4th November 1998

(3,571 words)

In what sense can Germany be said to be powerful within Europe?

The question as to what constitutes power must be central to this study. Whilst there does seem to be an intuitive definition as to what power is, a deeper analysis will be able to highlight more interesting features of state interaction. I believe that the best approach to the question therefore first discusses forms of power and then compares this to the practical case of Germany. A conclusion can then be used to show what kind of power is visible to be in action, if at all. These varying definitions of power correspond to varying approaches to international order, a point that should be noted. This means that some of the propositions put forward might be controversial to some international relations theorists.

It is perhaps interesting that much of the work of power relations which is applicable today was written in the 1970's, before the end of the Cold War. This is interesting because it might be assumed that during the Cold War, power could have been perceived as far less subtle than it might be seen today. Whilst there was without doubt a militaristic approach to power, other possibilities were also accepted at that time. It is some of these which I believe are most important in the German case as military force is limited.

Within all power theory, there is a notion that there are such things are coherent labelled actors, with specific interests who are carrying out their power on other such actors. I wish to question this notion and suggest that to characterise Germany as a unit for exerting power is a superficial interpretation for two reasons. Firstly, that German interests contradict one another, so it is hard to suggest what actions count as 'German power' and secondly that Germany does not seek to differentiate itself from its neighbours in many of its actions. By acting within supranational institutions it might not be exerting power. This second point does lead to questioning the German motives for participating in such organisations, as well as if they are simply exerting subtler forms of power.

Generally, what is power? It has already been eluded to that the definition of power that I wish to use incorporates the interests of the actor exerting the power. From this there are two general definitions of power. That of power being, 'the ability to cause another to do something it would not otherwise do, in your own interests' or of power being, 'the ability to shape outcomes in world events beneficial to your own interests'. Such ideas come from amalgamation of various models put forward by Baldwin and shall be used as a framework. There has also been a difference noted between the terms power and influence. I wish as Baldwin does, to use the two terms interchangeably. To justify this it is worth quoting Neaustadt out of context; influence can be the 'power to persuade', as such it is a form of power.

Another interesting distinction noted by Baldwin is the difference between power and strength. This is more than simply a linguistic point. The strength of an actor can exist independently of their power. Baldwin suggests that it is 'potential power', that strength is turned into power through intent and action. This distinction might allow when looking at Germany for a conclusion to suggest that although she is certainly strong, she is not necessarily powerful within Europe.

Rosemary Foot identifies three faces of power. These are briefly, power over resources, relational power and structural power. What is termed 'power over resources' is synonymous with the strength definition that I gave above, as it seems to be a passive measure of potential power. The other two faces are of greater interest in the differing forms that each can take. As has been already noted, I wish for this to be a study focused on power, rather than an analysis of recent trends in German history. So the form that it shall take will be with Germany supplying possible examples for the theoretical discussion. A conclusion will then be drawn reviewing what senses of power can be seen to be most appropriate to Germany and so answer the question in the title.

Relational or bargaining power is perhaps the most obvious use of the term in its active sense. This relates to how an actor is able to control another actor. In the realist world, these actors are states. There are various ways in which a state can gain a strong bargaining position, many related to their strength. Strength can come in different forms and strength in certain fields is perhaps not comparable to strength in other areas. The example cited for this is the United States, with a grand nuclear arsenal, yet unable to win a fight in the Vietnamese jungle. Baldwin stresses the importance of fungibility or adaptability of power resources, stressing that 'no power resource begins to approach the degree of fungibility of money'. Other obvious power sources include military power and strength, legitimacy and credibility of national leadership. With these strengths, states are able to threaten or bribe other states into doing as they wish, therefore using their power.

Post Cold War Germany is certainly economically strong. Its GDP is almost as great as the combined GDP's of Britain and France. This certainly suggests that there is potential for relational power to be exerted. There is, however, little evidence of this being the case. Relational power is often easy to spot as it is highlighted by short-term victories of one state changing their position as a result of outside input. This is not to say that Germany is oblivious to international events, but simply that the unilateral action that is implied in this form of power does not seem to be evident. Much of the bargaining that Germany does is within multilateral frameworks. This means there are multiple goals and interests meaning that concessions and victories are harder to spot.

Within NATO and the UN, partly due to her lack of seat in the UN's security council, the German bargaining position is far from overt. There was some notice of unwillingness to send troops to the Gulf War, but this was seen as largely an internal constitutional question. Because of fears inside and outside of Germany of a rise in her military and the historical memories that this provokes, much of German foreign policy is structured so as to move away from security areas. This is added to by the German Green movement of the last few decades, which has finally gained Federal government representation and so credibility. Ignoring domestic issues, a militarily strong Germany would not be accepted by the rest of the world, particularly those nations that fought her in two world wars. This means that when looking at German relational power the European Union, with a limited military agenda, is most useful.

Germany's involvement as a key player in the EU is due to a variety of reasons. One of these is the legitimisation of pursuit of German interests by diluting them within European structures and so avoiding a backlash against a strengthening German state. Other reasons are more social and will be discussed later. What is clear about German involvement is that as the economically strongest member, she is able to take a lead. Whether or not this amounts to a hegemony is unclear. The institutional mechanisms mean that Germany will not have voting rights which are proportional to her perceived strength, as she might deserve. Equally, there is no impression that Germany acts to corrupt the mechanisms and exert undue influence. Germany plays within the rules and there is no suggestion that she is calling the shots. The reason that Germany is taking the lead is because other states seem willing to follow. If this is an extension of soft or structural power will be discussed later. Germany bargains with her partners in a mutually beneficial way, there is give and take.

Germany, for example, during the early parts of the crisis in the Former Yugoslavia wished to recognise Slovenia and Croatia. Anderson and Goodman suggest that "[Germany's] display of foreign policy muscle pulled the EC in its wake". This would suggest relational power in a pretty pure form. More cynical observers didn't accept this and noted the coincidence of timing between the British government's successful negotiation of an opt-out from EMU at Maastricht (against German wishes) and the British change of heart to move towards the German position with regards to Slovenia and Croatia.

Whilst Germany is certainly given higher regard than a state such as Luxembourg, this is not for fear that she will impose sanctions on other states, or take her ball home and stop co-operating. Instead it is related to a respect that Germany gains. Interdependence means that if key players are stable, for example in European economics, others will benefit. It is therefore in the French interest to have a strong Germany to trade with. Also demographics means that if Europe is to be representative of the people, those countries which hold large proportions of the people should have a larger sway than smaller states. If this is an exercising of power, it is in a loose form, equal perhaps to suggestions that the South East of England is powerful over the Midlands. This is certainly a step away from the realist notions of relational or bargaining power.

The next form of power to look at is perhaps the most important in relation to modern ideas of international order. This is the notion of soft power as Joseph Nye describes it, or structural power in as distinguished by Foot. This is a subtler form of power and relates better to my second definition of power, namely, 'the ability to shape outcomes in world events beneficial to your own interests'. This is a less confrontational, more co-operative sense of the use of strength, and often less overt. It is associated with constructionist or international society models of international order. These models accept the importance of international institutions as being central to modern state interactions. Being able to manipulate or weight these institutions to your advantage can therefore aid the ability to 'shape outcomes in world events to be beneficial to you own interests'. Even further, by expressing state interest through such weighted institution, abiding by its (weighted) constitution and rules, the power that is able to be used is not only legitimate, but also less threatening to other states, who all agreed to these rules. This process of exerting soft power can go even deeper, into a socialisation of cultures in other states to fit your state's norms. This point is central to American power over its Western allies. They are not in fear of the US's army, or threatened by the possibility of economic isolationism by the US, they are instead bonded culturally. What is described as Western Capitalist culture is often simply an extension of US culture, slightly refined in Europe. It is an old arguing ploy that the beliefs that people hold strongest are those that they feel they have thought up themselves, not those thrust upon them. It is therefore the skill of the actor exerting this soft power to direct others towards following the path they wish, whilst making them feel they arrived there of their own accord. When this is done, the chosen path will be entrenched in their culture as their own idea.

Obviously spotting such acts is by their nature hard. Often, it could be argued, exertion of such power is not intentional, but a by-product of success resulting in copying by other states. This is especially the case with the use of soft power culturally. It is, however, still worthwhile to look at whether such power could be applied to Germany's actions within Europe.

Germany is certainly heavily committed to further political integration within the EU. A strong, open Europe signifies not only a market for German products, but also a trade bloc capable of competing with the US or Japan. Political integration further allows the removal of traditional state systems which had led to historical conflicts which harmed Germany. Germany is therefore a committed European state, she has been the driving force behind many of the measures which have increased the breadth and depth of the Union. For this reason, Germany was largely responsible for the building and designing of the institutions and structures of the EU, as well as for a great proportion of her funding. It is little surprise that many of the institutions have therefore been built in her image, or at least in ways that weight them towards German interests. This is not use or abuse of power, Britain for example wished to stay partially isolated from EU institutions and so would be expected to have a limited role in the creation of institutions which she might never enter. The reverse is true of the German position. The German position of being strongly in favour of integration results in institutions geared towards German interests. If this produces soft power it is simply a by-product, other states had the opportunity to act as Germany did or at least show disagreement by refusing to sign up to these structures.

One such institution which can be shown as being related to a German model is that of the European Central Bank, which will act to run monetary policy under EMU. Germany does not have overt powers in this bank, it has as many representatives as France, Italy, Spain, Finland and Holland on the board of the ECB and so an equal say in its decisions. The ECB is very much like the Bundesbank in structure. The targets that it is set to meet are similar to those of the Bundesbank as is its independence from political control. The Bundesbank was run for the benefit of German business, it can therefore be assumed that the policies that the ECB will follow would be similar to those that the Bundesbank would have taken, therefore advancing German interests. This fits within our definition of power, and is not necessarily to the harm of other states, but simply positively in the interests of Germany. Ironically, it may appear superficially that Germany has limited power in the ECB because her two votes in its council relate to a GDP almost eight times the size of Holland which also has two votes. Any power over this institution is therefore of a subtle nature.

Another issue which is thought to give structural power to Germany is that of EU enlargement. Enlargement would be to the north eastern states of Europe. Germany, centrally placed wishes to see the incorporation for security and trade reasons. Another benefit to Germany of such a move would be more soft power. Firstly, her links with states such as Hungary and Poland are greater than other states and so she would gain allies in bargaining and qualified majority votes. The second point is that the interests of these states would be more concurrent with Germany and other northern European states, so moving the balance further from the Mediterranean states of the Union. This structural difference would allow the EU agenda to be dominated by issues which are important to Germany. Again, whether this is a by-product or a motive for German help in the enlargement process is debatable. Much the same could also be said for the council of the regions. Germany's regions are politically more organised than others around Europe and so they could be placed at an advantage in such a body, but this is surely not the motive for its creation. Soft or structural power can therefore be identified, but it is questionable still as to how intentional it is.

The last perspective to look at is that which suggests that Germany is not powerful within Europe. This does not mean to suggest that this perspective suggests that Germany is weak, but instead that it could not be claimed that she is powerful. This is the argument which moves furthest away from realist conceptions, towards more liberal views of international order. In such a model, the importance of the state as a unit is diminished and so it is harder to suggest that it is the state exerting power. It might be actors within a state, but that cannot constitute the state's power. Also, such actors might contradict one another or have interest extending across national borders.

Such mechanisms are suggested primarily through globalisation of economics. It is unquestionable that German GDP is a strong, but to what extent can the national government use this potential power themselves?. The firms that are responsible for this GDP are independent of government, so whilst strong economics can cause increased tax revenues, there must be a limit to how much the government can claim economic success as a power resource. Many German companies are multinational, with capital and employees in other states. Culturally, it could also be claimed that these German based multinationals export work practises to other states, so suggesting a degree of soft power held by firms, not the government. Also, these firms interests appear to be often conflicting with what might be perceived to be the German national interest, or is the German national interest simply a summation of all individual interests within the state? Further, if one firm trades with Japan and another with the US, their interests could be different. In whose name is Germany using its power when it interacts with Japan or the US? This ambiguity suggests that the national interest, which was part of our definition of power is perhaps hard to identify in relation to Germany. This suggests that power, which does seem by all definitions to need a clear owner, cannot be attributed to Germany in this liberal model.

Another point to raise when looking at power theory is importance of variation in actor interests. Social changes and the Europeanisation of German society has meant that German people no longer see themselves as having their interests as being purely national. Germany is increasingly become a region of a greater Union and the people are beginning to feel affinity with Europe. This means that interests are increasingly defined at a supranational level, and so the demographics of what state certain people belong to is irrelevant as arguments are being fought according to ideological cleavages, not territorial or national ones. An example of such actions is in relation to environmental concerns. Indeed, through its drive for further political integration, the German government is acting as a catalyst for such changes. There is a realisation at a governmental level that some problems, such as immigration, organised crime and pollution need to be tackled in a combined way, removing notions of national sovereignty. In such fields analysis of national power becomes redundant.

In all, in the realist, military sense of power, Germany does seem to be limited. That power which it does have in these areas is by influencing, using other actors with strong militaries to act on the German behalf, such as by lobbying security council and leading NATO members. In other spheres too, whilst Germany does seem to have potential power sources and so strength, it does not seem to execute them as relational power. For this reason Kenneth Waltz identifies Germany as a possible new great power in post-Cold War multipolarism. Given the inclination it has capabilities of being powerful. This inclination does presently not appear to be there and the use of relational, bargaining power, particularly within Europe seems limited. Because of the complexities of the negotiations, it is hard often to identify. A more credible sense of German power would be that of soft or structural power, especially within the institutions of the European Union. As was discussed, this power might be a by-product of the German strong acceptance of the need for European integration, rather than a motive for it. The demographics of Germany also give it some advantages within the Union, but this is regionalisation in a representational democracy not Germany flexing her muscles. The factor of Germany's large proportion of funding to the EU also gives it some form of power, but it must be argued that other states could also gain this power source by contributing more.

The last issues raised were those of non-governmental interests and how these devalue discussion of power in realist terms and move towards a more liberal approach. There are cross-national interests and power sources, particularly money (Baldwin's most fungible power source) in the hands of non-governmental actors. This makes it hard to attribute power to Germany, even if it might reside in German territory. Similarly when the German government acts with other states for truly universal interests, power relations seem to disappear.

Germany can therefore be seen as powerful in a variety of senses within Europe. Particularly with regard to soft or structural power, but also in the sense that it does posses potential strength in the form of a thriving economy, that with the right inclination could be moved to relational or bargaining power. In liberal senses Germany has limited power, but under this liberal conception power as a notion of state relations is questioned and so is little reflection on Germany's place within Europe.