end of section 256, after denying that what is at stake is “system” or some kind of “learning,” that rather it is:

“That which is necessary, which only opens itself to those who, themselves of abysmal origin, belong to the compelled. But what is compelling is alone the incalculability and non-produceability of the Ereignis, the truth of Being. Blessed is he who should attend the unholiness of the emergence in order to be a listener in the always originary dialogue of the solitary, in which the ultimate God inwardly gives a sign, because he through it is indicated in his passing by.”72

71 “Von hier nimmt alle Sprache des Da-seins ihren Ursprung und ist deshalb im Wesen das Schweigen” (sec. 255).

72 “das Gemußte, das sich nur jenen eröffnet, die selbst, abgründiger herkunft, zu den Gezwungenen gehören. Das Zwingende aber ist allein das Unberechen- und Unmachbare des Ereignisses, die Wahrheit des Seyns. Selig, wer der Unseligkeit seiner Zerklüftung zugehören darf, um ein Höriger zu sein in der immer anfänglichen Zwiesprache der Einsamen, in die der letzte Gott hereinwinkt, weil er durch sie in seinem Vorbeigang erwunken wird.”
CONCLUSION

This has been a study in the interaction between two great minds, not usually thought of together, the comparison of whom can throw light on the thought of each. Because Heidegger was concerned, like Plato and the Neoplatonists, with what we have called the Platonic/Parmenidean concept of Being (the “third thing,” and its correlative counter-concept, the heteron), his celebrated deconstruction of Platonism has been understood as the effort to ground a more original Plato, one which, as we tried to show, achieved its most perfect expression in the Beiträge. Given Plato’s obvious devotion to intellectual experimentalism, he himself, if he were to review the record of Heidegger, undoubtedly, or so we submit, would have let him pass into the Grove. The famous motto over the gate to the Grove (᾿Αγεώμετρητος μηδείς εἰςίτω) would not have barred his way, for Heidegger was not someone who did not know what he already knew. He surely knew it, but merely did not think it original enough.

The investigations we have conducted in chapters 3-5, as homologues, had, as we have seen, a Platonic "side" and a Heideggarian "side." In Heideggarian jargon, the Platonic side has presented the matter under investigation in the lens of the first beginning, its "deconstructive retrieval," what we have called a Platonic-Heideggarianism. The Heideggarian side has presented the same matter in the lens of the other beginning; its "repetition in the other beginning," what we have called a Heideggarian-Platonism. And as we have seen, the matters
treated have been the productivity of negation (heteron) as Ignorance giving knowledge, Blindness giving truth and Not-Being giving Being respectively in chapters 3-5.

Thus chapter 3 uncovered the problematic of Socratic ignorance as the homologue of the movement of thought of the Beiträge taken as a whole. In chapter 4, the Platonic zugon, the always-seeing-in-a-light of the “flight to the logoi” as the not being-blinded of the eclipse-analogy of the Phaedo, has been uncovered as the homologue of the Lichtung für das Sichverbergen of the Dasein of the Beiträge. And in chapter 5, the problematic of the One in Us of the Neoplatonists has been uncovered as the homologue of the problematic of the ultimate God of the Beiträge.

The two sides of each homologue "reflected" each other, but the reflection was not symmetrical. That is to say, the Platonic side of each homologue gave the context for the Heideggarian side in terms of the first beginning, but, once that was appropriated, the same matter was able to be seen more originally in the Heideggarian side (analogously to the sense that Einsteinian physics, more original than that of Newton, contains the latter as a “limit case”).

In this way, in chapter 3, the philosophical place of the inner movement of thought of the Beiträge taken as a whole was projected in the problematic of Socratic ignorance that links virtue and the divine (daimôn), but which, as won back, or to say the same, as deconstructively retrieved, was able to be seen back in the Heideggarian side, where, if we are to believe Heidegger, it has been more originally repeated.

The procedure worked the same for chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 4, the negativity ingredient to truth as that is expressed by the formula Lichtung für das Sichverbergen was first
placed in context of the ontological dimension of the eclipse-analogy which, as we have seen, preserves, but otherwise leaves unsaid, what we have called a negative relation to the intelligible sun. Once won back, what Plato left unsaid in that context was able to be seen on the Heideggarian side in terms of the problematic of the *Lichtung für das Sichverbergen*, where, if we are to believe Heidegger, it has been worked out more originally. Likewise for the homologue of chapter 5; the One in Us of the Neoplatonists represented the deconstructive retrieve that served as a philosophical "template" to place the problematic of the ultimate God of the *Beiträge*, which at the same time, again if we are to believe Heidegger, is supposed to have found its more original unfolding in the latter problematic.

For each of the chapters 3-5, Heideggarians willing and able to take the former step (the deconstructive retrieve) may uncover how the matter was grasped in the first beginning and Platonists, willing and able to take the latter step (the more original, i.e., more radical repetition) may uncover whether Heidegger was right in claiming to have more originally uncovered the same matter. That the procedure is necessarily circular and that nothing can be proved by it is not an objection, but rather the mark of entry into the hermeneutical dimension.

In the end, we might suggest, the homologues we have sketched in chapters 3-5 may be of the kind that would be required if an attempt were to be made to project in outline a Platonic-Heideggerianism that is an adequate counterpart to the Heideggerian-Platonism of the *Beiträge*. Such “scaffolding,” at any event, is what we understand ourselves to have ventured herein.
LIST OF REFERENCES

THIS IS NOT a comprehensive bibliography. I have included only works to which reference has been make in the Chapters or Notes.

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(ii) Plato, Neoplatonism and Other Sources


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