What significant differences do federal arrangements make for
political decision making to a national polity?

The question of federal compared to unitary government seems to be one of a simple trade-off. This is between the accountability and responsiveness to an electorate of having the governing institutions operating over a smaller constituency, compared to the economies and advantages of larger scale infrastructure, especially in a world with developed communications. This trade-off has resulted in federal systems which are more or less centralised. There is also a whole range of systems which range from unitary states, through to confederations, through to outright federations. These systems are not clearly distinguishable as shall be discussed later, even in the most unitary of states, such as the UK in the 1980's there was some degree of powers held by elected institutions away from the centre. There are some common attributes that can be seen in federal systems and so these shall be focused on.

The cases to look at in particular are those of the US and Germany. These cases are extremely different to one another in the way that federalism is operated, reflected in the effect that the federal nature of the states has on the federal governments. Both do, however, have a central common feature. This is the lack of ability of the federal government to remove or change the states (or Länder) without their consent. There is also, in both cases representation of the states in the second chamber of a bicameral legislature, although, as shall be discussed, these are different in the two cases. What is common is that it is expected that this place in the legislature will act as a further check on the powers of government. This gives a further dimension to checks such as separation of power between executive and judiciary and executive and legislature (the later only in the case of the US). This will therefore force the federal government, which in terms of the trade-off stated at the start of this discussion is looking towards the advantages of large-scale, to be checked by the more localised needs of the states. For this reason it can almost be assumed, but will nevertheless be discussed, that the central effect of federal arrangements on a national polity will be to force them to be responsive to more localised interests than might be the case in a unitary state. Such a point can be dismissed by suggesting that all politics is local, that in order to win power in central government, you have to appeal to voters who will be part of these states. What is being missed is that often certain region's interests can be ignored if it is possible to gain a majority by doing so. Such a problem is not negated by federalism, but they are at least blunted by representation of states in the federal legislatures.

Away from the German Bundesrat and the US Senate, there are also other important aspects that cannot be ignored in a federal system which will have an impact on federal government. Not only is the federal government constrained by the states in the legislatures, but they can also be constrained by the need to work with state governments. This point must be addressed, as there are competing sites of power within countries which are no seen so strong constitutionally in unitary states. Another important point to note is the effect of state level politics on national politics. This is not only a matter of setting an agenda or in its direct interactions with the federal branches, but also its effect on changing the nature of national government institutions. An example of such an area is to do with political parties and how they relate over the two levels. In addition to this, there is also the role of state governments in being the initiators or pilots of projects that are later copied by federal governments. There is also the role of state governments as the nursery for federal leaders. For example, they allow them to gain experience of government even in periods when their party is in exile at federal level.

The first area to look at is that of the most direct impact that the states have on the national polity in the US and Germany. This is in the second chamber of the legislatures, the Senate and the Bundesrat. Although they are vastly different in their workings and appointments, it is nevertheless worthwhile discussing them together, whilst acknowledging their differences.

The most important difference between the Bundesrat and Senate is how representatives find their way there. In the US, each state has two Senators elected as individuals by the people. This representation ignores any sense of proportionality. This brings the anomaly that one voter in Vermont seems to have the power of sixty-six in California. Senators will have party ties but will be independent of any state government mandates. They are free to vote on their conscience. The only constraint to act for their state's interest is that this is where their electoral mandate is and so the chances of re-election (although the incumbency culture does limit the force of this constraint). There is also no obligation for the two Senators from the same state to act together or to be of the same party. This being said, the reality is that most votes in the Senate are won unanimously and voter alignments do mean that most states do return Senators of the same party.

This analysis is in stark contrast to the members of the Bundesrat. Vitally, the Bundesrat members are not elected directly by the people, but are instead representatives of their particular Land governments. Many see them as administrators who will vote as instructed by those back in their Land. There is also an element of proportionality in the representation of Länder. This does not mean that there is in fact proportionality, as the smaller states do still benefit from the arrangements. The large states, such as Bavaria and Lower Saxony each have six seats, compared to the smaller states such as the Saarland having three. In addition to this, as was hinted at earlier, Land votes in the Bundesrat must be cast as a block, so negating the views of the individual members as well as opposition parties within Länder legislatures. Another interesting point about this will be referred to later, but the importance of coalition government at Land level often means that there is little radical action taken in this chamber. If there is no agreement between coalition partners as to how to cast their votes, the representatives will be forced to abstain in the Bundesrat. The comparative point to be made about these two chambers is that the Senate is a body of people representing what they see as the interests of enough individuals in their state to allow them a majority, compared to the Bundesrat as a body representative of Land governments.

Before applying these features to national policy making, it is important to note also the abilities of these chambers in such areas. In the US, the Senate is a chamber that is equal to the House of Representatives. Their consent is required for any legislation to become law and their committees often do parallel jobs to their House counterparts. The importance of the differentiation between the House and Senate is that disproportionality allows the smaller states to be given a voice in the legislature. In the representative House, the 'tyranny of the majority' would allow such voices, which are central to US political culture, to be ignored. It could be argued that having smaller constituencies, the House of Representatives seems to be more catered to serving localised interests, but again, this would be to ignore the strong identity of states as important political units.

The powers of the Senate contrasts with the Bundesrat which only has powers in areas prescribed by the Basic Law. These are those which are seen of being in the direct interests of the Länder. On these measures they are able to have a veto over legislation. In other areas, if the Bundesrat refuses legislation it is simply sent back to the Bundestag to be overruled. This gives overall power to the representative chamber, and because this is controlled by the executive, the power balance is strongly in favour of the federal government. This does not, however, allow the second chamber to be ignored, but instead it is dealt with by agreement in the framing of the legislation.

Before addressing the impact of these second chambers it is worth again stating that it would be ridiculous to suggest that the national interest would always be in conflict with local interests. The national interest must be seen as a the sum of local interests. For this reason, state interactions can often be seen as complimentary to national policy making as they are able to express the practical needs and difficulties which are often removed and distant from central government.

The first role of these second chambers is simply as a traditional check on the power of other institutions in government. This is comparable to the role of the House of Lords in Britain. This acts to put legislation under further scrutiny and analysis under a system of separated powers. The limit to this separation of powers is tied largely to how independent members of this chamber are from party structures. Such party loyalties can negate loyalty to state units and with the added confusion of election mandates, it is easy to justify whatever action is taken. In the US and Germany these party ties are quite different.

It is generally assumed that in Germany, partly because of the consistency of cleavages across a relatively small area, party ties are strong. This does seem to be the case. In the period 1969-82, under a SPD-FDP Bundestag (and so executive) and a CDU Bundesrat the 'Committee of Mediation' (the body that mediates disputes between the chambers) was called 213 times by the Bundesrat. This contrast with the period 1982-91, with the CDU dominant in both chambers, when the committee was called only six times. There are, however, some constraints on this partisan behaviour. These constraints are largely due to coalition partnerships at Land level. This has been confused since the precedent set by the national grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and SPD between 1966 and 69. Following this almost any combination of partnerships could be expected, with no seeming link between alliances at national and Land level. This means that although it might appear that a party is dominant in the Bundesrat (because their party is in government in Land governments), the coalitions that they are in mean that they cannot deploy their block vote along party lines.

This partisanship contrasts with what Polsby calls a system operating with "100 state parties flying two banners" in the US. Split-party government is seen to be as productive as single-party government and so votes in Congress are seen to be won in regional issues of interests, with only a tinge of partisanship. It must be said that such arguments do seem to be the case in the House as well as in the Senate, with the difference being that the longer terms given to Senators allow them to be less responsive often to their electors than are those in the House. This lack of partisanship is of course understandable. The size of the US and defined regional diversity which is lacking somewhat in Germany means that it would be impossible for two parties to adequately represent the people and have consistent policies and discipline. This, however, is not a point to be made about federalism, but instead one of governing such a huge nation from one centre.

The next important aspect to look at is the power that State/Land governments are able to have on Federal government. In the German case this is represented partly in the role of the Bundesrat, a feature that cannot be said of the US Senate. State governments have various cleavages that they can use against central government, including that of the judiciary. Because both these countries are formed around strong written constitutions, clearly allocating the rights of the different institutions within, it is necessary for a strong judiciary to mediate disputes between tiers of government. The 'dual sovereignty' model of the US is especially prone to this, as often state and federal institutions are competing for competence in certain areas. This dispute is less defined in Germany because much of the administration and implementation of federal legislation is given to the Länder to carry out. This entanglement of the German institutions allows jurisdictions to be worked out in the framing of legislative initiatives which, because of the need of support in implementation, require consultation at earlier levels. Because this essay is looking at the effect on national policy decisions, rather than the effect of federal government on state politics, it is worth noting, but not discussing the various cleavages that central government has over states, such as with relation to funding for communications or other joint projects. The ability of states to challenge the use of Federal powers though the courts in important, however. This means that central governments have to be more cautious in extending their powers than they might in a unitary state such as the UK where parliamentary sovereignty is absolute. In Germany, cases brought to the Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, by Land governments are often successful, giving a further explanation for the lack of radicalism in German policy. As with many things, the defining moment in this relationship in the US came with the New Deal era of FDR. The Supreme Court eventually allowed through the measures which seemed to give greater powers to the Federal government to organise initiatives, particularly in the area of welfare. By allowing such initiatives, there was a precedent set for the ability of federal government to act in more controversial areas, even in a system of perceived dual sovereignty.

As stated earlier, there are more subtle ways in which federal arrangements have an effect on national politics. The first of these is seen in the importance of state politics are being an indicator of changing politics at national level (which must be seen as a summation of regional politics). In Germany, every change in federal electoral fortune has been pre-empted by changes at Land level. The Green party which finally gained Federal power in 1998 had built their reputation and experience of government in Lander governments. The importance of this is that often regional polls are held at different times to national polls, so giving a credible indicator of the mood towards national politics outside the period of electioneering. In addition to this, in Germany, state elections are often fought on national issues. This is greatly due to the strength of the party system, although, as was suggested earlier, this can often be muted when there are strong local issues involved. Such events at local level can therefore be a trigger to encourage national level governments to act in different ways.

It is also interesting to see the amount of federal politicians who cut their teeth in state/land politics. In Germany for example four of seven Chancellors had previously been Ministerpräsident of Länder. Although, because of the sense of 'working through party ranks' is lacking in US politics, such a relationship is somewhat lacking, there are some important advantages for such action. The first of these is that it shows competence in government and experience. This would be lacking for those that move straight from Hollywood into the White House. Being a success at state level can be a strong election platform, something that is thought to be being built upon by George W Bush at the moment as Governor of Texas. What does seem clear, is that when someone has experience in state politics it gives them a different perspective when in federal government which gives them greater empathy with the interests of those at state level. This will therefore change decisions being made at federal level as even without institutional constraints, the importance of the states in a federation will be prioritised in the federal executive.

The last point to make is largely speculative. This is in relation to British federalism. Federalism in the UK can be seen in two directions. The first of these is in relation to Europe. The EU has a legislature, a judiciary and in the commission, seemingly an executive. Further, for large areas of Europe there is a single-currency, which the UK seems likely to join. For these reasons it does seem rather crude that any suggestions that the EU is verging on being a federal entity are scorned upon. In such a federation, the constraints on the 'national polity' is strongly to do with the strong cohesion within states, based around nationalism and language. These are coupled to differences of economic interests, but essentially nationalism is the greatest cleavage. Compared to other countries, the EU (as a country) is extremely limited in its scope for radical policy, but with increased communications there does seem to be little reason why it could not be expected that in the future a US model of federalism, based around states with strong identities could occur.

The second direction of UK federalism relates to devolution of Scotland and Wales. There is a clear difference between the Scottish parliament and say that of California; Scotland does not have sovereignty. In theory, the Westminster Parliament can recall any powers that it cedes to the regions. In reality, this is unlikely and so it would be expected that Scottish politicians would have the ability to force the courts to decide on areas in which they believed that Westminster was intervening in their jurisdiction. This would to an extent constrain government, if only to the extent that it would slow down legislation as it was scrutinised by lawyers to make sure that it would be exempt from statutes relating to the devolved parliaments. It could also be said that without the creation of an English parliament, it could never be said that Westminster would be acting as the Federal government among states. Added to this, the amount of cohesion of interests between regions of the UK as well as movement of people means that state identities would be somewhat lacking except in superficial terms.

In all, it is clear that in having as part of the federal institutions a greater say for people with more specific regional interests, there will have to be a change in the constraints on decision making. There are also capabilities for power to be held away from central government, which if harnessed can have a great effect. Whilst party cohesion and other issues can dent this effect, by focusing government to units such as states, identities can form which can compete with the national identity. For the two cases begin compared it is clear that federalism is stronger in the US. This is largely to do with identity of states, compared with the more nominal units which were the product of Allied intervention in post-war Germany. If nothing else, federalism gives another direction from which legislation and federal activity can be scrutinised.