26th April 1999

(2,139 words)

Do you agree that the two key episodes in the early evolution of the Cold War were the Marshall Plan and the Korean War?

The Cold War was marked by various features that can be identified. In order to decide if these two episodes were 'key' in the evolution of the War, it must be seen how they led to these features of the war occurring. In addition to this, it must be addressed whether the characteristics that have been identified as being the result of these episodes could have occurred without them. Further, it also seems naive to suggest that such events occur in a vacuum. There were of course other factors and events that led to both the Marshall Plan and the Korean War, to ignore these could exaggerate the effects of the events themselves.

Another way to view such a question is to ask if the features associated with the Cold War were inevitable. For example Alexis de Tocqueville was quoted in 1835 as suggesting that he could see the Russians and Anglo-Americans, "Each ... to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world". Following the Communist revolution, such arguments seem easier to make as there does appear to be a clear incompatibility between a mixed communist and capitalist world. Such inevitability arguments must be addressed in order to qualify the importance of these episodes. Even if characteristics were not inevitable, it might be that other events were 'key', rather than those mentioned in the question.

The most important part of this study is to try and identify those characteristics which were central to the Cold War. To do this, I will try and stick to those features that seemed evident for much of the period between 1945 and 1985. A general feature that must be noted was the increased defence spending of the US and USSR in the time after WW2. This spending continued through the periods when the states were not involved in major conflicts. In addition to this, an important point to note was the absence of direct conflict between the two powers when they were in a 'war' for almost four decades. The reasons for this must be addressed, as they point to the importance of indirect confrontations, such as during the Korean War.

There was also a clear ideological angle to the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine, announced in March 1947 declared that the war was about more than US interests, but also to be fought for the values that the US stood for. Related to this feeling was the belief in model of communist expansion that has been described as the domino effect. That communism would spread to neighbouring states if one state was allowed to fall to it. For this reason another characteristic was that it was established that conflict could be limited to a specific region, without escalating into another world war. Such action could be taken in areas where there was a threat of communist expansion, but without causing Soviet and American forces to directly fight one another.

In Europe, the most notable characteristic of the war was the divide. Churchill declared in 1946 that, "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent". This was more than a divide between the states, but it also pointed to areas of influence of the superpowers. An orthodox or traditional view suggests that this influence was exerted by Russian aggression and direct political control in the East compared to the economic influence that the US had over the Western states. In addition to this general East-West divide was also the important division of Germany. Another important characteristic that 'evolved' was the militarisation of Europe. This was not only to the East, but the result of the North Atlantic Treaty of giving Western European states an American protective umbrella was central to European policy for almost four decades.

It is this aspect, the European features of the war that it can be suggested that the Marshall Plan helped to cement. Whether or not this was the deliberate aim of the plan is unclear, but there is little doubt that the division, particularly in Germany was its result. The Marshal Plan was an economic package in which the US would give credits to European countries in order to prop up their economies. The goal of this action would be twofold. Firstly, there was an economic aim. By resurrecting the economies of Europe, by rebuilding that which was crippled by war, the US was able to create a greater market for American goods. This was particularly important to France who would be repelled from seeking further reparations from Germany, as the American money would be a substitute. This would thus allow even the German economy to rebuild. Further, because of the strength of the US economy, the evolution of the rebuilding of Europe would lead to long-term economic connections with the US being formed. Economic dependence by European countries would also give scope for political influence in these areas by the US. This reason therefore links to the second goal of the Marshall Plan, the political aims.

The political aims of the Marshall Plan seem to be related to the containment of communism. This was one of the reasons why aid was offered to all European countries, including those in the Soviet Union. The conditions of taking the money would be related to following capitalist, rather than Communist economic tactics. As such the plan can be seen as an extension of the Truman Doctrine announced three months before. This link between the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan is extremely important. Some commentators have suggested that the Truman Doctrine was simply designed in order to gain congressional support for the primarily economic Marshall Plan. The doctrine created anti-Communist hysteria. The suggestion was that communism was not only a threat to US economic interests, but also a threat to the values that typified America. This made it easier to gain the support of the American people and so Congress.

When Moscow refused to be a part of the Marshall Plan (as would be expected) and used its influence on its satellite European countries to also reject, the European divide became increasingly apparent. The ability of the Soviets to prevent states from taking up their aid showed their influence to the East. Conversely, the economic power that the US was able to yield over those countries that did take the aid showed their influence to the West. In addition to this were the implications to Germany. The plan allowed the three western zones of Germany to unite their economies against the wishes of the Soviets, and so excluding their zone. In response to this was the creation of a currency in Eastern Germany and the bitter divide of a once strong country. This can be seen as key to further events in the region, such as the Berlin blockade the following year. By clearly marking those that accepted US money and those that didn't, a split was able to be rooted around the 'iron-curtain' which clearly showed areas of Soviet and US influence.

Another important result of the plan, was the precedent of allowing US money to be spent to contain the Soviets. Congress's acceptance of this allowed for the massive increases in spending that occurred throughout the Cold War in areas which did not appear to be of direct threat to American security.

When looking at the possibility of conflict in Europe, it was assumed, especially in the US that any conflict would be 'unlimited'. Especially with the new nuclear capabilities, it appeared to many defence analysts that any conflict would draw in all other parties. This was certainly the aim of the collective security intended through the North Atlantic Treaty. For this reason the possibility of limited warfare, in which war would be confined to a particular country or region and didn't directly involve the superpowers against one another was not expected. Even through the Truman doctrine's emphasis on Soviet containment, the domino theory of communist expansion was not salient and so the stress of policy was not towards preventing the early dominoes from falling. The watershed of this, to move towards the era of limited warfare that characterised the Cold War came with the Korean War.

By intervening in communist expansion in Korea, there was not only an acknowledgement that there could be limited war. It also showed that the US could fight groups which were not overtly supported by or containing Soviet troops. This must be linked to limited war as by fighting Soviet interests, rather than the Soviets, it did appear that unlimited war could be avoided.

Another important result of the war was a changing perception of the Sino-Soviet relationship. This is important as it highlights the difference between the US's aims being against communism, rather than the Soviets. Before the Chinese had acted against the US in the Korean war, it was part of US policy not to see the Chinese as a direct threat, but instead there was an intent to exploit any splits in the fraternity in the Sino-Soviet relationship. The result of the Korean war was to change this perception. China was seen as an aggressor who would work alongside the Soviets. This meant that much diplomacy was set back until later on in the Cold War era.

Outside the region there were major ramifications of the Korean war. As was suggested earlier, one major feature of the Cold War was high defence spending. This was increased due to the events in Europe, but Korean resulted in US public opinion further supporting spending in such areas. The result was higher military spending generally and in particular the arming of a NATO force under General Eisenhower, the first Supreme Commander of NATO forces. Coupled to this was the militarisation of the Federal Republic of Germany. These measures, perhaps more than any other characterised the conflict that continued.

When trying to judge how key these two episodes were in producing the Cold War's characteristics we must, as suggested take their context into account. For this reason, particularly with the case of the Marshall Plan, I believe that it can be seen as important as one of a string of connected events. Its particular importance is limited by the greater importance of what caused the Marshall Plan. As was stated earlier, the divide in Europe had been apparent since the end of the war. It had certainly been in the air at the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam. In addition to this, the Truman doctrine was a strong indication of the will of the US administration to contain the Soviets to allow for a world more suited to US capitalist interests and values. The intent was clearly there to develop areas of influence within Europe and so it would be expected that another event could cause similar characteristics to what followed.

Much the same could also be said for the effects of the Korean War, although with some key exceptions. The first of these is that of the acceptance of limited warfare. It was clear after the Korean War that such limited action could occur and so left a precedent for similar occurrences later. This precedent meant that it was accepted that conventional forces would be important in the conflict, dampening the reliance on nuclear forces. This also allowed for a greater emphasis on the domino theory and pressure on the US to widen its protective umbrella to cover countries which were of less direct importance to US interests. I believe that the Korean War was also key to the shape of Sino-American relations for much of the post-war period. It is hard to see a substitute occurrence at this early stage of the Cold War that would have an equivalent effect.

In all, it is clear that there is great importance to be attached to these two episodes in the evolution of the Cold War. This does not, however, mean that there were not other factors that caused these episodes or that others didn't have as great an effect. For example the Truman doctrine was central to the containment strategy of the US, but this did not occur on its own. Instead, it was the result of evaluating the events that had occurred before it and predicting where US interests existed in the future. In addition to this, the influence of nuclear weapons on shaping the form of the Cold War cannot be discounted. Nuclear weapons seemed to make direct confrontation between the two superpowers impossible, because of 'mutually assured destruction'. Even if never used, the nuclear undertone of the war was always central to military strategy throughout the period in question.