20th October 1998

(3,631 words)

Are globalisation and interdependence transforming world politics?

A direct question surely deserves a direct answer. This is no exception. At first it is tempting to say simply 'yes', the very existence of notions of globalisation and interdependence proves that there is a changing or transforming system of world politics. If we were to be simply comparing a world without globalisation and interdependence to a world with them, there would be a difference. A progression from one to the other would undoubtedly be a 'transformation'. But this is not the case. Notions of globalisation and interdependence are not new, they have been within international relations for over a century. Perhaps what is new is their increased strength and relevance.

The first thing to do in order to be able to see if there is a transformation is set a strong definition of the original state of affairs. Without a benchmark of this kind, there would be nothing to compare the results of globalisation and interdependence with. A difference between the models will show if there has indeed been a transformation. The model that I have chosen to use for this benchmark is the traditional realist approach to world order. It will be noted that this does contain elements of interdependence (particularly relating to military interdependence), but even so, it serves as a good contrast to much that seems to be suggested as the results of these two factors. After this benchmark model is set up clear definitions of both globalisation and interdependence must be made. From these definitions, a hypothetical comparison between extreme forms of the terms and the realist world will highlight the potential for transformation from one to the other. After this hypothetical analysis actual events in international relations should be reviewed to see to what extent they match this hypothetical transformation. This three staged analysis (definition, followed by the analysis on the theoretical and then real levels) should be done for both globalisation and interdependence. After this, globalisation and interdependence should be compared to see if either one is a larger factor in any 'transformation of world politics' observed. The last brief point to look at is whether there are any factors, other than those in the question, that might be responsible for the transformation suggested in the question.

The realist model is based around the core units of interacting states. The system that they act within is anarchic and their interactions are for their own security and survival. There is no respect for international law, other than when it is in the national interest. Alliances are formed and broken according to the national interest. The principle power in such a model is military force and this is used by stronger states to exert influence over weaker ones. When there are alliances formed, they are to support the balance of power which can occur and has the result of peace. This is because competing blocs see no advantage in taking on an enemy which it is not sure to overcome. Power in this model is firmly in the hands of individual state governments, in this military form. International organisations of states are given 'lip-service'. The real decisions do not occur within these organisations through co-operation (although a facade might be produced to suggest otherwise), instead the naked self-interests of states is the objective. Bargaining is done through exploitation of relative (military) power, not moral arguments.

Although this model does appear an extreme, this is how many see international order throughout this century and this was certainly the predominant view in the post-WW2, Cold War era. Its clarity does make it a useful benchmark to use in this discussion, as unlike other models, such as the international society model, there are clear conditions which it contains which will prove obvious in their absence.

The first concept to approach is that of globalisation. Globalisation is essentially an economic concept, although it does have some side-effects which can be noted in cultural changes and the cosmopolitisation of modern society. Hirst notes some characteristics of an extreme model of globalisation. He refers to these as the 'political rhetoric of globalisation', but they can be used to construct an appropriate model for this study.

The mobility of capital is intrinsic to this model. Globalisation means that technology and communications allow the transfer of funds to areas in which they will be most profitable. For this reason governments are unable to control monetary and fiscal policies in any way that is radically different from global market expectations. This would simply result in movement of capital from their territory. The result of this is that according to models of globalisation, economic power is no longer in the hands of the state governments, but is independent. If this power is therefore proved to have international sway, there does seem to be a divergence from the realist model of monopolisation of power by states.

The effects of globalisation are not restricted to economics, although this might be from where other effects originate. The need to satisfy the requirements of moving this capital results in better communications around the world. These include the moving of people across national boundaries and so a diversification of nationalities within states. This is very much a liberal conception. Eventually notions of nation-statehood could give way to an international civil society.

There is also an effect on domestic governance which is suggested in this theoretical model of globalisation. Although economic powers have been taken from the state governments by the global market, governments are not removed by globalisation. To the contrary, they have an important role to play. Markets require stability, governments supply this. Whether it is policing to stop theft or internationally working towards peace, business has a major interest in governmental success. Business does not have within its capabilities the legitimacy that governments have in their territories and because of 'free-loader' problems, they are unable to supply the public goods that modern society requires and expects. Governments can carry out these roles, so according to globalisation theory, government has a changing (not necessarily diminishing) role to play. Instead of organising Keynsian style economic policies, they are left to the administration of services as well as debating moral questions, such as abortion and organising social programs. Pressure by the market (according to this model) even removes military decisions from governments as they are aware that war leads to uncertainty which would move investment from their territory. For this reason the role of the state in a globalised world has be compared to that of a municipality government, with little real power, yet vital to the infrastructure of the broader system.

This model must now be compared to the realist benchmark defined earlier. There are clear differences between the two models. Power in the globalisation model seems to be in the form of economic power. This is because the need for stability for markets to flourish removes military power. A more important difference is in where this power lies. It is independent of the states, they are no longer (according to this model) the principle actors in international relations. The effects of cultural integration as a product of globalisation also acts to lessen the chances of war (and so a weakening of military power) as there is greater understanding of other nations and greater realisation of the individuals who make up what was previously seen as faceless enemies.

Before looking at whether the theoretical comparison accurately reflects the world, it must be asked as to whether globalisation is a new force in politics. The answer must be 'no'. Trade has existed for hundreds of years and within this period the markets that governed this trade must have organised themselves in some way to advance their own interests. While this point is accepted, only in the modern era (possibly since the end of the Cold War) has there been enough peace in the developed world to allow such markets to prosper and entrench themselves into the international political system. Also in this time, technological advancements (ironically, many of these were the result of war time research and development) have meant that the world really has got smaller and capital has become increasingly mobile, as have people. So, although globalisation isn't entirely new, it can be seen to have a strength in current times that it never previously could claim.

The modern world has seen relatively little conflict by the advanced states. Where conflict has occurred, such as over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it could easily be argued that the cleavages that caused the states to act were economic ones. The US was not trying to show its dominance in an anarchic world to would be military aggressors to its shores when it acted so firmly against Iraq. Instead it was acting on behalf of a market which was scared of instability in oil prices (although President Bush's upcoming election campaign might have perhaps explained the firmness of the action). Other conflict has been minimal, certainly not aggressive. Actions by the G7 industrialised nations' militaries have been of the kind to maintain world stability, so called 'peace-keeping' missions, rather than of the kind prescribed by realists. Global economics relies on global stability, so there is an easy case for a globalisation theorist to make that these actions were on behalf of market. Inaction suggests the decline of military power.

But simply because military power has declined does not mean that economic power has taken its place and increased. Nor does it mean that governments have lost all their power and turned into the model of municipality governments. Some might even say that governments still have some international power from their economies. For example, Japan, with a limited military still manages to claim a seat at the best tables in international organisations. This is simply because it has the second biggest economy in the world. Assuming that such organisations are more than 'talking-shops', this entails that Japan has power, from its economic standing. This example is surely a contradiction to globalisation theory and an indication that globalisation hasn't had such a large 'transformational' effect, as is asked of in the question. Or perhaps, as Hirst suggests, the economy has not become globalised but instead, 'highly internationalised'.

The next objection to the proposition that globalisation is a reality is seen by looking outside the main advanced states. Whilst capital undeniably is mobile around the world, people are not mobile to the same extent. This is especially the case for those who live outside advanced states. Further, it is worth noting that while firms might invest in poorer states, they are invariably based in richer ones. They seem to exploit the cheap labour and low taxation offered by states desperate for any economic activity from outside at all. This makes a two tiered system between the economically wealthy states and those that are poor. The market has no reason to equalise this imbalance and scared of competition, neither perhaps do richer states. The result of this is a need for attachment to some kind of defining ideology or creed within these countries who are left as excluded from the riches of the global economy. This it is thought is the basis of the rise of nationalism and religious fundamentalism in such countries. Such forces move the poorer states to arms and so regionally some areas do mirror the realist model greater than they do the globalisation model. Examples of such areas include the religious and national fundamentalism exhibited in the states of the former Soviet Union.

The second theory to look at is that of interdependence. States cannot operate in a vacuum. States are able to be militarily neutral, such as Switzerland, but this does not mean that they can be oblivious to international events. Indeed, part of the notion of sovereignty of states is recognition in the international system of the jurisdiction of a government over a given territory. Part of what it means to be a state is dependent on the actions of other states towards you. This dependence runs deeper than simply recognition. Distribution of natural resources and raw materials means that if no other interactions occur, trade is necessary between states. There is also the capacity for further interactions between states, such as giving of military support or intra-state economic investment. The further that these interactions become entrenched in the political or economic cultures of states, the more dependent they are on one another. To borrow a definition from Keohane and Nye, '[interdependence is] situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in countries'. This is seemingly a form of co-operation to the mutual benefit of those involved. Whilst this is largely true, the benefits of interdependence can also work asymmetrically or to the disadvantage of both parties.

Although there is a provision for non-state actors to be involved in the interdependence processes, it is largely accepted that within this model states are the main units. This is certainly true of military interdependence. Israel was dependent on US support during the Gulf War, supplying missiles to offer protection. In return the US maintained a foothold in the region that could be used to further US interests. The same was also true within the differing superpower's sphere's of influence during the Cold War. Within these systems (such as the US in Latin America), the states were dependent on each other for security and support in foreign policy initiatives as well as trade. The state is therefore a strong force in such systems.

There are non-state actors in operation as well. This is particularly the case in economics, as was shown when looking at globalisation. Firms are reliant on suppliers and buyers in different countries and some firms have part of their own company based abroad. This means that the economic success of one nation is closely linked to that of others. Following such links through can lead to what Keohane and Nye describe as the idealised form of interdependence, that of 'complex interdependence'. This is defined as 'a situation among a number of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies; there is no hierarchy of issues and military force is not used ... towards one another'. The 'hierarchy of issues' refers to cases where states are dependent on one another in multiple ways, in a simple (non-complex) system this would lead to one of these dependencies having a larger effect and being a possible cleavage to advance the other. In the complex model, this does not occur. Keohane and Nye stress that this is not a real-world model, but instead shows the extremities of interdependence theory. In such a system, whilst the states would have a role (although not military) it would be as part of a polycentric model. In such a model states are only one level in a complex system of overlapping agencies.

This can now be contrasted with the realist system. Depending on whether it is believed that the interdependence formed is due to co-operation or instead due to perceived mutual gains in an anarchic system, military interdependence can be used as part of a realist model. Notions of balances of power through alliances of collective security cement this opinion. Linked also to the realist model is the importance of the state as a core unit in international relations. There is a divergence produced when other levels of interdependence, such as economic interdependence and even environmental interdependence are looked at. The mechanisms governing these both seem to be clearly co-operative, such as trade organisations and also to an extent they are independent from state control. This therefore gives a mixed picture as to if interdependence has changed the political world from a realist model as some parts of the interdependence model were indeed part of the realist model defined as our benchmark. Further, it seems only those elements related to the other factor, globalisation, differentiate interdependence from the realist model, by giving it an economic level. This will be discussed again later.

To put these theoretical models into the real world, it is clear that the model of 'complex interdependence' does not occur. Perhaps some regions, such as within the Europe Union are approaching such a system, but globally it is not the case. In addition the importance of supra-national organisations, such as NATO, NAFTA and the old EC show that there is a clear move away from realist views of military interdependence, as the modern role of NATO (such as in Bosnia) has shown. What is constant is that poorer nations are more dependent on richer nations and would suffer more from ending of relationships. Such examples include the former colonies of the Empires which once spanned the world. There is not room here to go into detail of these interactions, but as tariffs are removed that once protected these relationships, these former colonies have slipped into deeper need of help. This core asymmetry that exists can be seen also in the realist model. In such a model this is due to military, rather than economic power, but in such cases strong economies is developing countries are often linked to strong military forces.

It has been hinted at that the rise of globalisation has caused much of the growth in economic interdependence. This complicates a study of their comparative effects on world politics. There is still a difference between economic interdependence and economic globalisation. Whilst they both do have roles for states (for example the municipality model within globalisation), the state in the interdependence model does possess some economic power in the ability to make trade agreements. States also use economics as one of the hierarchy of issues of dependence with other states (in the non-complex model) and so can exert power that in the realist model would be of a military kind, economically. Both systems suggest a lessening of military power and certainly a marked reduction in conflict between advanced states. Force is used, but not towards the objectives of the realist, but instead towards those of maintaining stability and enforcing international laws.

Before concluding on the role of these linked concepts in changes to world politics, other factors which could lead to such a transformation should be noted. The first of these is the development of non-governmental organisation (NGO's) outside the sphere of economics. Such organisations include Greenpeace, Amnesty and Oxfam. These groups apply pressure to those groups with power in order to achieve ideological goals. It is questionable as to whether they do in themselves have power (although some do have large budgets), other than that of persuasion. The importance of NGO's is that they highlight shared ideals and issues between people of different countries, moving perhaps to more liberal notions of a united world. The creation of a world culture that was identified under globalisation may also be shown here. Such a culture, as noted earlier, will lead to more effort towards peace and pressure against the use of military power as the international civil society is realised.

The next factor is one which many refer to as simply being MAD, mutually assured destruction. This relates to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a realisation that a major nuclear conflict would be futile because of the costs to all sides involved (and probably onlookers too). The cancelling out of military power through nuclear weapons between the advanced states removes a power that was pivotal to previous relations. States under these conditions need to seek other forms of power in order to show dominance, such as through economics, although they may need to compete or co-operate with business in order to do this. Nuclear proliferation could therefore have the effect of transforming world politics to one of peace where non-military cleavages are dominant.

In addition to these, the rise of terrorism in the name of ideology, nationalism or religious fundamentalism has transformed security issues that military powers are having to focus on. As was suggested earlier, these groups might form as a result of the inequalities left by globalisation and the lack of the spreading of the international civil society of some of these poorer states. This being said, technological advances give such groups increased strength and could force action that could change world politics.

In all, whilst not new concepts, globalisation and interdependence, particularly of the economic kind does seem to be transforming world politics. Both these concepts have become increasingly relevant in a way that does beg a 'chicken and egg' type question as to how they relate to peace among advanced states in modern times. The question is to the extent that these concepts forged this peace or whether peace is simply a catalyst for their success. If instead of globalisation, peace was produced by nuclear proliferation and MAD theory, then globalisation would simply be strengthening on the back of a larger change. This would make other factors more responsible for the 'transformation of world politics'.

Even accepting this point, the accomplishments of globalisation and interdependence go further than simply reduction in military power, such as in the redefining of the role of the state within international relations and the advent of international civil society. This must be qualified by suggesting that the effects of globalisation (and to an extent interdependence) are perhaps restricted to regions containing the most advanced states and in the weaker states, more realist interactions are occurring. Also, the extreme, advanced models of globalisation and interdependence are far from occur yet and although there are trends that can be observed, they do not suggest a complete end to the old state of affairs. There has therefore been a partial, but not complete transformation of world politics by the increased relevance of globalisation and interdependence.