![]() On this page, we discuss capabilities and patterns for
managing crisis.
![]() The foot and mouth crisis illustrates some important distinctions - between primary and secondary and between real, perceived and formal. [our approach - consultancy services] [routes into crisis: the scale of failure] [no crisis on January 1st?] [failure becoming visible] [management overloaded by events] [when to declare a crisis] [recommendations] [risk broker] [risk management]
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crisis management: containing failure
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Crisis and Sensemakingveryard projects > programme management > crisis management > sensemaking |
Simple polarization appears to help us cope -- but ultimately reduces our ability to engage adequately with the world.
Against the background of the appalling events in Manhattan and Washington, there is a predictable narrowing of vision and sense-making. Someone posted a message to the Complex-M list (supposedly a forum for complexity thinking) in starkly political language. He spoke of "terrible resolve", "coalescing of people", "focus sharply defined", and "we can unite in that objective". At the same time, there have been some real surprises - for those whose receptiveness to surprise has not already been overwhelmed.
Simple | Complex |
Instant categories and divisions
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Realignment of Friend and Foe |
Grasping at simple explanations | Reflection of repeated patterns |
Grasping at simple solutions | Reflection of interconnected outcomes |
Most people have difficulty tolerating complexity at the best of times. In times of great crisis, even this level of tolerance is reduced. There is a vital role for wise counsel, and we have a duty to foster this if we can.
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Sometimes people deny that there is a crisis. A company on the verge of bankruptcy may claim to be perfectly solvent, a company facing allegations or threats of product contamination may claim that there is no real risk. Or the crisis remains undetected - like an undiagnosed cancer.
Sometimes people are too quick to claim that there is a crisis. They perceive one or two incidents, and imagine the worst. Or they predict a crisis, as a motivator for action. (When the crisis doesn't materialize - consider for example the widely predicted Year 2000 meltdown - then this might be thought to justify all the effort that went into avoiding the crisis - or then again it might not.)
Sometimes a perceived crisis can cause a real crisis - like a run on a bank, or a stock price adjustment.
Sometimes Goverments or companies are much too quick to declare that the situation is back to normal. This is because policies and rules, or expectations of proper conduct, on which normal governance depends, may be suspended during a crisis. Junior officials can get away with all sorts of things that wouldn't normally be authorized - and use the crisis as an excuse.
At the other extreme, a formal crisis can continue for years, in a kind of stalemate, while people get on with their lives. Think of the Lebanon, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, the Balkans, ... the list is far too long.
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Disaster | A major accident or other event, preventing normal business and demanding an immediate response. |
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Slide | A gradually worsening situation, in which normal business is becoming increasingly difficult. |
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Swarm | A large number of small failures occurring at the same time, causing normal defences and responses to be overloaded. |
Failure. Crisis and catastrophe are examples of the dialectical principle of quantity becoming quality. In other words, when something reaches a certain size, it become different in kind. Crisis refers to some scale of failure. Failure represents a mismatch between intention and (perceived) outcome.
The threshold of crisis. This is the point at which normal operations and capabilities are overloaded - will vary according to the resilience of the organization. Resilience is a particular kind of capability, dependent upon resources and resourcefulness, and is closely related to resistance.
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One reason for justifiable concern was in the possible aggregate effect of lots of multiple failures - the swarm effect. Let's look at an example.
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In a typical organization, we can identify a number of existing mechanisms, mostly informal and undocumented, that cope with such disruptions. Many of these disruptions are typically handled locally and ad hoc.
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and in an extreme scenario, possibly leading to
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In other words, although systems may fail at any time, Year 2000 could have caused a swarm of failures, overwhelming normal operational responses and management capability.
If more than one of these events occurs simultaneously, the existing crisis management capability will be seriously overloaded. But it's not just Year 2000 that can trigger a swarm of failures.
An important part of general planning is to check that you have the management capability to cope with a swarm of failures.
Scaleability of response. If one fridge breaks down, then the store manager phones the support hotline. If a thousand fridges break down at the same time, then it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a thousand store managers to phone the support hotline. In other words, you cannot just multiply the response by a thousand. This raises the question: how to define the threshold for a coordinated response. How many fridges makes a crisis: ten fridges, fifty fridges? When does fridge repair become a responsibility of the crisis management team? When an organization is under pressure, it may become more vulnerable to crisis. Just as people are more prone to disease when they are tired, stressed or miserable, so the resilience of organizations may be reduced by various temporary factors as well as by permanent weakness.
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It is also expected that some systems will fail on February 29th 2000, because many software engineers seem to have misunderstood the rules about leap years.
However, unless a computer system fails spectacularly, we don't always
detect it straightaway. If software failure results in data being lost
or corrupted, or in normal security controls being bypassed, this may not
be detected for some time.
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Existing management capability seriously overloaded. |
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Crisis events also affect major competitors. Competitors race for restoration of normal business. |
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Urgent demands on the same scarce resources (such as equipment suppliers or backup power supplies). |
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Local ad hoc responses insufficient. A coordinated and planned response will be required. |
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Considerable media attention. For a large organization, broadcast media may provide the most effective way to communicate rapidly with customers and staff. Integrated PR response required. |
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combine
contingency planning with crisis mgt |
Do we concentrate on contingency planning - analysing the risks
and identifying responsibilities and responses?
Or do we concentrate on creating the management capability to handle unforeseen events and combinations of events? There needs to be an appropriate balance between these two activities. The same people should be involved in both, but in different roles. |
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replace
defensive planning with managed response |
Risk and crisis often provokes defensive activity within large organizations.
There are several patterns of response to risk that could be called defensive.
These defensive patterns may be contrasted with a properly managed response. |
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