10th May 1999

(2,106 words)

How should one explain the ups and downs of détente, 1953-85? What did détente actually amount to?

Détente is a term that during this period was employed to refer to almost any state of affairs. At its height, détente described co-operation and sharing of interests between the superpowers in a bipolar world. At its low point, détente can be seen as little more than appeasement of aggression, with détente surviving for as long as there was actual peace between the Soviets and Americans. To peg down examples of each of these, one could refer to the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) between Nixon and Brezhnev in May 1972. This contrasts with Carter's suggestion of détente existing even after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 caused him to impose a trade embargo, delay consular and cultural exchanges and prevent US participation in the 1980 Olympics. This breadth of usage of the term does strongly question as to what it does amount to. It may be interesting to question if, because of the lack of direct fighting between the Soviets and Americans, the whole Cold War was a period of détente. Alternatively, it may be possible to suggest that Carter was simply wrong to suggest that superpower peace was equivalent to détente and so allow us to follow a narrow use of the word.

When looking at the first part of the question, it is not enough to simply look at the events that can be sign-posted as highs and lows of détente. Instead, some of the underlying reasons for pursuing such a policy should be addressed, to see if the failure of the process can be blamed on false assumptions that lay beneath the strategy. It should also be noted that the length of the time period being discussed would naturally expect the fluctuations in key personnel, economic conditions and technological advances to alter the emphasis or workings of policies. This point is simply to suggest that it is in no way surprising that there should be 'ups and downs' in détente.

The most important reason for détente was the fear of nuclear weapons. By the 1950's, both of the superpowers had nuclear capabilities and were rapidly investing in technology to deliver them. The assumption that any nuclear attack would cause nuclear retaliation meant that it was in the interests of both sides that they never be deployed. This, however, must be balanced by the mistrust that each side had of a possible surprise attack which must be deterred by a nuclear arsenal. There is a tightrope; neither side wanted nuclear war, yet equally neither side felt safe without nuclear weapons. The bid to control this feature of the Cold War must be seen as central to any notion of détente. Even when détente in other areas can be seen to be at a low point, the mood towards arms control was still active. The earliest suggestions of this can be seen when it was clear that Eisenhower was willing to appease the Soviet action in Hungary because he didn't believe that it was worth risking nuclear war over. Following this, there were blips in relations, such as the failed Paris Summit following the U-2 plane incident of 1960 and the Suez crisis. I refer to these as 'blips', not because they should be seen as irrelevancies, but instead because their impact to détente was limited when compared to the effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Not only did the crisis show that there could be direct military tensions between the superpowers, but the brinkmanship that occurred highlighted the lack of communication between leaders. It was the fear of nuclear war, made real by the crisis, that caused the superpowers to move to prevent direct confrontation. This leads to what I believe must be viewed as the second factor central to détente (after the need to prevent nuclear war), the increased activity of agreement and meetings between leaders.

The Cuban crisis resulted in the production of the hotline between Washington and Moscow, but this was by no means the first sign of the need to communicate. The neutrality of Austria was secured by treaty in 1955 and there were certainly attempts for meetings between the Soviets and Americans before Cuba, including the Vienna meeting of Khrushchev and Kennedy in 1961. After Cuba, there was a greater enthusiasm to try and work to secure agreements, particularly with regards to arms control. Henry Kissinger to many personified the high point of such activity in the following decade. I do not believe it is naive to suggest that such negotiations can be seen as more than simply symptoms of a strategy of détente. This must be seen as a cause. It must be suggested that the willingness to be open to negotiations with an enemy not only shows a thawing of tension, but the negotiations themselves will catalyse the thawing due to a greater understanding of the pressures that a foe is under.

In addition to the fear of nuclear war and the increase in dialogue, there were other reasons for the pursuit of détente. The Soviets, for example, had much to gain from the economic benefits of trading with the US. The Americans believed that following such a policy would allow them greater diplomatic leverage, especially through the strategy of linkage employed by Kissinger. It must also be stressed generally that a period of lower superpower tensions allows the opportunity of reducing defence expenditure. This was certainly important for the Soviets, but also at times for the Americans as well.

As was suggested above, change in personnel leading the various states cannot be ignored as a cause of changes in the pursuit of détente. This can certainly be seen with the various changes of US presidents in this period. Interestingly, two of the presidents in this period succeeded a president in mid-term and so it can be expected that their policies would be of greater continuity. All of the others came of power after a presidency of the other political party. This point alone will suggest a variation in policy and therefore fluctuations in détente. Related to this are domestic influences on US policy. It was, for example, harder to follow policies of consolidation with the Soviets during a period of ideological witch-hunts. This can be seen with what many see as the end of détente with the presidency of Ronald Reagan moving back to using emotive language to describe the Soviets.

The same can also be said in Russian leadership. The brief period under Malenkov after Stalin's death seemed to suggest a move to greater conciliation with the West. Khrushchev, his successor, however, moved back towards a foreign policy which would increase the chances of conflict. The period under Brezhnev led to a variety in Soviet policy. He increased links with the West, whilst still following policies that could lead to tension, such as his support for Cuban activity in Angola and with the Red Army's invasion of Afghanistan.

As was suggested, each American administration had a different view of both how to act out a policy of détente, as well as to what the aims were. For example, the Kennedy-Johnson administrations seemed to see the strategy as a means of containing the Soviets without the need for military tensions. In addition, they thought that by creating greater links with the Soviets, they may have a chance of changing the internal politics of the system. This points to a sense that 'soft power' could be exerted on the communists. Détente with the Soviets must, however, be contrasted with the action in Vietnam. It was still clear that the administration believed in the domino risk of communist expansion and so wished to contain it in Asia. The result of this can be seen as a mixed foreign policy of détente towards to Soviet communists with warming relations, yet a bitter fight against other communists, requiring massive expenditure.

This contrasts quite strongly with the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger period. This period is marked by less ideological based strategy. Instead of seeking to contain or change the Soviets, the Nixon White House tried to simply find a way to coexist and to use leverage through negotiations to control any possible unwanted Soviet activity. During this period, it was clear that the US saw a bipolar world in which conflict was dictated by one of the major powers. Many people in fact suggest that the Americans transposed the Cold War into areas where conflict could be due to regional, rather than global tensions.

In addition to the bipolar situation, Kissinger understood the importance of exploiting diplomacy with the Chinese. This was made easier after the consolidation of power in China and Kissinger was able to use this relationship as a tool when negotiating with the Soviets. His 'shuttle-diplomacy' can be seen more as a process of managing tension when it arose in the world, rather than as a means of preventing any conflict. The theory of linkage would mean that benefits of co-operation could be used as reward or punishment for actions that the US disapproved of. Whilst this was somewhat limited, such as when Congress adopted the Stevenson and Jackson-Vanik amendments to reduce trade or when the US seemed powerless in preventing Soviet involvement in the Middle Eastern War of 1973, tension between the major powers were reduced and economic links were cemented. This was seen as a clear high point of détente. It was clear that there was still a basic balance of power antagonism between the superpowers, yet, through diplomacy, they were able to operate together towards those common interests outlined above.

Following Ford, Carter wished to put a greater degree of morality into the dealings with the Soviets, whilst maintaining some form of détente. He felt that the hopes of arms control were centrally important. This meant that whilst still trying to use his influence to prevent Soviet excesses in human rights, he didn't wish to push them too far and upset progress with the SALT II talks. It was clear, however, that Carter did not feel that he had much power to influence the Soviets. The sanctions that he enacted after their invasion of Afghanistan were to punish the Soviets and deter further aggression, rather than to cause a retreat. For this reason, it is possible to accuse Carter of appeasing the Soviets in order to prevent direct confrontation and secure arms control. It is therefore debatable whether it is fair to suggest that it is appropriate to equate Carter's policies with those of his predecessors, because unlike others he seemed unable to use any real leverage over the Soviets.

As was suggested earlier, the early Reagan years were marked by a backlash against détente. He viewed the word itself as having negative connotations. His aim was to be hard against the Soviets, although he was limited by his want to secure American economic interests. He saw Soviet expansionism as inevitable from such an "evil empire" and so believed there was little scope for negotiation or détente. Later, it could be suggested that Reagan warmed to greater co-operation with the Soviets, but this was after 1985 and many see Reagan's administration as the start of the second Cold War which followed a period of détente.

In all, it does seem clear that whilst there are some core factors underpinning the reasons for détente, this did not lead to consistent levels of co-operation. This must in part be due to the aims that different administrations put on relations with the East and what resources they were willing to use to carry these out. Similar explanations can be given for different phases of Soviet strategy as they acted as an expansionist power to a greater or lesser extent. Combined, these give great scope for fluctuations in the closeness of relations.

As to what détente amounts to, this is still unclear. The fact that the word is associated with policy from Eisenhower to Carter, including the diplomacy of Kissinger highlights that it has the possibility of having no use. If, however, we restrict the definition to exclude periods such as the Cuban crisis or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there could be some clarity. For example, this could suggest that détente was a period of not simply peace, but also the pursuit of some common interests by the superpowers, whilst still recognising the balance of power in a bipolar system. In this sense, détente does have some importance as it shows the capabilities of relationships in a conflict in which military activity is prevented by a mutual nuclear deterrent.