To what extent is collective security a viable alternative to the balance of power?

Before looking into what is entailed by the terms collective security and balance of power, it is worth mentioning the possibilities of contexts in which one could be a viable alternative for the other. Firstly, in a theoretical context. To what extent could collective security theoretically be a viable alternative to the balance of power in maintaining peace or order between states?. The second is a descriptive context which is based on the difficulty in applying theoretical labels to actual events and institutions, within which actors motives are often complex or hidden. On this interpretation the question should read, 'To what extent is collective security a viable alternative to the balance of power when describing trends and actions in contemporary international relations?'. These questions must be therefore addressed in this essay which must therefore look at both the theory and practice of models of alliance.

Because of the ambiguity and divergence in the specifics of these two terms, it is necessary to start this analysis with some definitions. I will try and define these terms so as to contrast them to the greatest possible extent, thus allowing arguments to be made on more than linguistic grounds and avoiding any potential tautologies.

When describing balance theory, Stephen Walt uses as a contrast the model of bandwagoning. Bandwagoning is interesting in its relation to collective security. A cynic might suggest that in the same way that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter; equally one man's collective security alliance containing a dominating state is another man's bandwagoning alliance led by a hegemonic power. But more of the US later. This is an indication that by using Walt's model, distinctions will be easier to make.

In response to an external threat of greater size, Walt suggests two courses of action for a state in the traditional realist anarchic world model. By uniting with other states against the threat they could act to deter it. This would therefore create two blocs of equivalent power, each with knowledge of each other's capabilities and deterred from conflict which would have an uncertain outcome. This symmetry in opposing powers gives a balance which deters war and so maintains relative peace, security and order. This in short in the balance of power model. The alternative to this action would be to unite with the prevailing threat. This would remove the immediate security risks. Also, such an alliance could offer further protection from other powers as well as the possible rewards of further conquests by the hegemon. This second model is the bandwagoning model. The choices facing the states in both these models are rational and self-interest orientated. If the purpose of a state's foreign policy is survival, it seems true that it must form some sort of alliance when faced with a more powerful threat. Further, it should be noted that although the simple model suggests balance occurs in a bipolar fashion, it can also be multipolar, such as in the classical balance models which described relations in the nineteenth century.

The role of strong and weak states is also distinguished in balance theory. It is more important as to which side a strong state joins to the outcome of a conflict and so certain key states may be able to exert undue influence on potential partners. Conversely, weaker states might not be necessary for military victory and so there is a suggestion that there is a temptation for such states to free-ride and join an alliance which they may end up contributing less to. Here lies one of the core distinctions between balance theory and collective security. Within an alliance in the balance model, the will to conform is only as strong as any expected security threat. Traditional realist thinking suggests that in the anarchic world, states should enter and leave alliances on the basis of self interests alone. Equally they should honour agreements and international law only for as long as it in the state's interest to do so. For this reason, a balance alliance is thought to be extremely fragile during times of relative peace, but then, if there is no threat, there is possibly no need for such military alliances. Within times of threat, such coalitions can also be unreliable. For example if a threat is perceived to be less by a country, such as because of geographical positioning or because a threat's aggressive intentions appear to be geared towards a specific target. Such differences can cause alliances to fold, as was seen in the build up to both of the world wars, the Nazi-Soviet pact being one such example.

Collective security however is built on different foundations. Still though, some theorists have suggested the choices made by states to enter into such alliances are rational in a realist world. The threats that alliances work against in a collective security system are internal. Members of the alliance are deterred from acting in aggressive ways due to threats from their partners. If the collective security system is a global one, all potential threats are internal. Some see little prospect of a credible system of global collective security and so suggest that regional or selective alliances would be more likely. In such circumstances the collective security alliance would react to both internal and external threats. Downs defined collective security as 'collective self-regulation: a group of states attempting to reduce security threats by agreeing to collectively punish any member state that violates the system's norms'.

Such an association therefore requires that member states have greater commitment to the alliance and there is an assumption that they will not act, as in a balanced alliance, only according to direct self-interest. The basis of such an agreement must therefore be an agreed contract or charter which sets out the association's principles and aims. Added to this, institutions would be necessary to organise collective action and act as a forum for consultation between states. A collective security system is more than simply an ad hoc alliance formed as a reaction to an event, it is a strong pact which has legitimacy, credibility and most importantly, its will must be able to be executed.

But it has already been stated that the realist view of alliance building is one based on no strong commitments and the ability to withdraw when the alliance is not in a state's interests. The realists suggest that this is how states will best serve their interests in the absence of rule, this is the rational strategy. It would follow that the commitment required for collective security would not therefore be a viable alternative. Downs argues that this is wrong. Using economic methodology, he compares the decisions facing competitive states as analogous with the decisions facing competitive firms. In a situation with a limited number of firms, best interests are often served by collusion, in economic terms this would be oligopolist theory. He further states that in the same way that there is no true example of perfect competition, perfect monopoly or perfect oligopoly, so it cannot be expected that collusion between states will be of a perfect nature. By dismissing what he sees as the unrealistic approaches to collective security, he suggests that as in oligopolies the imperfect collusion between actors still gains greater Pareto optimality than if there was to be no collusion at all.

Even beyond such considerations, on a more liberal view of international order, there are further theoretical advantages to collective security. These are very much in line with the maintenance of peace. The very institutions that make up such an alliance and active co-operation between members makes conflict less likely as dependence increases and a greater understanding of each other's positions occurs. Further still, by having unitary bodies for decision making of the collective, the complex webs of alliances which have caused conflicts to escalate in the past are prevented. There would also be a forum for disputes to be solved diplomatically, so reducing the threat of war. As a side effect of such co-operation, advances can also be made in areas which are of non-military interest to members. This is again important to liberals who see the importance of humanitarian actions and collective leadership of the world economy.

The ability of collective security to serve both the realist and liberal models of world order suggests that not only is there a realistic chance of collective security working, but also that there are moral motives to catalyse such a process. This suggests that it is a theoretical viable alternative to the balance of power model.

There are objections to the model of collective security. Downs might wish to refute these by stressing that he is not expecting a perfect model, but simply Pareto gains. For example, there is an objection which suggests that such an association would not work due to asymmetry in power among states. An extreme of this would be one dominant hegemon who controls the alliance. This is from where my earlier comparison between collective security and bandwagoning occurs. If one state is effectively dictating policy and has the powers to punish other states within a collective security system, surely there is little difference with the dominating power in a bandwagoning scenario. Other potential problems include those of free-loading and the variation in assessment of threats and so variation in willingness to respond. These problems were also linked to the balancing model and so they cannot be used to refute collective security as a viable alternative. Likewise objections relating to the practical structures of any alliance, whether it has a standing army, whether decisions are made on a one member on vote basis, proportionate to population size, economic or military strength do little to damage the theoretical credibility of such a system.

Possibly the most interesting objection to collective security theory is that related to what has been seen as a core paradox. This is that the agreement that is necessary to initiate collective security can only occur in times of peace, when such arrangements are not needed. But I believe that this is where collective security is strong. Unlike balance arrangements which usually disappear with the removal of a threat, collective security agreements can be built stronger in such lulls. This means that when in the future conflict is possible, the strength of the collective security alliance will diminish the scale of such conflicts or even prevent their occurrence.

The second part of the question must now be addressed. This is whether or not collective security is a viable descriptive alternative to the balance of power in contemporary international relations. Supporters of collective security will be glad that the League of Nations has been deliberately avoided in this study as I believe that it was an institution doomed and weakened from the start. It was based on superficial virtues and beliefs not strength and commitment. As such it lacked anything that would be strong enough to survive in a realist world. Criticising the League as an example of collective security is analogous to looking at the Luxembourg national team in order to criticise the state of European football.

There are many alliances between states. Economic alliances, such as the EU as well as some military, including NATO. Commentators seem reluctant to point to NATO as a system of collective security. This is related to the internal nature of action within a collective security system. Charles Glaser suggests that although there is a role for NATO in solving internal disputes, the possibility of the current members creating a military threat to another is so remote that the organisation remains one of balance (although to what it is currently meant to be balancing against is perhaps a mystery). Only with NATO enlargement would it be able to serve a role as a regional association for collective security. At the moment, the only organisation that can claim to have this role is the United Nations (not to be confused with the United States, although often the terms seem analogous).

Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the basis of much of the role of the UN in collective security. In particular, Article 42 allows the Security Council to take 'such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'. As the UN is comprised of such a high proportion of the world's states, such action would be internal and therefore abide by our definition of collective security. Further to this, Article 43 allows for states to contribute forces to be lead by UN staff (possibly through the Military Staff Committee suggested in Article 47) and even the possibility of a UN standing army. This is further re-enforced by secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 'Agenda for Peace' which calls for a force to be formed 'not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis'. The Security Council still contains the power to order such actions, not the General Assembly. This does give rise to some of the concerns expressed theoretically above as asymmetry of power within such alliances. The Security Council, by exerting the power and the strength of the five permanent members reinforces patterns about the traditional balance of power. Indeed, during the Cold War, the Security Council was able to be a venue for much of the interaction between East and West which is undeniably modelled in balance terms.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been increased opportunity for action to be taken according to Article 42, without risk of escalation due to Cold War alliances. The greatest example of this was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Here, a member state invaded another member states and by doing so further threatened the security of others, such as Saudi Arabia. Driven by economic considerations, the Security Council, under the leadership of the US (the sole remaining superpower) acted swiftly. Action involved fortifying Saudi territory (in operation 'Desert Shield') as well as passing resolutions in the UN to enforce sanctions and to threaten the Iraqi's to withdraw, under Article 41 of the Charter. Military forces deployed in Saudi Arabia were not under UN control. The US was leading a groups of allies which had offered assistance. The UN had simply sanctioned them to be there, not organised the force through such institutions as its military staff committee. There was no obligation on member countries to aid, although NATO agreements meant that the allies could station air forces in Turkey.

Following the apparent disregard for the Security Council resolutions and once the allies had built up a strong enough force, they started operation 'Desert Storm', an aggressive move to force back the Iraqis. Again, this was under US command and all her allies voluntarily donated troops. It is therefore questionable as to whether the action was truly 'collective', the troops did not wear the blue berets that UN peace-keepers had and they were not representative in composition of the states of the UN.

Assuming that the allies came together because they saw it as in their own interests, and not an obligation (others did not contribute after all) surely the question must be as to whether there would have been any action if it would have been outside the allies' interests. To go further, belief in the hegemonic power of the US would question if any such operation would occur if it was outside the US's interests. The US contributes more funds to the UN than any other state and is the most militarily powerful. It makes sense that the UN should mirror the US. What is not clear is if this relationship devalues collective security and instead the UN is simply the institutional basis for a US led bandwagoning model, or even part of a balanced model, just lacking a counterweight. Like Iraq, Israel is claimed to be in defiance of Security Council resolutions. Yet the only US weapons in Israel are those in the hands of the Israelis from their powerful big brother. Whether this relationship is due to the strength of the Zionist-Jewish lobby in the US or of a more tactical nature is debatable. What is clear is that there is a distinct lack of consistency in who is punished by the UN. This means that states will be less willing to accept its decisions, such as in areas of disarmament and so weaken the organisation to a point that a major crisis could unravel it. The strength of the UN and indeed any system of collective security lies in its legitimacy gained through its fairness. It might be perhaps in the interests of major states to recognise this and go against self-interest on occasions in order to prove their commitment to the impartiality that is necessary for such a system to work in a time of crisis.

As an extra point, it is worthwhile noting another role that is being forced upon the UN. This role is a lot closer to being part of collective security than it is balance theory and so it is worth highlighting. Since the end of the Cold War, nationalism has again been a cause of conflict in the world. This conflict is harder for the UN to react to as acts are not clear cut cases of foreign invasion, but instead often civil war. This does not mean that security is not affected by such action, as often such conflicts can spill out. W.W.I had origins in nationalist disputes in the Balkans. The UN and any other organisation designed to protect its members has a conundrum to face. If the UN is meant to act on internal threats, surely these civil wars are internal. But equally, those who are represented in the UN are states, not national or religious groups. Does the UN have the power to act under Article 42 against groups which are not its members and so have not signed up to or accepted the Charter. This question of jurisdiction is perhaps added to by the perceived role of the UN in humanitarian issues. There is little question that on humanitarian grounds the UN has jurisdiction to be in these areas, but have they a right to stop and punish aggression? Boutros-Ghali believes they have to an extent. He talks of wishing to see 'peace-enforcement forces'. These would be distinct from those forces that react to state aggression and those forces involved in peace-keeping. This vision would in practicality require a UN standing force, as in cases of civil war, it is not clear that states will act promptly as threats to their interests often are not obvious. This was seen in the delayed responses by the US in both Bosnia and Somalia. Such positive action to these threats would enforce the notion of collective security as compared to balances of power as a description of alliances in the modern world.

In all, both on a theoretical and descriptive level, there is a strong case that collective security is a viable alternative to balance theory. The key theoretical objection to the theoretical case is that of the likelihood of states to make the strong commitments required. The solution to this based in the legitimacy and credibility of the alliance. In the practical context, the UN does seem to be increasingly operating as an efficient organisation for collective security. The domination of the US and her interests and the problems of sub-state disputes raises problems, but does not move the model towards a balance of power model.