5th May 1999(2,169 words)
Explain the evolution of Soviet Cold War policies, 1953-64.
There are several key parts of Soviet Cold War policies during this period. It is useful to highlight them, as not only do they show distinctions, but also similarities and trends. The first aspects to look at are Soviet relations within its Eastern European spheres of influence. Particularly relevant to this are the causes of and reactions to dissent in these countries, such as during the Hungarian uprising. Also to be included here are the events that surround policy towards Germany, culminating in the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.
The second area to look at is Soviet policy towards the 'third world'. This is highlighted by relations in the Middle East and towards Castro's Cuba. Because it falls into the time period, this must include some discussion of the Cuban missile crisis.
The last important area of policy is one that is central to an understanding of much of Soviet policy. This is the nuclear arms race that occurred during this period. It is suggested by many that this was the period that brought the prospect of nuclear war closer than ever. Surrounding this also were advances in related technology, such as inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the race to space.
Shortly before his death, Stalin produced a publication detailing the economic problems that were developing in the Soviet Union. He felt that there needed to be a period of consolidation of the Soviet economy if it was to have any chance of competing with the capitalists who's post-war recovery seemed stronger. The importance of economic as well as military strength was one that could not be ignored during the Cold War. The realisation of economic weakness by the Soviet leadership is therefore central to their actions during this period.
During the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist party in February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev made a speech that would have major ramifications. Khrushchev made the speech believing that its content would remain secret, the results of this not being so, on its publication in the New York Times some months later, were massive. In the speech, there were three major points. The first of these was to condemn the inhumanity of Stalin's regime which had recently ended. Khrushchev then went on to contradict the doctrine that suggested that capitalism would inevitably produce conflict with communism. He believed that communism could triumph over capitalism through 'peaceful coexistence' without the need for conflict. The third point that he made was that world revolution could occur in a variety of ways. From this he suggested that the Soviet Union should not tell other communist parties how to proceed, but instead give them aid and encouragement.
It is not surprising, perhaps, that the leaking of this speech would have such major consequences. Such a powerful condemnation of Stalin and so a change in Soviet policies would make Moscow's allies at best unsure of their place. The advent of an armed NATO in Europe meant that the Soviets needed compliance of those Eastern European states in their sphere of influence. If, however, Soviet policy was so changeable, how would these states know who they were dealing with. They believed that they were expected to overwhelmingly pledge their support to Stalin one minute and then, with a new leadership in the Kremlin, simply denounce their previous affinities. It is not hard to see why Khrushchev's speech unsettled the union of the new Warsaw Pact which was created as a response to the inclusion of West Germany into NATO in 1955.
The first act against the Soviets came in Poland when the leaking of Khrushchev's speech resulted in strikes and a change in mood of the Communist Party led by Wladyslaw Gomulka. This would be a threat to the heart of the Soviet's area of influence and so Khrushchev intervened directly to seek a compromise and reassurance that the Poles would not leave the Warsaw Pact. This point must be made explicit. Khrushchev did not decree what should happen, but instead was forced to seek concessions in person. The lack of undisputed power, even in his back-yard, surely highlights the frailty of the administration.
Following the Polish rebellion was a more severe uprising in Hungary. Opposition, based again in the inconsistency coming from Moscow, caused rebels in the Hungarian Communist party, led by Imre Nagy, to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary on the 28th October 1956. An announcement followed that Nagy would then lead Hungary out of the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev's weakness in Poland was thought to contribute to this and it was clear that he would not make the same error again. On the 31st October, Khrushchev secured the Soviet presidium's approval for all-out military intervention in Hungary. The result was twenty thousand dead Hungarians, three thousand dead Soviet soldiers and Hungary, now under the leadership of Janos Kadar, strongly back in the fold of the Warsaw Pact.
The important point to note here was that event that seemed to cause these problems was Khrushchev renunciation of Stalinist methods. The bitter irony was that the only way that he was able to control the system was to employ Stalinist tactics in Hungary. If nothing else, this shows the insecurity that the Soviet's had about their own strength. Their need to act in such a severe way to maintain influence over allies must have undermined their ability to defeat their foes. In addition, although the Warsaw Pact has been established as a balance to the collective security NATO, the need for coercion to maintain membership meant that the Soviet alliance was far weaker, or at least extremely different.
This point was also shown in Germany, particularly in Berlin. As it became increasingly clear that there was little possibility of unification into a neutral Germany, troubles increased for the Soviets. The effects of economic failures and lowering living standards in the Soviet sphere meant that East Germans, and particularly East Berliners were increasingly trying to flee to the welcoming West. There was certainly no comparable reciprocal movement to the East. This put pressure on a Soviet leadership which had already proved to be somewhat isolated from those who it apparently influenced. The result was therefore pressure put on the Eastern German administration to tighten controls and particularly to prevent the exodus to the West. This culminated in what was perhaps one of the most striking symbols of the Cold War, a West Berlin engaged as an free island in a communist East Germany. In policy terms this showed that during Khrushchev's years there was a move from a thought that there could be 'peaceful coexistence' with the capitalists, who would produce their own demise, to a resilience to prevent the encroachment of Western influences which could undermine an already economically fragile regime.
The second important area to look at Soviet policy is in relation to the 'third world'. To use the US's domino theory, it was clear to the Soviets that world revolution was most likely to occur in the lesser developed, pre-industrial 'third world' countries. In turn this would spark off others. The Soviets therefore developed interests in these areas, particularly in relation to the Arab Middle East. There were a variety of reasons for this. Firstly, the relative proximity of the region made it of strategic importance. Secondly, it was clear that there was a great amount of oil that could be used by the Soviets. There was also the importance of Israel. The United State's relationship with Israel would naturally cause a rift between the US and the Arab world. If the Soviets could exploit this, they could gain major influence in the region. Some Arab leaders, particularly Nasser in Egypt were receptive to such Soviet moves, gladly taking their arms and moving towards systems more sympathetic to communists. This came to a head during the Suez crisis, when the Nasser regime wished to nationalise the Suez canal.
In Cuba also, the Soviets wished to aid the growth of world-wide communist and offered much assistance to Castro, as well as missiles to protect Cuba. This will be discussed more later, but it must be seen that Soviet policy towards the third world was twofold. Firstly, to aid the spread of communism in countries that because of their poor economic conditions would favour revolution. Secondly, the Soviets felt that they were behaving as many colonial powers had done previously. They wished to increase their spheres of influence and draw on the economic and strategic advantages that could be expected from such dominance.
The next aspect of Soviet policy under Khrushchev to look at is the arms race. There has always been an apparent paradox with nuclear weapons that those who accumulate them believe that in doing so they are reducing the need to ever use them. This was certainly the position of Khrushchev. Not only did nuclear weapons act as a deterrent against US aggression, but it also meant that in preparing for war there would be less need to invest in costly conventional forces.
Early tests of the nuclear devises had highlighted their devastating potentials. Khrushchev believed that for the weapons to work as deterrents, they must not only show that they had sufficient weapons, but also that they had the ability to deploy them. The scale of damage that a single weapon can inflict does make it hard to understand why there was a need for such stockpiling. The belief that military strength could somehow mask economic weakness, however, meant that the Soviets invested heavily in such areas.
The advancement of long-range missiles ahead of their American rivalries also did much to make the insecure Soviet leadership feel more secure. The tactic was certainly one of illusion. They wished to suggest to their foe that not only did they have more advanced technology, but that also that the US had less arms than the Russians did. The effect of successes in this area, such as the launching of Sputnik and the first ICBM in 1957 were diluted somewhat by US intelligence reports of the lack of actual armour that the Soviets had. Interestingly, the Soviets knew of the US's ability to gather intelligence as they had detected the presence of the U-2 spy planes which they could do nothing about. Gaddis suggests that the U-2 flights were something of a secret understanding between the Soviets and Americans. The rest of the world oblivious until the shooting down of one U-2 plane in 1960 resulting in a failed Paris summit with Khrushchev acting as if the spying was a surprise.
The one time thought of Soviet dominance was, however, exposed as being an arms deficit. The Soviets did appear to have better developed longer range missiles, but the numbers of weapons the US had, and their ability to place them in Europe somewhat balanced this. The Soviets particularly took this threat to heart with the US's deployment of weapons in Turkey, their NATO ally. This was one of the reasons that the Soviets put weapons in Cuba. If the US could house its weapons in an ally so close to the Soviets, it was not unreasonable for the Soviets to place weapons close to the United States. In addition, the US's failure in the 'Bay of Pigs' invasion showed that the communist Cuban state was under threat from the US. The dual purpose of this deployment, balancing American weapons in Turkey and defending a successful revolution in Cuba brought the world to what many see as the closest to nuclear war. The result, eventually, was a Soviet withdrawal after a sturdy display of brinkmanship. Although this might be viewed as an American victory, the survival of Castro's regime, beyond even the Soviet's, highlights that it was not a complete failure for Khrushchev.
There are some general features that should be noted about Soviet policy in this period. The apparent contradiction between the words that Khrushchev used at the 20th Congress and the actions that followed in Hungary and in the arms race cannot be ignored. Perhaps this can be blamed on the inconsistency of Khrushchev as a man and the inability of the Soviet system to have sufficient checks or balances to prevent this. Also, the failing economic situation in the Soviet Union stiffened the resolve of the leadership to try and suggest military power that they did not have. They forced themselves to compete with a United States which economically had a large advantage. The result was an arms race which Moscow found it hard to afford or sustain.
It is important to note that this period culminated with nuclear test-ban treaties and a consolidation of military forces. This was as a reaction to the world being taken to the brink of nuclear catastrophe which it is clear that no one involved was truly wanted.
Soviet policy in this time must therefore be viewed as an attempt to restate its military position regardless of domestic economic hardship.