In Memory of

H BAILEY

Rifleman
41955
1st Bn., Royal Irish Rifles
who died on
Wednesday, 23rd October 1918.

Commemorative Information

In Memory of

The 1^st Battalion of the Royal Irish Rifles joined the 107^th Brigade of the 36^th (Ulster) Division in February 1918.

This was part of the XVIII corps of the Fifth Army. They were involved in:

The Actions at the Somme Crossings - 24th - 25th March 1918

The Battle of Rosieres - 26th - 27th March 1918

The Battle of Ypres 1918 - 28th September - 2nd October 1918

The Battle of Courtrai 14-19^th October 1918

The Action of Ooteghem - 25^th October 1918. 

The Action of Tieghem - 31st October 1918

 THE great attack in Flanders was being carried out under the supreme command of the King of the Belgians, with the French General Degoutte as Chief of the Staff. The attack was to be made upon a front of seventeen miles between Voormezeele and Dixmude. The II Corps, to which the 36th Division was attached, was attacking on the right of the Belgians, and had its left flank on the Ypres - Zonnebeke road. The II Corps was employing the 29th Division on the right, and the 9th Division on the left. The 36th Division was not to be employed on the first day.

At 5.30 a.m. on September 28th the attack was launched, in heavy rain. The result was one of the most remarkable victories of the war. The Allies swept forward, and in one bound put behind them the waste of the old battlefields. By night the 29th Division was a mile east of Gheluvelt, and the 9th had Becelaere, distance some three and a half miles from the starting - point. The Belgians were well east of Zonnebeke. At 11 a.m., seeing how affairs were going, the II Corps ordered the 36th Division to move forward, with its infantry brigades in echelon. The 109th Brigade moved first by train to Potijze. The 107th Brigade was in rear. It entrained in the afternoon with orders to move as far as Vlamertinghe. When it arrived there, however, orders were received to the effect that, the advance having been so rapid, the men were to keep their places in the trucks and move east of Ypres. At Hell Fire Corner, for the first time since it had won its name far from the front line, they detrained. The men had little or no shelter for the night, which was wet and cold.

On September 29th the 109th Brigade entered the line between the 9th and 29th Divisions. Again a very remarkable advance was made, all the more remarkable because there was no artillery to support it, it being impossible to get guns up over the unspeakable roads. The 9th Division captured Dadizeele, and the 109th Brigade Vijfwegen, a village a mile south of it. Unfortunately, however, the 29th Division had not made much progress, and there was a very long open flank from Vijfwegen to a point south of Becelaere. On this date the 107th Brigade did not make a big move, merely forward to the Westhoek Ridge, of terrible memory, where both the 1st and 2nd Battalions had seen fighting so fierce the previous year.

At dawn on September 30th the 108th Brigade passed through the 109th to renew the attack, with the great embanked Menin - Roulers road as its objective. After heavy fighting the road was reached at two points north and south of a mound known as hill 41, but the two flanks were unable to join hands. Hill 41 was a most important position, crowned with two or three farms and their outbuildings, which had been strengthened with concrete. A second attack made by the 12th Irish Rifles at 4 p.m. was pushed to within a short distance of the crest, but a heavy German counter-attack drove the somewhat thinned line off it.

Meanwhile the 107th Brigade had begun to move forward at 4.50 a.m., the 2nd Irish Rifles leading, to the neighbourhood of Becelaere. At 1.55 p.m. the Battalion received orders to move up on the right of the 108th Brigade and attempt to seize Klythoek, the main road. It was, however, found impossible to advance owing to the machine-gun fire, which we had no artillery to neutralize, and the attack was not persisted in. The men lay on the ground, getting such cover as they could from their waterproof sheets, to await the dawn and make another attempt.

This had no better fortune. The day dawned in a dense wet mist. The leading companies, swept by machine-gun fire, lost direction. Lieut. Colonel Bridcutt, attempting to reorganize them, was killed, and the attack died away, as attacks do in such circumstances. On Hill 41 the 108th Brigade had captured Twigg Farm, just short of the crest, with over twenty prisoners, but had been unable to gain complete possession of the hill. That night the 1st Battalion relieved the 2nd, suffering severe casualties from artillery and machine-gun fire on the way up.

On October 2nd another attempt was made to advance, which was again unsuccessful. On tile left good progress was made at first, but the intense fire kept the right stationary. That the men had not spared themselves in their efforts to win ground was shown by the casualty list, 5 officers and 100 other ranks, happily for the most part wounded.

As a fact, further advance under present conditions had become all but out of the question. The very speed with which the Anglo-Belgian Armies had advanced, over the worst ground upon the whole of the Western Front, was now proving a handicap. They had outrun their service of supply. Across the Ypres Salient there were three roads only, the Menin, the Zonnebeke, and the Poelcappelle, of the slightest value for heavy transport, arid these three were blocked with the mass of wheeled vehicles of all kinds struggling forward. There should have been a rigorous limitation of what should be moved east of Ypres, in which case twice as much would have reached the front line as was actually the case. Some wagons of the 107th Brigade took at this period, it is recorded, thirty six hours to move from Potijze Château to Terhand. Sometimes for hours together there was not a move of an inch in the columns of traffic, and the drivers huddled themselves at night on top of their wagons or on the clammy and sodden ground at the roadside, and slept as best they might.

The Germans, on the other hand, had been driven back into civilisation. They had roads and railways both excellent and numerous behind them. They had unlimited artillery. Without it the resistance of their infantry, by no means the infantry of the previous year, would not have been anything like so determined. The 107th Brigade, it must he admitted, had not had the best of the luck in this, the last Battle of Ypres. It had been brought up into action just as we had really shot our first bolt, as the German resistance was stiffening; too late to win the honour gained by the 109th in a remarkable advance, in tune only to take hard knocks.

There was nothing for it now but to wait till some sort of order could be made in the traffic, and more guns and ammunition brought up. In these circumstances there was a double advantage in moving back as far as possible all troops not required to hold the line during the quiet period. They could be rested, reorganised, in some cases even given baths, and their rations would not be on the forward roads. The 109th Brigade had the best fortune. It was moved by train to the neighbourhood of Vlamertinghe, and had not only its baths, but training on unbroken ground. Some troops had to remain in reserve, against the unlikely chance of a counter-offensive. This lot fell to the 107^th Brigade. On the night of the 4th the 1st Royal Irish Rifles was relieved in the line and moved to the area of Terhand, where the 2nd was already. Next night both battalions moved back to Reutel, where they were accommodated in tents and bivouacs. During this period of rest, Lieut.-Colonel C. M. L. Becher, D.S.O., took command of the 2nd Battalion. He had had a very varied career with different battalions of the Regiment in France, Macedonia, and Palestine. Now he was back again to complete it by leading the Battalion to final victory.

 THE BATTLE OF COURTRAI. 

The rest lasted till October 13th, on the evening of which the two battalions marched up to positions of assembly for the new attack. Artillery was now up in force; the whole of the 36th Divisional Artillery, an Army Artillery Brigade, three batteries of a French Cavalry Division, and medium trench-mortars. The first objective of the II Corps was the important Tourcoing-Courtrai-Inglemunster railway line, upon which the 36th Division was to be directed from the Lys on the right at Courtrai to the northern outskirts of the town of Heule. There were two other towns, Moorseele and Gulleghem, on the front of the attack, lying in almost a straight line from west to east, at equal distances. Moorseele was about two and a half miles from the line now held, Gulleghem a mile and three-quarters farther on, Heule a mile and a half beyond that. The attack was to be made by two brigades, the 107th on the right, the 109th on the left. Each was to attack with one battalion, on a front at the starting-line of 500 yards, which was somewhat longer upon the final objective. The 107th Brigade’s attack was to be carried out by the 15th Irish Rifles. After Moorseele had been captured, a line east of it was to be consolidated, and the 1st Irish Rifles was to pass through the leading battalion and advance with the road from Gulleghem to Wevelghem and the southern houses of the former town as objective. The plan thereafter was fluid, and the details for the final advance to the Lys would depend upon how quickly the resistance of the enemy was overcome. The attack was to be supported by a barrage almost equal in density to those of previous years, but moving much faster - at the rate of 100 yards in two minutes, with a pause of fifteen minutes every 1,500 yards. Batteries were to move forward during the pause beyond Morseele to support the new advance. They would at this point be firing at extreme range.

At 5.32 a.m. on October 14th, in fine but foggy weather, the great assault was launched. The 15th Irish Rifles lost the barrage owing to the mist, but they went forward unchecked. By 8 a.m. they had reached the western houses of Moorseele, and within another hour had chased the German rearguards through its streets and were upon the line of their objective. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion had been following up in artillery formation. At 10.35 it passed through the leaders. All went well at first, and, in company with the 2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers on its left, the Battalion gained a mile of ground. Then, 1,000 yards west of Gulleghem, came a serious check. The town was defended by three lines of barbed wire, behind which snugly ensconced machine gunners sat. The Battalion had outrun the small amount of artillery support it had had since Moorseele. An attempt was made to outflank the town, and a little more ground was won. But it was madness to go forward unless the fire of the machine guns could be kept down, and the commanding officer ordered the attack to be broken off. The Battalion’s losses had again been very heavy - 23 killed, 92 wounded, and 8 missing.

It had accomplished one feat very rare in the war’s history, bringing down by rifle fire a German aeroplane, of which the occupants, an officer and a sergeant-major, were captured. It received 22 reinforcements that night, who must have felt some bewilderment at being conducted in the darkness into a line of figures muffled in waterproof sheets, sheltering in ditches and below hedges, and being told they were to carry out an attack the following morning. More than 250 prisoners had been taken by the Division, 15 field guns, a number of horses, and uncounted light machine guns.

All that was now wanted to enable troops to storm any position the Germans were likely to hold was a moderate amount of supporting field artillery. The German machine gunners frequently left their positions under a fourth of the volume of fire that their predecessors of last year would have withstood. Indeed, the Flanders offensive, had it stood by itself, could have been conducted with less cost by making movement more leisurely, and insuring that artillery was in position to cover each successive advance. It did not stand by itself. It was part of a general and carefully planned offensive along the whole front, and speed was essential.

The value of artillery support was proved the following morning, October 15th, when, at 9 a.m., the attack on Gulleghem was renewed under a barrage. The 1st Battalion then broke through the wire defences, passed through the town, and consolidated a line 1,000 yards east of it. And though, as will subsequently he shown, it was to come into action again before evening, its losses for the day amounted only to 8 killed and 24 wounded.

It was now the turn of the 2nd Battalion. This battalion had on the 14th moved off at "zero" behind the 1st, and passed through the 15th. By evening it had taken up a line some five hundred yards behind the 1st Battalion, west of Gulleghem. On the morning of October 15th it had followed its leader through the town. The plan was for the Battalion to pass through the 1st at 1 p.m. and attack the southern part of Heule, while the 9th Inniskilling Fusiliers took the greater portion of the town, pushed on north of the Heulebeke, to the railway. Unfortunately, the Battalion was not up in time, lost the barrage, and was held up in front of Heule by machine-gun fire. The 9th Inniskilling meanwhile had, reached its objective, and it was necessary to move up the 1st Irish Rifles to cover its right flank.

There was nothing for it but to arrange a new barrage for the 2nd Battalion. This was done at 3.50 p.m., when the Battalion reached its objective without serious difficulty. A patrol under 2nd-Lieutenant Rule entered Courtrai, and found the whole city on the left bank of the Lys clear of Germans, but all the bridges over the river destroyed. The 1st Battalion was now withdrawn, and marched to Rolleghemcappelle.

The Germans were holding the further bank of the Lys in some strength, and it was decided to make an attempt to cross at the quays. For this task fresh troops were needed, the 107th Brigade having had two hard days. At 5.30 a.m. on the 16th the 108th Brigade passed through the 2nd Battalion and occupied that part of Courtrai west of the Lys. There were scenes of extraordinary enthusiasm in the city, which had waited over four years for this deliverance. But the Germans held over half of it still, and any troops approaching the Lys were greeted with heavy machine-gun fire.

In the course of the afternoon the 108th Brigade, with its attached Field Company, effected a remarkable crossing, two boatloads of men getting across under cover of a smoke-screen. The bridge of pontoons subsequently put across was, however, demolished by artillery fire.

 Orders received that day altered the plans. It was not the object of the Allies to fight their way through the great industrial towns, a difficult operation, and highly destructive to civilian life and property. They were going to launch a new attack across the Lys farther north, which would complete the task very much more easily and effectively. For this the 36th Division, which had won a high reputation in the late fighting - " one of the best fighting divisions in the Army," as the Corps Commander put it a little later - was required. It was, indeed, to lead the attack, and carry out one of the most difficult and intricate operations possible to conceive in warfare.

On October 17th the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Rifles marched to Lendelede, the 2nd following the next day. It was a welcome change to find good billets, even if only for a day or two, and equally welcome were some excellent baths, in which 300 men an hour could bathe, left behind by the Germans. That night, much disturbed by enemy bombing, the 109th Brigade was relieving Belgian troops along the left bank of the Lys, with its left on the junction of the river and the Canal de Roulers. It had the task of forcing a crossing about five hours before the troops of the 9th Division on its right, and twenty-four hours before a French division, now hurrying into line, on its left.

The actual details of the crossing may be said not to be the concern of the historian of battalions of a brigade which was in reserve. But the details are so interesting, the manoeuvre so difficult, and the importance of the first bridge-head over the Lys so great, that it is probable he will not be blamed for giving a brief account of the action before the 107th Brigade intervened in it.

The crossing was to be made at a sharp bend of the river due south of and three-quarters of a mile from the village of Oyghem. The troops, on reaching the farther bank, would be midway between two villages, each about half a mile from the river, Desselghem and Beveren. The plan was to ferry across in pontoons one battalion, the 9th Inniskilling Fusiliers, at dusk on the 19th. This battalion was to push forward to the main Courtrai - Ghent road and hold that position. Directly it was across, the Engineers were to throw across a " half-pontoon " bridge, to be complete at 10 p.m. On this a second battalion, the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, was to cross, and form flank from the Oyghem- - Desselghem road to the left of the 9th. Then, the bridgehead being established, the 107th Brigade was to begin its crossing as early on the morning of the 20th as possible, to carry out the further advance in a southeasterly direction. It was a very difficult operation. In the first place, the enemy was holding the farther bank of the river in some strength. In the second place, the attack of the 1st Inniskilling was to be at right angles to that of the 9th, and it had after crossing to change front in the darkness. The scheme would have been impossible but for the moon, almost full.

The 9th Inniskilling crossed successfully, with a single casualty only, and began its advance. It met with considerable resistance, and did not quite reach its objective, being brought to a halt 400 yards short of it. The bridge meanwhile was thrown across, despite the heavy fire which the German artillery directed upon the river. At 10 p.m. the 1st Inniskilling began crossing. Then the Battalion swung left, and one company attacked each of the four villages, which lie in a nest, Spriete, Desselghem, Dries and Straete. The Battalion had sterner work than its predecessor, since the Germans were now fully on the alert. In fierce fighting, resort being frequently had to the bayonet, Spriete and. Desselghem were cleared of the enemy. Then the supporting companies went through. Straete was captured, but the right company could do no more than reach the outskirts of Dries. However, that was not of great importance. The plan had succeeded in essentials. Eighty prisoners had been taken and numerous machine guns.

The Engineers had desperately hard work to keep the bridge, hit more than once by German shells, in repair. But they accomplished their task, and the 15th Irish Rifles, of the 107th Brigade, was able to begin its crossing at 2 a.m. It then moved forward to relieve the 9th Inniskilling Fusiliers. The 1st Irish Rifles then crossed. On the right troops of the 9th Division had begun crossing at midnight. For some time it was hard to find touch with them, and when this was accomplished the line at the point of junction was rather too close to the Lys for safety, the village of Beveren being still in the enemy’s hands.

The new attack was launched at 6 a.m., Beveren being at once taken by a combined operation of the two Divisions. The 15th Irish Rifles had considerable casualties from machine-gun fire, and lost their Commanding Officer at an early stage. But the advance was very rapid. By 9 a.m. they were across the road from Deerlyck to Waereghem, or two miles beyond the Lys. A mill, in which were several machine guns, gave great trouble at this point, and a platoon of the 1st Irish Rifles was brought up to capture it, and succeeded in its task. By this time, however, our field guns across the Lys were firing at extreme range. It was decided to call a halt, to allow the French to cross that evening, while the 108th Brigade came into line on the left of the 107th. The 1st Irish Rifles relieved the 15th. The 2nd Battalion had crossed that morning, and moved forward in reserve. About two hundred prisoners had been captured by the Division.

The attack of October 21st, carried out by the 1st Irish Rifles on the 107th Brigade’s front and the 1st Irish Fusiliers on that of the 108th Brigade, was of peculiar difficulty. There was no artillery support. The country was admirably suited to long-range machine-gun fire. And on the left the French, who had to fight their way from the bank of the Lys, were always considerably in rear. Nevertheless, the 1st Royal Irish Rifles carried out a very fine attack, the line at dusk being from the village of Knock to the Gaverbeek. Casualties in the circumstances had been light - 1 officer and 4 other ranks killed, 2 officers and 14 other ranks wounded.

That night the four batteries of the 153rd Brigade R.F.A. crossed the Lys, to fire a barrage the following morning in support of the advance of the 107th Brigade. It was thought that this comparatively small amount of artillery would yet make a very great difference. It was highly necessary. From the Gaverbeek the ground rises to a general ridge, crowned by a series of little heights, then drops down over two miles to the great river which runs parallel to the Lys at this point, the Escaut or Scheldt. The various little crests afforded admirable positions to the enemy on which to fight a delaying action before falling back on the Scheldt.

The artillery support was indeed most valuable on the morrow, October 22nd. At 9 a.m. the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, supported by a company of the 15th Battalion, attacked the Klijtberg Hill, the first of the crests described above’, and captured it almost without loss. The little hill was an easily recognised objective, since there was a windmill upon it. But: it was to be an objective to the enemy also. A really vigorous attack,

On the previous day 2nd-Lieutenant W. J. Linton and the Rev. W. H. Hutchison were wounded by a Prussian Assault Battalion, drove in the left flank, which was considerably in advance of the 108th Brigade, and pushed the Battalion off the hill and back for a distance of 800 yards. Colonel Becher at once organised a new attack with two companies, which went forward very gallantly and again took possession of the knoll, driving the enemy off it. And that, though no man in the ranks can have guessed it, constituted the last action of the Battalion in the Great War.

The 1st Battalion was to have one more turn. There were signs that the enemy’s resistance was weakening, and it seemed possible that he might be about to retire to the Scheldt. Two companies of the Battalion, with a squadron of the 28th French Dragoons, were ordered to form an advanced guard and move toward the river. They passed through the 2nd Battalion on the Klitjberg Ridge. Vossenhoek was taken, but Kleineberg, a mile farther down the main road, was strongly held by machine guns. It was found impossible to make any further advance till these had been adequately dealt with by artillery. The Battalion had seven men wounded during the day. It, like the 2nd and 15th Battalions, was weary, and very low in strength. General Coffin therefore decided to relieve the 107th Brigade at once by the 109th. The relief was carried out without difficulty, the enemy being strictly on the defensive. The 1st Battalion marched back to Desselghem, which provided good billets; the 2nd to Bavichove. Both battalions then moved south-west by easy stages to Mouscron, practically a suburb of Tournai, but on the Belgian side of the frontier, arriving on November 3rd. It may be added that the other brigades of the Division only remained in line till the 27th, the 19th having the satisfaction of capturing the important Kleineberg Ridge, and were then relieved by troops of another division.

The men of the 36th Division were indeed suffering severely from fatigue. We had slipped into winter almost without realising it. Two factors had contributed to strengthen the men and enable them to endure more than under normal circumstances of warfare. The first was that they had been fighting in inhabited and undamaged country, an experience new to most of them. That meant that battalions not actually in the firing-line had the shelter of houses at night. Such shelter was of enormous benefit in putting back the moment when fatigue and exposure made the troops unfit for further offensive action. But it was one factor only, and perhaps not even the most important. The other was the flow of victory on this and other fronts, and the sure hope that a few more resolute blows would bring the war to an end. That was a stimulus to all, to the young recruits as well as to the veterans of many battles. It nerved them to make a great final effort. The two battalions with which we are concerned, and, indeed, the whole Division, had written a splendid last page to their career in the war. Apart from the gallantry shown, there had been given proof, in dealing with the German machine guns which were the backbone of the enemy’s resistance, of a very high order of tactical skill. This was all the more creditable because there was in the ranks a small proportion of the non-commissioned officers and men who had experience of battle. The young successors of the men of Mons and Le Cateau, of Neuve Chapelle and the Somme, of Ypres and Cambrai, had lived up to their traditions worthily from every point of view.

The German units were very depleted and weak at this time. But they missed numbers on the defensive comparatively little, because they had their full complement of light machine guns, on which the infantry now wholly relied. It was, in fact, an army of machine gunners, than which, in the defensive, nothing could be more formidable

THE 36th (Ulster) Division was not to form part of the British Army of the Rhine. It was to end its existence in the area about Mouscron, to which it had retired to rest after its last battle. Reinforcements from the Base arrived here, and all preparations were made to enter the line again. But that was not required. On November 11th came the Armistice, and warfare ceased after four years and three months. That was precisely the period of active service of the 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, while the 1st had served in France and Flanders exactly four years.

 Lieutenant-General C. N. Jacob, commanding II Corps wrote to Major-General C. Coffin, V.C., D.S.O., commanding 36th Division:-

 " The spirit, dash and initiative shown by all ranks have been splendid and beyond all praise. When the history is written of what the Division has done in Flanders during the past month, it win prove to be a record of magnificent fighting and wonderful progress .... Over the worst of country, and under the heaviest machine-gun fire ever experienced in this war .... The 36th Division has overcome every obstacle, and has proved itself one of the best fighting Divisions in the Army ....

Aubers

Somme

Albert

Ypres

Pilckem

Langemarck

Somme

St Quentin

Rosières

Ypres

Courtrai

IN the forcing of the Lys the 36th Division was to have the honour of the "left of the line," a real honour, because in an attack only a good Division was employed on the flank of an Allied Army. The reputation of the 9th Division, which had hitherto occupied that position, is too high to stand in need of glorification. But the 36th Division was not only to move on the flank of the British Army; it was to be its left flank-guard across the Lys, which was to be crossed by it first of any British Division, and considerably before its Allies on the left.

On the afternoon of the 18th of October General Coffin’s headquarters were established in Lendelede, a town of upwards of four thousand inhabitants. Here the Germans had left behind perhaps the most valuable gift they could at this juncture have bestowed — excellent baths, where three hundred men could be bathed within an hour. Accommodation generally was now very good in a country so thickly populated, but there were still some unpleasant surprises. One such was the discovery by one unit, that in an excellent stable, recommended to it by a civilian, there was in each of ten stalls a dead horse, killed a week earlier by a single burst of Belgian shrapnel. That evening the relief of the 3rd Belgian Division, along the left of the Lys, from Bavichove to the point of junction between the river and the Canal de Roulers a la Lys, was carried out by the 109th Brigade. Heavy bombing of the roads by enemy aeroplanes made it an affair of great difficulty. A French Division, the 164th, was coming in on the left of the 36th, but there was no prospect of its being ready to cross till the night of the 20th. As every moment was of importance, the 36th Division had orders to effect a passage more than twenty-four hours earlier.

General Coffin’s scheme was in itself a scathing commentary upon the decadence of German moral. It was one which would not have been contemplated in the heroic age of the German infantry. In those days an isolated battalion, pushed across to form a bridgehead, would have been flung back into the river almost before it had had time to draw breath. But times had changed, and methods changed with them, Extreme boldness now paid as it had never paid in the previous course of the war. With adequate artillery support great risks could be taken, for the German machine-gunners frequently left their positions under heavy shell-fire. Moreover, there were no more "pill-boxes."

The Germans, it must be explained, appeared to be holding the opposite bank of the Lys in some strength. At several points they had put up wire fences to defend it. Opposite Oyghem, near the 36th Division’s left flank, was one very large moated farm, round which they had dug a trench, The plan was that one battalion of the 109th Brigade should be ferried across at dusk on the 19th, should push forward to the main Courtrai-Ghent Road, from east of Beveren to Dries, on a front of a thousand yards. That accomplished, a second battalion was to cross, to form flank from the Oyghem-Desselghem Road to the left of the leading battalion. Two machine-gun companies were allotted to the operation; "B" to fire a barrage, "C" with its sections attached to the battalions of the 109th Brigade. The original intention had been for the 121st and 150th Field Companies to effect crossings for the infantry opposite both Oyghem and Beveren.

A daring daylight reconnaissance of the river-bank by Lieutenant W. Brunyate, of the latter company, caused the Oyghem crossing to be abandoned, and the construction of a bridge at that point postponed till the first part of the programme was complete. The bank here was very steep, was heavily wired, and commanded by machine-guns. The farm of which mention has been made would have been in itself a formidable obstacle. Three bridging wagons with full bridging equipment had been brought up the previous night and hidden in farm buildings beside the river bank, north-west of Beveren, by the 121st Field Company. The pontoons of the 150th Field Company were hidden slightly further north.

At dusk two pontoons were launched, and at 7-25 p.m. the passage of the 9th Inniskillings began. Two trips were actually made before the enemy fired a shot; then machine-gun fire burst out, followed a little later by that of artillery. Nevertheless, by 8 p.m. the whole battalion and its attached section of machine-guns were across, with one casualty only. Hastily in the darkness the battalion formed up. Then the British barrage dropped, and it began its advance over open country. The night was cloud-veiled, but the full moon was of great assistance to subsequent operations. Capturing such machine-gun detachments as did not fly, the 9th Inniskillings worked its way steadily forward, and crossed the Beveren-Dries Road, four hundred yards short of its objective, the main road from Courtrai to Ghent. Almost immediately afterwards, however, it was held up by heavy machine-gun fire. It had not accomplished quite all that had been hoped, but it had done enough. The still more complicated task of bringing across a second battalion to guard the left flank remained.

Directly the 9th was over, the 121st Field Company set about throwing across a "half-pontoon" bridge. It was found, however, that the river was here actually over a hundred feet wide, considerably more than was anticipated from the information in our possession, and that two pontoons in halves would not reach across. Since pontoons were infinitely precious — some having been sunk at Courtrai — as many as possible being required for a subsequent heavy bridge, an attempt was made to assemble a trestle-bridge instead. But under the very heavy shell-fire now falling upon the river this had to be abandoned for want of time, and eventually a pontoon was borrowed from the 150th Field Company to complete the bridge. It was ready at ten o’clock, just as the leading platoon of the 1st Inniskillings appeared on the bank. The battalion had four hours for its crossing and assembly on the further bank.

On the left flank of the attack were four villages, Desselghem, Spriete, Straete, and Dries. Of these the first was considerable, the others tiny hamlets which were really part of it. Desselghem and Spriete were to be attacked by the two leading companies; Straete and Dries by the supporting companies, which were to pass through them. The operation of bringing the battalion across, forming it up and attacking north-eastward, at right angles to the line of attack of the 9th Inniskillings, of supporting the new attack by barrage fire, would have been considered of the greatest difficulty in the mimic warfare of manoeuvres, and would almost certainly have been characterised as impossible by the umpires. In this case the whole programme, owing to good staff work, intelligent local leadership, and the dash of the private soldier, was carried through without a hitch. Spriete and Desselghem were cleared; then the supporting companies went through. Their task was a sterner one, since the Germans had had time to make some preparation for resistance. Straete was captured after fierce close fighting, the Inniskillings frequently using the bayonet. On the right the other company reached the outskirts of Dries, but was unable to make further headway, and there consolidated its position. Here again, though not quite all was won, elbow-room sufficient had been gained. Eighty prisoners had been taken, and passed back over the pontoon bridge.

It was now the turn of the 107th Brigade. The sappers passed a busy and disturbed night. The shelling of the Lys continued, and there was a direct hit on the bridge, a pontoon being damaged and a length of the superstructure destroyed. By desperately hard work all repairs were completed for the leading battalion of the 107th Brigade, the 15th Rifles, to cross at 2 a.m. This battalion, followed by the 1st, moved forward, the former forming up west of they Courtrai-Ghent Road, in relief of the 9th Inniskillings, which withdrew through its ranks. Troops of the 9th Division had crossed about midnight, but, as may easily be imagined, it was not without considerable difficulty that touch was obtained with them. This, however, was at last accomplished, but the line at the point of Junction was perilously close to the river, owing to the fact that German machine-gunners still held out in Beveren.

At 6 a.m. on the 20th the new attack began. Beveren was quickly taken, with some aid from the Scots Fusiliers of the 9th Division. Machine-gun fire was very heavy, and the 15th Rifles had considerable casualties. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel B. Y. Jones, D.S.O., was killed. But the advance continued at a great pace. The main Courtrai-Ghent-Antwerp Railway was crossed before eight o’clock. An hour later the line was astride the road from Deerlyck — already in the hands of the 9th Division — to Waereghem. A mill on that road gave considerable trouble, but was eventually taken by a platoon of the 1st Rifles. Further progress for the time being was found impossible. The advance had reached a point two and a half miles from the Lys, and could no longer be supported by artillery fire. At 12-30 p.m. the 1st Inniskillings made another attempt to clear Dries, and reached the centre of the hamlet. Resistance was now quite determined, and it was decided to await the crossing of the French before attempting any move on the left flank. About two hundred prisoners had been captured in the day’s operations.

The Engineers had continued their good work. By evening a pontoon bridge for first-line transport had been thrown across by the 150th Field Company. The 121st had completed a good permanent foot-bridge, and, returning to the abandoned trestle, for which all materials had been collected locally, had finished that also. At night the 108th Brigade and a French regiment on the left made the crossing. Artillery, however, could not cross yet awhile. The 108th Brigade was to relieve the 109th, and the advance was to be continued for another twenty-four hours without it.

The advance of the 21st was timed for 7-30 a.m. It was to be carried out by the 1st Rifles of the 107th Brigade, and the 1st Irish Fusiliers of the 108th. It was, however important to be rid of the hornet’s nest in Dries upon the flank, and this village was cleared by a company of the 12th Rifles before the attack began. Without artillery this attack was of the greatest difficulty. There were no hedges, and it was the custom in this part of the country to lop the lower branches off the trees. Consequently, the attacking force was constantly exposed to long-range machine-gun fire. Moreover, the 133rd French Regiment, since it had to fight its way from the river bank, was always in rear, In all the circumstances the advance of the day, which found the right of the 107th Brigade at Knock, north of Vichte, and the left of the 108th at Spitael, on the Ghent Railway, was highly creditable to the troops concerned. The advance of the 107th Brigade, with the 9th Division on its right, was to be resumed on the morrow, but it was decided that the 108th Brigade should not move till the French had come up into line.

By the morning of the 22nd the Lys was crossed by bridge after bridge in the area of the 36th Division; there being, besides numerous foot-bridges, three medium bridges for first-line transport, and a trestle which was subsequently used by French motor-lorries. On the night of the 21st the four batteries of the 153rd Brigade R.F.A. crossed the river, to fire a barrage in support of the 107th Brigade next day. On the right, upwards of half the distance between the parallel rivers, the Lys and the Escaut, had now been covered. From the Gaverbeek onwards the advance was now faced by rising ground, which culminated in a general ridge before the drop down, over some two miles, to the valley of the latter river. The various little crests of this chain afforded excellent positions to the enemy, and it was evident that, if so disposed, he could make a very effective stand before falling back across the Escaut. The fist of them had to be attacked on this morning. It was taken by the 2nd Rifles. The barrage, small though it would have been reckoned in old days, and as it was in comparison with the German barrage which had to be faced, nevertheless made a wonderful difference to the attack. The little rise, about a mile north-east of Vichte and topped by a windmill, was carried. But there followed the most resolute counter-attack experienced for a long time by the 36th Division. It was made by a Prussian Assault Battalion, and succeeded in driving our men off the crest and back for almost eight hundred yards. Colonel Becher, commanding the 2nd Rifles, organised a new attack by two companies, which, going forward with the greatest gallantry, once more drove the Germans off the crest and re-established the position. The left flank swung sharply back, the junction with the 108th Brigade being on the Deerlyck-Waereghem Road. On the left of the 108th Brigade the French, after heavy fighting, were established in Spitael.

On the 23rd, as the enemy appeared to be withdrawing, the advance was continued all along the line behind a screen of scouts. A squadron of French dragoons, attached to the Division, made a spirited dash for the Escaut crossing at Berchen, but came under heavy machine-gun fire from the second line of hills, which it was evident the enemy held in force. He had, in fact, withdrawn a mile or so during the previous night. On the extreme left a company of the 1st Irish Fusiliers, entering Heirweg, was vigorously counter-attacked and driven out with the loss of several prisoners. Eventually a liaison post was established by British and French at the station, just west of the hamlet. On the right the 1st Rifles had captured Vossenhoek and Hutteghem. The advance had been well maintained. The men of the 107th Brigade were now, however, weary, and the battalions very weak, It was decided to relieve the Brigade that night by the 109th. This was carried out without event.

The following day was given to reorganisation. Two batteries of the 173rd Brigade had crossed the river on the 22nd, the remainder were now brought over in readiness to support an attack upon the ridge. This took place at 9 am. on the 25th. The 109th Brigade on’ the right had two battalions, the 1st and 2nd Inniskillings, in line; the 108th one only, the 12th Rifles. The advance was covered by a barrage moving at the rate of a hundred yards in three minutes. On the right not much progress was made, in face of heavy machine-gun fire. Loss of direction, due to fog and the smoke-screen of the enemy barrage, caused considerable difficulty. Eventually a line east of Hutsbosch was consolidated. On the left the 12th Rifles made an advance of half a mile, in face of the most determined opposition encountered since the fighting at Hill 41. Every house was held, and the Germans fought their machine-guns desperately. No less than ten were counted in ten separate houses at the day’s end. The advance would have been greater had the French supported it on the left, but their line had not moved beyond Heirweg. The work of the 12th Rifles on this day was probably the best performed by that battalion, amid much good work accomplished since the beginning of offensive operations. Repeatedly the men had charged in upon houses defended by machine-guns, and bayoneted the detachments.

The 9th Division had captured the twin crests of Ingoyghem and Ooteghem, and it was determined that the 109th Brigade should, the same afternoon, assault that of Kleineberg, to their north-east, which would have brought the right of the Division, its left drawn back through circumstances beyond its control, into the van of the advance. A new barrage, starting at 5 p.m., was hastily planned and admirably carried out. Unfortunately, however, orders did not reach the battalions soon enough, and, at the appointed hour, three companies only, two of the 1st Inniskillings and one of the and, went forward to the attack. And it must be remembered that companies were now never more than fifty strong. The crest was actually reached, but the advance had been on a frontage so narrow that it was impossible to maintain the position. A farm-house at the foot of the slope was, however, held and consolidated.

The 26th was a day of calm, broken when night fell by tremendous shelling, above all with gas, which seemed almost to have superseded high explosive and shrapnel in the enemy’s armoury. Nor was a further advance contemplated on the 27th, owing to the complete exhaustion of the troops. A wounded prisoner had, however, reported that it was the enemy’s intention to withdraw at once to the Escaut, and our outposts were on the qui vive for signs of such a movement. About a p.m. that afternoon they were rewarded. Small bodies of the enemy were seen retiring from the Kleineberg Ridge. Instantly patrols of the 109th Brigade were pushed forward and occupied it. And so this last goal of the 36th Division, after three years’ campaigning, was reached without a shot fired. The 108th Brigade, in attempting to follow suit, met with a certain resistance, but the 9th Irish Fusiliers had the railway "halt" west of Anseghem before dusk. Attempts were made to push onward to the river, but it was found that the Germans still held Bergstraat with machine-guns, and no further progress could be made. It was quite evident that they were not going to fall back on the Escaut till forced to do so. Their policy, directed with great skill — for never did the work of their divisional and regimental commanders shine more brightly than in these days — was to give up what could not be held, and no more, thus husbanding till the last the declining moral of their infantrymen, and delaying the advance as long as might be. A resistance more rigid, with the German soldier in his present temper, would inevitably have led to a break through, somewhere or other, and a consequent rout.

The bolt of the 36th Division was now shot. Weary flesh was at last proclaiming itself master over spirit unwearied. The only thing that had kept the men so long on their legs in this winter warfare was the excellence of the accommodation behind the line. Such a campaign in devastated country would have been unthinkable. Even as it was, they had been subjected to great hardship and exposure, while the constant gas shelling had had some effect on many hundreds who had not left the ranks. The casualties since the beginning of offensive operations numbered over three thousand. Of these, six-sevenths were wounded, and a very large proportion, most fortunately, suffering from light wounds from machine-gun bullets, or a temporarily disabling whiff of gas. But not more than a tenth of these casualties, or of a certain sick wastage, had been replaced by reinforcements. As a consequence battalions in action had seldom more than two hundred or two hundred and fifty bayonets. Other arms had suffered in less, but still in high proportion, while the loss of transport animals was becoming serious. All preparations were made for a renewal of the attack, but on the afternoon of the 27th came a wire from the X. Corps to the effect that the Division would be relieved by the 34th, and would come under its orders the following day, being withdrawn for rest and reorganisation. Soon after dusk on the 27th the 101st Brigade of the 34th Division relieved the two weak Brigades of the 36th in the line, which began their march back to the area about Courtrai. Though little they knew it, their part in the war was finished.