Primal Pain and Narcissism
Frederick M Farrar
The Simple Needs
I have argued elsewhere1 that primal theory adds something to the experience of primal therapy which is not implicit in primal pain. I would like here to illustrate how this can be seen in attitudes towards everyday life.
In traditional primal theory as formulated by Arthur Janov2 the basis of all human development is the “real” self. This entity is described as a coherent psychological unity where mind and body are as one. Janov has often described the real person as someone who thinks what she feels and feels what she thinks. As Janov deepens his description of the real self, he points out that it is a needing self whose needs are basically simple - to be fed, kept warm, and to be allowed to be what it actually is at any given stage of development. He gives a very thorough picture of this self, including its physical and emotional needs together with its neurological organisation and structure. There can be no question but that Janov strives to maintain a model of the real self which is consistent with current scientific knowledge. Nor can there be any doubt as to the depth of compassion which underlies Janov’s work.
The Mind-Body Problem, Individualism and the Real Self
Janov’s compassion and integrity notwithstanding, I believe his view to suffer a flaw not found in the theoretical work of his predecessors the Gestalt therapists3. Whereas the Gestaltists emphasise the organism-environment field as the primary analytical unity, Janov emphasises the unity of mind and body. Because the unity of mind and body is, for the Gestaltists, a function within the organism-environment field, I believe their view to be more comprehensive than Janov’s.
This is not to undermine Janov’s discovery of primal pain, but to address some of the problems which arise out of his limited theoretical stance. The emphasis in Janov’s writings is very definitely upon the individual and her need for self-determination. But without the overarching framework of the organism-environment field, this emphasis leads to the coalescence of individualistic social values which direct the self in that particular direction, with corresponding consequences.
Primal Man as a Utopian Abstraction
In Janov’s philosophy, and I insist that he does propound a philosophy, this individualism masquerades as “natural” man. Natural, or primal man is a feeling person. He is a person who, having no buried primal pain to distort his behaviour, is basically peaceful and sensitive. He is naturally kind and wishes no harm to others. He feels the richness of his world and responds to that with love and compassion. He enjoys and appreciates natural beauty and would do nothing to spoil it. His sexuality and gender are simple and straightforward, because his feelings are simple and straightforward. He does not suffer envy or jealousy, because he feels his own needs and fulfills them himself. Or so the story, which purports to merely describe the real man produced by primal therapy, goes.
The most obvious problem, it seems to me, with this description of primal man, is that he appears to live in a cocoon, the cocoon of his own individuality. It’s as if Janov takes the unconditioned, potential human being as his model of the normal self, the nearest practical example of this unconditioned potentiality being the post-primal person, still focused very strongly on the simplicity and supportive nature of the therapeutic environment. In this environment there is a close fit between it and the undivided self.
But in the general environment life is, of course, not like that. In this environment the feeling self reveals very quickly just how divisible it still is. For despite Janov’s clearly utopian standpoint there still remains the problem of how to get from this actual world to the desired one. We may all feel that the world could and should be a better place. But we all differ as to how to go about creating it. And because of this it is inevitable that we will repeatedly create or discover conflicts of feeling throughout our lives. Janov’s utopian primal man is utopian precisely because he is postulated as being isolated from these conflicts rather than embedded in them. His view is thus profoundly unrealistic, which, given that it purports to be the view of the real self, is poignantly ironic. It also demonstrates in the clearest possible manner the way in which primal theory conditions post-primal experience.
The conception of the primal person as the primary unity rather than the organism-environment relationship is based on the perception of a person as an abstraction from that relationship. As such it is an erroneous perception which leads to an erroneous concept, which leads to an erroneous theory.
Civilization (and one of its discontents)
For Janov the evolution of man and civilisation, and the evolution of neurosis, are synonymous:
“I have said above that it is my belief that one of the major factors in the evolution of the third line, of man’s neocortex, is Pain... I believe that man grew around his inevitable Pain; that he developed a higher cortex to handle that Pain and symbolise it.
It is Pain which has caused convoluted behaviour in man’s life, which, over time may have literally convoluted the brain. I an suggesting that we have needed much of the neocortex to handle [Pain] overloads; and because lower-line systems [of consciousness] are quite vulnerable, we seem to have produced a higher cortex to reroute all that inner pressure. In that sense it takes much more to overload the third-line because it expanded, literally, to handle and cope with life...
What brought on all that Pain for man? Adversity, scarcity, social organisation, changes in the earth’s structure and climate; many, many factors. The very fact of social organisation means to defer oneself for the good of the whole. It means hierarchies, control and authority. It means specialisation and narrowing of one’s interest and sphere of influence. It means exploitation... When I visualise the neocortex I see an intricately convoluted series of folds encased in a narrow box. It seems ‘unnatural’ to me to have such a great amount of structure for so little space; and I believe that it is largely Pain which has constantly activated the brain to develop more and more cortex to handle it.”4
Unless Janov is simply restating standard Darwinian evolutionary theory, which is hardly likely, then it seems he is suggesting here that the evolutionary complexification of human consciousness is essentially a neurotic adaptation. But his idea that convoluted behaviour may have led to a convoluted brain is silly. The convolutions of the neocortex increase the area and number of neurons within the confined space of the skull cavity, a space which must remain confined due to the limitations of the birth process. The resulting increased conceptual capacity confers massively increased adaptability upon human beings by permitting post-natal learning and cultural creativity. This alone amply explains the convoluted expansion of the neocortex, and is no less “natural” than the convolution of the lung tissues which increased the capacity for oxygen absorption and thus increased the mobility of animals millions of years ago.
More worrying still is Janov’s attitude towards social organisation which he sees as “deferring oneself to the whole” and “creating hierarchies, control and authority”, all of which “involve an outside power coercing people into certain modes of behaviour” and “contravene the principle of self-determination”.5
Where does Janov get this notion of social organisation as an “outside power” from? He gets it from his misrepresentation of the human organism as the primary unity rather than the organism-environment relationship. Seen from this point of view the environment is a coercive force acting upon the individual. But this doesn’t merely apply to social institutions; it applies to the whole external environment. One’s friends and associates are no less external than hierarchical organisations. Similarly, hierarchical organisation, control, and authority, are not features unique to social institutions but to social life in general. There can be few hierarchies more rigid and controlling than the pecking orders of the animal kingdom. Few social institutions exercise control with the vigour or brutality of a dominant antelope in a seasonal rut. And surely this is precisely the type of setting to examine the real self, that is, in its involvement with the real world, not in its abstract, detached potential.
The Self in the World
The real self in potentia no doubt does lack aggressive drives and so on. In fact Buddhism goes further, saying that it lacks inherent existence all together. But the real self in action must surely reflect the conditions with which it is in contact. How does the real self deal with stress? How does it deal with inner conflict? How does it cope with unforeseen consequences of its own decisions? How does it deal with strategic conflicts where one person’s interests have to be balanced against another’s? This is the really difficult though commonplace subject matter which Janov barely touches upon, and when he does frequently contradicts himself.
Consider for instance the notion that social organisation means deferring oneself for the good of the whole. It is a highly manipulative statement premised on the assumption that the individual is not included in the whole. As soon as one includes oneself in the whole then acting for the good of the whole means acting for the good of oneself, as well as others; at which point Janovs argument collapses. It is obvious that some social organisations exclude some individuals, but Janov’s point is a general one pertaining to all social organisation. In this respect his view is vulnerable to a Freudian critique which identifies it and similar views as expressions of narcissistic yearning for the pre-differentiated, pre-egoic phase of life-experience associated with the womb and early infancy. This latter Freudian, or neo-Freudian view, is well worth studying as it throws a different light on infant experience to that cast by traditional primal theory.
Narcissistic Wishing
Primal theory understandably concentrates a great deal of attention on primal pain in infant and foetal experience, whereas Freudian and neo-Freudian studies pay particular attention to the characteristics of normal infant and foetal experience. Most Freudians accept that foetal experience consists of a stream of experiential awareness which is not differentiated by the perception of self or other. This blissful, undisturbed pre-egoic unity carries on into infancy for some time. When the infant cries for food, say, and receives food through the attentions of its mother, it does not see its mother as a separate entity to itself, or as having a will of her own. It perceives the whole situation as responding to its own actions. This creates an illusory sense of omnipotence within the infant’s emerging ego. When reality begins to disabuse the infant of this illusion it tends to cling to its old view. After all, for quite a while it has enjoyed the unique experience of being able to achieve satisfaction merely by calling out. Try to imagine the sense of power involved in this, which is especially palpable when it begins to wane. This clinging onto the omnipotence of the pre-egoic self is known by Freudians as primary narcissism. It is self-love in the context of the whole world having previously been immersed in the self. And there is certainly an ambience redolent of this detectable in Janov’s expressed view on civilization and social organisation.6
A New Synthesis
It is easy to see how the Freudian theory of narcissistic clinging could obscure the presence of primal pain in infancy. But it is equally easy to see how an exclusive primal theory of unconsciousness as primal pain could obscure the presence of narcissistic clinging. The only way to resolve this problem is to incorporate both possibilities in a more comprehensive theory, something which Janov has consistently resisted from the beginning. The problem with Janov’s exclusive form of primal theory is that if narcissistic wishes are authentic psychological phenomena, then his theory makes it almost a certainty that they would be conceived by primal people as primal pain, that is to say, as the pain of not being allowed to be what one really is. Primal theory would then have become a weapon in the armoury of the immature, narcissistic psyche, doing its level best to avoid accepting its limited individuality, and all of the problematic feelings associated with that. Bear in mind that individualism, or standing out as an individual, is one of the most effective ways of neutralising the discomforting claustrophobia of experiencing oneself trapped in one’s relationships.
It seems clear to me that both narcissistic wishes and primal pains, are fact not fiction, and that each have autonomous validity and are not functions of each other. Primal pain is not disguised narcissism and narcissism is not disguised primal pain. As soon as one entertains such a possibility however, the true complexity of the developmental situation comes to the fore. Suddenly we are no longer looking at the “simple soul” which Janov believes primal man to be. We are looking at a sentient organism with an unprecedented capacity for self-transcendence or growth, and whose development, far from being a smooth progression, undergoes a succession of characteristic phases which the individual psyche identifies with and organises itself around. We should think of these phases as semi-autonomous systems of behaviour, or mandalas, to use a Buddhist term, which conserve themselves for the duration of their serviceability to the organism. They are recognised through careful observation and analysis of the dynamic elements within experience, and cannot be adduced from studies of the neural structure of the brain.
As an example of such analysis, the Freudian notion of primary narcissism and the possibility of its becoming a prototypic pattern of behaviour, is very powerful and cannot be lightly dismissed. It is not contradicted by the presence of primal pain, as the true nature of primal pain is open to question, not only in general theory, but in the mind of every person who feels it.
Let me try to contrive an example of the type of feeling which may have an ambiguous character. First of all let’s eliminate the obvious. A baby suffering from hunger, thirst, coldness or physical discomfort is obviously experiencing simple physical need at a basic level. It would be ridiculous to describe its physiologic need as an expression of narcissism. If we consider however, an infant who is beginning to explore her environment and reach out beyond herself, but one day takes a step too far and loses confidence, she may suddenly miss the safety of her known world. She may begin to panic and start crying. She stops trying to complete her exploratory endeavour and reverts back to what she knows, hoping the power of that old way of doing things will override her present difficulties. She begins to cry like the baby she was before she began her current explorations, and hopes to be rescued by her mother or father, or whoever else she has grown to trust. Traditional primal theory would see this as primal pain, though not, as yet, overwhelming. The Freudian may see it as a narcissistic regression to an earlier pattern of behaviour, though not, as yet, pathological.
But if no response came to the infant’s cries, then what? Some infants may resume their explorations and try to find a way back to safety. Others may completely go to pieces and cry in helplessness until either someone came to their aid, they became exhausted, or they shut down the feeling. In the former case the whole experience may be strengthening, building confidence for the future. In the latter case it may be severely demoralising, leading to feelings of helplessness and the consolidation of a yearning for the infant’s lost sense of safety and belonging.
In the former case the infant, confronted with an entirely new environmental demand, would have wavered between the old and the new, and then risen to the challenge, leaving the old pattern behind and incorporating her needs into a new behavioural strategy. Primal pain would have played a positive part in this example of growth by overwhelming the clinging onto the past, but not the organism as a whole. In the latter case, because the infant, for whatever reason, was unable to go forward, the primal pain just grew and grew, strengthening the imprint of the old pattern whilst at the same time engendering feelings of failure and hopelessness. The infant would have become fixated on primal pain.
In each case the different sets of feelings produce entirely different sets of expectations. The first infant becomes forward looking and adventurous. The second becomes reluctant to face the future, hates newness, and continually clings to the golden age of its past, before the pain of this world appeared. The earlier the onset of overwhelming pain the more ancient the period for which the infant yearns.
What is interesting about this example is that the notion of overwhelming pain differs between the primal view and the Freudian view. Traditional primal theory describes primal pain as overwhelming when it becomes unbearable to feel. The Freudian model sees pain as being overwhelming when the situation giving rise to it cannot be overcome by further development of the individual’s behaviour. Then the pain goes on to become overwhelming in the primal sense.
Pain and Immaturity
Whilst it is true, I think, that only primal therapy has brought home to people just how serious the experience of primal pain really is, it is at the same time necessary to take into account the subtlety of the Freudian view. For instance, the problem for the second infant in the example, was premature frustration of a new behaviour pattern. For some reason or other she was unable to adapt to a new problem and because of this resorted to a futile but familiar old strategy. Now, according to traditional primal theory, a primal patient suffering similar problems to the failing infant of our example, needs to feel her pain in order to resolve her problems. All of her neurotic symptoms are said to emanate from that buried pain. But what of her developmental immaturity? Would feeling her pain rectify that? The answer can only be no, it would not. Developmental growth is an act of creativity which feeling old pain is not. At best primal therapy can return the feeling function back to the person who has lost it. But then the ball is in her court. She has to creatively adapt to the world using her powers of feeling to recognise its significance to her life. Thus, becoming real is a far bigger project than merely feeling one’s primal pain. For most of us it involves a protracted period of belated growing up. In this regard I believe it is necessary to recognise that a great deal of traditional primal theory originates in the immature growth phases of its protagonists. As such it exhibits narcissistic tendencies and should be critically assessed in that light.
Similarly, the tasks of therapy must include the obligation to provide nurture and encouragement absent in the clients previous life. Like any other immature person, she needs a combination of love and firm support in order to take up the challenge of adulthood. The trick is to give the right type of support at the right moment.
To date traditional primal theory has failed to fully acknowledge the fullness of the therapeutic obligation, obsessed as it has been with the task of restoring the feeling function. Hopefully the future will see a change of attitude so that primal therapy can take the place it deserves at the heart of the psychotherapeutic tradition. Instrumental in this widening of primal therapy’s acceptance may be the recognition that the “feeling self” and the “real self” are not identical, my objection to such a shared identity being that the immature psyche necessarily perceives reality in immature, and hence unreal or mistaken ways. This is the case regardless as to whether the individual is neurotic or not. Hence the term “real self” for the fully feeling self is a misnomer which leads to complacency with regard to the need for personal growth.
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5 September 1997
1. "Neurosis and Normality: A Critique of Early Primal Theory"
2. "The Primal Scream", "Primal Man", "Prisoners of Pain", etc
3. "Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality", Perls, Hefferline and Goodman
4. "Primal Man", pp233-5
5. Ibid, p271
6. see "Thoughts Without a Thinker" by Mark Epstein, publisher: Duckworth.