20th October 1998

(1,970 words)

Is Moral Luck a contradiction in terms?

The question of moral luck is based around the problem of how to base moral judgements. There are various angles from which you can judge a situation and differentiating these can perhaps aid in deciphering varying views of the role of probability and luck in moral criticism.

The Kantian judgement of morality essentially occurs in the mind of the agent. Indeed, Kant believes that it is not even simply the results of the deliberations of the mind that will gain moral justification, but also the way in which decisions are made. Kant rejects the claims that the same decision is morally justified if it is brought about through self-interest or immediate inclination, what it must be derived from is duty to the categorical imperative universal maxims which the individual would wish to be applied universally. It is the intent of the agent, rather than the action of the agent that Kant was interested in. Further still, it is questionable as to whether Kant was even wanting to have a system of morals to be judging past events. Instead, Kant wanted to set up a system of laws by which people could have a basis of deciding future actions, not one for others to judge these actions with the advantage hindsight.

This assessment does not mean that moral judgements can be purely a priori judgements. The maxims which are being exposed by Kant relate to the real world and to what is actually done. In order to prove that making a false promise is morally unacceptable it would be necessary to relate the idea to actual cases and seeing the effects of making this idea a universal doctrine.

So what effect can luck claim to have on moral judgements. Phillips suggests that Nagel had three contexts in which moral considerations are not immune from luck. The first of these is what is termed the 'consequences of our actions'. This again relates heavily to what part of an event it is feasible and justifiable to judge according to moral principles. Should it be the agent's motives, the agent's intent, the agent's action or even the moral difference between the state of affairs had the event occurred compared to if it had not? Nagel believes there is a contradiction in moralists who wish to judge an event by the effect of the action, as these are not immune to moral luck. For example, a man is shot, but he happens to have been wearing a bullet proof vest. The consequence of the marksman's action was little more than a hole in a jacket, but had the vest not been worn, the consequence would have been a death. But the marksman was ignorant to the fact that his intended victim was wearing protection, the marksman's intent was to kill his victim. Events outside the control of the marksman meant a different result. This must count as luck, although the marksman might disagree as luck is usually a positive result, and this is not a positive outcome for the marksman, perhaps 'chance' is a better term.

It must be noted that already Kant has made up his decision. That the marksman has done the morally wrong thing as he is going against moral duties in deciding to shoot. It must therefore be seen from another moral perspective how we can judge the situation. I believe that regardless of the consequences of his actions, the man is morally wrong, by willing his actions to result in a certain immoral consequence. Chance results cannot justify any weakening of our judgements. He is no better person due to the existence of the vest. Perhaps it could be claimed that the result was a morally better one, but this has little to do with the agent and so he should still accept full responsibility. As Nagel states, "the account of moral luck cannot be understood without an account of the internal conception of agency". If the marksman is assuming a positive outcome in the death of his victim, then chance has nothing to do with our understanding of his actions. He is equally accountable success or failure and the element of chance has little to do with the morality of the event.

The second form of consideration not immune to luck is that described as constitutive luck. This is questionable, as is there truly a difference between someone's 'natural disposition' to do moral acts and someone who simply often commits moral acts. Kant might draw the distinction on the basis of the motive for the action, suggesting that anything less than duty to the categorical imperative could not be claimed to be moral. He would try and dissect the meaning of what it is to have a disposition of this kind, such as to be generous. If what is translated by observes as a moral disposition is in fact someone acting according to his duty, there is no chance involved at all. To suggest that someone's disposition is due to luck is surely questioning notions of free will. If free will is removed, so too is any element of responsibility for anything and so any notions of morality, leaving everything open to the probabilities and chance of science.

The last context that Nagel suggests is perhaps the most interesting, although I don't believe it puts into doubt that morality is immune to luck. This context is that of one's circumstances. as Nagel puts it, "It may be true that in a dangerous situation he would behave in a cowardly or heroic fashion, but if the situation never arises, he will never have the chance to distinguish or disgrace himself in this way and his moral record would be different".

I believe that in referring to a 'moral record', the argument is being moved onto a different level. As was noted before, it has to be distinguished as to what our moral judgement is referring to within an event. I noted earlier possible criteria for judgement include the agent's motive or the agent's action, but now we have to add another, the agent's moral record. This suggests we are judging a person's actions as if they are connected to a disposition to act in a certain way. The first problem with this is that it ignores (or at least neglects) 'free will' and suggests that a test, as Nagel suggests, will highlight this natural tendency, as if it is there to be highlighted and observed. To believe this would be to trivialise human actions as it is clear that people do not always conform to previous trends. Added to this it is also questionable to whether it is possible or necessary to grade people as moral or immoral according to a 'moral record', this is surely not the point of morality.

The interesting point that is raised by Nagel's third context is that of what use can be drawn from the judgements that can be made due to circumstances. This would move us back to the level that was being discussed earlier. The luck or chance is preceding the event, so unlike the marksman, there is a closer link between the agent's willing and the agent's action. As I tried to show before, this difference doesn't have much importance when discussing a moral judgement of the agent in the decision, this new context does not seem to change this. In this sense the luck is extrinsic, rather than intrinsic to the action concerned. This context is interesting in its ability to show the possibilities for different behaviour of a person according to luck. It also highlights to those who wish to follow a moral duty that circumstances can make such a quest difficult. The judgements of how the agent acts in these situations must still be a cold one depending on their motives and what they wish the results to be. Circumstances could perhaps explain actions, but not justify them, as there is still free will.

In all of Nagel's contexts I don't believe that there is a clear indication that luck does have to be included in deliberations of the moral value of an agent. The place of luck is simply one which could in the first context, that of consequences of actions, decide whether an action is good or bad, but surely the morality still lies within the intent.

Williams approaches the issue from a slightly different angle. He also tries to produce and example of the consequences of one's actions, in the sober driver who through no fault of his own, runs down a child. Williams suggests that the moral responsibility is inherently greater for the driver than for any onlooker, although he has no intent to indeed no negligence in the case. He tries to quantify this by suggesting how the various agents would view the situation and that the driver would feel more accountable. But then too would the maker of the truck's bumper and the builder of the road. It is not a moral guilt that is felt, but instead a regret. The event shouldn't be regarded as moral or immoral, again these are being used to define things that can't be seen in these terms. The event is bad, but there is no negligence or immoral intent. There is a tragedy, but not an injustice, unless you suggest that the child was unjustly denied a right to live. This moves to another level as you ask by whom has the injustice been committed and the answer is nobody. This is the difference perhaps between good and bad and moral and immoral, that there needs to be an agent and motive to make an act immoral, yet judgements of good and bad occur through chance and motiveless events.

The next case that Williams suggests is that of Gauguin. Here the problem is set that Gauguin has the choice of staying at home and carrying out his responsibilities or travelling in order to pursue his art. Williams suggests that the morality of the situation is based on the luck of the success or failure of his artistic venture. Surely not, according to the Kant, Gauguin must produce a maxim which he would be happy to see universally accepted in order to make the decision. The maxim would be 'act so that whenever there is a chance of progressing your artistic talents, you neglect your responsibilities', this is obviously unacceptable. Willams agrees that such a maxim would not work and he tries to prove that there is no such appropriate maxim to cover his choice. But this is not the main problem with Williams' account. There does seem to be an assumption that the good produced would be universally accepted to be moral, that the successful Gauguin is undeniably at the head of a moral event. This should not be assumed, certainly the family he leaves would not see this. Whenever there is an injustice there must be questions raised of morality and I don't believe the answer can lie in trying to pitch positive against negative effects. Like the bullet proof vest, the agent's motives must be the basis of judgement not success or failure.

Phillips suggests of the Gauguin case that he is simply seeking justification for what he wants to do. Williams to an extent agrees in this when he concludes that he is not suggesting Gauguin is moral, but instead other considerations are and should be taken into account in addition to moral ones. This is therefore not moral luck.

In all, although it is not clear that moral luck is a contradiction in terms, the examples suggested by Williams and Nagel do not sufficiently justify a belief that judgements of morality that are made can be subject to chance or luck.