Is democratisation making international relations more peaceful?

Whilst there might be a distinct link between democracy and peace, this does not necessarily mean that democratisation will in any way entail peace. Indeed, if the conditions which lead to stable democracies also lead to peace between states, looking at democracies as causes might be distracting study from the real issues involved in maintaining peace. In order to justify notions that democratisation is making international relations more peaceful, causal links between the two must be established. Something to be investigated here is as to why democracies only appear peaceful in relation to other democracies, yet still fight with non-democratic nations. The causal links established must therefore differentiate willingness to act against different types of enemy regimes.

The above analysis must be focused on established, stable democracies. If the world was full of such nations and causal links established between such regimes and peace, it would become a tautology that international relations would become more peaceful. This ignores however the process suggested in the question, that of democratisation. Democracies do not come into existence in strong and stable forms straight from other kinds of regimes and the instability on the road to democratisation can indeed lead to more conflict. The study by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder will be used to illustrate this point. Further, democratisation does not even necessarily lead to successful establishment of democracies.

The last contention of this essay will be that democracy is a political luxury, that it will only be successful (i.e. take the form associated with 'democratic peace theory') if conditions allow. As a luxury, it will only be stable in times of economic strength, political consensus and perhaps peace. Conditions other than these would lead not only to conflict, but the end of the stable democratic system. This is an extension of the first point that democracies do not entail peace. Conditions necessary for democracies to survive could also be conditions which allow for peace between major states. These conditions mean that states will be less aggressive and so account for why democracies do fight non-democracies which they see as threats, yet other democracies do not pose such risks. For this reason, it might be better for President Clinton to have talked of working towards aiding the development of industry around the world leading to peace, rather that highlighting the need to aid democratisation. Further, it will be suggested, as it has been by Christopher Layne, that peace is leading to democratisation and that democratic peace theorists are therefore "looking through the wrong end of the telescope" .

Bruce Russett identifies various reasons why there should be a causal link as to why, "Democracies almost never fight each other" . He identifies two models for this, the 'cultural/normative' model and the 'structural/institutional' model. For each of these he suggests why they will not only cause democracies to fight infrequently, but also why there will still be frequent conflict between democracies and non-democracies.

The 'structural/institutional' model can claim the writings of Kant as part of its roots. Kant believed in a perpetual peace based partially upon states sharing "republican constitutions". His model of 'republican constitutions' contains many features similar to modern democracies. These included, political freedom, representative government with separation of powers as well as transnational ties, such as those of culture and commerce. There is great importance placed on public opinion and the reliance on it of politicians for their power. This means that they are more careful in entering to wars and are less likely to make rash decisions. A government that is representative of the people will be representative if those involved in conflict. It is far easier, perhaps, to send someone else into battle than to send yourself. For this reason democracies are often more hesitant about waging war and particularly in being aggressive. This is the first of the parts of the structural/institutional model.

The second part is due to the institutional 'checks and balances' which are typically present in stable democracies. These can be in the form of separated legislatures and judiciaries, adversarial oppositions or need to appease coalition partners. These institutional devices slow down and open up deliberations about conflict and so again avoid rashness and short-termism. Such systems are recognised between democratic states and so it is assumed that surprise attacks would be unlikely from other democracies; thus they pose a lesser threat. This contrasts with the strong autocratic executives of many non-democratic regimes, which are seen as not requiring legitimisation by other bodies and so are able to act more quickly and often (because of the lack of deliberation) more irrationally. The unpredictability of such states will account for wars by democratic states against non-democratic states.

There is a slight flaw in part of this model, in the shape of the patriotism that is often associated with military conflict. The result of control of media and other forms of propaganda allows public opinion to be shaped in order to support military action. Those dissenting could be seen as unpatriotic and as such, public opinion may be a limited check. To remove this flaw, it could be suggested that in the advanced forms of democracy that we are suggesting as peaceful, high degrees of information, education and freedom of expression would negate or at least reduce the power of propaganda.

The second model used by Russett is the 'cultural/normative' model. This model relates to the cosmopolitanisation of democratic societies which recognise that interests and moral values will be similar in other democracies. For this reason, they are more trusting of other democracies and seem more willing to work co-operatively to aid mutual interests, so adding to interdependence. The norms that they see within their systems are seen elsewhere and so there is less suspicion of other's actions. Instead they see other states' security dilemmas as being similar to their own and under the same restraints outlined in the 'structural/institutional' model above. From these cultural links, greater economic and political integration is able to occur between the states. Such integration and action including moves towards acceptance of mutual law, such as through supra-national judicial bodies, through extradition agreements, trade agreements or mutual security pacts. Such measures are not though unique as to always being between two democracies.

The ideological cohesion between the relative small number of democracies in the world perhaps allows for such socialisation between states, but this cohesion is not necessarily based on democratic principles. It might be conceivable that a democratic state could exist with a populace which has fundamental religious tendencies. The will of the people could be expressed democratically, yet might be radically different to other states. Cleavages that separate societal different groups would exist if these were expressed through democratic systems or other forms of rule. This would suggest that there could be motive or cause for democracies to fight one another. It is has been averted simply because the number of developed democracies and the time they have been in existence has been so limited that the case hasn't arisen yet. The creation of a democracy within an Arab state which opposes Israel could be a possible future example of this, as too could progressive conflicts between India and Pakistan.

Whether or Russett's models can been seen as true causal links is debated. Layne argues that for there to be a true causal link, not only must there be an empirical case that wars have not occurred between democratic states, but also that there has been no threat of war between democratic states. This leads to a notion that for a 'democratic peace' to be relevant, it must be shown that force is no longer used by democratic states against one another. Further he suggests that when there is tension between democracies with a threat of violence, it should be the considerations outlined in the two models above that prevent conflict, not more traditional realist notions of use of force in an anarchic international order. He studies four cases in which democratic great powers 'almost came to blows'; the Trent affair of 1861, the Venezuela crisis of 1895-6, the Fashoda crisis of 1898 and the Ruhr crisis of 1923. In each case he concludes that the considerations that prevented conflict aligned with traditional realist theory of conflict resolution, rather than the model of democratic peace theorists. These ranged from models of fear of other's military strength, such as in the Ruhr crisis, to fears of the actions of third parties in the event of conflict, such as Lincoln's fear of an opportunity being given to the Confederacy in the event of a clash with Britain during the Trent affair.

Cases such as the US civil war and the Great War of 1914 also suggest to Layne that democracies (although it is admitted the democracies in these cases were not stable, or necessarily legitimately called states) can go against the democratic peace theory constraints and enter into conflict. Sidelining the debates of appropriate definitions of 'democracy', this point is valid. It shows that imperfect forms of democratic systems can go to war with one another. This point will be now raised in depth when looking at Mansfield and Snyder's research into conflict involving 'democratising' states.

As the question asks at to whether 'democratisation is making international relations more peaceful', it is important to note the effects of the transition to the democratic model outlined above on international order. This is the focus of the study by Mansfield and Snyder which concludes that although stable democracies do not fight one another, those states in a transition towards democracy have a higher tendency for conflict than do regimes which are unchanged. This suggests that in the long term, a process of democratisation would lead to more peace, but this would be at the expense of short-term conflicts. Moves to democratisation are not always successful and so it must be noted that if this is the case, democratisation without the conditions necessarily to succeed could lead to long term as well as short term conflicts.

A brief explanation of why such transitions to democracy can lead to conflict is therefore necessary. The institutions and structures accredited by Russett to being responsible for the democratic peace do not appear immediately and if constitutions are drawn up, it takes time to adapt them and build the institutions around them. In this period the state is lacking both the checks and balances of democracy and the discipline of autocratic rule. The result of this is various groups competing for power, using what ever forces are available to them, each claiming some legitimacy. This could include, perhaps, the former leaders who might fear punishment for their previous actions and so use state institutions to protect their positions. This internal instability allows for other states to see advantages in conflict, according to realist theory, especially in regions where there has been a widespread breakdown in autocratic rule, such as currently in the former Soviet states. Another factor that can cause wars in these states is that in order to galvanise support for a new administration, the emotions of patriotism can be used to unite a state behind a war effort. Also, there would be citizens not used to voting and the extremist backlash expected to follow the fall of a regime. This would lead to the "short-run thinking and reckless policymaking that lead to war" in the administration elected.

If a previous state was help together by a non-democratic regime which led peoples of various nations, the collapse of such regimes can cause a rise in nationalists tensions within states. This is even more evident if it appears that a particular group would be likely to have a clear minority and so a small democratic voice. The de facto disenfranchisement of minority groups within a democracy would be expected to lead to conflict in states with high ethnicity. Whilst issues of self-determination might lead to some new states being created peacefully, the mixing of populations under the previous state would mean that conflict would be highly likely. Neighbouring states might even get involved in support of national groups which have communities in their states.

These points to seem equally to apply to any states which are in transition, not necessarily always to democracy. This view is supported by the empirical data that is produced by Mansfield and Snyder, but for this study their findings on democratisation will be focused on. Looking at all kinds of conflicts, their results showed that "democratising states were, on average, about 60 percent more likely to go to war than states that were not democratising" . These figures varied according to which of the key aspects of democracy were prevalent in the democratising state. For example based on competitiveness of political participation, states became 75 percent more likely to be involved in conflict. The results also highlighted that for states undergoing changes towards autocratic rule, the probability of conflict was higher than in states with no regime change. This supports the link noted above.

These findings do not mean that all transitions to democracy will necessarily lead to conflict. The cases of post-Second World War Germany and Japan highlight this. What is clear from the research is that the transition can be made more peaceful by various measures. These include economic aid to prop up an economy and the issuing of 'golden parachutes' which allow former leaders to give up power without the risk of being made accountable for previous actions. As was apparently the case with General Pinochet in Chile. Too much foreign intervention could catalyse a nationalistic force within a state, so making policy towards such states difficult. These nationalistic forces are important. It has been noted that of the former Soviet states, those states that have moved the furthest and most peacefully towards democracy have been the less nationalistic ones.

An important note must be mentioned regarding democratising states. It seems clear that certainly Russia and possibly eventually China, both with nuclear capabilities, are embarking on a path towards democracy. Conflicts that could occur as they are democratising might not only make international relations less peaceful, but could draw an end all to international relations. For this reason a policy of encouraging democratisation must be applied with the safeguards to prevent the instabilities identified by Mansfield and Snyder.

The last issue to discuss is whether democratic peace theorists are indeed 'looking through the wrong end of the telescope'; if conflict can lead to conditions in which democracy cannot survive. Certainly not all states on the path to democracy succeed. Also, success in conflict is often based on the ability to make quick decisions and have control over all the instruments for mobilising national power resources. Such features go against the institutions discussed above as being part of democracies. This would suggest that under threat, democracies would fair worse than other regimes and so it might be expected that democracy could not survive in states under perpetual threat. An example of this could be seen in the age of the British War Cabinet which changed the governmental institutions during WW2 to concentrate hands in an extended executive and dilute many of the democratic structures of Britain. The US constitution gives the President similar powers to democratically remove democracy in times of crisis. Indeed, such constitutional actions were used by Hitler to create a dictatorship using the democratic constitution of the Weimar Republic. The survival of democracy in Israel perhaps refutes this claim, but this might be pinned to the nationalistic cohesion within Israel as well as conscription which instils a military dimension to citizens and so voters.

Conversely, there are conditions that are produced by peace. These include economic growth and stability and the ability to spend less on militaries and so more on increasing welfare and education of the populace. This can aid democracy. Post-war Germany and Japan are examples of this. Emphasis on economic strength allowed democratic systems to become entrenched. For this reason, democracy seemingly becomes a luxury of peaceful, prosperous states and it is hard to see being as successful if applied to states with security concerns. For this reason, the question could be answered that rather than democratisation making international relations more peaceful, instead, peace is leading to more democratisation.

In all, the empirical research showing that democracies do not go to war with one another gives a strong case for suggesting in a world full of democracies, at the end of a stage of democratisation, there would be no wars. This claim is reliant on the forms of democracy that develop from this democratisation process conforming to certain conditions. More importantly, this claim is reliant on democracy truly being a cause of this peace, and that other more central factors, such as economic interdependence are not responsible of the link. There have been attempts to do this, but as Layne suggests, by testing these as to whether they are the real reasons behind resolution of conflicts between democracies historically, they are proved to be false. He suggests a more realist explanation fits in, concerns which make policy appear independent of democratic concerns.

The research of Mansfield and Snyder shows that states going through democratisation will in fact be less peaceful than those not changing in regime. This therefore suggests that democratisation is not 'making' more peaceful international relations, but instead is leading towards more peaceful international relations.

The inability of some states to achieve democracy also suggests the last point, that conditions are required for stable, developed democracy to survive. These conditions might include peace itself. Some cleavages between states, such as ideology, might by so strong that conflict will occur no matter what regime is in control and this conflict prevents the stability and social consensus required for the luxury of democracy

Whilst there does perhaps seem to be increased peace between democratised states, it does not follow that democracy is making this peace, or that the transition towards democracy for others will be peaceful.