9th March 1999

(1,246 words)

Is there a notion of innateness which survives Locke's argument
in Book I of the Essay?

To deny any innate aspect to behaviour does seem ridiculous. A puppy who has never seen a bitch will attempt to mount anything in sight and a newly born, presented with its mothers nipple will have a reflex to suck. But, such actions must be viewed to some extent as being mental capacities. The baby has a desire to cry, well before it has learned that such behaviour will gain it attention. Such a desire must be seen a mental state. This point is made, not because it would necessarily be denied by Locke but instead, because it highlights that there does seem some capacity for there to be a hereditary or innate notion in the mental, as well as the physical side of life.

There are two main levels on which Locke attacks notions of innateness. The first of these is an attack on suggestions that there are logical and metaphysical principles which are innate. The second is what he terms 'practical' principles, such as those of morality and duties. He does not, however, give a detailed analysis of why there should be no innate 'concepts', instead dismissing them because of their relationship to the speculative metaphysical principles. The distinction that I am try to make is between the innateness of a principle or an argument and that of the concepts which are the component of that principle or argument. It is surely not guaranteed that because a principle, such as "I think therefore I am" is not innate, the concepts within it (in this case, existence and thought) could not be innate. Whilst I am still agnostic whether concepts are indeed innate, it does not mean that Locke should dismiss the possibility that they might be.

The next thing that must be addressed is Locke's attack of those that suggest innateness. His objection seems to be around the assumption that innatists found their beliefs around the notion of 'universal consent'. He suggests that for an innatist, proof of a principle being innate will come if it is seen to be universally consented, this could therefore be empirically proved. Locke then proceeds to suggest firstly, why such a claim would be wrong and secondly that there is nothing that is universally consented to.

In his formulation of this point, he points to the cases of children or idiots who he feels are unable to have ideas which he believes innatists would suggest are universally consented to. The examples that Locke uses are those of whatsoever is, is and tis impossible for the same thing to be and not be. The first problem is ask is how he could prove that a newly born would not have the ability to consent to such principles. It is clear that the baby could not do this by way of language, because the process of learning the language could alter the experiment and inadvertently teach the child the principle. Another problem is that although a child or an idiot might not state (in what ever way) the principle without prompting, it surely does not mean they are not believing it. There must be a possibility that it is part of their mental abilities, yet has never been brought to the conscious in the form demanded by Locke. This does not seem to deny that there is a possibility of there being innate principles, but instead that there are no innate principles that we can successfully point to empirically.

For this reason, it is important to discuss what could be intended by innate principles, ideas or concepts. It would certainly be extreme to suggest that the mind was capable of knowledge of language or mathematical rules before either had been taught. This does not, however, mean that there is necessarily the lack of the capacity of the mind to carry out such functions. This point suggests a more subtle use of innateness. This is that although principles are not innately implanted in our minds, there is a capacity for the mind to easily recognise and understand some concepts in a way that is universal. Further, there does seem for the ability for such prompting to result in extrapolation of the mind into other areas to apply such understanding to a mental picture. An example to illustrate this are shown in the experiments which showed babies' abilities to differentiate pictures of apples from the real thing. One point that was being made showed that although the baby learned in other circumstances the existence of a three dimensional world, it had the cognitive capacity to apply this model to the apples experiment. This application is made possible by the make-up of the mind, so when clarified through experiment the baby is able use these capacities. What I have suggested is a capacity must be able to be seen in some ways are representing some form of innateness in the human mind.

It does seem that Locke's attacks on the 'practical' principles as being innate do seem to be more justified. His writings on this do seem to reflect a political agenda which was against people being universally condemned for their beliefs or being forced into a morality which was innate. It is clear that although there is much universal consent to notions such as immorality of death, these seem to be linked to teachings, which in themselves seem to relate to Darwinstic approaches to the morals which would best lead to survival success. Experimentation has proved that such principles are indeed taught. This would seem understandable. If it is believed that even simple metaphysical truths are not innate, so it would be harder for the more complicated mental facets of morality to be innate.

In all, although it does seem clear that Locke would deny it, there is still the possibility of concepts, as sub-units of principles being able to be innate. The question of innateness must revolve around a definition. It is certainly clear that without being taught a language or other form of communication, it is impossible for a person to transmit their thoughts, yet equally, it would be impossible to gain a grasp of a language without there being thoughts to associate such language with. Such thoughts could be gained from action in the world, but the linkage between languages around the world suggests that there are some core ideas which seem to be common in humanity. Whether this is proof of these ideas being innate is debatable, but it does suggest that Locke is wrong to dismiss such a possibility.

Secondly, it is important to note that if innateness is seen in a wider context, as an ability of the mind to be able to grasp ideas in a certain way, it does seem clear that this could be seen. The mind does appear to be 'wired-up' in a way that permits the mind to extrapolate knowledge and apply it to new situations. This ability is certainly inherited physically and so must to an extent be seen as a notion of innateness.

Further than this, it does appear that Locke is right to discount innate knowledge as empirically, if nothing else, such a notion does seem unsound. This argument also must be taken towards innate morality, especially when looking at changes in what is seen in morality through time, such as when looking at slavery or attitudes towards sexuality.