Edges Magazine Issue 25: The Nightmare Of The Middle East

EDGES MAGAZINE Issue 25

April 2001

THE NIGHTMARE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Edges Magazine enters into dialogue with people all over the world.
We recently made contact Ami Isseroff who lives at Rehovoth, in Israel.
He shares with us his views on the political issues behind the conflict in the West Bank.

The news from the Middle East is not good. In Israel, Sharon, despair and extremism. In Palestine, anarchy, despair and extremism.

The Intifadeh (uprising), which Palestinians and radicals insisted was so absolutely necessary for the advancement of the cause of peace and justice, has helped to bring about the election of Ariel Sharon. The repression of the Intifadeh, which the Israeli government insisted was absolutely necessary for the advancement of the cause of peace and justice, has enthroned the radicals in Palestinian politics as never before.

It is generally agreed that the Middle East peace process, launched with so much hope in 1992, is dead. Maybe it never had a chance. Aside from an inconsequential group which may include the majority of ordinary people in Palestine and Israel, peace had no real supporters. There are in fact, two power groups on either side of the divide: those opposed to the peace process and peace, and those who favour the peace process, but are in fact, opposed to peace in the ordinary understanding of the word "peace."

Those opposed to the peace process are those groups that would lose their meaning and rationale if there was peace. These include the settlers and their right-wing allies on the Israeli side, and the Islamic fundamentalists and radical groups on the Palestinian side.

One Israeli goal is to obtain recognition for Israel and peaceful relations with its neighbours, a laudable goal. However, a second Israeli goal is to retain a substantial part of the settlements in the territories conquered in 1967, not just in West Jerusalem, or even in the symbolic East Jerusalem, but in Efrat, Maaleh Edumim, and Ariel. These somehow became part of the "national consensus" adopted by former PM Ehud Barak as well as Ariel Sharon. The maps presented at Camp David, and later, in the strange negotiations that continued, for some reason, during the pre-election period, did not show a viable Palestinian state, but a collection of enclaves separated by the infamous checkpoints. The final settlement that was proposed would be a continuation of the current nightmare. There was no indication that the proposals took into account Palestinian needs for economic development and relations with their Arab neighbours.

Palestinians want to obtain an independent state and an end to the misery of the refugees. Laudable goals as well. But at the same time as they insisted on full implementation of their version of the Oslo agreements, which the Palestinians insisted were being violated by Israeli settlement activities, the Palestinians themselves gathered arms and trained soldiers in violation of the same agreements, with the advertised goal of "liberating" Haifa and Jaffa and all the other parts of Palestine that became part of Israel in 1948. Curiously, Israel did practically nothing to stop this activity.

While talking peace, the Israelis continued to build settlements and confiscate land. While talking peace, the Palestinians stockpiled weapons illegally, put out a constant barrage of anti-semitic and anti-Israel propaganda, trained a "Palestine Liberation Army" and sent children to paramilitary camps.

But the main controversy was not over the substantial points of borders, contiguity, economy and security, because it is hard to get people excited over maps, trade agreements and the like. The major rallying points of extremists were the two sacred cows of Palestinian and Israeli national consciousness: "Jerusalem" and the "Right of Return." Nobody on either side could take the "wrong" stand on these issues, and as soon as they became the focal point of negotiations, the negotiations were doomed.

Jerusalem and the Right of Return are both non-issues in fact. The Moslem Waqf has enjoyed virtual sovereignty over the Haram as Sharif (Temple Mount) since 1967. Of the 4.4 million Palestinian refugees, a large number live in the United States and Jordan and would not really want to return to their destroyed villages. A good number of those living in refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria, Gaza and the West Bank want to return because they have been brought up to believe it is the only way. But the parents and grandparents of these people fled Palestine so they would not have to live under Israeli rule. If there is nothing, in fact, for them to return to, why should settlement in a new town under Israeli rule be preferable to settlement in a new town under Palestinian or Syrian rule?

Nonetheless, when a final settlement that might exclude the destruction of Israel was threatened, Palestinian extremist groups founded a coalition around the "Right of Return" and planned rallies abroad that coincided with the possible critical dates of the final status negotiations. Right of Return is a sacred part of the Palestinian national mythology, a holy rallying cry of patriotism as important to them as "United Jerusalem" is for Israelis. Right of Return is interpreted as the return of every refugee to Palestine.

In Israel, rumored concessions over Jerusalem were magnified by right wing politicians, so that it seemed that Ehud Barak was giving up the Jewish birth right by allowing the Palestinians limited autonomy in a few Arab neighborhoods and suburbs. In Palestine and the Arab world, the Holy War for Quds al-Sharif was declared.

Israel correctly anticipated that the "final settlement talks" might end in violence. However, it seems the Israelis trained units to deal with the possibility that the Palestinians would declare a state and try to invade settlements. Soldiers were trained in marksmanship and fighting in built-up areas. The obvious possibility, that the PNA would use the same tactics that worked so well in the 80s, was discounted. There was no preparation for crowd control. The result is over 300 Palestinian dead - three Deir Yassins (site of a famous massacre in the 1948 war of independence that have left another monument to inhumanity and bitterness on the Palestinian side.

The Intifadeh made Israeli concessions impossible, wiping out popular support for the Oslo peace process. Israelis fear that concessions could precipitate not only further Palestinian demands and violence, but possibly a regional war. The brutal Israeli response to the Intifadeh has made Palestinian concessions impossible as well.

Arabs see the election of Ariel Sharon as a symbolizing an Israeli "No" to peace, but that is not necessarily the case. Sharon was elected Prime Minister despite his record as a military adventurer. Israelis facing daily machine-gun fire in Jerusalem and bombs in Hadera felt the situation was getting out of control. Sharon's proven abilities when the chips are down suggested that maybe he could succeed where Barak failed. A key factor in Sharon's election had nothing whatever to do with the peace process. The ultra-orthodox Shas party wanted to reduce the jail sentence of their leader, Arieh Deri, serving four years for bribery. Sharon promised, and delivered, a special law that allowed reducing jail terms to one-half of time served. In return, Shas promised, and delivered, the votes of their constituency.

Despite militaristic rhetoric, both sides realise that they have no good options for dramatic resolution of the problem. In Israel, a unity government is being formed because there is no other choice. Ariel Sharon could not govern with a narrow 63 vote coalition. Those elections would have been, by all indications, a sweeping victory for the Israeli right. Probably, Sharon would have been replaced by Benjamin Nethanyahu, who is in fact, a more orthodox right-wing partisan than Sharon. Instead, Sharon has sought a coalition with Labour that will give him a certain amount of flexibility.

On the Palestinian side, the hardening of positions has been accompanied by a rapid disintegration of economic and social life. According to numerous accounts, the Israeli closure and the break up of government mechanisms, such as they were, are causing a rapid slide toward a kind of anarchy or feudalism, in which Palestine may come to be ruled by armed gangs in the service of different clans or political factions.

The first priority of the Israeli government must be to "restore order" and stop the violence. Sharon projected a tough image, and the Palestinian side, whether at the instigation of the PNA itself or of dissident groups, has greeted the election of Sharon with a barrage of violence that is clearly meant as a challenge. If Sharon fails to quell the violence, his government, unity or otherwise, must eventually fall. It is not possible to restore order without some rationalisation of the Israeli borders, to exclude the most indefensible settlements. There will be some Israeli withdrawals, either as form of concessions to the Palestinians during "interim settlement" negotiations, or else in order to implement a "separation" plan. If the peace process is dead, so too is the dream of Greater Israel dead for now.