17th May 1999(2,774 words)
Where should one look for the springs of Chinese
foreign policy, 1950-85?Although there were great fluctuations in the nature of China's foreign relations in this period, it can be seen that the roots of policy appeared to remain surprisingly consistent. The thesis of this essay is that national security was the primary goal of Chinese policy. Fluctuations were made in response to perception of external threats to this aim. In addition, China's policy seemed geared towards two other objectives. The first of these relates to the revolutionary nature of the regime. Not only did the Chinese wish to promote their ideology in other states, but they also wished to encourage liberation of poorer states from colonial powers. The last aim was one of gaining international recognition, prestige and power for China. Although this is greatly linked to security considerations it is worthwhile noting separately.
In order to study how each of these aims can be seen in policy decisions, it is useful to separate Chinese policy into those with the United States, those with the Soviets and those with the third world. By addressing what caused the stark deviation in relations within each of these spheres it may be possible to assess where Chinese policy was rooted.
An interesting point to note is that although there were incredible domestic changes occurring in China during this period, they seem to have had limit effect on foreign policy. This too should be addressed.
Chinese policy towards the United States does seem to highlight the various aims identified above. These being, concern for national security, ideological and anti-colonial success as well as the search for international recognition and prestige. Even with roots in such goals, however, policy was in no way constant. The beginning of this period showed war in Korea between the US and China with additional antagonism surrounding Taiwan. The later parts show co-operation between the US and China, and a realignment towards regarding the Soviets as a common adversary. I believe that this contrast occurred without altering the primary goal of the Chinese, of national security and indeed are consistent with it.
After Beijing was taken by the Chinese communists in late 1949, Mao Zedong became leader. His nationalist opponents, the Kuomintang led by Jiang Kaishek were forced to the island of Taiwan. Although Mao quickly established links with the Soviets, visiting Moscow within three months, the United States refused the newly declared People's Republic diplomatic recognition. The United States, domestically under the spell of anti-Communist hysteria decided to instead back the weak Kuomintang in Taiwan, so refusing the new regime its seat at the United Nations. There are two obvious implications of this in relation to China's objectives outlined above. Most importantly, American support for the defeated nationalists was seen by the new communists as a threat, they strongly feared an American backed counter-revolution by the Kuomintang. The strategic threat that foreign occupation of Taiwan could cause had been seen by Japanese action in 1931 and so a nationalist-American occupation of the island was of great concern. Also, refusal of diplomatic recognition by the US and of UN membership prevented Mao from showing China as the world power that he believed its size necessitated. US influence over other states also damaged China's chances of increased relations in the international community. In addition, the ideological conflict that Mao saw as inevitable with the imperialist capitalist United States would come closer for as long as the United States was active in Asia. If it can be shown that China's policy centred around removing these American threats to her security and place in the international system, there would be a strong suggestion that the roots of Chinese policy lie in external, not internal pressures.
Although the Korean war started with the North Korean army invading the south, the result of MacArthur's success in leading the UN troops to push the North Korean's past the 38th parallel drew the Chinese into the conflict. This was almost half a year after it had started. As well as advancing troops closer to the Chinese border, the Americans had further fortified Taiwan. It is therefore not hard to see why Mao believed that the Chinese should become involved for security reasons, regardless of any ideological support he would want to give the North Koreans. This explains his pre-emptive attack which turned the Korean troubles into a three year Sino-American confrontation.
American attitudes towards China, and particularly Taiwan, continued after the end of the Korean war. This is consistent with the Secretary of State Dulles' aims of containing what he saw as a potentially aggressive and unpredictable communist regime. The creation of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (Seato) is testament to this and raised concerns in a China still scared of the security threats of a Kuomintang Taiwan. In a bid to both test American commitment and dislodge Jiang Kaishek, China started to bombard the small islands off the coast of Taiwan. This went against the spirit of Geneva which China was a part of, but did not cause major incident. America was following a policy of containment against Asian communism, but was not willing to commit troops to it in the mid-1950's. Because of the nuclear threat, China was also unwilling to push the Americans too far, although there were cases of brinkmanship during the bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu in 1958.
This post-Korean war period also saw a deflation of Sino-Soviet relations. This split was seen by the US as a weakening of the communist bloc. American domestic understanding was not, however, sophisticated enough to distinguish Soviet and Chinese communism. This delayed major moves towards co-operation. There was, however, some warming of relations, not met by diplomatic recognition, but with an American pledge not attempting to catalyse a counter-revolution. As this occurred, China's policy was directed elsewhere, particularly towards the Soviets. Whether China's policy shift was because of US action, or the reason for US action is debatable, but the 1960's saw a lull in antagonism between these powers.
As relations with the Soviets declined and the Chinese showed self-discipline during the Vietnam conflict, the 1970's heralded a major shift in Sino-American relations. As will be discussed, the Soviets became the primary superpower adversary for China and the changes following the Cultural revolution in 1966 allowed for co-operation with the old imperialist enemy. This gives another suggestion that security, rather than ideology can be seen to be the primary consideration of Chinese policy. Moves towards better relations with the United States supports the view that state, rather than class struggles were central to Chinese superpower relations, if not rhetoric. It is important to note that throughout this period China continued trade relations with almost all of the industrialised world.
Better Sino-American relations were cemented by the Nixon-Kissinger administration. The shadow of the Vietnamese conflict made this difficult to publicise, but the seeds were sown at the Geneva talks in the 1950's. China's first nuclear exposition in 1964 must also be acknowledged as an important cause of the American's more realist approach. In 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that it was not an American aim to overthrow the Maoist government, however, American presence in Asia still made complete reconciliation impossible. By 1971 Nixon had finally dropped his resistance to China taking Taiwan's seat at the UN and the security council in an attempt to better relations with Beijing. This followed unofficial meetings by Kissinger and led to Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972. Relations had increased dramatically characterised by the deeply political tour of China by the US Ping-Pong team and lifting of trade embargoes. There were clear motives for this on both sides. The US wanted to send a message to Moscow to not take their détente for granted. Chinese interests were centred around removal of the security risk of the US as well as indicating to the Soviets not to increase border tensions. In addition, increased trade links with the US opened up vast markets in countries which were under US influence.
By the 1980's, the Deng Xiaoping regime that followed Mao's death in 1976 had close relations with the United States. They had achieved a negation of the US military threat, American diplomatic recognition and an understanding of China's place as a world nuclear power.
Relations with the Soviet Union can, unsurprisingly, be seen to invert the fluctuations in relations with the Americans. The springs of this can again be seen in the basic aims identified in the introduction. The fear of nationalist counter-revolution moved Mao to seek the aid of the natural ideological ally in the Soviet Union. Stalin was warmly regarded by Mao as the leader of the communist world. The comparative strength of Stalin's regime and his moves towards expanding the communist sphere were respected. The Russo-Chinese treaty of February 1950 also developed other links. This was primarily an economic measure and led to joint control of oil mining in border areas and air routes in central Asia. Also in the package were aid credits to China of $300 million over five years. It is not hard to understand Mao's motives for this as he moved towards collectivisation. The pressures of the weak new China, Mao's admiration of Stalin and the bi-polarity of the post-war world managed to paper over the cracks of differences between these two communist regimes.
The cracks did begin to show after the death of Stalin, bringing differences to a head. Not only was there clear dislike between Mao and Khrushchev, but better entrenched in power, Mao also questioned the assumed leadership of the communist world by the Soviets. This was seen within his own borders where Soviet nuclear weapons were places, but without any Chinese control over their deployment. Events in Eastern Europe and denunciation of Stalin in the second half of the 1950's added to Chinese questioning of Soviet dominance. Lack of Soviet support over action in Taiwan showed Mao that Chinese security interests were not necessarily protected with this Sino-Soviet alliance. This was, however, only the tip of the iceberg of Chinese complaints. Economically, the Soviets also withdrew support from China in the latter part of the decade. Ideologically, Mao took great offence at Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence with the West. Mao believed in the inevitable communist-capitalist conflict and saw moves towards détente, such as at Camp David in 1959, as selling out communism to the imperialists. Soviet-American détente also undermined Chinese attitudes towards aiding revolution in the third world and encouraging world revolution against the imperialist West. The background to this, however, was the apparent strengthening position of Moscow in the Cold War. Whilst she was moving towards peaceful coexistence, she was also developing ICBMs and Sputnik. This made Mao frustrated. He believed Soviet advances showed that capitalism was under threat and that they should move to a more active third world policy in a climate of the 'East wind blowing over the West'. For much of the 1950's, China therefore remained, superficially at least, aligned to the Soviets.
The weakening of Soviet military support for China led Mao to seek greater independence as part of this foreign policy. The achievement of nuclear power allowed her to deter either of the superpowers. Soviet relations worsened in the next decade with the Soviets attacking the Chinese at a communist meeting in Rome in 1960. The ideological splits and lack of need for Soviet security were therefore the roots of this new period in relations. This eventually allowed for co-operation with the Americans. Tensions rose even further following Soviet neutrality in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and border clashes with the Soviets on the Ussuri River at the end of the 1960's. Sino-Soviet tensions lasted through the 1970's and dramatically increased when the Red Army invaded Afghanistan, one of China's neighbours.
The breaking of relations with the Soviets not only allowed China to be seen as an independent military power, but was also invited into the international community. In 1970 major countries such as Italy and Canada had established diplomatic links and she was soon a member of the UN's security council. It is hard to say whether this was because of worsening relations with the Soviets or greater relations with the US, or if these are simply two sides of the same coin. What is clear is that changing superpower relations greatly affected the Chinese position in the world, and so her foreign policy.
The last area of relations to look at are those with the developing world. China's primary goal of national security and her limited resources strongly dictated activity in these areas. Whilst activity was therefore limited, rhetoric towards the third world was increased. China saw herself as the leader of emerging revolutionary states that were ignored by the bi-polarity of the largely European centred Cold War. She saw herself as an opponent to both American imperialism and Khrushchev's revisionism of revolutionary principles. This was made clear at the Bandung Conference of 1955 where the Chinese set out an agenda for third world states which wished to be non-aligned from Cold War pacts. Principles outlined at the conference included the recognition of each other's sovereignty and the abstention from aggression. Success in the third world would contain US expansion near the Chinese border, as well as to remove Chinese dependence on the Soviet bloc for security. Again, Chinese policy seems to have been consistently defensive in this area, trying to gain better and peaceful relations with states. This included through economic agreement, such as those with Cambodia and Nepal in 1956. By gaining neighbouring allies she sought buffers from outside aggression, rather than territory to invade. This again seems consistent with the thesis that Chinese policy was rooted in national security.
The policy was, however, of limited impact. In Africa, Chinese involvement was seen largely as a failure due to their inability to commit major resources. Even in Asia, Chinese military action was determined by the possible threat of retaliation. This explains why she was unable to start conflict with Taiwan, but willing to be involved in war with the non-nuclear India. Indeed, India is a good example of Chinese foreign policy. Although relations had been good between the two countries following Indian neutrality in the Korean war, tensions had increased through the 1950's. India's giving of asylum to those fleeing Tibet and disputes over the MacMahon Line in the North East Frontier Agency region had increased tensions. This led to war in 1962, but interestingly, it was an Indian attack on China which started it. The Chinese response was clinical, winning back large areas of land but limiting her own successes. Her offer of a cease-fire and twelve mile retreat after she gained most of the disputed territory signifies that her action was defensive, rather than aggressive. China had no illusions of trying to gain territory in other states, but instead was simply concerned in removing threats from her borders and maintaining her territory.
The result of her split with the Soviets was that her policy was moved to one of realism. Her move towards strategic, rather than ideological alliances was also reflected in the third world. She looked for allies from countries disaffected with the Soviet and American blocs, rather than simply communist states. This must be seen as relating to her increased intention of wanting to be regarded as a major player in the international community, as well as the reduction of military threats.
In all, China's policy does seem shaped by the constant will to maintain national security. Chinese military action seems confined to those areas in which she believed that there was an external threat, such as the Korean war or Taiwan. Chinese fear of counter-revolution and nuclear war meant that the actions of others were the largest cause of changes in her policy. When, for example, the Soviet alliance seemed incapable of guaranteeing Chinese security, she moved towards bettering relations with the United States. This can also be seen in the alliances that she pursued in the third world.
In addition, it should be noted that the incredible changes in domestic China, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution can not be regarded as major causes of shifts in policy. They did, perhaps, catalyse changes, such as by famines causing further reliance on Soviet help in the 1950's, but domestic developments cannot be seen as root causes.
When looking for the springs of the changing Chinese foreign policy, it is therefore necessary to look first in Washington and Moscow, rather than a Beijing who's priority was security.