4th March 1999

(1,531 words)

What function does Descartes envisage for the cogito? Can it
perform that function?

The method of Descartes' meditations is one of scepticism. He seeks to find in the world some core truths that he cannot doubt. Once such truths have been gained, they can be used as the foundations for building a system in which there can be absolute certainty. To test his observations of the world to the fullest, Descartes suggests the existence of a deceiving God, the malin genie who is all powerful in being able produce a world to Descartes' perceptions which is utterly false. The quest is therefore to find something that it would be impossible for the deceiver to deceive Descartes of. To fit this role, Descartes employs the cogito, I think, I exist, which was later put in replies to objections in the more common form of I think therefore I am. This emerges in the second Meditation from when he reflects on his doubts of everything. From this he states, "Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly exist".

The importance of the cogito to the rest of Descartes system cannot be underplayed. Until he was able to show his own existence, he was unable to assert the existence of anything else. This is the very basis for there being able to be anything that can be called existence. The moves that Descartes makes from his point are contentious, particularly regarding proof of a non-deceiving God, but in the process of scepticism, the production of the cogito does seem sound.

As well as using this as a basis for suggesting existence in the universe, another function that Descartes has for the cogito is that of the first stage in putting forward his arguments regarding dualism. Cartesian dualism stresses the distinction between the physical body and the mental mind and their separateness in identity. For this reason, it is important to stress that the 'I' in 'I exist' or 'I am' is purely in relation to the mental state.

There is some speculation about whether other attributes can be used instead of to think. For example, could Descartes have equally said, I am walking, therefore I am. Descartes does address this point to an extent by suggesting such notions as imagining, doubting and perceiving as being part of the mental processes which are related to the cogito. Where there are such processes occurring it would be clear that there is existence. Equally, perhaps, whenever something was truthfully said to be walking they must be in existence. The problem with Descartes using such a model would be that so far in his deliberations he has no evidence of a physical body and he would be wrong to assume that there was such a thing, due to the possibility of the arch-deceiver. He could extend 'I am walking, therefore I am' to say, 'I have perceptions or I think I am walking, therefore I am', but surely by doing this, Descartes would be restating the cogito. The very notion of uttering or contemplating anything must be proof of existence, regardless of whether what is being uttered or contemplated is true.

From this point, it does seem hard for Descartes to move from the cogito into asserting knowledge of anything else. He is correct to stumble on the incorrigibility and self-evident nature of the cogito, but there is a real problem in suggesting if much more can be claimed from this foundation. All that he knows is that he is a thing that knows things, but still, according to his scepticism, should have no ability to discern which of these things might be true. The escape that Descartes uses in order to perform the function of showing him clear and distinct perceptions of the outside world is to suggest that from the cogito, he can prove the existence of a non-deceiving God. This God will make everything that is clearly and distinctly perceived true. If his creation of God is not accepted, then there is very little that can be made from the cogito as far as building a further model.

This point is also clear with regards to Descartes' suggestion that the cogito would give some key towards his dualism of mind and body. Descartes says, "... this 'I' is entirely distinct from the body and indeed is easier to know than the body and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist". Before criticising this remark with relation to brain functioning and the other objections to dualism, it is important to question if Descartes has any right to suggest any such thing as a result of his process of scepticism. Simply because he is able to be more certain of one mental attribute of the 'I' through intuition, it does not simply mean that the other physical quality of the 'I' cannot exist. For example, it seems analogous to a blind person detecting the song of a bird, but denying that there is any possibility of it having colour, because colour is not accessible to their mind as easily as the sound.

By making objections such as that he has no right to claim anything further than the cogito or that there is no basis for dualism within it, highlights a key problem in Descartes. The system seems designed as a move through a process of thoughts to see what is attainable. However, what increasingly becomes obvious is that the process seems instead to be a justification of a model of the world that Descartes had already arrived at. This world includes God and dualism and the cogito is destined to lead there. For Descartes to have stopped at the cogito, as it seems he should, his project would have been a failure. The problem is not that he has no right to suggest theism and dualism, just that he is unjustified in claiming that proof of them can be gained through a sceptic approach.

Another important point to make about the cogito is although it is often seemingly written as inference, in the form, 'I think therefore I am', it does seem unjustifiable for Descartes to use it in such a way. In his system of scepticism there can be no premises which he cannot doubt and so to suggest one such as 'anything that thinks must exist' must be outside his capabilities. Instead, as Descartes says in a response to an anonymous objection, "... he does not conclude his existence from his thought as if by force of some syllogism, but as a thing that is self-evident". Indeed he further suggests that it is something that he could expect to come from any writers pen as it is not based on any understanding, but simply seems self-verifying. If it is not self-verifying, it must be suggested that to seriously suggest that it is false would be wrong. The mental process of doubting after all is proof of existence, so to be doubting the cogito would be to prove it.

A point raised by Williams is that of Descartes not being entitled even to the cogito, but instead to the weaker premise of 'there is thinking'. This is however problematic as there does seem to be a need for thought to be fixed into a single identity. Even if there was only one thinking thing in the universe, it would still be appropriate for it to be able to think 'I am thinking'. Surely it is impossible for thinking to occur in any way other than the first person. For this reason Descartes must be entitled to look at his own thoughts and conclude that there is an 'I' which is thinking. This does not mean that he would have any ability to look at another person and suggest that they are thinking, or that that would entail their existence. Firstly, this is not possible because the external world is being controlled by the malin genie at this point. Also, there is no way of being able to tell if thought or consciousness is going on in another body. The example of the machine that talks your weight highlights this. For this reason it seems that at this point of the meditations, Descartes is entitled to the cogito and the derivations of it, such as 'I think I am walking' or 'I am doubting'. He cannot, however, suggest that there is any thought and so any existence anywhere outside his body.

In all, it is clear that the function that Descartes envisages for the cogito is one as the first solid foundation from scepticism in constructing his model of the world. It is, however, unclear that the model that he wishes to build from this, including his theism and dualism have any justification from this point. This being said, the importance and incorrigibility of the cogito do allow further study as to what can be made from a sceptic world. The importance of highlighting that there must be a first-person 'I' and so some identity wherever there is thought must not be ignored.